




# Invasion and Resistance

Aboriginal-European Relations on the  
North Queensland Frontier 1861-1897



Noel Loos

North Queensland has long been a frontier province of Aboriginal Australia. Well before Europeans penetrated to the south-west Pacific, the Torres Strait Islanders had regular and extensive contact with Aboriginal groups in Cape York Peninsula and the Dutch had visited the coast at intervals since 1606. Not till the coming of the white settler in the mid nineteenth century, however, did 'invasion' begin. When it did, the Aborigines were dispossessed of their land and, since in British eyes they had no title to it, resistance was considered a criminal activity.

This book studies Aboriginal-European relations on four different frontiers of contact. Though the pastoral industry led to the colonisation of most of North Queensland other parts were also the scene of confrontation: the gold mines, the timber-getting areas of the rainforest which later were settled by farmers and the pearlshell and *bêche-de-mer* areas on the far north coast. In all areas, despite sometimes armed resistance by the Aborigines, the Europeans imposed their authority.

This book has something challenging to say to all white Australians interested in the basic values on which their society is based and is an essential reference for Aborigines wanting to know how and why they were dispossessed.

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For Betty Loos

## Foreword

Having read this work in an earlier form, I know the long hard work in solid research involved. Here is a further, and a major, extension of our knowledge of part of our history so long suppressed, yet so significant for us all.

The destruction of Aboriginal society in the far north of Queensland involved a war for survival more effectively fought by the clans than in most other places; and Dr Loos traces the story from the first contacts of Aborigines with the whites up to the beginnings of what is still basically the Queensland Aboriginal policy. A comparable, but less effective fight had been waged in earlier times in the rugged country round the headwaters of the Clarence River. Here, as in far northern Queensland later, the superior use of the topography (in Queensland rainforests) by the Aboriginal groups offset to some extent the settlers' free use of the gun. This resistance, writes Loos 'at length did compel the government to modify its policy considerably'. In desperation it had to try some gesture towards justice, and accept the suggestion of a police magistrate that food should be supplied for those who had been robbed of their hunting and gathering areas.

This book might well be read along with *A Thousand Miles Away*, Professor Bolton's history of settlement in northern Queensland.

Dr Loos's history of the frontiers in this region begins with the very first known contacts between the races. This is followed by invasions for different purposes; and the invaders sought wealth from both sea and land. Marine, pastoral, mining, and farming enterprises each had its own frontier against the original occupiers, whose claims could so easily be denied, as they still are. The frontiers disappear just in time for the twentieth century with 'the decent disposal of the native inhabitants'.

Those maintaining Queensland policy about Aborigines might read this book to the profit of us all. If in doubt, let them apologise for us all to those who might fairly be recognised as inheritors of the claims of the first occupiers—the North Queensland Aboriginal Land Council.

The James Cook University of North Queensland, and the Australian National University have performed a national service in assisting Dr Loos to bring this significant work to fruition.

Canberra, 1979

C.D. Rowley

## Preface

The dispossession of Aborigines and the assertion of European dominance throughout Australia seem to many to have established a permanent and irreversible state of affairs. In reality, the struggle for land rights, for better social and economic conditions, and for a self-determination decided by Aborigines and not by white bureaucrats and white politicians, is part of a process in which Aborigines are trying to hammer out a new relationship with their colonial overlords. It is similar to the process of decolonisation we have seen throughout the world since the end of World War II. It is in fact a kind of internal decolonisation. The aim is not to make the colonisers and their descendants go home to Europe. It is rather to renegotiate the unwritten treaties and the written legislation that have been dictated to Aborigines throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries by force of arms. All Australians must realise that the history of the frontier, a very recent history in many parts of Australia, is alive in the present relationship existing between Aborigines and non-Aborigines. We need to understand this so that we can be empowered to heal the real divisions that separate us today.

It is regrettable that the weight of evidence for the period being studied, the second half of the nineteenth century, is provided by the invading colonists. I have attempted to redress the balance through collecting oral histories from North Queensland Aborigines. These have been invaluable in providing me with the perspective of the colonised, and for this I am in the debt of the many Aborigines I interviewed formally in the course of this study, and the much greater number I have met informally. I am especially in the debt of the late Mrs Iris Clay and the late Mr Dick Hoolihan who in the very early stages of my research generously offered me their time, support, and friendship. Their courageous determination is a warm light in the lives of all who knew them.

I am grateful for the help given to me by members of the History Department of James Cook University. Since Henry Reynolds and I first began exploring the area of race relations in North Queensland, a large volume of research has been produced, much of it being made available to the general reader through the very active publishing policy of the History Department. Like all who have worked there I have appreciated the concerned, personal involvement and invaluable, professional support



## INVASION AND RESISTANCE

of Professor Brian Dalton. I would also like to express my appreciation for the way the Townsville College of Advanced Education has made its facilities freely available to produce the manuscript for this and other publications I have recently submitted. My wife, Betty, not only typed the doctoral thesis from which this work is derived but often worked with me in the lengthy visits we had to make to southern archives and libraries. Her dedicated support made it all possible.

Townsville, August 1979

Noel Loos

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## Abbreviations

A.B.M.	Australian Board of Missions
C.C.L.	Commissioner for Crown Lands
Chief Sec.	Chief Secretary
Col. Sec.	Colonial Secretary
Const.	Constable
C.P.S.	Clerk or Court of Petty Sessions
D.L.	Dixson Library, Sydney
Gov.	Governor
Govt Res.	Government Resident
Insp.	Inspector
J.P.	Justice of the Peace
Jun.	Junior
L.A.	Legislative Assembly
L.C.	Legislative Council
M.L.	Mitchell Library, Sydney
M.L.A.	Member of the Legislative Assembly
N.L.A.	National Library of Australia, Canberra
N.M.P.	Native Mounted Police
N.P.	Native Police (generally instead of NMP)
N.P.A.	Northern Protector of Aborigines
P.M.	Police Magistrate
Pol. Com.	Police Commissioner
Q.G.S.	Queensland Government Steamer
Q.P.D.	Queensland Parliamentary Debates
Q.S.A.	Queensland State Archives
Q.S.L.	Queensland State Library
Sgt	Sergeant
V & P	Votes and Proceedings of the Queensland Legislative Assembly
V.S.L.	Victorian State Library



Newspapers and Journals

<i>C.C.</i>	<i>Cooktown Courier</i>
<i>C.H.</i>	<i>Cooktown Herald</i>
<i>C.P.</i>	<i>Cairns Post</i>
<i>H.A.</i>	<i>Herberton Advertiser</i>
<i>H.M.N.</i>	<i>Hodgkinson Mining News</i>
<i>M.M.</i>	<i>Mackay Mercury</i>
<i>N.M.</i>	<i>Northern Miner</i>
<i>N.Q.R.</i>	<i>North Queensland Register</i>
<i>P.D.T.</i>	<i>Port Denison Times</i>
<i>R.M.</i>	<i>Ravenswood Miner</i>
<i>T.H.</i>	<i>Towers Herald</i>

## Introduction

North Queensland has long been a frontier province of Aboriginal Australia and, in many ways, it still is. Well before Europeans penetrated to the south-west Pacific, the Torres Strait Islanders had regular and extensive contact with Aboriginal groups in Cape York Peninsula, and parts of the Australian mainland were as much encompassed within their living area as some of the islands in Torres Strait that they systematically visited. In 1606, the first known European to visit Australia, the Dutchman, Willem Jansz, in the *Duyfken* chanced upon Cape York Peninsula while exploring the southern shores of New Guinea for the Dutch East India Company. Indeed, three other Dutch expeditions, seven vessels in all, probed the western shores of Cape York Peninsula before Cook took possession of eastern Australia for England on Possession Island in Torres Strait. The last Dutch expedition, that of Gonzal, in command of the *Rijder* and the *Buijs*, set out from Batavia in February 1756, only fourteen years before Cook was in the same waters. This expedition also indicated some revival of Dutch interest in the exploitation and possible colonisation of New Holland.<sup>1</sup> However, although European financed fishermen and traders began to establish a sea frontier in North Queensland from at least as early as the 1840s, the Aborigines of North Queensland were spared the full onslaught of European colonisation for another hundred years.

Today there are extensive areas set aside for Aborigines in North Queensland. Some, like Aurukun, result from uncompleted colonisation; others, like Palm Island and Yarrabah, were set aside as repositories for those Aborigines deemed to have no useful place in the developing white Queensland democracy. In these communities, the Aboriginal residents were controlled by a white colonial administration and for seventy years placed in an institutionalised limbo. Now there is a fresh dynamic to European colonisation in the form of such industries as mining and tourism; these threaten to continue the physical dispossession of the Aborigines of North Queensland begun in the nineteenth century.

The European colonisation of North Queensland began in 1861. The first Aboriginal Protection Act in Queensland was passed in December 1897. In this period the Aborigines were in theory British citizens; their land was, in British law, crown land. During this time European and Chinese colonists invaded Aboriginal land and asserted their control over

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the original inhabitants so that they could exploit North Queensland's wealth. As the Aborigines had no British title to their land, when they resisted the invaders they were deemed outlaws and their resistance a criminal activity to be punished by the settlers themselves, or by the official law enforcement agencies of the Queensland government, or by a combination of both. But this was no new thing. It was the nature of colonisation in all the Australian colonies.

The study of North Queensland in this period is of special interest. It was the last area of Eastern Australia to be colonised and was settled largely by experienced colonists from the south where settlement had begun over two generations previously. The squatting movement had been in progress for over thirty years, the gold rushes for a decade; the colonists were thus men who had experience with Aborigines or believed they knew about them. The settlers brought with them not only a racial stereotype but also a stereotyped pattern of dispossessing the Aborigines.

In this region it is also possible to study four different frontiers of contact. The pastoral industry led to the colonisation of most of North Queensland. However, large areas of Cape York Peninsula that had been considered unfit for pastoral settlement were opened up by miners. Indeed, for a time the Aborigines of such goldfields as the Palmer, Hodgkinson, and Gilbert encountered the largest numbers of invaders. The extensive rainforests of north-east Queensland had also been largely avoided by the pastoral industry; but, when timber-getters revealed the fertile soil, farmers began clearing the rainforest, thus creating another frontier. Finally, in far North Queensland, fishermen in the pearlshell and *bêche-de-mer* industries needing the labour of previously uncontacted or little contacted Aborigines made a frontier of the sea which was in many ways the most interesting of all. Thus there was in North Queensland a frontier contact situation unparalleled elsewhere in Australia.

The nature of each industry posed different challenges to both Aborigines and settlers; the environment in which each occurred provided varying opportunities for Aboriginal resistance. The Queensland government found that its frontier policy, which had been developed on the pastoral frontier of New South Wales, was nowhere near as effective in meeting the challenges of the other frontiers. Indeed, successful Aboriginal resistance forced alternative government intervention to cope with the resistance offered from the rainforests and on the sea frontier. On all frontiers, Aboriginal resistance was for a time a major obstacle to economic exploitation. The European response, however, cost the Aborigines dear and resulted, in all areas, in the imposition of European authority, an authority that is still the key factor in relations between the coloniser and colonised in Queensland.



# 1

## The Prelude to European Colonisation of North Queensland


That part of tropical Queensland north of Cape Palmerston, approximately 21°30'S latitude, and west to the Northern Territory border makes up the geographic region of North Queensland which has an area of approximately 300,000 square miles. In the east, a narrow coastal plain is fringed by often steep coastal ranges which contain the highest country in the region, reaching to over 5,000 feet in the Bellenden Ker Range south of Cairns. To the west of these ranges is the broad extent of the eastern highlands curving inland to enclose the Burdekin and its tributaries. What is known as the Great Dividing Range, an often scarcely discernible rise acting as a watershed between east and west flowing rivers, lies in this upland expanse. West of the Divide, the highlands gradually decline to the Gulf of Carpentaria. The two extensive river systems draining these areas are separated by a low western extension of the eastern highlands rising again to some significance in such rugged north-south ridges as the Selwyn Ranges near the present city of Mt Isa.<sup>1</sup>

North Queensland has in effect two seasons: a summer 'wet' season extending mainly from December to March followed by a very much drier period from May to October. However, though this pattern is uniform throughout the region, there are great extremes of rainfall. The narrow eastern coastal plain backed by steep ranges receives torrential rainfall from January to March to bring the annual average of most of this area to over 60 inches, while Tully, with an average rainfall of 178 inches per year, is the wettest town in Australia. However, there is a drier coastal strip between the present towns of Townsville and Bowen averaging only about forty inches per year. To the west of the Great Dividing Range and south of the Gulf of Carpentaria, the rainfall diminishes to the semi-arid south-west section of North Queensland. In the west the temperatures are correspondingly much higher than nearer the coast although here the higher humidity can make the summer days very uncomfortable. North Queensland's higher summer rainfall is caused by the southern shift of moist equatorial air. On the east coast, especially, the unpredictable intrusion of cyclonic influences from the Coral Sea can bring flood rain and, once or twice a year, cross the coast leaving behind a wide swathe of destruction. The extreme variability of rainfall over much of North



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Queensland from season to season means that drought is an annual possibility even though the average annual rainfall may be quite high. In addition, the high temperatures result in a very high evaporation rate so that a given quantity of rainfall is much less effective for plant growth than in more temperate regions. These two factors, extreme seasonal variations and high evaporation, greatly diminish the significance of the average annual rainfall figures. However, the extensive drainage systems



MAP 1 North Queensland

created by the high rainfall act to some extent as a compensating factor as the streams tend to retain water in or below their beds long after the wet season.

The natural vegetation cover reflected the variation in rainfall and, to a lesser extent, topography. The eastern coastal plain, the higher coastal ranges, and the Atherton and Evelyn Tablelands, where the rainfall is over 60 inches per year, were generally covered by dense tropical rainforests. Most of the rest of the region was, and is still, open woodland covered by tall-growing natural grasses. In the interior plains, open grasslands predominate while, in the semi-arid south-western region, low scrub and spinifex are dominant. The most fertile soil, in areas of useful rainfall, is found on the alluvial plains near the river mouths and on the Atherton Tableland.


To the east, the Great Barrier Reef runs along the whole extent of the North Queensland coastline. Between the reef and the mainland are numerous islands geologically linked with the mainland such as the western Torres Strait Islands, Hinchinbrook Island, the Palm Islands, and the Cumberland Islands, as well as numerous coral islands and outcrops.

In comparison with most other areas of the continent, North Queensland was 'a land of milk and honey' for the Aborigines. In fact, Professor Davidson, in discussing his ethnic map of Australia, placed 'the tropical northern coasts and hinterlands of Queensland, North Australia and, to a somewhat lesser extent, of the Kimberley district, Western Australia' first in order of importance of 'the regions most favourable to the aboriginal system of economy'.<sup>2</sup> His maps (Maps 2 and 3), clearly indicate that North Queensland was the single most densely populated large region in the continent. Davidson's estimates are derived from Professor Radcliffe-Brown's which are still regarded as the most reliable available.<sup>3</sup> Using these figures, North Queensland's Aboriginal population may be estimated to have been between 61,000 and 76,000.<sup>4</sup> Thus, on sheer numbers, the Aborigines of North Queensland would have posed a greater challenge to the invading Europeans than they had previously encountered.


As this study is concerned with the European conquest of the Aborigines of North Queensland and the Aboriginal response to this challenge, it is necessary to understand Aboriginal life generally, especially those economic, social, political, and religious aspects which largely determined the nature of the Aboriginal response and, in part, the relationship between the races.

The Aborigines of North Queensland, like those throughout the rest of Australia, were hunters and gatherers using a simple, if effective, stone age technology. The gathering of small game, shellfish, eggs, insects, and plant food supplied the bulk of the diet, most of this generally being

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MAP 2 Estimated number and distribution of Aborigines in 1788



MAP 3 Estimated density of population in Aboriginal Australia in 1788  
 (Both maps reproduced with permission from D.S. Davidson, *An Ethnic Map of Australia*, *American Philosophical Society Proceedings*, 79 (1938), pp 654, 655.)

## PRELUDE TO EUROPEAN COLONISATION

collected by the women while the men occupied themselves with the more exciting but often less reliable pursuits of hunting and fishing, or devoted themselves to religious ritual, art, and feuding. This economic pattern was subject to regional variations from one area to another. Thus, on the coast and along large river systems fishing could become more important than hunting. Within any one region the economic pattern would also vary, largely because of seasonal changes.

To the Aborigines, the land and society were linked with the world of non-human nature from the Dreamtime when transcendental beings and totemic prototypes created and consecrated the present shape of the earth. Important aspects of the topography were living evidence of these world-creative powers. Thus, the land and the life-force associated with it pulsed through the daily activities of the Aborigines and in the cycle of religious ritual which linked the present with the creative impulse of the eternal Dreamtime, and thus guaranteed the future.



1. Naturalist Beete Jukes meeting Burdekin Aborigines, 1843. Jukes, *Surveying Voyage of H.M.S. Fly*.

Aborigines were 'restricted nomads'<sup>5</sup> and thus particular groups were associated with certain areas of land, although there is much controversy as to the nature of such local groups and local organisation. What is accepted is that Aborigines lived in groups of fluctuating size depending on the availability of food and water. Thus, residential groupings varied from the 'hearth group', a man, his wife or wives, children, and possibly one or more dependent relatives, to large gatherings of up to several hundred.<sup>6</sup> At one extreme is Radcliffe-Brown who, if rigidly interpreted, equated the range of a local group (or 'horde') of approximately twenty-five members with the religious estate of a patri-clan. At the other extreme

## INVASION AND RESISTANCE

is Hiatt who holds that the basic unit of local organisation (the 'community') comprised several patri-clans of up to several hundred members which would meet in such numbers whenever possible but subdivide as conditions dictated. Maddock seems to have cautiously accepted Hiatt's hypothesis and enunciates this new concept of local organisation. He uses the term 'clan' for the group that had a religiously sanctioned 'estate' in land and differentiates it from the 'band', the group that habitually used a certain 'range' of land. He concludes: 'The data suggests that ranges included more than one estate, but that they were defined differently in different parts of Australia'.<sup>7</sup> The dispute seems to be best represented in an article by Birdsell and in the appended criticisms of his article.<sup>8</sup> Birdsell and Stanner, among others, put forward a convincing case for a middle way, that is a more flexible interpretation of Radcliffe-Brown's concept of the 'horde', which allowed such small local groups of about twenty-five members to co-operate with other local groups for economic, religious, and social purposes to produce occasional large gatherings of several hundred which might remain together for several weeks while some local food supply lasted. If Birdsell's argument is accepted, these large groups consisted of several local groups (or 'hordes'). Such a local group generally consisted of the members of the patri-clan who owned and inherited an area of land, the 'estate', through totemic association ranging back to the Dreamtime, minus those members (generally women) who had left to join spouses in other bands or for other reasons, plus persons (generally women) who had joined the local group through marriage or for other reasons. The local group was thus the most important religious, social, economic, and political group and the one with which a man most closely identified himself. (Hiatt and Maddock would maintain this distinction for the "band" or 'community'.)<sup>9</sup>

Most non-Aborigines think of Aborigines in terms of their tribal affiliations. Certainly in the nineteenth century the term tribe was used indiscriminately to refer to almost any identifiable group of Aborigines. The term is still a troublesome one. Elkin concludes: 'in most cases, a tribe is a territorial and linguistic group with some other characteristics peculiar to itself'.<sup>10</sup> A tribe is thus made up of several local groups. Tindale has estimated that there were approximately 600 such tribal units. Berndt suggests the more conservative figure of 500 with tribal membership ranging from 100 to 1,500, the average being 500 to 600. He has cast doubt on the term's usefulness in some parts of Australia.<sup>11</sup>

Indeed, Elkin cautions that, 'in referring to a tribe as a territorial group, we must remember that this aspect is not really important politically or economically. In other words, the tribe seldom, if ever, functions as a whole in warfare or foodgathering'.<sup>12</sup> In this study, Tindale's revised tribal distribution has been used for convenience.

Political and judicial decisions emanated from the local and kinship groups by discussions, mainly among the mature and respected men. As kinship was co-extensive with Aboriginal society and indicated patterns of behaviour, obligations, and expectations for every person an Aboriginal was likely to meet, a centralised authority was unnecessary. Because these norms of behaviour were well defined, there were no separate political, judicial, or religious institutions. Nevertheless, there were effective sanctions which upheld these norms and an obvious transgressor could not expect support even from close kin. Berndt stressed the influence of religion in the functioning of daily life: 'In Aboriginal Australia "law" speaks, for the most part, through religion'. As there was no rigid distinction between the sacred and the secular, the authority of religious leaders thus carried over into the cycle of life to which the religion was attuned.

These men arranged meetings, led revenge expeditions, officiated at inquests, directed ceremonies, restrained men in ritual fighting, and organised the settlement of disputes and the punishment of religious offenders.<sup>13</sup> Maddock's conclusion highlights not only the strengths of traditional Aboriginal society but also how ill-equipped it was to deal with the European invasion:

The polity of the Aborigines, with . . . its freedom from any institution of enforcement, and its consequent stress on self-reliance and mutual aid within a framework of generally recognized norms, was a kind of anarchy, in which it was open to active and enterprising men to obtain some degree of influence with age, but in which none were sovereign.<sup>14</sup>

As Berndt has pointed out, the limitations of authority in social range and scale resulted in a 'political organisation [that] was poorly developed throughout the continent [and] was a major reason for the Aborigines' collapse under the impact of Europeans'.<sup>15</sup>

Despite extensive Torres Strait Islander influences in Cape York Peninsula, in all important respects Aborigines in North Queensland formed part of an Australia-wide culture as exotic aspects imported from Papua had been grafted on to the existing culture without changing it fundamentally. Aborigines in North Queensland had had closer and more continuous contact with peoples of different cultures than Aborigines farther south, but this had apparently made them no more receptive to European influences and their culture no less vulnerable to attack.<sup>16</sup>

There were numerous though intermittent contacts with European intruders for two hundred and fifty years before the first British colony

## INVASION AND RESISTANCE

was established in North Queensland in 1861. Moreover, relations with the intruders gave the Aborigines of North Queensland a reputation for aggressiveness and bloodthirsty treachery. Although there was often spirited Aboriginal resistance to such threatening and often clumsy intrusions, the conflict better reflected the attitudes and intentions of the intruders than the nature of Aboriginal society.

Relations with the Dutch could not have been anything but disastrous because of their unrestrained abrasiveness, particularly their determination to kidnap Aborigines at every opportunity so that they could learn more about the country from them, especially whether opportunity for profitable trade existed. This is clearly reflected in the reports extant: that of Jansz in the *Duyfken* in 1606, Carstensz in command of the *Pera* and *Arnhem* in 1623, and Gonzal in command of the *Rijder* and *Buijs* in 1756. Each of these resulted in bloody conflict. The first two were important in the creation of the reputation among the Dutch that, Australia wide, the Aborigines were fierce, treacherous, and bloodthirsty.

This early stage of European imperialism indicated a raw lack of sophistication as well as a lack of concern, sensitivity, and even understanding of the reasonableness of resistance, which is, perhaps, best illustrated in Carstensz' journal. After obeying to the letter the East India Company's instruction to kidnap 'full-grown persons, or better still, . . . boys and girls, to the end that the latter may be brought up here and be turned into useful purpose in the said quarters when occasion shall serve', he lamented:

that in all places where we landed, we have treated the blacks or savages with especial kindness . . . but in spite of our fair semblance the blacks received us as enemies everywhere, so that in most places our landings were attended with great peril.<sup>17</sup>

The next known colonialist intruders were the British. There were six major Royal Navy surveying expeditions into North Queensland waters prior to 1861: Cook and Banks in the *Endeavour* in 1770, Flinders in the *Investigator* in 1802, Phillip Parker King's surveys between 1818 and 1822, first in the *Mermaid* and later in the *Bathurst*, Wickham and Stokes in the *Beagle* between 1838 and 1842, Blackwood with naturalist Beete Jukes in the *Fly* between 1842 and 1846, and Owen Stanley with naturalists Macgillivray and Thomas Huxley in the *Rattlesnake* between 1846 and 1850.

In their contacts with the Aborigines of North Queensland, the Royal Navy had, in comparison with the Dutch, an admirable record. The tradition of tolerance and restraint towards indigenes was at first expressed to Cook in Christian and humanitarian terms. It was stated to later com-

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manders as not only the most just but also the most efficacious service routine. Throughout it was combined with an absence of immediate economic interest and a scientific if condescending enthusiasm to learn about the country and people visited. The officers' confidence in themselves, their strict discipline, and their realisation that the Aborigines in a contact situation did not deserve the reputation that Dampier and the Dutch had given them, contributed to their ability to exercise restraint even in a menacing situation. The leaders were men of the enlightenment; the fear and superstition associated with 'savagery' in the seventeenth century had been replaced by an aloof tolerance capable of shading off into romanticism.<sup>18</sup>

The Aborigines responded cautiously to these limited intrusions. Prolonged contact sometimes led, as at Evans Bay, to an enthusiastic interaction with the strange intruders; sometimes it resulted in resentment and a realistic desire to be rid of the white men living without permission in Aboriginal land. There were a number of clashes, one, at Cape Direction, resulting in the death of a British sailor. On a few occasions, the British fired upon the Aborigines and on at least one occasion, at Cape Melville, repulsed an Aboriginal attack with loss of Aboriginal life.<sup>19</sup>

In 1848 and 1849, the *Rattlesnake* visited Evans Bay at the tip of Cape York, staying the second time for over two months, much of the time being spent on shore. The Aborigines had had friendly, confident contact previously with passing ships and accepted *Rattlesnake's* crew as an addition to their way of life. On the second visit in 1849, after an absence of five months, the Aborigines were attracted to the ship, in Macgillivray's words, 'as vultures by a carcass'. They assisted the British in the work on shore, supplied fish and turtle meat, and accompanied them on their walks on shore. Each sailor had a regular helper plus less enthusiastic hangers-on, the latter doing as little work for as much food as possible and expecting payment for every service rendered. It was obvious that at Evans Bay the Aborigines had successfully adapted to the visits of friendly aliens who encroached little upon their land or resources. In fact, the Europeans seem to have been accepted into a gift-exchange system where Aboriginal labour was exchanged for such articles as pipes, tobacco (they had already learned to smoke from the Torres Strait Islanders), biscuits, steel axes, and knives.

At least some of the Europeans had been drawn into the kinship system at Cape York and the gift exchange was probably seen in terms of kinship responsibilities. Thus, Macgillivray reported, each European's regular helper was known by the kinship term 'younger brother'. He further noted that the

Cape York people even went so far as to recognize in several of our



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officers and others in the ship, the ghost of departed friends to whom they might have borne some fancied resemblance, and, in consequence, under the new names of Tamu, Tarka, etc. they were claimed as relations, and entitled to all the privilege of such.

The exception that proved the Europeans had been successfully accommodated occurred when they recompensed male dancers by giving a woman biscuits to distribute. The Aboriginal men would not deign to ask a woman for them and were incensed when they were not given any. After this affront to Aboriginal custom, the Europeans had to leave hurriedly, Macgillivray's Aboriginal 'younger brother' insisting on this as 'he considered himself bound to attend to my safety'.<sup>20</sup>

There are few records of the maritime commercial interests contemporaneously sailing through these northern waters or attempting to exploit the coasts and islands of Aboriginal North Queensland. They had at least some and, possibly, many disastrous contacts with the Aborigines and seem to have thoroughly deserved them. In their dealing with the Aborigines, the sailors of such vessels as the *Will o' the Wisp*, the *Dick*, and the *San Antonio* seem indeed quite as crude as the Dutchmen.<sup>21</sup> The tale of disastrous contacts of the *Will o' the Wisp* will serve to illustrate what could, and no doubt often did, happen when these small traders went searching for profit.

The *Will o' the Wisp* was sent out by a Sydney merchant seeking sandalwood on the north-east coast of Australia for the China trade. The ship had landed at a number of places before it reached the Palm Islands. Here, it was claimed, a friendly intercourse with the Aborigines had developed until, unexpectedly in the dark, they had attacked the Europeans in their boat, wounding the master of the vessel and one of the crew. The mate drove the Aborigines off the vessel with a sword, and a swivel gun was fired at the fleeting survivors in the water. At Goold Island in Rockingham Bay there was another affray in which several Aborigines were shot. The first attack was blamed on the cupidity of the Aborigines, but Macgillivray, who recorded the story, noted: 'Some parts of this account appeared so extraordinary, and others so improbable, that Captain Stanley felt it his duty to report it to the Colonial Government, along with the depositions of the men.'<sup>22</sup> Macgillivray obviously agreed with Stanley in suspecting that these men had provoked the Aborigines. The later history of North Queensland will indicate that similar irresponsible coastal traders and fishermen had a disastrous impact on the Aborigines in this area. Thus, it seems that this type of contact began at least as early as the 1840s.

There were other maritime European visitors of North Queensland, such as the survivors of shipwrecks and runaway convicts. The only ones



2. Etheridge River Aboriginal, nineteenth century, Mitchell Library.

known to-day are those who managed to return to the outposts of European settlement or those whose stories became known from informants. Of these, the most important to this study is James Morrill, an Essex seaman

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who was shipwrecked on the Great Barrier Reef in 1846. After forty-two days adrift on a raft, seven survivors were washed ashore at Cape Cleveland near the present city of Townsville. Three died after landing. The remaining four were befriended by Aborigines, who regarded them as deceased relatives returned as whites to their previous state of existence, a factor which often seems to have determined whether whites were received kindly or regarded as dangerous intruders. The Europeans moved south to the Port Denison district, hoping for rescue, and lived there for about two years. After the other three died from natural causes, Morrill moved back to the local group at Mt Elliott, near Townsville, who had accepted him when he first landed, and lived with them for the next twelve or thirteen years. When news reached him of European settlement to the south, he made his way back to the mouth of the Burdekin River and eventually approached two shepherds at Inkerman Station.<sup>23</sup>

Thus some Aborigines between Cape Cleveland and Port Denison had Europeans living with them for extensive periods of time before contact; yet this had no apparent effect on their tribal life. Morrill and his companions no doubt explained such aspects of European culture as sailing ships, clothes, guns, and iron, but, in isolation from the culture, this information could hardly have seemed relevant or meaningful. The few items they landed with were insignificant and the Europeans were absorbed into the Aboriginal culture. Indeed, it is for this reason that Morrill will later appear in this history of North Queensland race relations.<sup>24</sup>


In contrast to the importance and widespread nature of contacts from the sea, the overland intrusions in this period must have been a transitory wonder to the Aborigines though, of course, of great significance to the Europeans.

The rapid expansion of settlement caused by the squatting movement of the 1830s and 1840s raised the hope that a great northern river system would be discovered to provide a new area for pastoral exploration. As early as 1843, the New South Wales Legislative Council supported a motion seeking the establishment of an overland route from New South Wales to Port Essington because of its trading potential with Asia and the possibility of opening up valuable new grazing lands. Eventually, in 1844-5, Ludwig Leichhardt made this journey and in doing so dramatically brought the attention of the rest of Australia to the potential of North Queensland, and especially to the vast area watered by the Burdekin and its tributaries.<sup>25</sup>

In the main, the expedition encountered good weather. They were on the Burdekin and its tributaries from February to May, presumably just after the wet season. Leichhardt described the district as 'one of the finest we have seen. It was very open, with some plains, slightly undulating, or

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rising into ridges, beautifully grassed, and with sound ground'. He was even more enthusiastic about the Upper Burdekin: 'the most picturesque landscape we had yet met with . . . all the elements of a fine pasturing land were here united . . . Finer stations for the squatter cannot exist'.<sup>26</sup> Leichhardt's enthusiasm was to arouse the interest of southern Australia, some being convinced that the north would prove more valuable than the south.<sup>27</sup> Leichhardt's relationships with the Aborigines of North Queensland are generally thought of in relation to the death of Gilbert. This, however, is misleading as it was one of the very few occasions where conflict occurred, and, most often, the Aborigines avoided the party.



MAP 4 Land exploration. Derived from Fecken, E.H.J. and G.E.E., & Spate, O.H.K., *The Discovery and Exploration of Australia*. Melbourne, 1970. (Various pages.)

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A variety of reasons can be postulated for this. Firstly, the party was large and, to the Aborigines, no doubt awe-inspiring. Ten men, seventeen horses, and sixteen cattle set out from the Darling Downs and Leichhardt intended that the movements would be 'in light marching order'. The party progressed mainly through open country with abundant water, always mounted and constantly firing at the plentiful game. Leichhardt's potential opposition was generally soon left behind. As he moved along the Upper Burdekin on 3 April 1845, he had averaged almost ten miles a day for twenty-three days.<sup>28</sup> As well, until they were attacked, Leichhardt's party had been fit and masters of the various contact situations. By the time they had reached the Valley of Lagoons on 4 May 1845, they had been moving along north-south flowing rivers with only relatively minor intervals since December 1844 and had found the journey so easy that Leichhardt commented, 'we all got stronger and improved in health'. After they left the Burdekin River system they soon came upon the Lynd and were thus able to connect up with the Gulf rivers. On 5 July, Leichhardt wrote,

We had now discovered a line of communication by land between the eastern coast of Australia, and the Gulf of Carpentaria: we had travelled along never failing, and, for the greater part, running waters: and over an excellent country, available, almost in its whole extent, for pastoral purposes.<sup>29</sup>

The attack on the party in late June was apparently provoked by the Aboriginal members of the expedition, its success guaranteed by Leichhardt's neglecting to take elementary precautions against a surprise attack. The negligence resulted from Leichhardt's over-confidence in his ability to deal with Aborigines and from the expedition's experiences. By 1 May, Leichhardt had admitted he had allowed the night watch to lapse:

no one actually thought of watching; . . . I did not check this because there was nothing apparently to apprehend from the natives, who always evinced terror in meeting with us; and all our communications with them have been accidental and never sought by them.<sup>30</sup>

Almost immediately before the attack on the party, there were indications that their confidence in the timidity of the Aborigines was foolish; on one occasion some Aborigines had tried to drive off a bullock. Leichhardt commented: 'the natives of this part were not so amicably disposed towards us as those we had hitherto met'. Yet, he chose a site for a camp that was surrounded by a narrow belt of tea-trees providing potential attackers with ample cover, allowed the members of his party to pitch

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their tents where they chose (the tent of the convict, Phillip, was, as usual, far from the others; Gilbert's and Murphy's were among the trees), and finally had put the caps for the guns away where only he could find them. The Aborigines had carefully posted themselves to wipe out all members of the expedition and would have done so if their attack had been better co-ordinated. As it was, Gilbert was killed instantly and Roper and Calvert severely injured. The Europeans had apparently believed that Aborigines would not attack at night but, after this, Leichhardt took the necessary precautions against a repetition.<sup>31</sup>

Evidence as to provocation came out later but some members of the party at the time thought, correctly, that the two Aborigines travelling with the expedition as scouts had caused trouble by interfering with Aboriginal women and had as well shot an old Aboriginal who had tried to defend them.

Just to the north of the river he named the Gilbert, Leichhardt noticed that one Aboriginal weapon utilised a piece of iron and near the river, later named the Leichhardt, he found a piece of pack-canvas wrapped around some Aboriginal utensils. These may have resulted from direct or indirect contact with Macassan fishermen or unknown Europeans or perhaps have been discarded or lost from the *Beagle* which had been in these areas.<sup>32</sup>

It was ten years before Europeans were in or near the areas traversed by Leichhardt. A.C. and F.T. Gregory's North Australian Expedition of 1855-6 set out from the Victoria River on the north-west coast of Australia and made its way across the base of the Gulf of Carpentaria to the Gilbert and down the Burdekin, through central Queensland to Brisbane. The scheme, which had originated with the Council of the Royal Geographic Society, received the financial backing of the British parliament and aimed 'to lay open . . . more . . . of the great interior of the Australian continent than the many energetic but partial attempts hitherto made have succeeded in developing'. These most efficient and indefatigable explorers were to push inland from the coast, returning to rendezvous with an attending ship. Much of the time in North Queensland Gregory followed, or was close to, Leichhardt's path but at a later and normally drier period of the year. He was much more experienced than Leichhardt, universally respected for his knowledge of Australian conditions, and certainly less easily impressed. He found much of the Gulf Country unattractive but noted, on 10 September 1856, that there was a great extent of fine grassland around the Flinders and, on 30 October, after traversing the Upper Burdekin, he commented with rare enthusiasm:

considering the number of miles we have travelled along the banks of the Burdekin, few impediments have been encountered, while

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the extent of country suited for squatting purposes is very considerable—water forming a never-failing stream throughout the whole distance.<sup>33</sup>

Gregory mentioned very few meetings with Aborigines in North Queensland, where they seem to have avoided him whenever possible. However, near the Gulf between the Albert and the Leichhardt Rivers, on 3 September, Aborigines were noted keeping the party under observation. Next day nine Aborigines came up in a threatening fashion, but Gregory's conciliatory efforts appeared to appease them. On the fifth, an Aboriginal party entered the camp in a friendly manner, only to attack suddenly with spears. Acquainted, as it seemed to him, 'with the treacherous character of the Australian', Gregory was prepared and broke up the attack with small shot directed at the leader and a neatly-timed horseback charge as soon as the Aborigines 'shipped' their spears. This was the only conflict he had in North Queensland. Yet, in his evidence to the 1861 Select Committee inquiry into the Native Police, Gregory stressed the necessity of that force because the terrain and abundance of food and water in Queensland would continue to allow the Aborigines to resist determinedly.<sup>34</sup>

Gregory's journal suggested that the Aborigines in various places had experienced increased direct or indirect contact with either Macassans or Europeans. On the Gulf of Carpentaria, he noted that Aboriginal water vessels had been made by iron tools as well as stone, while four days later he found fishing spears which had also been partly made by iron tools. In latitude 21°22'43"S, he noted that the marks of iron tomahawks were frequent where the Aborigines had been cutting out bees' nests or possums. Yet it was not until he reached latitude 23°37' that he saw tracks of horses and cattle. It seems clear that these axes were traded either from groups on the coast who had made contact with European vessels or from the more remote frontier.<sup>35</sup>

If Leichhardt and Gregory were largely responsible for giving North Queensland its reputation for pastoral possibilities, Edmund Kennedy was partly responsible for giving its Aborigines an evil reputation. Kennedy's journey from Rockingham Bay to Cape York was but part of a grand plan stimulated by the discoveries, in 1846 and 1847, made by Mitchell and Kennedy in inland New South Wales and southern Queensland. From Cape York, Kennedy was to travel south on the western side of Cape York Peninsula back to the settled districts to try to discover the mouth of the Mitchell, and the source of the Flinders, and to proceed south-east to the Barcoo and Belyando, raking the inland plains for any river that might flow from southern Queensland towards the Gulf of Carpentaria. There was still the hope that, in this way, easy overland access would be found from the settled districts to the Gulf of Carpentaria

and thence on to Port Essington in the far north of the Northern Territory, thus providing a trade link to Asia as well as opening up new pastoral opportunities. As Kennedy's expedition experienced more systematic and sustained hostility than any previous one, and because conclusions about North Queensland Aborigines were largely derived from popular knowledge of its fate, it will be dealt with at some length.<sup>36</sup>

With the inland plains in mind, the expedition had been equipped with three carts, which proved an encumbrance in the rugged mountains and dense scrub around Rockingham Bay where they disembarked on 20 May 1848 and from which they set out on 4 June. Yet it was not until 14 July that Kennedy abandoned the carts with other heavy equipment.<sup>37</sup> The party of thirteen men, twenty-eight horses and one hundred sheep would probably have intimidated most groups of Aborigines initially but in many places its progress was so slow that this fear would fade and its presence arouse hostility. As well, its sheer size would guarantee serious disturbance to native game, trampling and destruction of food plants, and possibly fouling of water holes. Carron's journal does not provide enough detail to more than suggest the reasons for the great diversity of response from the Aborigines.

During Kennedy's prolonged stay at Rockingham Bay while he tried to discover a route inland, the Aborigines were friendly, very curious, and eager to take openly or covertly any articles belonging to the intruders that they could get their hands on. Kennedy showed firmness but great forbearance. Their progress, initially in a south-westerly direction from Rockingham Bay to escape from the coast, was so slow that after six weeks they were less than twenty miles inland and still slightly south of their first camp.<sup>38</sup> By this time they had had their first real clash with the Aborigines. On 4 July, Kennedy and three others had roamed some distance from the camp when a group of Aborigines followed threatening them until finally a spear was thrown, whereupon Kennedy ordered his men to fire, killing at least one and seriously wounding three others. From the journal it is difficult to tell whether Kennedy could have avoided this or whether the difficulties and frustrations of the journey had caused him to be less restrained than he otherwise might have been. There is no evidence of small shot or a warning shot being used, both normal practices since Cook's time, nor whether circumstances permitted these. This disastrous beginning was not apparently the cause of the opposition the expedition later encountered as a group they met a week later was friendly, and their next clash did not occur for over two months when, one night, three spears were thrown without effect into the camp on the Walsh River. On the Mitchell River five days later, six to eight Aborigines threatened the party and, after the failure of friendly overtures, the Europeans fired at them. The next day a party of twelve to fourteen fired the grass to frighten



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the Europeans and eventually threw three spears at them until shots were fired and the Aborigines fled.

Two and a half weeks later the whole expedition was lucky to escape total destruction when unseen Aborigines fired the grass to windward of the party, who were able to reach a previously burnt spot only minutes before the flames. A week later at Princess Charlotte Bay a large party of Aborigines visited them, ordering them to leave and hurling spears even after they decided to do so. The Europeans charged their assailants, firing at them to break up the attack.<sup>39</sup> This series of clashes was interspersed with incidents where the Aborigines avoided contact or were friendly.<sup>40</sup> Indeed, the hostile Aborigines seemed primarily intent on hurrying the party out of their localities or diverting it from particular areas.

By early October, the strength of all was fast declining, so that, when Kennedy missed his rendezvous with the *Bramble* at Princess Charlotte Bay, he decided to push on with a small party, leaving eight men under Carron at Weymouth Bay.<sup>41</sup>

On 13 November, Kennedy's advance party set out but after twelve days he had to leave another three men at Shelburne Bay when one man accidentally shot himself and another became ill. This left Kennedy and Jackey Jackey, the expedition's Aboriginal scout, to push on to Port Albany to rendezvous with the relief ship. At the Escape River, Aborigines who had seemed at first friendly followed them relentlessly for two days, eventually killing Kennedy and wounding Jackey Jackey slightly. The Aborigines, like those at Weymouth Bay, were extremely cautious. The surroundings were most suitable for ambush, the two men were too weak to protect themselves adequately, the rain affected their guns, and the Aborigines were superior in number and realised the comparative helplessness of Kennedy and Jackey Jackey.<sup>42</sup>

At Weymouth Bay, the Aborigines at first seemed friendly to the whole party, but after a week, when greatly outnumbering those left behind, they attacked and were repulsed by gun-fire. After this they apparently decided to wait until the Europeans were completely helpless and it seems were only willing to risk an attack on the two enfeebled survivors when they realised a rescue party was moving in from the beach. There is no evidence as to the fate of the three men at Shelburne Bay but it was presumed on circumstantial evidence that they had died or were killed.<sup>43</sup>

At Weymouth Bay and Escape River, the desire to possess familiar European material wealth was one obvious and strong motive. At Princess Charlotte Bay, Kennedy had found in a basket some pieces of glass bottle carefully wrapped in bark. As well, at Weymouth Bay and Escape River, the Aborigines had at first seemed friendly and had no doubt been able to observe some of the tempting European possessions; looting certainly diverted their attention from the actual attack. Another possible motive

for the attack on Kennedy was revenge for the shooting of an Aboriginal woman and child near Albany Island some years previously.<sup>44</sup> It is certainly possible that earlier European contacts from the sea exacerbated relations with the Aborigines and almost certain that they had familiarised the Aborigines at Rockingham Bay and Escape River, and possibly Weymouth Bay, with the material wealth Europeans would normally possess, some of which Aborigines had found useful. The Europeans also spent considerable time in these three places.

There were many aspects of the Kennedy expedition which made it more liable to have conflict with the Aborigines than Leichhardt's or Gregory's. Kennedy's large expedition moved extremely slowly for long periods so that the intrusion which first may have been intimidating soon became provocative. The camps which were set up for long periods aroused the interest and intense acquisitiveness of the Aborigines and possibly their hostility. The expedition was also moving through an area where occasional contacts with Europeans could have stimulated such motives. Finally, the terrain and vegetation provided opportunities for attacks to be made with comparative safety. The Jardines' expedition of 1864 indicated that Aborigines in Cape York Peninsula could be informed about and prepared for such an expedition as Kennedy's over a distance of several hundred miles,<sup>45</sup> a fact which suggests that the serious clashes which punctuated the course of this expedition could have sometimes been connected and, on the Walsh and Mitchell, probably were.

In addition to the lengthy reported official expeditions, there were probably some private expeditions into North Queensland before separation in 1859. Some details of three survive in second-hand accounts. Christopher Allingham was reported to have followed Leichhardt's route to the Burdekin with two young Aborigines in 1851 and marked out two runs; William Kilman was reported to have travelled north from Rockhampton along the coast to Cleveland Bay in 1854; while W.H. Gaden was thought to have made two trips to the Burdekin in December 1856 and September 1857. There may have been others of which no report has been found. Nothing is known of any contacts with Aborigines on these expeditions.<sup>46</sup>

After Queensland's separation from New South Wales, there were several other early official expeditions which were in effect the outriders of the pastoral expansion into North Queensland which was then in progress. However, they also pushed out among Aborigines who had little if any prior contact with or knowledge of the European invaders. In their dealings with the Aborigines they were examples of the most restrained and most ruthless of the frontiersmen who were to follow.

In 1861, expeditions led by Frederick Walker and William Landsborough

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from Queensland and John McKinlay from South Australia were sent out to search for the ill-fated Burke and Wills expedition. In their relations with the Aborigines of North Queensland and their opinion of them, Landsborough and Walker differed greatly. Walker had introduced the Native Police to southern Queensland in 1848 and broken the resistance of the Aborigines wherever he met them. His normal ruthlessness in dealing with menacing or possibly menacing Aborigines is admirably illustrated in his journal of the 1861-2 expedition. When Walker's party, consisting of three Europeans and five Aboriginal troopers, were ordered by a large number of Aborigines to leave a water hole to the north-east of where Hughenden now stands, Walker ordered a mounted party to charge about thirty armed Aborigines when 'twelve men were killed and few if any escaped unwounded before they could throw a spear'.<sup>47</sup>

The expeditions searching for Burke and Wills were separately to rendezvous with Captain Norman in the *Victoria* on the Gulf of Carpentaria near the present site of Burketown. A large number of Aborigines near the rendezvous approached menacingly in three separate groups in a half-moon formation, a tactic Walker had seen before which he believed was peculiar to Aborigines using a woomera. He ordered one detachment of his force 'to charge their left wing . . . and their centre and left wing suffered a heavy loss', presumably meaning that more than twelve Aborigines were killed. In three other clashes, three Aborigines were known to be killed with a possibility of one or two others. Once a large number of Aborigines chased a small party of the explorers who, Walker claimed, could have 'played with the enemy on these large plains' but they refrained because they knew 'how reluctant [Walker] was that any unnecessary slaughter of these people should take place'.<sup>48</sup> This comes as a surprising comment from the ex-commandant of the Native Police force and the leader of one of the bloodiest explorations in Australia's history unless it is seen to illustrate what pragmatic frontiersmen understood as necessary slaughter. When McKinlay, in May 1861, travelled through areas where Walker had had some of his clashes with the Gulf Country Aborigines he found it almost impossible to approach them.<sup>49</sup>

Landsborough, on this expedition at least, and apparently as a rule, took great pains to avoid conflict with the Aborigines, even if this meant changing his plans or moving on to avoid unnecessarily giving offence. He avoided contact with Aborigines as much as possible, encountered very few, but sometimes sought and obtained advice as to the nature of the country. Yet if he considered it unavoidable, he would fire at the Aborigines, as he did on the Barcoo. Walker and Landsborough even came to conflicting conclusions about the Aboriginal population density near the Gulf of Carpentaria. Walker wrote that he had never seen a country so thickly populated while Landsborough concluded that 'he

could not imagine that they were numerous'. This is explained only in part by his following Walker into some areas. It is tempting to suggest that one factor contributing to the differing estimates was the expectation of conflict and the assessment of the potential 'enemy', a conclusion which Walker's military terminology and tactics tend to support.<sup>50</sup>

In 1864, another remarkable expedition led by Frank and Alec Jardine found the western side of Cape York Peninsula equally as uninviting as Kennedy had found the eastern side and met the most determined and prolonged Aboriginal resistance of possibly any exploring party in Australia. The Jardines' expedition, which was government assisted, had set out to overland cattle from Rockhampton to Somerset near the tip of Cape York. The Queensland and British governments, in 1863, had established it as a harbour of refuge for the crews of the numerous vessels wrecked in Torres Strait and as a provisioning port for passing ships. It was hoped that this port would become the 'Singapore of the north' and a base for the 'civilising' and Christianising of the Torres Strait Islanders. John Jardine, father of Frank and Alec, was the first police magistrate at Somerset. The settlement did not develop because it was poorly sited for passing ships and its hinterland failed to attract pastoralists or, indeed, anyone else. When the pearling industry developed after 1868, the government establishment was moved to the more accessible Thursday Island.<sup>51</sup>

There were ten (including four Aborigines) in the Jardines' expedition which was droving 250 cattle and had as well 41 horses and one mule. That such a large, slowly moving party should provoke the Aborigines is not surprising; but their determined, persistent, and often reckless attacks are. The first show of real hostility occurred at the Staaten River just over a month after they left Carpentaria Downs on the Einasleigh River, which was the outer limit of expansion when they set out in October 1864. It seems clear that they had been under observation previously but from this point on until they were about one hundred miles from Cape York they were dogged by persistently hostile Aborigines and attacked eleven times. On four occasions the Aborigines stood firm or returned to the attack after being fired on. A minimum of fifty-four Aborigines, with a credible maximum of seventy-two, were killed and others wounded. None of the expedition was killed or wounded although several experienced uncomfortably near misses.<sup>52</sup>

While the size of the slowly moving expedition was provocative and no doubt destroyed or disturbed economic resources of the Aborigines and probably infringed on aspects of their social and religious life, the frequency of the attacks and their recklessness suggest a complete lack of understanding of the firepower of the intruders. This was also probably true of the Aborigines who clashed with Walker near the Gulf of Carpen-

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taria. Another factor common to both of these expeditions was the lack of restraint in dealing with apparent or potential Aboriginal opposition. In this, they well represented the ethos of the colony employing them.

Thus; in many parts of North Queensland the Aborigines had experienced tentative contacts with intruding Europeans, varying greatly, not only in duration but also in the nature of the relations that developed between the races. There is no evidence, and little likelihood, however, that such contacts or knowledge of contacts prepared the Aborigines to accept basic changes to their way of life, and no likelihood that they could have accepted the changes expected of them by the invading Europeans without forsaking the traditional life they found so satisfying.

By the time the frontier had moved into what is now southern Queensland most squatters had come to believe that force was indispensable in taking up a run; in particular that the Aborigines had to be 'kept out'—driven off all parts of the run necessary to the squatter and prevented from returning. In 'keeping the blacks out', they were greatly assisted by the Native Police, who had developed the policy of 'dispersal' of groups of Aborigines whenever they were encountered. Initially it was intended that large and thus potentially dangerous groups were to be broken up. However, as the size of the group to be dispersed was not and could not be defined precisely, any group larger than a family unit was vulnerable to attack at the discretion of the officer. In time, 'dispersing' became an official euphemism for attacking and thus, in an area of frontier conflict, one unfortunate Aboriginal might be 'dispersed' by a Native Police patrol.<sup>53</sup>

The extension of pastoral settlement into what is now southern Queensland was initially an unbroken part of the spread of grazing in New South Wales. Repeatedly the efficacy of the Native Police in allowing rapid pastoral expansion was evidenced in this region. Indeed, the newly established Queensland administration did, in effect, specifically review the lessons of New South Wales experience with regard to its frontier policy and the state of the Aborigines. A Select Committee of the Legislative Assembly was appointed in the first six months 'to enquire into the efficiency, management and general working of the Police and Native Police Force throughout the Colony'. This was followed by a much more exhaustive inquiry the next year into 'the Native Police Force and the Condition of the Aborigines Generally'. This was a nakedly pro-squatter Select Committee which sought and found justification for what was by then conventional colonial wisdom.<sup>54</sup>

The 1861 Select Committee reported that the Native Police had reduced considerably 'the destruction of property and loss of life on either

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side'. Some excesses of the force were admitted but these were blamed on the inefficiency, indiscretion, and intemperance of some of the officers. Consequently the Select Committee recommended the continued use of the force with no real change in the nature of its work and only such modifications in its organisation as would improve its efficiency. The Select Committee reported with dogmatic certainty on the Aborigines the new administration was responsible for:

Credible witnesses show that they are addicted to cannibalism; that they have no idea of a future state; and are sunk in the lowest depths of barbarism. Missions have been established amongst them with but partial success; and the same may be said of the schools established in the different colonies.

New South Wales experience had suggested to the colonists that the Aborigines were a race of subhumans beyond help or redemption.<sup>55</sup>

In southern and central Queensland there was extensive Aboriginal resistance which the Native Police were largely instrumental in breaking.<sup>56</sup> Indeed, it was this experience which led to the automatic acceptance of the force and some of its personnel as Queensland's only instrument of frontier policy. Any hope there might have been as to the possibility of a new approach was shattered by two successful Aboriginal attacks, one immediately before and the other shortly after the separation of Queensland from New South Wales in 1859.

In 1857, eleven Europeans, believed (mistakenly it now seems) to be sympathetic to the Aborigines, were killed at Frazer's Hornet Bank station on the Dawson River. On 17 October 1861, on Will's Station, Cullin-la-Ringo, nineteen Europeans, well-disposed to the Aborigines, were killed. These two events left indelible scars on Queensland's race relations.<sup>57</sup> For many years after, Europeans sympathetic to the Aborigines or critical of the settlers' treatment of Aborigines had these two incidents flung at them to prove the innate murderous treachery of Aborigines. Most colonists were confirmed in their belief that frontier Aborigines could only understand coercion.

The attacks also seemed to prove the soundness of Queensland government policy: the use of the Native Police and the tolerance of settlers' actions against the Aborigines. As one squatter put it: 'if the magistrates are obliged to overlook the doings of the Native Police they must also overlook any imprudent acts committed by the settlers too'.<sup>58</sup> The government tacitly agreed as was indicated in the interview Alexander Kennedy had with the Commissioner of Police, D.T. Seymour. Seymour was responsible for Queensland's frontier policy until 1895; Kennedy was a pioneer settler of the Cloncurry district. He informed Seymour of the



3. Native Police 1860s: Lt G. Murray, another officer, a camp sergeant and troopers. Murray, the taller officer, became a Police Magistrate and in 1889 conducted an inquiring into the food distribution scheme being developed on the Atherton Tableland. Kennedy, *The Black Police*, frontispiece.

Aboriginal resistance he was encountering and pointed out that he would have to resort to extreme measures unless he received additional police protection, whereupon Seymour warned him severely that he would be breaking the law and liable to prosecution. As Kennedy left, Seymour hurried after him and told him in private to take whatever measures he felt necessary. His official comment had been his public pose.<sup>59</sup>

The failure of all efforts prior to Queensland's separation in 1859 to ameliorate the condition of the Aborigines or to 'civilise' them along European approved lines was a complementary lesson Queenslanders had learnt, as the 1861 Select Committee report indicated. From Phillip's experiment with Bennelong, to Macquarie's more systematic and determined efforts to educate the Aborigines and to make them amenable to British law, to the 'Grand Imperial Experiment', the Port Phillip Protectorate: all had failed.<sup>60</sup> All attempts by missionaries had produced negligible results. Settlers did not understand the reasons but they did see the failure. And then regardless of what measures were tried, they believed the Aborigines were dying out. They were a 'doomed Race'.<sup>61</sup> The rapid spread of settlement encouraged the colonial governments not to spend

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the time, resources, or finances to strive for a better solution of the resulting frontier conflict. The protection of the lives and property of the British settlers was their most urgent problem, and the settler complained loudly if he was not satisfied.<sup>62</sup> The problem of the welfare of the Aborigines was completely over-shadowed by the many other pressing problems of development. Thus the concern for security on the frontier was evidenced in the select committee inquiries of 1860 and 1861 and in the first estimate when £13,516 (6 per cent) was voted for the Native Police Force out of a total budget of £220,808.<sup>63</sup>

Because of its importance in the colonisation of North Queensland, some discussion of the organisation and procedures of the Native Police is necessary. Each detachment of the Native Mounted Police Force consisted of a senior European officer, called, at first, lieutenant, but after 1864, sub-inspector, sometimes a subordinate European officer, with the rank of acting sub-inspector, a camp sergeant, and generally four to six Aboriginal troopers.<sup>64</sup> The non-commissioned officer drilled the troopers when they were in camp, supervised the distribution of stores, and generally remained in charge of the station while part, or all, of the detachment patrolled under the command of the senior officer. The 'Instruction of the Commandant to Officers and Camp Sergeants' pointed out that it was the duty of each detachment to patrol stations, providing the squatters with protection when called upon, and at all times 'to disperse any large assemblage of blacks', because 'such meetings . . . invariably [led] to depredations or murders'. Officers were instructed to see that all 'outrages' were severely punished to teach the Aborigines that 'retributive justice' would speedily follow the 'commission of crime'.<sup>65</sup> Officers were told to be careful in receiving reports to identify the aggressors correctly. Such a patrol could stay out a month, travelling twenty-five to thirty miles in a day, visiting the stations, and 'giving any troublesome blacks an occasional lesson'.<sup>66</sup>

The Native Police, thus, had three duties. They were to prevent Aboriginal 'depredations' by breaking up assemblages of Aborigines and by intimidating them into quiescence with constant patrolling; they were to act as a punitive force to protect the settlers; they were to capture or recapture suspected Aboriginal 'criminals'. The extent of territory that they had to patrol and the constant calls on their services meant that they would become associated with violent, rather than non-violent, repression of the Aborigines. In practice, their protection was limited to Europeans.

The advantages of the Native Police over the Aborigines being dispossessed are obvious: superior mobility, European weapons, European organisational support, and such powerful allies as the squatters and their employees. It is no wonder that a comparatively small force, 120 troopers in 1860, was able to move into areas of conflict and break the resistance of



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the Aborigines.<sup>67</sup>

In practice, the Native Police were very often indiscriminating in utilising their superior power. Thus, the term commonly used for breaking up Aboriginal groups, 'dispersing', was understood to mean 'firing at them'. Similarly, in punitive expeditions, the complaint of the pastoralist was generally accepted without checking, and collective punishment practised on the rationale that 'depredations' were 'tribally' planned, but really in the hope that the punishment of any Aborigines in the locality would intimidate all.<sup>68</sup>

On patrol the officers had virtually unchecked power which was often used irresponsibly. However, the difficulty of proof accounts for the small number of proven examples of abuse of power. It was not until 1876 that the Oaths Act Amendment Act allowed Aboriginal evidence to be accepted in a court of law; there were very rarely white witnesses and even more rarely were these unsympathetic to the officers.<sup>69</sup> When flagrant examples became known, the authorities contented themselves with dismissing the officer concerned. Thus for an 'excess of zeal' at Morinish Diggings which resulted in a well publicised massacre Sub-Inspector Aubin was dismissed. So too were Sub-Inspector Nichol's troopers who were involved in a massacre at Irvinebank. Nichol was dismissed for negligence as it was clear that either his troopers could indulge in unsupervised action against the local Aborigines who, in this case, were known to be peaceful, or he himself was involved. Perhaps the case of Lieutenant Frederick Wheeler best encapsulates the problems inherent in officering the force. Lieutenant Wheeler had informed the 1861 Select Committee: 'I act on my own discretion, and on my own responsibility'. In 1876 it became clear what this could mean when Wheeler was charged with the murder of a ten-year old Aboriginal boy. Manifestly guilty, he was allowed bail and, predictably, fled the country.<sup>70</sup>

Brutality in the force became habitual and accepted both by the officers and the majority of the population. Not only was 'dispersing' equated with shooting at the Aborigines, the officer could also arbitrarily bestow any punishment, even the death penalty, upon his troopers<sup>71</sup> and normally ordered the summary execution of prisoners rather than attempting the formidable task of proving that they, and not other Aborigines in the vicinity, were guilty.<sup>72</sup> As well, the officers allowed troopers to collect women as camp followers from dispersed groups, a practice which could only further antagonise them.<sup>73</sup> Thus, on the frontier, not only did the Native Police assume the roles of police, counsel, judge, jury, and executioner: they often further parodied the legal process by inciting the Aboriginal group they had just pacified.

There can be no doubt that the Native Police did inspire the Aborigines with great dread as James Davis, after living fifteen years with the

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Aborigines in southern Queensland, could avouch. It seems that the initial impact was often to provoke the Aborigines to a more vigorous resistance which was then broken.<sup>74</sup> In 1861, Commandant Morrisset expressed the colony's abiding philosophy which indicated that the Native Police was the only solution to the violent conflict which was believed to be the inevitable result of frontier contact: 'blacks . . . only understand brute force . . . the more lenient you are the worse they become'. Indeed it was seriously argued that the settlers would kill more Aborigines than the Native Police if that force were abolished.<sup>75</sup> This was an obvious pro-squatter counter to the humanitarians which was difficult to rebut because of the impossibility of assembling the necessary statistics. Moreover, the argument may have been perfectly correct, given the nature of pastoral expansion.

One of North Queensland's pioneer squatters probably gave the most realistic view of the force:

It was often charged that the native police behaved with great brutality and this may have been correct, but it is difficult to see how a small and scattered European population could have continued to occupy the country without some such protection.<sup>76</sup>

In this statement the inverted logic of European thinking is evident. The squatters owned the land; the Aborigines were the aggressors; the government had to take all necessary action, even if this involved the use of an irresponsible para-military force and resulted in brutality. Criticism of the Native Police Force came predominantly from the city as the 1861 Select Committee noted with but slight exaggeration:

In classifying the evidence, it is remarkable, that the opinions of the persons examined, as to the relative advantages or efficiency of a White or Native Police Force appear to be governed by the distance they may have been residing from the towns where the concentration of population affords sufficient mutual protection.<sup>77</sup>

Such expressions of urban unpopularity were not to weigh very heavily with those in power until the mid 1880s.

Indeed the efficacy of the Native Police in meeting the needs of most frontier pastoralists is perhaps best attested by its durability; for despite such criticism it was still the main instrument of Queensland's frontier policy until 1897, functioning much as it did in 1861 as the then Police Commissioner, W.E. Parry-Okeden, reluctantly confessed.<sup>78</sup> To this time it was the only governmental agency formally charged with responsibility for Aboriginal affairs on the frontier. Thus, this study will reveal Queensland's native policy in practice.

## 2

# The Pastoral Frontier

The wealth of North Queensland's grasslands, minerals, fisheries, and rainforests produced four frontiers of racial contact. The nature of each frontier was determined not only by the lack of effective governmental control and the attitudes of the colonists but also by the environment the wealth occurred in, the ability of the Aborigines to use their habitat as a shield against the invaders, and the nature of the invaders' industries exploiting the resources of the Aborigines' land. Inevitably the pastoral industry, which caused the rapid colonisation of such vast areas, provided Aboriginal North Queensland with its greatest challenges and wreaked havoc upon the largest number of Aboriginal tribes. It is with this frontier that this chapter is concerned.

After Leichhardt's glowing reports of the pastoral opportunities in North Queensland, settlement did not immediately follow as there were more accessible pastures in southern Queensland, much of which Mitchell's explorations in 1846 and Leichhardt's own in 1844-5 had revealed. The gold discoveries in New South Wales and Victoria after 1851 also diverted attention from the north although, as indicated in the previous chapter, some squatters probably made unpublicised reconnaissances. Gregory's expedition of 1855-6 redirected attention to the north at a time when the squatters' hold on the lands in New South Wales and Victoria was being challenged and their leases due to expire in 1861. So it was predictable that some pastoralists would look to the Burdekin, especially as it was to be part of a new colony which the squatter interest hoped to dominate.

An imaginative adventurer, George Elphinstone Dalrymple, had formed a syndicate and set out on 16 August 1859 to explore and later settle the Burdekin only to have his plans frustrated by the first Queensland government, which was vitally concerned with the problem of land legislation and considered the capitalists supporting Dalrymple to be mere speculators. However, because of Dalrymple's knowledge of the country, and in compensation for his successful exploration, he was appointed Commissioner for Crown Land in the Kennedy District. He set out in the *Spitfire*, on 14 August 1860, to explore the mouth of the Burdekin and to examine the suitability of the recently discovered Port Denison as a port of access. Dalrymple found the Burdekin useless for navigation but reported favourably on Port Denison. On both his 1860

and his 1859 expeditions, Dalrymple reported frequent clashes with the Aborigines and stressed their numbers and aggressiveness. It is ironically symbolic that Queensland's first official expedition used firearms freely whenever Aboriginal resistance was encountered.<sup>1</sup>

By this time, the Queensland government had passed its land legislation which it hoped would encourage a quick taking up of land without speculation. The government advertised its intention of accepting applications for pastoral runs in the Kennedy from 1 January 1861 and stressed that settlers would have ample Native Police protection.<sup>2</sup> As indicated in map 5, the Kennedy District comprised that enormous area drained by the Burdekin and Herbert Rivers and their tributaries. The port of Bowen which Dalrymple established on Port Denison was thus in the centre of the new pastoral district and two hundred miles beyond the then outer limit of settlement at Broadsound.<sup>3</sup> As a result the settlement of the Bowen District was initially different from the pastoral occupation of any other in the Kennedy District or, indeed, in Queensland. The government schooner *Jeannie Dove* and the ketch *Santa Barbara* sailed from Rockhampton on 15 March 1861 carrying officials, settlers, their families and stores. A number of squatters joined the land party led by Dalrymple to enjoy the security provided by a Native Police detachment of eleven troopers under the command of a Lt Williams.<sup>4</sup> On 10 April, Dalrymple led a forward party on to the beach at Port Denison, frightening off a large number of Aborigines camped near the harbour. Within six weeks of Dalrymple's arrival runs had been taken up in an unbroken line 350 miles inland despite the fact that there was intense conflict with the Aborigines by the third week of settlement.<sup>5</sup> By the middle of 1862, 454 runs and 31,504 square miles had been applied for and, by 1863, almost the whole of the Kennedy District had been settled.<sup>6</sup>

In the southern extremity of this district, Mackay, on the Pioneer River, had been gazetted a port of entry on 2 October 1862 as a result of an expedition setting out from Armidale even before Dalrymple had returned from his 1859 explorations. The leader, John Mackay, had returned with stock to the Pioneer District by 26 February 1862 and, by August 1862, other squatters were taking up runs in the area.<sup>7</sup> Near the northern limit of the Kennedy, Dalrymple himself participated in the expansion of settlement. Impressed by the possibilities of the Valley of Lagoons, he had interested the Premier, Robert Herbert, who in 1862 had then enlisted the support of his friends, the wealthy and well-connected Arthur and Walter Scott, in a large-scale pastoral development. The Scott Brothers and Dalrymple, with Herbert as a sleeping partner, applied for an occupation licence for eighty square miles of the Upper Burdekin at the beginning of 1863; by 1864, they had leased 1,270 square miles believing they would be able to sell some later at a profit to the younger

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sons of wealthy English friends. Although the scheme was a disastrous failure, it was not abandoned for over thirty years.<sup>8</sup> Attention had been turned to north-west Queensland by the parties, led by Walker, McKinlay, and Landsborough. Walker agreed with Gregory that, on the Gulf of Carpentaria, good country available for squatters was limited to strips 45 miles in depth on the Flinders and the Leichhardt Rivers. However, McKinlay and, especially, Landsborough were much more enthusiastic. Landsborough declared to a public meeting in Melbourne, attended by over 3,000 people, that 'he had never seen better country for stock than he found on the shores of the Gulf of Carpentaria'.<sup>9</sup>


Twenty years previously Stokes, while exploring from the *Beagle*, had named this area the Plains of Promise. Now they were once again beckoning to the squatters as was the newly discovered Flinders and Leichhardt country. In 1863, a route from the Cape River to the Flinders was discovered which was much more suitable for the squatter bringing up his flocks and herds than the Burdekin and Gulf rivers link Leichhardt and Gregory had indicated. On 1 January 1864, the pastoral districts of Cook and Burke were thrown open and runs were taken up almost immediately, many by Kennedy District squatters. Pioneer pastoralist and historian, Edward Palmer, wrote:

The year 1864 may be styled the year of Hegira or flight of stock outwards to settle new country; they came from all parts, and helped to fill the land everywhere with the beginning of civilization. A boom had set in for pastoral occupation; the reports of recent explorations told of enormous tracts of grand open country waiting for stock to utilize it, and each one was anxious to be the first to secure some of it for his sheep and cattle.

This was the pioneer's 'greed of country' the pastoralist de Satge wrote of. With unconscious irony Palmer commented: 'The settlers were like a great advancing army, confident in their numbers and strength; and so they advanced into the unknown land, and left the rest to fortune'.<sup>10</sup>

Palmer himself took up Canobie on the Cloncurry in 1864 and stocked it with cattle from the Wide Bay district. In 1864, Ernest Henry, who had previously taken up Mt McConnell Station, on the Suttor near its junction with the Burdekin, was one of the first to take up country on the Flinders when he established Hughenden Station. In the same year, the first occupation of the Gulf Lowlands occurred; cattle were overlanded from Bowen Downs in central Queensland to Beames Brook about sixteen miles above the present site of Burketown.<sup>11</sup> Almost immediately afterwards, a rush to the Gulf country was triggered off by J.G. Macdonald's private explorations from his station, Carpentaria Downs, which he had only established in 1863 and which was then one of the most northerly

THE PASTORAL FRONTIER



MAP 5 The pastoral frontier

stations. Most of these squatters came from the Kennedy District. Settlers had thus pushed out as far west as the Barkly Tableland, which Landsborough had discovered only three years previously, and north to the Gulf of Carpentaria.<sup>12</sup>

The wave of pastoral expansion had surged into all parts of North Queensland except Cape York Peninsula. Kennedy's expedition had certainly shown the east coast to be inhospitable. In 1864, the expedition led by Frank and Alec Jardine found the western side of the peninsula equally uninviting and met such determined and prolonged resistance

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from the Aborigines that the run hunters were not induced to scour the country ahead of settlement as they had elsewhere in North Queensland. As the editor of the journals of the expedition commented: 'It has also made known with tolerable definiteness, how much, or rather how little, of the "York Peninsula" is adapted for pastoral occupation'.<sup>13</sup>

The vast area of Cape York Peninsula was thus branded as a dangerous disappointment for the pastoralists and had to await the incentive of gold to attract settlement. The other region still to be opened up was the rainforest-covered area north from the Herbert River to just south of the Endeavour River and inland to the eastern slopes and plateaus of the Great Dividing Range. Timber, mineral wealth, and fertile soil would eventually attract the invaders to this daunting wilderness although it was already partly known to the fishermen and traders who were beginning to exploit the wealth of the sea from the Torres Strait south to Mackay.

In this rapid expansion of the pastoral industry, the role of the Native Police was limited but vital. A large detachment had accompanied Dalrymple's overland party and immediately began far-reaching 'dispersals', driving the Aborigines from the river valleys which were so essential to the economies of both races. In December 1861, after a routine patrol, Lt Powell, then in charge of Native Police in the Kennedy District, reported that the Bogie River was nearly cleared of large groups of Aborigines but that 'immense' numbers still occupied the Bowen River where Powell had twice attacked parties of sixty to eighty men. At the same time, the pastoralists were actively engaged in the process of dispossessing the Aborigines. Thus, a squatter on the Bowen had formed a vigilante to break up a large group of Aborigines menacing his employees while Powell had dispersed another group on the same river only thirty miles away. At this time, Powell believed his forces inadequate to protect the settlers on the Bowen and the Burdekin yet others were already on the Suttor and Belyando.<sup>14</sup>

Indeed, while the settlers were establishing themselves, they constantly sought Native Police assistance. By early 1862, there were two camps in the Kennedy District, one at Bowen and another on the Bowen River. In May 1862, Dalrymple presented a petition from thirteen influential residents requesting greater police protection because of the 'extreme hostility of the Aborigines'. Yet in August 1862, the new commandant, Bligh, reported the frontier was completely protected.<sup>15</sup> The government expected the squatters to be active partners in dispossessing the Aborigines and protecting property. A third detachment was moved to the Upper Burdekin from the pacified Wide Bay and Burnett areas, bringing the Native Police strength in the Kennedy District in July 1863 to twenty-three out of a total force of 154 officers and men. However, the

Upper Burdekin detachment of seven troopers promptly deserted.<sup>16</sup>

Probably, no frontier region considered itself, nor indeed was, adequately protected against Aboriginal resistance. Dalrymple had correctly pointed out that Queensland's policy of not establishing effective control over such districts as the Kennedy before allowing settlers to take possession of Aboriginal land ensured that they would impose their authority with the rifle: '[An] almost necessity impels the whiteman to adopt hostile measures for the preservation of his life from a numerical preponderance capable equally of wearing him out or overwhelming him with numbers'.<sup>17</sup>

In North Queensland, throughout the period 1861 to 1868, there was an almost complete uniformity in the procedures that the pastoralists adopted towards the Aborigines. When the pastoralists took up their runs, they adopted the same practice that had developed in the south. They 'kept the blacks out'. In November 1869, a pastoralist sympathiser described in the *Port Denison Times* what this meant in North Queensland, not to criticise the process but to urge caution where the Aborigines were being 'let in'. Most Aborigines were not hostile at first, he declared, but as some had been 'treacherous' (presumably when they realised the significance of the alien presence) the pioneers were forced 'to keep them out':

[that is] never to allow them near a camp, out-station, head-station, or township; consequently they were hunted by anyone if seen in open country, and driven away or shot down when caught out of the scrub and broken ground. This course adopted by the early settlers and pioneers was unavoidable and quite necessary under the existing circumstances.

Although extra men were employed to protect the runs, he asserted the Europeans would have been at the mercy of the Aborigines if they had been 'let in' and realised the weakness of the squatters. He admitted:

This system of keeping them out, however has led to dreadful results . . . every bushman had to take the law into his own hands in self-defence, and for a time every man's hand was against the blacks, and their hands against every man—as those who had been peacefully inclined towards the settlers at first became revengeful, and committed several most horrible murders, . . . and [killed] sheep, cattle, and horses.<sup>18</sup>

Despite the fact that it was a violation of one of the conditions of lease to deny the Aborigines free access to a run, there was no expectation by the government that the squatters would comply with this stipulation and





4. Queensland squatters dispersing Aborigines. Vogan, *The Black Police*, frontispiece.

no pretence by the squatters that they were doing so. In 1867, the Under-Colonial Secretary even rejected a request by a squatter that the Aborigines be let in at that time.<sup>19</sup>

During this period of 'keeping them out', communications between the races were minimal. This is perhaps best illustrated by Dalrymple's attempt to prevent bloodshed in the establishment of the township of Cardwell as a port for the Upper Burdekin in 1864.

The owners of the Valley of Lagoons, with government assistance and the expectation of reimbursement through Premier Herbert's influence, decided to establish a port at Rockingham Bay. Dalrymple, the leader of the expedition, believed that if the Aborigines were made to understand the new order being imposed upon them the initial violence and hostility would be avoided. For this purpose, he took James Morrill, who conversed with some difficulty. The next day some Aborigines approached Dalrymple and Morrill. In response to Dalrymple's questions about a route over the ranges to the Burdekin, they tried to send him off in a different direction into an ambush. They wanted to know whether the Europeans came as friends or enemies whereupon, at Dalrymple's direction, Morrill answered that

we came as friends . . . I then told them they must clear out and tell others to do so as we wished to occupy the land, and would shoot any who approached, that we were strong, and that another party would soon follow. They told us to leave and not to return and then they went away.<sup>20</sup>

Except for the definition of the word 'friends', communications between

the two races were unambiguous. Dalrymple's instructions had been less provocative than Morrill's translation but the ultimatum was the same: the Aborigines had to surrender their tribal land to the invaders.

Three days later, Dalrymple and the Native Police detachment came upon a party of armed Aborigines, possibly waiting to attack those left at the settlement, whereupon, according to Morrill, 'they were set upon suddenly by Mr. Dalrymple's men and rather cut up'. Dalrymple's good intentions had evaporated and the scheme to persuade Aborigines to accept passively the loss of their lands had collapsed. Yet this pitifully inadequate attempt at communication was obviously atypical.

A general pattern of conflict can be observed in the European colonisation of North Queensland which was in part typical of Aboriginal response to alien intrusion, but as well consequent upon the nature of the challenge the pastoralists offered. Most commonly the Aborigines avoided the small number of pastoralists and their employees first moving into their tribal areas, sometimes almost completely, for periods of a few months to as long as two years. After this initial period, clashes occurred with increasing intensity until overt Aboriginal resistance was broken by the combination of squatter and Native Police action. As will be subsequently seen, this period could extend for several years and in some areas, where the terrain favoured Aboriginal resistance, continued for as long as twenty years. Perhaps the pastoral occupation of the Burke District provided the starkest example of this initial 'lull-before-the-storm' pattern.

The Burke Pastoral District stretched from the Great Dividing Range in the east to the Queensland-Northern Territory border in the west and from the Selwyn Range in the south to the Gilbert River in the north. The owners of two stations in the Burke District clearly described the pattern of contact from the time it was thrown open for settlement, on 1 January 1864, to April 1868 when conflict was at its height:

Outrages by the blacks are seldom committed in the earliest stages of the settlement of a new district, and this has been particularly the case in this district of Burke, where for the first two years the blacks were quiet enough to make many settlers believe them incapable of violence and to consider them harmless.<sup>21</sup>

The limited evidence available fully supports this account.

By September 1865, most of the Gulf Country had been taken up. East of the Great Divide where conflict was then intense, the settlers were surprised to have such reports from the Gulf lowlands and the Cloncurry River as: 'The blacks are very quiet'. Some settlers on the Albert River even had enough confidence to go into their camps unarmed to talk to

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them. The Burketown correspondent to the *Port Denison Times* remarked in late August 1866, 'The aboriginals of this district appear to be a fine race of men and thus far have proved very friendly'.<sup>22</sup>

Although there had been some suggestions of sporadic conflict in 1865, the first indications of serious resistance came in February 1867 with reports of attacks on travellers on the Flinders road. These led to the Native Police dispersing a large group who had apparently gathered for *bora* ceremonies. The Aborigines were found to possess such a large number of European articles that it seemed that their successful attacks on unknown travellers had been much more extensive than had previously been realised. Conflict became very widespread thereafter and, as late as December 1874, the Aborigines were still regarded as dangerous and had not yet been 'let in'.<sup>23</sup>

The Aborigines killed and robbed sufficient invaders and did enough damage to their stock and property to alarm them greatly and to infuriate them into determined and ruthless retaliation. In 1867, one traveller was killed and one wounded on the Cloncurry River. In September 1867, the Aborigines attacked four travellers within sight of Canobie Station on the Cloncurry River, killing one and wounding two others.<sup>24</sup> In late 1867 or early 1868, four Aborigines from Wide Bay who had been employed by various settlers bringing out stock were killed by hostile Aborigines while they were returning to their home country. In March 1868, a shepherd was killed, others wounded, and property stolen on Urilla Station near the junction of the Saxby and Flinders Rivers. Within the same month, two Europeans and a Chinese employee were killed near the Gulf of Carpentaria. Thus, in the first year of conflict in the Burke District, ten of the colonists or their Aboriginal employees were reported killed by Aborigines. There were almost certainly others killed but unreported or undiscovered.<sup>25</sup>

It is obvious that the details of only a small percentage of Aboriginal attacks and European acts of aggression or retaliation have been discovered. Indeed, generally only the most blatant acts of the Native Police or the activities of the Aborigines most alarming to the settlers were recorded. Upon the receipt of a petition detailing most of the Aboriginal attacks described above, another detachment of Native Police was despatched. The officer in charge of both the native and ordinary police, Sub-Inspector Uhr, had previously earned the respect of the residents with the limited force he had at his disposal.<sup>26</sup> With the increase in conflict between the settlers and the Aborigines he soon won enthusiastic approval for his ruthless reprisals. In one of the few extant detailed accounts of a Native Police dispersal, the Burketown correspondent to the *Brisbane Courier* exulted at Uhr's success in killing fifty-nine Aborigines in retaliation for the slaughter of 'several horses' near Burketown and

the killing of a Mr Cameron near the Norman River:

I much regret to state that the blacks have become very troublesome about here lately. Within ten miles of this place they speared and cut steaks from the rumps of several horses. As soon as it was known, the Native Police, under Sub-Inspector Uhr, went out, and I am informed, succeeded in shooting upwards of thirty blacks. No sooner was this done than a report came in that Mr. Cameron had been murdered at Liddle and Hetzer's station, near the Norman. Mr. Uhr went off immediately in that direction, and his success I hear was complete. One mob of fourteen he rounded up; another mob of nine, and a last mob of eight, he succeeded with his troopers in shooting. In the latter lot there was one black who would not die after receiving eighteen or twenty bullets, but a trooper speedily put an end to his existence by smashing his skull.

The complacent tone of this report and the absence of any hostile reaction and of an official inquiry demonstrate the changed attitude towards Aborigines in the Burke district even more strikingly than the ferocity of the deeds themselves. They suggest that this was, perhaps, only the most successful act of revenge and bloodshed. The Burketown correspondent concluded: 'Everybody in the district is delighted with the wholesale slaughter dealt out by the native police, and thank Mr. Uhr for his energy in ridding the district of *fifty-nine* (59) myalls'.<sup>27</sup>

As well as killing or attempting to kill the invaders and their animals, the Aborigines of the Burke District appropriated their goods and possessions and destroyed much property. Indeed starvation seems to have been a strong motive for many attacks. Aborigines took great risks to obtain food as their own resources became limited by the increasing number of stock. The raiding of shepherds' huts was so frequent that some squatters built iron huts with padlocks which still did not stop the Aborigines. There was, however, another motive besides necessity. The settlers were surprised at the apparently wanton destructiveness of the Aborigines who took everything, even articles that could be of no use to them. It is clear that the need for food and the desire to have European goods was now mixed with a determination to resist and harm the invaders. Indeed, there is a strong suggestion of desperation in the Aboriginal daring the settlers described. The flare-up of Aboriginal resistance over such a wide area of the Burke District was linked by the settlers with *bora* ceremonies. In February 1867, the Native Police had 'dispersed' (i.e. attacked and broken up) a group of Aborigines, estimated at more than two hundred, on the Flinders Road where travellers had been menaced and some, whose bodies and identities were never discovered, robbed and killed. This was a common criticism of large

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Aboriginal gatherings, and although they would have resulted from traditional religious and socio-economic causes, it is inconceivable that, at such meetings, grievances against the invaders were not discussed. This would reinforce the natural desire to strike back which could, in part, account for sudden outbreaks of resistance over a wide area.<sup>28</sup>

The initial pattern of conflict examined in the Burke District could be illustrated as well by reference to other areas where sufficient records survive. Thus, speaking of the Kennedy Pastoral District as a whole, one of the first commentators on its history of conflict pointed out that this was at its worst between 1864 and 1868 and that the earlier years had even promised a peaceful dispossession in some areas. This claim is supported by evidence from such parts of the Kennedy as the Townsville and Mackay districts.<sup>29</sup>

The extended period of Aboriginal avoidance of the pastoralists is not difficult to explain. The normal Aboriginal reaction of cautious avoidance was reinforced firstly by the reputation the aliens brought with them from the Bowen district and the settled regions to the south; and, secondly, by the clashes that frequently occurred with the initial European intrusion.<sup>30</sup> As the invaders did not at first seem to offer an unendurable threat to the Aborigines' way of life and made clear their determination to 'keep out' the Aborigines, they were avoided. There is clear evidence in North Queensland that Aborigines were able to communicate information accurately over very long distances and, no doubt, where actual conflict did not occur, knowledge of the European destructive potential was well known.<sup>31</sup> As the limited bloodshed involved in Aboriginal 'warfare' contrasted starkly with the firepower of even a few Europeans, this awareness must have resulted in greater caution. However, once the Aborigines came to understand the nature and permanence of European occupation, conflict was bound to occur unless the pastoralist took positive steps to establish meaningful communications with the Aborigines and provided the Aborigines with the economic resources of which his activities were depriving them. This happened on a very few runs only.<sup>32</sup>

The most notable exception to the pattern of conflict outlined above occurred in the settlement of the Bowen hinterland. Dalrymple had given specific instructions that the settlers were not to disembark on the mainland if they arrived before his land party but to camp on an island in the bay. Despite his previous experiences, he was hopeful that he could establish a pattern of contact different from that known on the pastoral frontier in the south. The presence of the mounted land party, he hoped, would deter Aboriginal opposition or rout it if absolutely necessary.

Unique among the pastoral districts of Queensland, the hinterland of Port Denison was separated by more than 200 miles from the nearest

settled district, Broadsound. An opportunity existed for making a fresh start in establishing relations with the local Aborigines, one which might avoid the brutal dispossession which had occurred elsewhere. Although the government showed no interest in these possibilities, Dalrymple was eager to seize them and optimistic of success. His intentions were benevolent, but he had no real comprehension of the ways in which white intruders injured Aboriginal interests. Other settlers did not even share his intentions and were wholly beyond his control.<sup>33</sup>

Despite the fact that, *inter alia*, he had deliberately appropriated some Aboriginal wells large enough to supply 'the requirements of the port for some years to come', Dalrymple believed the Aborigines would quietly resign themselves to the presence of 'an irresistible force'.<sup>34</sup> Such naive optimism was short lived. Within three weeks, three squatters were driven back to the settlement by an estimated 120 Aborigines. Moreover the Native Police had already begun far-reaching 'dispersals' and were soon emulated by the squatters moving out to claim runs. Dalrymple feared the town would be attacked and assumed the role of commander-in-chief.<sup>35</sup> The infant colony met with intense Aboriginal opposition and retaliated vigorously. Eight years later, a resident of Bowen wrote: 'We know that our town at least had its foundations cemented in blood'.<sup>36</sup> The same could be said for much of the early settlement of the Bowen District. One year after Dalrymple's arrival at Port Denison, he was still complaining of the 'extreme hostility of the Aborigines'.<sup>37</sup>

There are several factors which probably account for the difference between the early contact experienced in the Bowen District and that experienced in more remote areas. First, the exceptionally rapid spread of settlement from Bowen must have appeared from the first an invasion of menacing proportions, in contrast to the more gradual infiltration of graziers elsewhere. Secondly, in the early years the district drained by the Burdekin and its tributaries was constantly disturbed by travelling settlers with their flocks and herds looking for or going to runs further out. Thirdly, in the Bowen District the Native Police were provocatively used in the first weeks of settlement and subsequently aggressively scoured the river valleys attacking assemblages of Aborigines. In most areas, because the demand for Native Police exceeded their supply, they patrolled districts intensively only after conflict had occurred or was thought imminent. Fourthly, in some districts, early clashes demonstrated the power of the invaders so strikingly that the Aborigines avoided further contact as long as possible. Finally, in yet other areas, the Aborigines probably avoided contact during the early stages of pastoral occupation because of knowledge of the invaders' destructive potential communicated from the Bowen District. The initial reckless daring of the Bowen Aborigines in attempting to oppose what was apparently per-

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ceived as an inescapable threat was repeated in remote Cape York Peninsula in opposition to the Jardine expedition and to the Palmer rush.<sup>38</sup> In such areas, a lack of information of the firepower of the invaders was an important factor in such apparently suicidal confrontations.

In suggesting the above pattern of conflict on the pastoral frontier of North Queensland, no attempt has been made to give a comprehensive and detailed account. This would have been impossible with the data available. From the reports of the Police Commissioner, however, the areas of greatest conflict can sometimes be discovered. Thus in his report for 1868, he commented of the Aborigines from Mackay south to St Lawrence: 'The blacks in this district are very bad . . . complaints and requests for assistance are every day received.' Of the Aborigines north of Mackay, he commented:

The coast country all along from Townsville to Mackay is inhabited by blacks of the most hostile character. On some of the stations north of Bowen, such as Woodstock, Salisbury Plains, and some others, it is almost impossible to keep any cattle on the runs; and south of Bowen some stations are or were about to be abandoned, in consequence of the destruction of property by the blacks.<sup>39</sup>

D.T. Seymour, who was Police Commissioner from 1864 to 1895, was not one to exaggerate Aboriginal hostility. It was more typical of him to blame the settlers for not taking adequate precautions to protect their own lives and property or to accuse the local newspapers of exaggeration.

Even though the number of Native Police at Seymour's disposal was reduced greatly as a result of economy measures associated with the 1866-70 commercial depression and the use of the Native Police as gold escort, he went to extraordinary measures to pacify the Townsville to Mackay coast. At a time when he was giving each detachment a larger area to patrol, he was unable to reduce the Native Police on the Townsville to Mackay coast and had to establish two 'flying detachments'. These had no settled camps but patrolled constantly, one between Townsville and Bowen and the other between Bowen and Mackay.<sup>40</sup>

The conflict described in this chapter persisted unabated for more than six years during which time most of North Queensland was colonised by European pastoralists. The cost of such protracted struggle, measured in the broadest sense, must have been very great for both races, but especially for the Aborigines. Rarely, of course, was the cost of the European invasion of Aboriginal land chronicled with an Aboriginal perspective. It is therefore fortunate in North Queensland that there was a European who had lived with the Aborigines for seventeen years and had heard the descriptions of the first encounters from his black friends.

Table 1  
Strength of Queensland police force, 1864-1872

Year	Departments	White police	Native police	Total	Expenditure	Population
1864	3	178	164	345	£43,397	74,036
1865	3	239	124	366	£44,972	87,804
1866	4	267	151	422	£52,297	96,201
1867	4	297	112	413	£53,888	99,849
1868	4	301	106	417	£60,223	107,427
1869	4	288	114	406	£57,045	109,897
1870	3	299	114	416	£57,716	115,567
1871	3	309	118	430	£58,326	125,146
1872	3	337	145	485	£64,267	135,497

From 'Report from the Acting Commissioner of Police for the Year 1872', 1873 *V. & P.*, p. 918. In 1868, the total should be 411. The term 'Departments' refers to personnel.

On 25 January 1863, when James Morrill made contact with the advancing white settlers at Inkerman Station, he was able to describe something of how the Native Police and 'keeping them out' affected the Aborigines. He told of misunderstanding, fear, and malice. In 1860, a ship, which Morrill believed to be the *Spitfire*, engaged in Dalrymple's Burdekin exploration, hove to at Cape Cleveland. The Aborigines tried to make the Europeans understand that there was a white man living with them in accordance with Morrill's request. The Europeans grew alarmed and fired upon the apparently menacing 'savages', killing one of Morrill's friends and wounding another.

The next encounter Morrill heard of occurred about three years later. Some Aborigines were lamenting the death of an old man when an unnoticed settler fired upon them killing the old man's son. Presumably, this was the opening gambit of 'keeping the blacks out'. Later the Aborigines induced this settler to dismount and slew him. Thinking the horse was also rational and malevolent, they tried to kill it too.

Reports of the encroaching whites increased, each one bringing fresh evidence of their ruthlessness. A party of Native Police with squatter volunteers shot down the Aborigines Morrill had lived with at Port Denison. Next, fifteen members of the tribe Morrill was then living with were shot dead while on a fishing expedition. By 1863, 'keeping them



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out' meant that the Aborigines could not safely win their livelihood from their own country.

They also realised that their tribal lands were being changed by the mere presence of the white man. Some had watched while a herd of cattle drank a waterhole dry, temptingly exposing the fish which they were afraid to come forward and take. Morrill had commented on the great variety of edible plant life utilised by the Aborigines, much of which would have been consumed or destroyed by the vast numbers of voracious, hard-hoofed cattle pouring into the region. At a simple economic level, the food and water resources which were just sufficient to support the tribes in a dry season were being limited and free access to them denied. Eventually, Morrill persuaded the Aborigines to let him go as an emissary to attempt to come to terms with the invaders.

Morrill made it clear to the Aborigines that the Europeans would dispossess them of their land, a prospect which caused great distress. They requested Morrill to ask the Europeans to let them keep some of their tribal lands, even if only the coastal swamps which were valueless to the invaders. Morrill probably helped formulate the proposal and gave it much emphasis in his pamphlet published in 1863. The Queensland government, however, made no response and a unique opportunity in Aboriginal-European relations in Queensland was lost.<sup>41</sup>

It was not because Morrill was held in low esteem. Governor Bowen conversed with him on several occasions and, 'finding him to be a very respectable and intelligent man', obtained a job for him at Bowen.

At Bowen, Morrill married an emigrant girl 'and was universally liked and respected'; the chief journals of the Australian colonies were much interested in his experiences, as was the Secretary of State, the Duke of Newcastle.<sup>42</sup>

Morrill's eagerness to act as mediator was deemed a failure before the close of 1863. It was rumoured that the squatters were dangerously hostile to him because they beleived him in league with the Aborigines to destroy their flocks while, it was alleged, the Aborigines had come to mistrust him because of his association with the settlers. In his obituary in the *Port Denison Times*, mention was made of the government's fear that he would rejoin the Aborigines and 'cause mischief'.<sup>43</sup>

It was unlikely that a squatter-dominated government would legislate to give land rights to a race it regarded as nomadic savages. Even the sympathetic Governor Bowen had claimed the Aborigines only 'wandered' over the country. Europeans would only accept the land rights of nomadic hunters and food gatherers if they were forced to do so. Like Dalrymple, Morrill did not understand the basic conflict of cultures which required more than goodwill to provide a solution.<sup>44</sup>

As early as 1863, Morrill was able to describe the depopulation in the Bowen District resulting from frontier conflict which was still continuing: 'The work of extinction is gradually but surely going on among the Aborigines. The tribe I was living with is far less numerous now than when I went among them'. Morrill indicted the settlers and the Native Police but also blamed 'the wars, fights, . . . and the natural deterioration of the people themselves'. Yet Morrill had previously acknowledged that traditional Aboriginal 'wars' caused little loss of life, an observation supported by modern authorities.<sup>45</sup> Similarly Morrill spoke of the 'natural deterioration of the people', presumably implying their decline in health and numbers. It is clear that Morrill was indicating the increased inter-tribal warfare and an unnatural deterioration in the physical and, possibly, mental health of the people consequent upon the chaos into which Aboriginal life was thrown by the European invasion. The very basis of the Aborigines' economic, social, and religious life was disrupted, natural resources restricted, alien land trespassed upon, dietary habits changed, and the security of their sacred life shattered.

In their determination to break Aboriginal resistance, the settlers often provoked it. Thus they deliberately destroyed or appropriated such important Aboriginal equipment as spears, fish nets, wallaby nets, rugs, and tomahawks which the Aborigines had been forced to abandon. More provocative, of course, was the indiscriminate slaughter of unoffending Aborigines which was inherent in the policy of 'keeping the blacks out' and the associated Native Police policy of 'dispersal', as a brief report of what was probably a routine Native Police reprisal indicates.<sup>46</sup> In retaliation for heavy stock losses, Inspector Isley and six troopers swept south from Bowen 'dispersing' two 'mobs' of Aborigines on the Don River, through the Proserpine District to the Mackay District where Isley attacked at least five more 'mobs' several of which were termed 'very large'. In the area he had passed through, the Aborigines had re-commenced killing cattle so, on his return north, he attacked them, driving them over the ranges. Even frontiersmen well-disposed towards the Aborigines believed this was unavoidable, justifying it on the grounds of tribal, and often, it seems racial responsibility for particular offences against the settlers. Thus one commented: 'each tribe is fully aware that it is responsible not only to the whites but to other tribes of blackfellows for the acts of its members'.<sup>47</sup> Aboriginal social and political organisation rendered this expectation unreal and Aborigines must have often concluded that the invaders were inexplicably and irrationally murderous.

Another common source of great provocation during this period of frontier conflict was the kidnapping of Aboriginal women and children. As will be seen, this practice was common throughout the whole North Queensland frontier. It was also a feature of life in the pacified areas.

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However, even while frontier conflict raged, squatters took Aboriginal women, or allowed them to be taken, from their tribes to provide concubines for themselves, for white employees, and for the Aboriginal employees they brought from the south. These women soon became useful sources of labour. In the predominantly male society of the frontier, it was predictable that at least some squatters and their white employees would turn to Aboriginal women to satisfy their sexual needs either on a casual basis or through some more permanent relationship. However, it is obvious that when Aboriginal women were kidnapped or taken from their tribes without the sanction of their kin this would be extremely provocative.<sup>48</sup> Children, too, were commonly taken from their parents or kin to work on the stations during this period of frontier conflict. Thus Charles Eden, a Police Magistrate at Cardwell, recorded in his reminiscences his kidnapping of a twelve-year-old boy because he thought the boy would be useful; while Richard Anning described how his father, who had taken up Reedy Springs on the Upper Flinders in May 1862, had captured a young lad to work on the station—'catchem young' he recorded.<sup>49</sup> Even in the Burketown District before hostilities developed, settlers were insensitively exploiting the Aborigines for their labour and their women. Sometimes the Aboriginal women and children either accepted their fate or came to prefer it to their tribal life. Thus, in the Burketown District before the outbreak of hostilities, an Aboriginal parent reclaimed his son only to have the boy run away to return to the station.<sup>50</sup> Some old Aborigines interviewed in the course of this research have also indicated their great reluctance to return to tribal life after being taken into stations as children.<sup>51</sup> However, the removal of Aboriginal women and children from their kin was as destructive of traditional Aboriginal life as the massacre of the men and often no more humane. Yet, the full cost of frontier conflict was not apparent to the Aborigines until the Europeans 'let them in'.

Except in a very few circumstances, the Aborigines had not been allowed to reach an accommodation with the colonists until after the invaders had asserted their dominance. The Aborigines were engaged, generally for a number of years, in a bitter and bloody conflict which not only damaged their way of life but also must have caused great personal stress and produced a fierce resentment against those inflicting the suffering. Basic to the conflict was land usage and land ownership. Accommodation could only mean dispossession.

Dispossessing the Aborigines entailed many obvious costs for the Europeans. Conflict was almost universal in the process of pastoral occupation and it was not until 1868 or 1869 that pastoralists in parts of the Kennedy thought it safe to let the Aborigines in. Even then some thought it premature.<sup>52</sup>

Before the Aborigines were allowed in, an important cost to the squatter was the tension of life on the frontier. W.R.O. Hill, manager of a station west of Bowen and later a respected public servant, wrote: 'I can only say that life was never safe, and the only wise thing to do on seeing a black was to shoot, and shoot straight, otherwise he would certainly spear you.'<sup>53</sup> There was a very real fear that death could come to a settler out of a clear blue sky, suddenly without warning and, it appeared to most settlers, without provocation. Each local newspaper reported Aboriginal attacks and European deaths from all over North Queensland often in horrifying detail and in a period of almost universal frontier conflict this must have helped reinforce the belief that a sudden 'treacherous' attack was always possible.

Contemporaries believed that the loss of life on the frontier during the 1860s was very large. Robert Gray of Hughenden Station estimated that 10 to 20 per cent of the white population were killed by the Aborigines while a police officer said 20 to 30 per cent.<sup>54</sup> They were probably taking into account the killing of shepherds and travellers, otherwise unrecorded, but possibly over-compensated. In the course of this research fifty-six deaths were discovered which could reliably be attributed to Aboriginal resistance on the pastoral frontier during the 1860s, with indications that there may have been ten more. Because of the paucity of the records in this early period, these figures are probably misleadingly low. However, if one considered the extremely limited population on the frontier where Aboriginal resistance could be expected, a death rate of between six and, say, twelve a year would be significant and frightening, especially as this was combined with a much larger number of unsuccessful attacks, woundings, and threatened and feared attacks. Indeed, there was also the fear, perhaps the expectation, that the numerous attacks on cattle and sheep were as suggestive of danger to the human as to the animal invader.<sup>55</sup> Moreover the number of lives thought to have been lost or believed to be in imminent danger was more important than statistics, however accurate, which were not known at the time.<sup>56</sup>

There was another aspect of the danger involved in dispossessing the Aborigines. Thus Montagu Curr, looking back over a long life, claimed that it had added the spice of adventure to taking up land. He wrote:

We thoroughly enjoyed those days of wild and romantic life, with our horses and our gun, swimming flooded rivers, with the danger of being dragged under by undertows or swept under driftwood, and always the danger of being speared by some blackfellow ambushed under cover, so we had to be ready to protect ourselves and try and keep our powder dry.<sup>57</sup>

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When Byerley edited and published the Jardines' journals in 1867, he proclaimed their reluctance to shed blood; yet it is clear that they accepted opposition as a declaration of war and ignored any real effort to come to terms with the Aborigines. And Byerley, anticipating an appreciative reading public, glorified the encounters, terming one, in which at least thirty unarmed Aborigines were killed, 'The Battle of the Mitchell'. In 1865, the Queensland newspapers had carried long extracts of this journal, much space being devoted to the conflict with the Aborigines. An entry for 21 December read: 'In this instance it was thought better to carry the war into the enemy's camp than to have them throwing spears at us in the night. Most of our party went after them, and an exciting chase commenced.'<sup>58</sup> To some, it seems, such was life on the frontier.

Yet in North Queensland, Aboriginal resistance was often a very important obstacle facing the pastoralists. There has been a popular tendency to see Aboriginal resistance as spasmodic, as almost a non-intelligent reflex response to periodic irritations. As has been previously indicated, in North Queensland at least, and probably more often elsewhere than has been realised, there is ample evidence that Aborigines communicated the nature of the threat the invaders offered over long distances and that they reacted in a variety of ways according to the nature of such information. In areas where the nature of European firepower was apparently not understood, such as at first in the Bowen District and later with the Jardines in Cape York Peninsula, the Aborigines sometimes responded to what they must have regarded as a hostile intrusion with direct and determined confrontation.

As the Aborigines came to understand better their enemy, they began to adopt more appropriate responses wherever possible. In the Kennedy District where conflict was almost universal, Aborigines responded to the settlers and the Native Police generally by attacking isolated shepherds, unsuspecting travellers, and station homesteads they thought were poorly defended. Often, the inability of the settlers to retaliate effectively produced more determined Aboriginal resistance. Thus where the terrain was suitable their attacks were often prolonged despite the fact that constantly retreating to inhospitable hills, scrubs, and islands must have meant very great readjustments to their traditional life. When the runs were heavily stocked, Aboriginal food resources decreased or became less accessible, and Aboriginal raids on the settlers' herds and flocks increased. Thus in June 1866, one station in the Mackay District reported twenty-five cattle killed, while ten other stations in that area had all suffered losses. On one station, the pastoralist claimed the Aborigines had killed two hundred cattle in one year. Attacks on the settlers' cattle in the Townsville District became so frequent that the local newspapers remarked more than once that they were tired of the subject.<sup>59</sup>

However, the deliberate destructiveness of Aboriginal raids noted in the Burke District seems to have been characteristic of the later stage of resistance when the Aborigines were retaliating against the settlers' presence or aggressive actions and attempting to drive them from the land. An Aboriginal woman told Christison of Lammermoor that the Aborigines understood the value the whites placed on their horses and cattle and realised what their reactions would be to Aboriginal raids but were still determined to kill stock.<sup>60</sup> There are numerous examples of the driving off of large numbers of animals and the wholesale slaughter of beasts, with little or no attempt to use them for food, to attest to the widespread nature of this determination. From Mackay infuriated squatters reported that the Aborigines had killed three to four hundred sheep and taken nothing but kidney fat. A Bowen resident recorded flocks of two thousand sheep scattered and up to four hundred killed at a time. In possibly the most destructive raid reported in North Queensland, John Yeates, the Mayor of Bowen, whose property was only fifteen miles from that town lost 1,300 sheep which he valued at 10s. each and 36 rams at £2.10s. each. In addition, his huts were pillaged and damaged to an estimated value of £55.<sup>61</sup> Headstations and outstations were sometimes attacked and attempts made to loot and destroy them. In March 1868, the Europeans at Crystalbrook Station had to flee for their lives, while Merri Merriwah Station was attacked by about thirty Aborigines and the occupants rescued just in time.<sup>62</sup>

Yet the animals killed by Aborigines were only part of the loss inflicted upon squatters, and sometimes the least serious. The loss of condition by herds repeatedly disturbed by Aborigines could be much more important. It is not clear how far this was deliberately intended and how far it was a consequence of attempts to kill some or to drive herds from waterholes. This was especially serious when they were to be boiled down for tallow for, until the gold rushes of the late 1860s, there was very little market for beef.<sup>63</sup> At the much raided Balnagowan Station in the Mackay District, only one beast was killed when four hundred cattle were galloped nearly eight miles. The *Mackay Mercury* complained:

If the blacks merely killed a beast now and again without indulging their propensities for a general onslaught upon the remainder of any mob they may choose to select one from, the loss to a squatter would be comparatively trifling; but this has never been the case, and outrages are invariably accompanied with great injury, especially to those who have stations bordering upon the sea coast.

The *Mackay Mercury* maintained that the cattle would not fatten because they were so disturbed by the Aborigines and that this had delayed the progress of Mackay's boiling down works. Against this sort of assault the

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only answer seemed to be more Native Police.<sup>64</sup>

In this early period of open conflict there is very little detailed European comment on the methods used by the Aborigines in their resistance of the settlers and, of course, an almost complete lack of comment from the Aborigines. However, there is some evidence to suggest what becomes more apparent in the later stages of the pastoral frontier and on the mining frontier: that the Aborigines used traditional hunting techniques against the settlers' animals and that they modified these in accordance with the new conditions. As unprotected, docile sheep and cattle were easy game for such expert huntsmen, they used wallaby-drive techniques when they wished to slaughter large numbers of the compliant animals. Aborigines found unguarded sheep easy to handle and sometimes drove them off to remote or almost inaccessible places, this practice being no doubt forced on them both by the policy of 'keeping the blacks out', which often compelled them to occupy regions unused by the pastoralist, and by the fear of reprisals. Eden reported a story he had at second hand of one group of Aborigines copying the settlers and building a yard, regularly shepherding the sheep, and butchering them systematically. This sounds like a traveller's tale except that a similar story was reliably reported from the Tully River where a group of Aborigines were killing, jerking, and drying beef in typical European fashion. In this case, the Aborigines were believed to be escaped Native Police troopers. While there is nothing inherently improbable in the belief that Aborigines formerly in European employ took the lead in such activities, the claim may merely reflect the conviction that Aborigines lacked intelligence to imitate such activities.<sup>65</sup> Wood indicated that some Aborigines in the Bowen District drove cattle through a narrow pass into natural hilly enclosures where they slaughtered the animals at their leisure; while two members of the Koko Patun tribe told me that, on the Valley of Lagoons, two Aborigines famous for their speed and daring, 'Charlie White' and 'Long Tommy', specialised in cutting a bullock out of the herd and driving it towards fellow tribesmen waiting to spear it.<sup>66</sup> On the Mulgrave River, Collinson indicated that the Aborigines adapted their custom of digging pits to trap cattle. The pits were placed on well-used cattle tracks and the cattle in them speared.<sup>67</sup> The Aborigines thus seemed to adapt quickly to the alien challenge despite the inhibiting dangers involved.

Another common Aboriginal practice that was completely inimical to pastoral occupation was the extensive burning of grass. Fire was deliberately used against intruders in North Queensland from the time of Cook and it is very probable that it was used deliberately against the squatter's animals as it was against native game although there is no direct evidence of this.<sup>68</sup> There is one reliable report, in 1885, that the

Aborigines of the Tully River used fire as a weapon against the settlers' property as some Aborigines who had been placated by Isaac Henry, nephew of the pastoralist Tyson, informed him that hostile Aborigines intended to burn him out. As they had killed 69 of his cattle and 200 of Tyson's in ten months and forced three other settlers off their properties, Henry believed this to be no idle threat.<sup>69</sup> It seems likely that fire was used deliberately against the intruders and their animals much more frequently than would appear from the extant records and probably more frequently than the settlers themselves realised.

The effectiveness of traditional or modified Aboriginal techniques was such as to make heavy demands upon the Native Police, a force that had been created especially to counter Aboriginal resistance. Yet the rapid expansion of European settlement in North Queensland in the 1860s very often left the pastoralists inadequately protected and often not provided with a retaliatory force. This was clearly brought out when twelve men were killed by Aborigines on or near Natal Downs during late 1864 and early 1865. Four of the men killed had been on the main road from the Cape River (and ultimately Bowen) to the Flinders, thus showing the threat to all stock travelling to the Gulf of Carpentaria. Two shepherds had been killed twenty miles from the headstation 'notwithstanding our practice of having 2 men armed with each flock'. The ability of the squatter to protect his employees on a run of this size or to 'keep the blacks out' so that they were unable to launch a surprise attack was limited unless he had a body of men to roam at will to do just that. He believed this was the role of the Native Police; yet their camp was 130 miles away on the Bowen River and on this occasion, as all of the detachment's horses were knocked up, it could not reach Natal Downs for a fortnight. It was not surprising that John Melton Black abandoned the neighbouring station, Victoria Downs, after two shepherds had been killed, a victory which the manager of Natal Downs claimed had emboldened the Aborigines. The government's response was to form another Native Police camp, which was no nearer Natal Downs than the existing one but which would allow more frequent patrols to the area.<sup>70</sup>

There were very few stations where there was no conflict such as Robert Christison's Lammermoor, south west of Hughenden. Here Christison had taken the initiative, captured an Aboriginal, established friendly communications with the Aborigines and explained to them the conditions by which they would be allowed to live their lives in safety and Christison would be able to develop his station. He had refused to allow the Native Police on his station, a practice that was hotly criticised by most settlers from the earliest days of Queensland to the 1880s. The success of this experiment depended to a large extent on Christison's humanitarian concern for the Aborigines which did not evaporate at the



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first crisis when the Aborigines decided to attack him.<sup>71</sup> The conflict on adjoining stations and protection from the Native Police also provided strong incentives for the Aborigines on Lammermoor to abide by Christison's conditions.

Most pastoralists borrowed heavily in order to stock their runs, and in the crucial early years of becoming established had no financial reserves from which to replace losses or meet 'unproductive' costs like that of armed protection against Aborigines. The practice was encouraged, though not created, by the 1860 Land Act which stipulated that each run had to be stocked to one-quarter of its capacity before a lease could be granted. This legislation also tempted the pastoralist with a comparatively secure, fairly long-tenured lease (fourteen years) at a low rental of ten shillings per square mile. Wealthier pastoralists tended to take up a series of runs and stock each to the legal minimum, rather than stock fully a smaller number of runs from the outset. The tendency of the pastoralists to strain their financial resources to the limit on taking up runs was intensified by an 1863 amending act which made stocking the run to the legal minimum the basis of initial occupation. This was intended to close the loophole which enabled a speculator to take out a licence to occupy a choice run in order to sell at a profit a few months later before the first official inspection revealed that no attempt had been made to stock it. The amendment thus increased the competition to put stock on the runs. Such speculation was based on the expectation that northern runs would continue to be an attractive investment. In 1867, an inquiry revealed the still unsatisfactory speculative aspect of the large land holdings and resulted in the stricter enforcing of regulations relating to the stocking of land.<sup>72</sup>

However, during late 1865 the pastoralists were discovering that the sheep industry was unprofitable in North Queensland. As Bolton points out, there is no simple explanation for the failure of the pastoral industry during the 1860s. In part, the graziers found problems adjusting to a tropical environment. As well, costs were high, especially the cost of labour. Shepherds were demanding 50 per cent higher wages than they would have received in southern Queensland. Yet fencing to replace shepherding was almost unknown in North Queensland in the 1860s. Labour was always in short supply and satisfactory labour even more difficult to obtain: yet shepherding required a large labour supply. Although wool exports continued to grow until 1868, the pastoralists were turning, with no enthusiasm, to cattle, for which there was no real market until 1866 when the first boiling down works opened in Townsville.<sup>73</sup>

The wool industry was beset by further problems. The wool prices for several seasons dropped alarmingly. On the coast sheep were found to be prone to foot rot, fluke and worms. Yet probably the most decisive factor

in the swing away from sheep was the spread of spear grass whose seed penetrated the skin of the sheep and could kill them. The spread of this grass largely resulted from overgrazing although most likely associated with the practice of burning to encourage new growth. Palmer claimed that the presence of spear grass in quantity immediately indicated the run could not support sheep. Thus for a variety of reasons sheep numbers began falling in the late 1860s, and by 1871 had been replaced by cattle on most stations.<sup>74</sup>

Some graziers were already selling out to salvage something from their investment and by June 1866 there were many North Queensland stations up for sale with no takers on any terms. The collapse of the Agra & Masterton Bank, which was underwriting much of Queensland's extravagant borrowing, had a grave effect upon the whole colony, especially the many North Queensland squatters who were still getting established.<sup>75</sup>

The Aborigines were thus one of a complex of problems confronting the pastoralist of the 1860s. In some areas, this resistance was enough on its own to cause stations to be abandoned. On more, as the promise of riches from the pastoral industry disappeared, Aboriginal resistance was a crucial factor. The ever present struggle involving the threat to life, the need to protect the capital invested in animals, and the apparent impossibility of preventing stock losses made Aboriginal resistance much more than just another problem. Yet at this very time the protection offered to the squatter by the Native Police was reduced as a result of the government's economy measures and the use of the Native Police as a gold escort. In some areas the Native Police detachments were removed as the Police Commissioner tried desperately to rationalise his forces to achieve a protective cover for the squatters. Often, as on a station in the North Kennedy, the withdrawal of a detachment was followed by an increase in the destruction of stock and threats to life.<sup>76</sup>

Indeed it was widely alleged that insufficient Native Police protection against Aboriginal attacks was causing the abandonment of stations. From the latest area settled, the Gulf Country, there were reports that squatters were abandoning their runs for this reason. Here the difficulties of establishment and frontier conflict were aggravated by the extremely high price of labour. Shepherds, no matter how inefficient, could demand 35 shillings per week which was 75 per cent above the south Queensland rate. Graziers in this area were further disadvantaged when the police magistrate, Landsborough, decreed that employees could not be held financially responsible for their negligence;<sup>77</sup> while in the first settled region, the Port Denison District, Inspector Marlow reported that the number of 'collisions' with and 'depredations' by Aborigines from the middle of 1865 to the end of 1867 were double that of the previous eighteen months. The Police Commissioner informed the Colonial

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Secretary that the existing force was unable to prevent 'outrages' in the Port Denison District and endorsed a plan from the harassed Marlow which aimed at collecting all the coastal Aborigines from Port Mackay to Townsville and confining them on an island off the coast where they could be 'taught to be useful'. The Colonial Secretary was 'unable to entertain' increased expenditure nor to consider Marlow's proposition although he found it interesting. In this area in 1868, the Police Commissioner reported stations had been abandoned or were being abandoned because of Aboriginal hostility.<sup>78</sup> One such was Yeates's station fifteen miles from Bowen. As mentioned previously, he had lost 1,300 sheep and 36 rams and sustained damage to property estimated at £55. As well, one of his shepherds was killed and five others left the run and refused to return. Yeates, who was Mayor of Bowen, petitioned the parliament for indemnity because he had not been given police protection. The government expressed sympathy but felt there were no grounds for compensation. Yeates abandoned his station.<sup>79</sup>

Although Aboriginal resistance was but one of many problems confronting the squatters of North Queensland, it was often the most vexatious. Its consequences were obvious and it seemed that it, at least, could be solved if more Native Police were provided or if the squatters really applied themselves to their often threatened 'war of extermination'. A financial collapse, fluctuating markets, ecological changes, diseases in stock were beyond the control and often the understanding of the man on the run. Aboriginal resistance did not seem to be. As a result, this was the problem that dominated the newspapers of the day and the one that could rouse the pastoralists to fury.

The Aborigines not only drained the squatter's capital by causing destruction; they also increased his expenses. More labour had to be employed to provide increased protection than was needed for the actual running of a station. Sometimes, at least, these men were used aggressively to clear Aborigines off the property, and it was quite plain that pastoral employees were expected to use firearms against Aborigines. John Yeates was criticised by Inspector Marlow as well as other squatters when he claimed he had not armed his shepherds effectively because he did not think it was their right or responsibility to kill Aborigines, a task which he believed the Native Police should fulfil. W.R.O. Hill when managing Reedy Park, west of Bowen, conformed more to northern expectations. Each shepherd had a Terry rifle and a Colt 12 revolver while Hill's hut was loop-holed to fire through, a precaution which he found 'very useful'.<sup>80</sup>

The disturbance of the cattle by the Aborigines caused another expense. When cattle were first put on the unfenced runs, they had to be 'tailed'; that is, someone rode around the herd for some months until the cattle

were content to remain there. This process often had to be repeated after Aboriginal attacks thus consuming valuable labour and time, giving very real meaning to the common nineteenth century expression that Aborigines and cattle did not mix.<sup>81</sup>

Even at the high wages employees could command they were difficult to obtain. One moderate speaker at a public meeting in Brisbane asserted that unemployed immigrant townsmen from Britain could not be expected to take lonely jobs up country 'where after a couple of years they would be imbeciles in mind or idiots for life'.<sup>82</sup> This normal reluctance to leave the towns was accentuated when the jobs offering were in areas where conflict was occurring with the Aborigines. Robert Gray reported how one of his shepherds refused to stop by himself at Mt McConnell and 'the less seasoned among them said they were not going to risk their lives for 30 bob a week and tucker'. This evidence, plus that of Yeates near Bowen and Davidson near Cardwell, indicated that such labour was likely to leave when most needed to protect the stock and property against aggressive Aborigines.<sup>83</sup> Shortage of labour and high wages were constant problems of the pioneer squatters for which Aboriginal resistance was in no small part responsible.

Many problems faced the northern pastoralists in the late 1860s which not only sapped their finance but their enthusiasm and confidence as well. Edward Palmer, who had experienced these times, wrote: 'the march of settlement was instantly checked, and the outward flow of civilization turned backwards'. Stations in outlying areas like the Barkly Tableland were abandoned completely and not reoccupied for a decade when, Palmer remarked, the new generation were sometimes surprised to find signs of previous occupancy.<sup>84</sup> Between 1868 and 1870, a total of 299 runs or 18,094 square miles were abandoned in North Queensland. By 1872, there were few runs occupied on the Barkly Tableland, the Gregory and the Leichhardt. The stock was abandoned or removed to areas closer in where it was sold or boiled down for tallow.<sup>85</sup> As runs had been abandoned and were available much closer to the coast, the Gulf country runs were valueless. In 1870, the Commissioner for Crown Lands for the Burke District stated that though he had 'so much country, so well adapted for cattle and horses . . . unoccupied', the Gulf Lowlands had 'such a bad name that I fear they are not likely to meet with favour in the market if offered just now'.<sup>86</sup>

The pastoralists who stayed on were 'a few dozen struggling resident owners' who had all their financial resources and any possible hope for the future invested in their runs. Capitalists, like Robert Towns, John Robertson, and the Bowen Downs Company, could find much more attractive fields of investment elsewhere. The North Queensland pastoral

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industry became a 'small man's frontier'. But, as Bolton remarked, the owner-managers probably could not have survived without the discovery of the North Queensland goldfields which provided markets for the cattle.<sup>87</sup>

The period 1861 to 1868 was unique in the history of Aboriginal-European relations in North Queensland in that it was one of uncomplicated frontier conflict. Until 1868, there was no reported change in the policy of 'keeping the blacks out'. However, in January 1868, Aborigines were admitted at Natal Downs on the Cape River and, later that year, at other stations like Vane Creek on the Belyando.<sup>88</sup> By February 1869, Bode of Strathdon, near Bowen, had established communications with Aborigines on his station and admitted them. The *Port Denison Times* reported that the 'blackfellows' were anxious to be let in and were appearing openly on the outskirts of the town, to which they were soon admitted. By May 1869, the process had spread so much that one squatter claimed they were wholly admitted between Bowen and Townsville. The Aborigines and European colonists in many areas of North Queensland were entering into a new relationship.<sup>89</sup>

During the period 1870 to 1897, throughout most of Queensland hostile contact between Europeans and Aborigines still took place mainly on the pastoral frontier. The mining industry was partly responsible for this in that it stimulated pastoral development in settled areas, revived pastoral activity in many areas that had been abandoned, and attracted pastoralists to Cape York Peninsula.

The period of the late 1860s and early 1870s provided a respite for many Aboriginal groups who had experienced the earlier dramatic pastoral expansion only to see their enemies curtail their activities or retreat with their animals. The resident owners who remained were no doubt even more determined to prevent losses to Aborigines but, as the squatters failed to increase, and often decreased, their herds, the Aborigines in some areas accommodated to the new situation. One can only speculate on the effect on the Aborigines of seeing the departure of the Europeans from some or all of their tribal lands and their subsequent return a few years later.

The acting Police Commissioner remarked that, in 1872, 'outrages' of the Aborigines had 'considerably increased as civilisation has advanced, and the country became occupied for pastoral, mining, and other purposes'. In 1874, the Police Commissioner was granted an increase in both ordinary and Native Police 'in consequence of the re-occupation of the stations in the Northern districts and the sudden influx of population in the hitherto unknown Palmer and Endeavour river country'. In fact, the distribution of the Native Police force indicates that conflict in North Queensland in the 1870s and 1880s was very severe. The increased

prosperity of the Colony was one reason for the expansion of the force; the other was certainly necessity. The Police Commissioner constantly had to rationalise his force during this period to meet the most urgent demands and always worked within the penny-pinching framework of nineteenth century liberal ideas of government; yet it was not until 1889 that there was a sizeable reduction in the force.<sup>90</sup>

In 1875, the Police Commissioner announced a plan to move Native Police detachments to the most unsettled districts leaving a tracker or trackers attached to the ordinary police stations. This was intended, in part, to help him cope with the 'incessant' demands for additional Native Police protection in the wake of the northern goldfields and pastoral expansion. In reality he was increasing the number of white police performing Native Police duties in areas considered moderately disturbed or pacified but unsafe. These constables or sergeants performed ordinary police duties but as well were expected to undertake prolonged, regular mounted bush patrols, retaliate against Aboriginal raids upon stock, crops, etc. and 'disperse' Aborigines who were considered menacing.

This change of policy entailed stationing policemen who were good horsemen and good bushmen at strategic points in moderately disturbed areas. Such a procedure was not unknown previously. Now it became part of a slowly evolving plan to such an extent that men like Constables Hansen and Higgins and Sergeant Whiteford became as important to Aboriginal-European relations on the frontier as Sub-Inspectors of Native Police like Douglas, Johnstone, and Lamond. They were expected to keep a district quiet rather than make it quiet. Thus, although they were generally less aggressive than the Native Police and had an ordinary policeman as their immediate superior, they performed many of the functions of that force.<sup>91</sup>

The residents in these moderately troubled areas were opposed to the removal of the Native Police but it accorded with the wishes of the legislature and indirectly with that vocal body of public opinion that disapproved of the Native Police. In his report for 1879, the Police Commissioner pointed out that he had broken up several detachments of the Native Police and distributed the troopers as trackers among the ordinary police stations as he had done the previous year. He still regarded this procedure as experimental but envisaged the 'gradual disembodying of the Native Police Force until the Native Police, as a separate Force, ceases to exist'. This did not happen for another twenty years. However, in his report for 1880, one-third of the one hundred and sixty Aboriginal police were trackers, the remainder troopers in the Native Police.<sup>92</sup>

During this period, 1870 to 1897, there were two features of frontier conflict: first it was progressively confined to North Queensland; and secondly, it tended to drag on in some coastal areas longer than might be

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expected, certainly longer than the Police Commissioner expected, a fact he lamented as late as 1884.<sup>93</sup>

In parts of the Bowen District, the Aborigines were still resisting the squatters as late as 1881. The editor of the *Port Denison Times* doubted 'whether two black troopers here and two at Mackay will be sufficient force to prevent or even check their depredations'. He also pondered philosophically upon the extension, from the Native Police to the ordinary police force, of the customary, if illegal, practice of arbitrarily shooting down Aborigines and wondered 'whether it will improve the *morale* of the police to make them executioners not by warrant of law but merely as an experiment on the part of the government'.<sup>94</sup> This, in areas that were first settled in the early 1860s.

In many areas after the main frontier conflict, there was a period when the two races uneasily co-existed. In some areas Aborigines were let in but continued to live traditional lives with, at first, little contact with the settlers. In others, a reduction in Aboriginal attacks led settlers to cease direct interference with Aborigines without any conscious adoption of a policy of letting in. During this period of mutual suspicion and fear, occasional hostile actions were common on both sides.<sup>95</sup>

Settlers were sometimes aggressive or provocative or they incensed Aborigines by making unwelcome approaches to their womenfolk. Thus at Hughenden a constable was accused of needlessly firing Aboriginal camps; while near Bowen a squatter infuriated 'Larry', the leader of a group of Aborigines, by ordering them away and threatening them.<sup>96</sup>

Near Cloncurry a station employee was killed in a period when the Aborigines were not troubling the pastoralists because he tried to keep an Aboriginal woman against her and her husband's wishes. Such provocative liaisons with Aboriginal women became very common as soon as the most tenuous contact was established.<sup>97</sup>

The Aborigines often renewed attacks on the settlers' cattle, although this was generally on a small scale and presumably for food. In some cases, 'civilised' Aborigines, that is, Aborigines who had worked for the settlers and learned some English and something of the settlers' way of life, were involved in such attacks, and sometimes seem to have assumed leadership. Europeans often referred to Aborigines by a European name, even some who were hostile and aggressively continuing to live a traditional life; for example, one Aboriginal leader of a group raiding cattle was referred to as 'Hector'.<sup>98</sup> The settlers considered a 'civilised' Aboriginal's return to his tribal life a reversion to barbarism. Moreover, the thought of an Aboriginal using his understanding of the settlers against them, when they were still outnumbered on their runs and extremely vulnerable, was a recurrent fear which was very easily activated, as the exasperated tone of one report to the *Port Denison Times* revealed: 'one palavering

two faced animal stops at the station to watch the movements of the whites, to give them who are doing the mischief the tip—which way the station hands go out—in case the blacks should be caught in the act'.<sup>99</sup> The settlers on the lower Burdekin became terrified when it was reported that the Aborigines on Inkerman Station were being led by 'Whistler', a Brisbane Aboriginal. He had summoned the women off the station to join the band and, according to an Aboriginal who remained on the station, intended to kill and mutilate all the whites and to use the horses to hunt cattle.<sup>1</sup> The conclusion of this daring act of resistance was not reported but it can be easily surmised.

Settlers were quick to demand that even minor resurgences of Aboriginal hostility be crushed by the ordinary police or the Native Police. Almost invariably they protested against the removal of their Native Police detachment and demanded its restoration or renewed patrols at the first sign of trouble because of the inability of a constable and two trackers to terrify the Aborigines over a wide area. The Bowen Sergeant of Police was scorned for refusing to take action against a group of Aborigines just outside the town because he 'was not quite sure' they were guilty.<sup>2</sup>

As most of the responsibility for intimidating the Aborigines rested on the settlers themselves, even with the Native Police in the district, in this period of co-existence, it is not difficult to see why they objected to the removal of the local detachment. They believed their already onerous responsibility would become almost intolerable and much more dangerous. On Cargoon Station when the Anning Brothers rode out to attack some Aborigines who were spearing cattle, one was suddenly set upon by a 'civilised' Aboriginal who had sent the other Anning off on a wild goose chase.<sup>3</sup> Very often the squatter took the law into his own hands to force the Aborigines on his station to accept his conditions for co-existence. Such actions could range from fighting and using a stockwhip to shooting and poisoning.<sup>4</sup> In fact, it is possible that poison was used as frequently against Aborigines in this twilight situation as it was in the previous period of open conflict; if an article in a far northern newspaper is any indication. A pastoralist east of the Hodgkinson Goldfield found a very large group of Aborigines around the body of a recently speared bullock, but they escaped before he could extract vengeance with his rifle.

Thinking it a pity to lose so good an opportunity of poisoning some of the hawks and dingoes with which the country is infested, our pastoral friend literally peppered the carcass of his quondam grass-eater with that violent corrosive venom—arsenic; and (in order that none of the pilfering curs for whom the feast was intended should partake of it) labelled the body 'POISON'. His surprise may be



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imagined when, visiting the spot to see the result of his scheme, he discovered that, disregarding his caution, a large number of the original monarchs of the soil had injudiciously partaken of the insalubrious 'bullocky' and, as a natural consequence most of them had become slightly indisposed.<sup>5</sup>

Such illegal actions were apparently common enough to make them acceptable to the colonists as a good topic for a humorous story which in this case, had been facetiously captioned: 'Dark Doings with the Sable Savages'.

The settlers retaliated ruthlessly whenever a resurgence of Aboriginal resistance seemed aimed at driving out the settlers or reasserting Aboriginal authority. Thus settlers in the Cloncurry District believed that the Kalkadunga (or Kalkadoons as they were commonly known) after a period of comparative quiet, were determined to wipe them out. An Aboriginal station employee claimed to have heard plans by apparently peaceably inclined Aborigines to kill settlers and cattle while an Aboriginal employed in the town reported that the Kalkadoons had sent a challenge to the Native Police at Cloncurry. After a Native Police detachment was attacked and the officer and three troopers killed, another detachment (under Sub-Inspector Urquhart, later Commissioner of Police), was sent to break Aboriginal resistance in this area. Urquhart made systematic punitive attacks upon the Aborigines, at length undertaking a nine week campaign which pacified them for a time. Another severe clash with the Kalkadoons at Battle Mountain, outside Cloncurry, finally destroyed the threat this tribe could offer to the pastoralists. The Kalkadoons seem to have lived in this state of uneasy co-existence with the intruding settlers for long periods of time, intermittently launching determined campaigns which produced severe retaliation. It was probably only the mountainous nature of the country that allowed them to resist for so long and so effectively that they provided possibly the most dramatic examples of Aboriginal resurgence and European repression.<sup>6</sup>

Once again, as with Christison, it is the exception which counterpoints the main frontier theme. William Chatfield had bought Natal Downs after it had experienced several years of severe conflict with the Aborigines but was one of the first known to let in the Aborigines in North Queensland. He publicly disagreed with those who considered the Aborigines an unmitigated nuisance and the removal of the Native Police an unmixed evil. Indeed, he asserted the Native Police provoked the Aborigines and their removal was a blessing. He claimed that as the Aborigines were then, in 1881, only one-quarter as numerous as they were in 1861, any manager could keep the Aborigines on his own run 'in order' with the aid of the ordinary police. He believed that too much emphasis was

placed on the few cattle that Aborigines in the Kennedy District were then spearing while the more prevalent cattle-duffing by whites received little comment. Chatfield alleged that the Aborigines were blamed for careless management, especially when neglect led to cattle scattering and becoming wild. With 'a little trouble' he believed that the local Aborigines proved very useful in watching the cattle and accustoming them to the run, but were most valuable in controlling that marsupial population; he had seen as many as 300 wallabies and kangaroos hanging in one camp. He referred to Christison of Lammermoor who employed Aborigines all the year round as shepherds and asserted he would not be able to keep sheep on Natal Downs without them. He concluded:

We have a duty to perform toward the aborigines (which does not consist solely in administering lead) and I am convinced we shall find that doing that duty will in the long run pay the best. Personally I have suffered much loss at the hands of the Kennedy blacks, but per contra they have of late done me many services for which I shall ever feel grateful to the 'Murray' race.<sup>7</sup>

This objective European comment suggests that, in this period of tentative co-existence, the personality and attitude of the pastoralist were of very great importance; and, further, that much Aboriginal resurgence was provoked by the settlers.

Conflict was still so widespread in 1880 that the *Queenslander*, one of the colony's leading metropolitan newspapers, began to point out the ruthlessness of the Europeans' dispossession of the Aborigines under the title, 'The Way We Civilize'. The editor, Gresley Lukin, was determined: 'the public shall understand what they are doing'. The editor of the Bowen newspaper claimed that those parliamentarians who debunked the articles were lying; but in the same article demanded more Native Police protection.<sup>8</sup> Such was the pragmatism of the frontier.

The area half-way between Bowen and Mackay, especially near the present hamlets of Bloomsbury and Calen but also near Proserpine and Nebo and along the Bowen River, were scenes of prolonged and often determined Aboriginal resistance till the early 1880s. In fact, the Bloomsbury Native Police detachment was not replaced, and two troopers attached to the ordinary police at Bowen and Mackay, till 1880, while the detachment at Nebo, west of Mackay, had been removed only in 1878.<sup>9</sup> The terrain suitable for Aboriginal resistance—rugged mountainous country, thick scrub and forest, or numerous islands off the coast—which had aided the earlier resistance of the 1860s and early 1870s was also an important factor in prolonging the conflict.

This was probably the case in other coastal areas where prolonged

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conflict was recorded such as Inkerman near the mouth of the Burdekin, and the Cardwell District.<sup>10</sup> Even on the Valley of Lagoons blocks, especially on the Herbert River just west of Cardwell, Walter Scott was still demanding more Native Police protection ten years after he had first taken up the runs. Yet the Police Commissioner complained that the Valley of Lagoons had been provided with more protection than any other station in the whole colony. In the early 1880s, Walter Scott attempted to prevent Aboriginal raids on his stock by providing the Aborigines regularly with food. This attempt failed. It satisfied the Aborigines on the Valley of Lagoons headstation but not those on the periphery who accepted the rations at the Valley of Lagoons but continued to spear cattle in their own country and on the journeys back and forth.<sup>11</sup>

During the period at present being examined, 1870 to 1897, the change from sheep to cattle made the Europeans much less vulnerable as progressively the isolated shepherd's hut became rarer. As indicated previously, attacks on cattle station homesteads occurred but they were much less common and much more risky to the Aborigines.<sup>12</sup> A listing of the known deaths caused by the resistance of Aborigines on the pastoral frontier after January 1868 suggests that the danger to European life on the pastoral frontier was much less than in the 1860s. After 1875, death caused by Aboriginal resistance was an isolated occurrence, except in the Cloncurry District which, with Cape York Peninsula, now became the most dangerous place to own a station. From 1879 to 1897, only seven deaths have been discovered, which can be attributed to Aboriginal attacks, outside of the Cloncurry District and Cape York Peninsula and, after 1881, only four.<sup>13</sup>

From the early 1880s Aborigines apparently ceased to trouble pastoralists seriously except in the two areas indicated and in some places around the Gulf of Carpentaria.<sup>14</sup> This left a very large area of North Queensland where conflict was still occurring and in these areas the struggle was just as intense. This was well brought out by the incident known as the Irvinebank Massacre. The murder of a group of well-known Aborigines, accepted by the colonists as inoffensive, by a detachment of Native Police led to the officer and his troopers being put on trial by the Griffith Liberal Ministry. Many northerners felt such a course of action was a threat to their freedom to solve the Aboriginal 'problem' with violence. The northern newspapers covered the trial with interest but a letter to the *Palmer Chronicle* seemed to reflect the situation in North Queensland so well that it was repeated as the editorial of the *Herberton Advertiser* with the title: 'To Shoot or Not to Shoot That is the Question'. In this article the uncompromising nature of the struggle is clearly brought out.

The Native Police ought to be allowed complete freedom, the article

argued, and any indiscretions excused. Aboriginal resistance might brutalise the squatters but this was pardonable. Indeed, the writer had been invited to spend the Christmas holidays on the Upper Mitchell 'potting blacks'.<sup>15</sup>

Thus, except for the change from sheep to cattle, race relations on the pastoral frontier were much the same in the 1890s as they were in 1861 or even in the 1840s. Liberal use of the rifle and poison to combat Aboriginal resistance was still common in Cape York Peninsula and unchecked by government policy or practice in the late 1880s and 1890s. In 1889, after a European was killed and another seriously wounded at the head of the Archer River (near Coen), three detachments of Native Police, under Sub-Inspector Urquhart, plus volunteers, to make up a force in excess of forty, set out to punish the Aborigines. Although Urquhart was wounded in the action, he managed to 'disperse' five Aboriginal camps.<sup>16</sup>

Looking back, after having participated in the policy of dispersal, and forward to the post-1897 policy of protection, Inspector Lamond of Cooktown commented to his Police Commissioner:

I do not wish to refer to the manner in which most blacks have been 'hunted' for many years on all country when found in this and other districts, in so much that they were like the 'Sons of Man' and had not where to lay their heads in safety.<sup>17</sup>

Perhaps no better witnesses could attest to the unchanging thoroughness with which the settlers and government of Queensland had pursued their policy of dispossessing the Aborigines.

### 3

# Conflict on the Mining Frontier 1869-1897

In large areas of North Queensland it was not pastoralists but miners who made first contacts with Aborigines to exploit the resources of their land. Because of the terrain in which these fields were situated and the nature of the mining industry, this frontier posed challenges to both the Aborigines and the invaders significantly different from those experienced on the pastoral frontier. Aboriginal resistance was facilitated by the terrain and provoked by the fluid nature of the mining population and the depletion of natural resources. These were not replaced by large numbers of easily hunted sheep or cattle. The isolation of the frontier mining fields made them vulnerable not only because of the increased costs associated with exploiting them but also because of their extended communications. Queensland's frontier policy had been inherited from New South Wales' experience and developed to meet the needs of the pastoral industry. On the frontier mining fields it was often tested and found wanting.

Despite the optimism of Dalrymple and Leichhardt, the potential mineral wealth of North Queensland for the first few years was ignored as the settlers were preoccupied with pastoral development. Here indeed seemed eldorado enough for the colonists and for the immediate needs of the new colony's treasury. Goldfields had generally come as an additional blessing subsequent to the primary purposes of settlement; as yet, the region was too far from the established goldfields to attract the normally impecunious prospectors.

In 1866, some Townsville businessmen stimulated prospecting by offering £1,000 reward for the discovery of a payable goldfield. This resulted in a small, short-lived rush to the Star River about fifty miles west of Townsville. Prospectors were in the field and there were soon rumours and shows of colour. About seventy men were attracted to a rush at Mt Wyatt, south-west of Bowen, in January 1867 but abandoned its obviously limited rewards after two months of determined Aboriginal resistance.<sup>1</sup> Soon after, in July 1867, gold was discovered on the Cape River south-west of Townsville, and a full scale rush ensued. There were over 2,000 men on the field in 1868, but, by 1869, most of the alluvial gold had been worked out and the population dwindled away.<sup>2</sup> By this time, gold had been discovered on Merri Merriwah and Ravenswood

stations seventy miles south-west of Townsville.

To this time the goldfields had been discovered within areas opened up by the pastoral industry and the diggers inherited the *status quo* as far as their relations with the Aborigines were concerned. Except at Mt Wyatt, conflict does not seem to have been significant. The discovery of the Gilbert River goldfield in April 1869 took the miners to the limits of pastoral settlement where they met fierce Aboriginal resistance. However, the initial reports from the field were so glowing that there was a population of 3,000 in July 1869. By August there were only about 150 on the field.<sup>3</sup>

The decline of the Gilbert and Cape goldfields turned attention back to Ravenswood where easily worked quartz deposits replaced alluvial gold as an inducement to the small diggers. By 1870, a permanent town of about 2,000 people was growing up to feed the crushing mills. An important factor in Ravenswood's development was its easy access to the coast, which lowered freight costs and encouraged the early introduction of machinery. In November 1870, the long-lasting reefing field on the Etheridge River was discovered to the north of the Gilbert, once again taking miners to the limit of settlement. Machinery was quickly introduced for the diggers on what was still a small man's frontier. Meanwhile, close to Ravenswood, in 1871, there was a series of promising discoveries which, in January 1872, culminated in the very rich, easily worked reefing field of Charters Towers. Crushing machinery was introduced almost immediately and by the end of 1872 three thousand miners were working the field. By then, Ravenswood and Charters Towers were producing more than half of Queensland's gold.<sup>4</sup> Yet, even while Charters Towers and the Etheridge were booming prospecting went on unabated.

In 1872, a Queensland government expedition led by William Hann reported traces of gold on the Palmer River, a tributary of the Mitchell.<sup>5</sup> Parties were soon in the field and an experienced prospector, James Venture Mulligan, reported rich alluvial gold all along the Palmer. Despite Mulligan's attempt to point out the inhospitable nature of the country, the biggest rush ensued since gold was first discovered in New South Wales and Victoria. Between 1865 and the close of 1879, North Queensland produced a recorded 2,038,170 ounces of gold of which the Palmer produced 1,023,855 ounces, that is, more than half. Four-fifths of the Palmer's gold was produced between October 1873 and December 1877.<sup>6</sup>

The alluvial pickings of the Palmer acted like a magnet on the Chinese in North Queensland and by the end of 1874 all but 500 of an estimated 2,000 had moved to the Palmer. At this time there were six to seven thousand European miners in North Queensland. By April 1877, the number of Chinese on the Palmer had swelled to a maximum of 17,000



5. The Chinese Invasion, Northern Queensland 1877: Disembarkation at the Endeavour River, Cooktown, 1877. *Illustrated Sydney News*, 21 July 1877. Mitchell Library.


and were almost completely male. Yet the population of North Queensland, exclusive of Chinese, Pacific Islanders, and indigenes, at the 1876 census was only 17,606. During 1876, the number of Europeans working alluvial deposits dropped from 1,500 to 300 but by then there were 600 involved in reefing. Between 1877 and 1880 the number of Chinese on the Palmer fell from 17,000 to 3,000, many moving to other fields, especially the Hodgkinson.<sup>7</sup>

The Chinese on the mining fields were nearly all alluvial gold seekers. They were, in the main, peaceful, industrious and law abiding. They had their own law to punish Chinese offenders and their own organisation and were left to themselves as much as possible by the Queensland government officials. The first Chinese came from the south to the Cape River in 1867-8 and others followed; but in 1875 capitalists in South China began organising an export of Chinese labourers to the North Queensland goldfields from which they had to remit a large part of their earnings. Warden Hodgkinson estimated that while a European needed to find gold worth £3.10s. to £4 per week to carry on, a Chinese miner could live comfortably on 13 or 14 shillings.<sup>8</sup>

Exploration did not cease with the discovery of the Palmer. Mulligan alone led five more major expeditions from that field, on the last of which, in 1876, he discovered the Hodgkinson goldfield. This was a reefing field which had attracted 1,400 miners and a total population of 4,800 by 1877. Other goldfields were opened up on the Coen, north-east of Princess Charlotte Bay (1878), the Mulgrave (1879-80), and the Woolgar, south-west of the Etheridge (1880). By this time the major deposits of surface



gold which caused the large-scale, if short-lived, rushes were exhausted and individual prospectors roaming at large were being replaced by settled



6. Main Street, Cooktown, 1874. Early days of the rush to the Palmer.


*Illustrated Sydney News*, 30 May 1874. Mitchell Library.

mining populations working the more extensive underground reefs.

North Queensland was transformed by the discovery of mineral wealth. There was an inflow of capital and labour to exploit it and to provide services for the new centres and the increased population. Ports to service the goldfields came into being almost overnight: Cooktown for the Palmer, and Cairns and Port Douglas for the Hodgkinson; while Townsville received a decisive boost from the Cape, Ravenswood, and Charters Towers fields to the south-west and the Gilbert and Etheridge fields to the north-west.<sup>9</sup>

The pastoral industry derived immediate benefit from the gold discoveries. Cattle were selling at first on the Palmer for £10 or £12 a head and the supply was not equal to the demand. Stations had reduced their






7. Cooktown 1880. John Oxley Library.

herds during the 1866-9 depression and had difficulty supplying the 20,000 miners who had suddenly appeared.<sup>10</sup> Fortunately, despite the wildly fluctuating populations of the various fields, they were widely scattered and readily accessible to all stations in north-eastern Queensland for extensive periods of time. The pastoral industry had become largely dependent on the mining industry. Indeed, it even led to new stations being taken up in the far north. Although such prospecting explorations as Hann's and Mulligan's had confirmed the limited pastoral potential of Cape York Peninsula, runs were taken up as close to the mining fields as possible, such as along the Mitchell from 1873 and on the western fringes of the Atherton and Evelyn Tablelands after 1877.<sup>11</sup>

On such major fields as the Gilbert, Etheridge, Palmer, and Hodgkinson and others less important, like the Coen, Mulgrave, Woolgar, and Cloncurry, the miners were on or near the frontier and Aboriginal resistance was often a very real problem, sometimes the greatest one confronting them. Some contemporaries argued that conflict between miners and Aborigines might have been avoided if the former had behaved with more restraint: in reality the basis of conflict was, as on the pastoral frontier, the invasion of Aboriginal land.<sup>12</sup> However, the nature of the invaders' industry and the terrain and isolation of the major frontier fields not only determined the degree of Aboriginal resistance but also produced a pattern of contact significantly different from that on the pastoral frontier. It will be the purpose of the rest of this chapter to analyse this pattern of contact.



MAP 6 The mining frontier. Derived from G.C. Bolton, *A Thousand Miles Away: A History of North Queensland to 1920*. Brisbane: Jacaranda Press in Association with A.N.U. Press, 1963, p. 49.

Until 1880, the nature of mining on the major frontier fields of North Queensland entailed a great deal of 'gully raking' for surface gold by large numbers of miners scattered widely, prospecting or working small shows. Miners congregated for varying lengths of time in areas where large quantities of gold had been discovered making them inaccessible to the Aborigines. Often, of course, such areas were streams like the Palmer or the Gilbert which were equally as valuable to the Aborigines. On these, relatively permanent towns grew up such as Palmerville, Maytown (Edwardstown), Gilberton and Georgetown with lines of communication

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to all parts of the field and to the distant coast. Concentrated in such small areas or scattered widely over large areas, constantly on the move in small or large groups, the European presence was a provocation to the Aborigines.<sup>13</sup>

The miners expected the government to protect them as they were providing much of the colony's wealth but the Police Commissioner, D.T. Seymour, found it impossible to do this adequately. As he observed:

In a wild unsettled country it would not be possible for ten detachments of police to protect from the blacks *solitary* travellers or persons out prospecting who do not take ordinary precaution and who frequently keep as a close secret the direction they intend taking.<sup>14</sup>



8. Palmer River Goldfields, 1876. Miners Preparing for Defence. *Illustrated Sydney News*, 22 July 1876. Mitchell Library.

The Police Commissioner's outburst highlighted several of the problems. Firstly, the miners were often moving into terrain suitable for Aboriginal resistance. Secondly, they often combed the fields in small groups or alone. Even if a miner belonged to a larger group, he sometimes had to

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separate from the rest whereupon he became an easy target for Aborigines who often had the miners under observation. Thirdly, the secrecy of many miners who were 'on gold' or hopeful of finding it rendered complete protection impossible with anything less than a full scale military campaign to subjugate each new field. Fourthly, there was an inevitable hiatus when the miners rushed from one area that was patrolled, albeit inadequately, by Native Police to a new one.<sup>15</sup> Indeed, a misleadingly optimistic comment made by Mulligan, nineteen months after the discovery of the Palmer, to encourage diggers to come to the field indicated how serious was the challenge of Aboriginal resistance: 'The blacks are now only troublesome on the roads and outskirts of the gold fields, and arrangements have been made by the authorities for better police protection.'<sup>16</sup> On the goldfields, inhospitable areas, such as around Gilberton and the Palmer, where the Aborigines might have been forced to find refuge, were just as liable to attract prospectors as the plains were to attract cattlemen. Thus Queensland government policy, which had been shaped by the needs of the pastoral frontier, was much less able to cope with Aboriginal resistance on the mining frontier.

There were several important consequences of Queensland's inability to provide adequate protection for the frontier miners. One was their failure to reach an accommodation with the Aborigines during the period of the major rushes to 1880. This was the time of maximum frontier mining population and exploitation, when racial contact was most chaotic and conflict greatest. In fact, in his 1881 report, the Police Commissioner still lamented his failure to establish communications with the Aborigines in the far north:

During the year the attempts to conciliate the Aborigines in the Northern districts . . . have been continued, but owing to the difficulty which has been experienced in inducing these people to come into the camps and townships, have not so far come up to expectation. . . .<sup>17</sup>

On the frontier mining fields, failure was apparently complete yet the days of large-scale rushes were over.

Another consequence of the government's failure to provide adequate protection for the frontier miners was the unresolved conflict between government policy and the miner's expectations. As Seymour said, a force ten times as large would have been insufficient. The settlers were expected to take 'ordinary precautions': that is, they were expected to accept their vulnerability to Aboriginal attack and to be armed, vigilant, cautious, in company with other miners, and willing to shoot Aborigines. Seymour, an ex-army officer, was either expecting miners to behave like

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combat soldiers or accepting loss of European life and a much larger loss of Aboriginal life as inevitable. The immediate consequence was that the southern miners rushing to the new fields were forced to try to meet Seymour's expectations. Thus the first miners and packers to reach the Palmer soon realised the necessity of firearms and the need to take corporate action against resisting Aborigines. Just over a year after the first rush to the Palmer, the *Cooktown Courier* reported: 'now every man travels well armed and a carriers camp at eventide is a regular "school of musketry"—no man goes looking for his cattle in the morning unless he has his rifle slung ready for use and revolvers by his side.'<sup>18</sup> The typical wagon on the frontier fields of Cape York Peninsula was a 'perfect arsenal in the matter of Snider rifles, double barrellled guns, Colt's revolvers and all kinds of ball cartridge'.<sup>19</sup> Teamsters and packers often travelled in groups for mutual protection from the Aborigines and settlers frequently participated in punitive raids. When the Strau family, husband, wife and child, were killed on the Palmer Road in 1874, at least one settler found himself sworn in as a special constable although he refused to take part in the subsequent massacre of Aborigines at Skull Camp.<sup>20</sup> Corfield, the owner of two bullock teams, joined the Native Police detachment under Sub-Inspector O'Connor, unsworn and willingly, to avenge the killing of two of his horses and two packers. Such settler retaliation against the Aborigines, with or without the Native Police, was common<sup>21</sup> and a direct result of Queensland's inadequate frontier policy.

Not all of the settlers lived up to government expectations and there was a great deal of foolhardiness among the nomadic population of the goldfields. A perusal of inquests of deaths resulting from Aboriginal attack and of contemporary newspapers reveals a surprising willingness to take risks: to push out unarmed or inadequately armed into territory known to be occupied by belligerent Aborigines. Yet the reputation of the Aborigines of Cape York Peninsula was well established by 1873 and increased with the intrusion of the mining frontier. It seems to have been well-merited. An experienced settler like Edward Palmer, who had lived at Canobie north of Cloncurry, where the Kalkadoons earned a legendary reputation, and at Gamboola near the Palmer goldfield commented: 'In no district in Queensland have the blacks shown themselves more hostile to the settlers than in the Peninsula.'<sup>22</sup>

J.H. Binnie told how as a ten-year-old child on the Palmer, in the late 1870s, he regularly had to journey, alone and unarmed, through country occupied by hostile Aborigines. Soon after, in the same area, a group of Chinese who had built a stockade were attacked. Binnie often stayed at an isolated mine for two to three days with only a little dog for company. Binnie's father was just as foolhardy with regard to his own safety. When the Aborigines killed his horses, he walked to Cooktown on urgent

business unarmed as he did not own a revolver and thought a rifle too heavy to carry. Although he travelled by night to avoid the Aborigines, he was fortunate to get through unnoticed.<sup>23</sup> On another occasion when an Aboriginal raiding party was near their house, the Binnie family and their nearest neighbours—a Chinese fossicker camped fifty yards away, and two miners camped half a mile away—had not one firearm between them. After the Aborigines were frightened off by barking dogs, Binnie commented, 'However, no time was lost in getting a rifle from Echotown by special messenger'.<sup>24</sup> One of the residents of the Gilberton goldfield even claimed 'that the population in Queensland generally have Police Protection and therefore don't provide themselves with firearms or ammunition'.<sup>25</sup> This was greatly exaggerated but was probably the basis for the attitude of many who could afford firearms but refused to purchase them. Some simply would not accept the condition of the mining frontier. There were many others who could not afford to buy arms. The Chinese were rarely adequately armed, often not at all. They hoped that by travelling in large groups the Aborigines would avoid them. The reputation the Chinese had for running away at the sight of Aborigines was thus, on most occasions, easily explained.<sup>26</sup> Unarmed miners were not always as fortunate as the Binnies. Donald and Hugh McQuarrie set out from Cooktown unarmed. The *Cooktown Courier* reported with horror that at Hell's Gate they were 'run down like paddymelons by a merciless mob of infuriated cannibals'.<sup>27</sup>

Yet apart from the rashness of entering country occupied by hostile Aborigines unarmed, many of the risks miners took were inherent in the industry. Miners had to scatter widely and to separate in order to prospect. It was unrealistic of the Police Commissioner and the Queensland government to expect miners with generally very limited means to guard one another all the time they were prospecting or to constantly travel in large groups. The first reports from miners on the Palmer clearly described Aboriginal resistance: 'the blacks keep driving in all small parties . . . No person ought to start without he has four months provisions with him, and he must have horses to carry them . . . and be well armed'. Another miner wrote, 'all diggers must travel in gangs . . . When you come bring as many horses as you can and a gun—no man is any good without both'.<sup>28</sup> Miners, often poor but usually optimistic, frequently ignored such sound advice.

The government's failure to accept the responsibilities inherent in the dynamic frontier industry which had transformed the colony's economy posed serious problems not only for the miners but also for the Aborigines they were dispossessing. Aboriginal resistance often hindered the development of a new field. Before the Palmer field was ten months old, Aborigines were preventing prospecting by single miners or small parties.

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A group of six armed miners prospecting near Cooktown had been driven in leaving provisions and horses to the Aborigines. The *Cooktown Herald* claimed that such actions, plus Aboriginal raids upon the unattended camps and the spearing of miners and their horses, were causing the men to keep together in the main camps. The paper asserted that this was one of the main reasons no new auriferous ground was being discovered: 'Men did not care to isolate themselves with the chance of a spear terminating their existence suddenly.'<sup>29</sup> In early August 1874, the Police Magistrate at Palmerville informed the Colonial Secretary that five men had been reported killed by Aborigines since November 1873 and nine others wounded, as well as horses destroyed to the value of several hundred pounds. He added: 'incalculable loss is suffered by the miners in consequence of not being able to prospect'.<sup>30</sup>

Such laments were often raised as a new field was being developed but Aboriginal resistance did not cease to be troublesome. Thus, in the Etheridge Gold Field Report of 1881, the Warden remarked nonchalantly: 'the blacks have committed their usual amount of crime. Cattle and horse spearing [are] of course normal features'; and as late as 1885: 'The aboriginals have given a little trouble in stealing rations etc., from miners' camps, but that is no new thing'.<sup>31</sup> Miners did not always accept this state of affairs so fatalistically. They often complained of almost daily 'depredations' which forced them to work in pairs, one man prospecting while the other stood guard with a rifle.<sup>32</sup>

The miners' horses were especially vulnerable yet a horse was almost indispensable to the European miner as essentially he was a gambler and mobility was of paramount importance. The European miner's dream was a find rich enough to enable him to leave off mining altogether. Consequently he was never content with merely making a living on one field, but remained ever alert for news of new discoveries where he might have better luck. As the richest yields of easily worked gold were usually recovered early in the life of each new field, he had to be able to travel rapidly if he were to have any chance of 'striking it rich'. Only a horse could give him this mobility. Often he would desert a sound claim at the hint of some distant eldorado. Gold Warden Phillip Sellheim captured the mentality of the frontier miner the world over when he described the North Queensland miner:

If the Northern miner has one besetting sin . . . it is his readiness at a moment's notice to sacrifice his all, if required, to enable him to hurry off to the scene of some new discovery—good or bad, authenticated or not. He most probably leaves a claim that means good wages, if nothing better, and tramps, suffering all kinds of danger and hardships, on his way to some locality where, on calm



reflection, his own commonsense and long experience would have told him that payable gold at the best could be but a very remote contingency.<sup>33</sup>

The Chinese, who generally moved into a field in large groups after it was opened up, might be able to walk, but most Europeans thought themselves dependent on horses.<sup>34</sup> Yet horses had to be turned out to graze and were easy marks for the Aborigines.

The countless references, in northern newspapers, to the killing and consumption of horses and cattle on the mining field suggest overwhelmingly that the Aborigines killed them primarily for food—not merely to injure the intruders. This conclusion is supported by the accounts detailed below of Aborigines starving on the mining frontier. The opportunity for large-scale slaughter of these animals was much more limited than on the pastoral frontier. Most mining fields depended largely on cattle brought from stations removed from the generally inhospitable mining areas, such herds being overlanded directly to the fields or to nearby holding stations from which they were consigned to butchers at Maytown, Palmerville, Cooktown, Thornborough, etc.<sup>35</sup> For most of the time the large herds of cattle on the Peninsula goldfields were under supervision.

The Aborigines persistently attacked the comparatively small number of teamsters' bullocks and the horses belonging to miners and packers in the outlying camps and along the tracks. They often attacked in large co-ordinated groups and speared or drove off the horses. They were reported driving numbers of horses (from two to more than thirty) to inaccessible 'mountain strongholds' to kill them as required. This charge of systematically harvesting horses was made by over two hundred residents of the Palmer Goldfield in a petition to the Colonial Secretary, as well as in the *Cooktown Courier*, and especially in the *Hodgkinson Mining News* where it was alleged at least five times in seventeen months. Such attacks were most intense in the early chaotic years of a new rush but persisted until the field was abandoned or accommodation was reached.<sup>36</sup> Such measures may indicate the ease with which the animals could be killed or driven off. They also indicate that the Aborigines' traditional sources of food had been so damaged, depleted, or rendered inaccessible that they risked the very real dangers involved in killing the invaders' animals and the subsequent reprisals. The fact that at least some had to seek refuge in inhospitable ranges and had to take food there to their dependants seems to support this. At this stage of frontier conflict, there was little opportunity for comment on the physical condition of the Aborigines, but there survive three reports which support this conclusion. In 1877, an Aboriginal employed on the Hodgkinson encountered some



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Aboriginal women and children west of Mt Mulligan who were emaciated and starving and scarcely able to walk. They asked him to take some of their children to save their lives and he brought one to Watsonville. A report to the *Queenslander* was much more specific:

Perhaps the determination they show may be the courage of despair. The country is not fertile, is poorly stocked with game, and the whites have taken possession of all the main watercourses. Native Police officers say that most of the Palmer blacks seem half-starved, and recent advice from the Hodgkinson describes the aborigines there as suffering from famine. The white men occupy their only hunting grounds, and in default of the fish, roots, and game of the waterholes and creek 'bottoms', they are in a manner compelled to eat horses and bullock.

Even the Police Commissioner noted, in 1880, that the Aborigines on the Hodgkinson goldfield were half-starved.<sup>37</sup> Frontier mining fields thus seem to have posed even more immediate and urgent challenges to the Aborigines than commonly occurred on the pastoral frontier.

Thus spurred on by hunger, favoured by a suitable terrain, and opposed by invaders whose industry made them especially vulnerable, the Aborigines attacked their enemy wherever possible. Indeed their raids on the limited number of accessible animals inhibited communications within a field and sometimes threatened its links with the outside world. Horses were essential to enable the scattered miners to keep themselves supplied with provisions. The *Cooktown Courier* claimed that one field would have to be abandoned because so many horses were being speared that the miners could not get rations. A broader aspect of this problem was the need to keep the roads open for packers, teamsters, and travellers. This was especially important for isolated fields of the Peninsula like the Palmer and Hodgkinson. Indeed the *Cooktown Courier* in 1877, pointed to the impossibility of keeping even the main road to the Palmer safe.<sup>38</sup> Once again the Police Commissioner contended that packers and travellers expected to have their horses entirely looked after by the police. Yet teamsters and packers had to allow their animals to graze and could not watch them the whole time as Seymour seemed to suggest. As well, on most roads certain areas were more suitable for camping and allowing the animals to graze than others or, through some districts, the only ones. These were soon known to the Aborigines with the result that there were often attacks that wiped out the best part of or even a whole team overnight. Provisions for the fields were delayed and sometimes destroyed or pillaged.<sup>39</sup> The destruction of animal capital was often crippling enough to arouse the local newspapers to a criticism of the government and the local member to his responsibilities, an understandable conse-

quence when the cost of such teams is considered. To outfit his second team, Corfield had bought as a bargain thirteen steers at £16 per head and then had to break them in. In March 1878, the *Cooktown Courier* reported that one teamster had lost ten or eleven horses valued at between £40 and £50 each 'at one fell swoop'.<sup>40</sup> Thus, one successful Aboriginal attack could destroy all of a teamster's capital and remove one essential unit of transport.

The Aborigines were thus, from the invaders' perspective, at times the biggest single problem facing the miners, often preventing them from attempting to gather the wealth of a new field that seemed temptingly scattered about. It was unthinkable for colonists to accept such restrictions on their 'progress'. As the *Cooktown Herald* observed: 'When savages are pitted against civilization, they must go to the wall; it is the fate of their race'.<sup>41</sup> Because of the fear of attack from ambush and the impossibility of protecting their stock and property, the settlers would have liked a large enough Native Police force to drive the Aborigines from each mining district. The Queensland government increased the size of the Native Police force and sent an increasingly large proportion of it to the Cook District. Yet it became apparent that this did not quell Aboriginal resistance. The scattered nature of the population meant that the increased cost of greater protection was out of all proportion to its effectiveness.<sup>42</sup> Contemporaries even criticised the relevance of the whole philosophy of the Native Police on the mining frontier. Four years after the discovery of the Palmer, the *Cooktown Courier* pointed out that the aim of the force was 'to establish a state of terror among the blacks, and if it fails in doing so, it becomes worse than useless'.<sup>43</sup> Indeed, resistance on the mining frontier provoked discussion of alternatives to the Native Police. The editor of the *Cooktown Courier* even suggested 'justice', as the system of shooting as many Aborigines as possible, innocent and guilty, contained no incentive for the Aborigines to show restraint with the apparent result that 'the blacks had sent around the fiery cross to muster up all their forces to harrass the white intruders'.<sup>44</sup> It was also urged that a missionary should go out to the Aborigines to establish peaceful relations, accepting if necessary martyrdom as missionaries had done in the South Pacific. The contention that the existing Native Police system on the mining frontier was almost a complete failure led even to the conclusion that the 'present system of desultory little massacres' should be replaced by a policy of conciliation and reconciliation.<sup>45</sup>

Yet, when the government briefly tried to change its policy by attempting to make the Native Police more conciliatory to the Aborigines, there were immediate complaints from the frontier.<sup>46</sup> Nor could a change of government policy change the reactions of the settlers. There are ample records that vigilantes of teamsters or other settlers were formed if Native Police

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protection was unavailable or inadequate.<sup>47</sup> And, as on the pastoral frontier, a complaint about lack of police protection was always a sensitive and serious political issue which was generally taken up by the local newspapers and regarded as a reflection on the government. Some action was normally promised.<sup>48</sup>

The hostility of the Peninsula Aborigines was often given as the reason for the need for extra protection. Even the beleaguered Police Commissioner admitted: 'The chief difficulty in the Palmer District has been occasioned by the aborigines, who in that district have shown themselves to be unusually hostile and intractable.'<sup>49</sup> There were accounts of Aborigines on the Palmer returning to the attack after they had been attacked and put to flight by the Native Police.<sup>50</sup> After a series of attacks on the Chinese at the Etheridge and the nearby Gilbert, a feeling of panic seemed to grip the residents. Two Europeans were killed and two wounded on the Etheridge in late September 1873. In late November, five Chinese miners were killed and two badly wounded when the Aborigines raided their camp at Gilberton and a European, bound for Gilberton, was killed.<sup>51</sup> The Police Commissioner protested that the residents were abandoning the Gilbert for the Palmer; yet there seems no doubt that at least some, and possibly all, of the 140 to 160 remaining, panicked and abandoned the field so precipitately that much valuable property, including crushing machinery, was left behind. Large quantities of goods were burnt to prevent the Aborigines from using them. A telegram to the *Cleveland Bay Express* from the Etheridge reported: 'Fugitives from the Gilbert are still coming in'.<sup>52</sup> In February 1874, the Gilbert telegraph station was besieged by Aborigines estimated at 'some hundreds'. The station master, his wife, and his assistant barricaded themselves in the office. A telegram was sent to Georgetown and the goldfield warden and a party of volunteers arrived from that town and drove the Aborigines off before they could break in.<sup>53</sup>

Although such dramatic events were not frequent, they had both an immediate and a long term effect. In the long term they reinforced the lessons learnt from such earlier incidents as the Frazer and Wills 'massacres' where the Aborigines had struck hard at European life and property. They were used to highlight European vulnerability and to strengthen the argument that European firepower was all that prevented the repetition of such events. The attack on Gilberton and the flight of the settlers became a minor part of the frontier folklore, despite its less dramatic basis of a mining field in the process of being abandoned by most of its population. In December 1874, a rather nervous Acting Lands Commissioner at Normanton, worried about the attention his office and dwelling were receiving from individual Aborigines or, at the most, small groups, commented: 'Fortunately the blacks have made no organised

attacks or this place would share the fate of the Gilbert Township.<sup>54</sup> In 1879 when the field was revived and incorporated in the surrounding Etheridge, a local correspondent retold the story to stress what 'a few howling savages' could do if police protection was denied.<sup>55</sup>

The immediate reaction can be seen in the fevered reports that appeared throughout North Queensland. The *Northern Miner* of Charters Towers believed the withdrawal of the Native Police from Gilberton when the Aborigines were so aggressive, had 'produced a most pernicious and dangerous feeling among the blacks'. To illustrate his point, he pointed to a similar situation existing near Charters Towers and Ravenswood when the Native Police protecting the pastoral and mining district had been withdrawn from Dalrymple:

What was the consequence. The black telegraph was speedily at work, the news spread among the tribes, two unfortunate Chinamen were murdered by our 'black brethren', on the Seventy-Mile road, prospectors have been hunted and their lives endangered. On the outlying diggings life is no longer safe, diggers were stuck up not a week ago by a prowling tribe at Brooks' Camp, and this week there was a general gathering of tribes near Millchester—comprising contingents from the Flinders, Cape, and Belyando tribes. There was a grand 'palaver', the general purpose was to attack Ravenswood, and treat it as they treated Gilberton, and, perhaps, they are leaving Millchester as a *bonne bouche* . . . The simple remedy is to restore the troopers to Dalrymple, Gilberton, and other points of advantage on these Northern gold-fields.<sup>56</sup>

The *Northern Miner* asserted that, if the government did not meet its responsibility to protect the whites, a 'Mutual Protection Association' would be formed. It even used the current excitement to threaten the government in Brisbane that North Queensland would have to seek separation. This was not the last time that the two hounds of the north-south battle, separation and organised large-scale vigilantes, were unleashed because of frontier conflict.

As noted previously, the Aborigines of Cape York Peninsula soon developed a reputation for sustained and vigorous resistance which seems to have been well-merited. It is probably impossible to discover the extent of the Aboriginal campaigns the Europeans believed to exist at Gilberton, Ravenswood-Charters Towers, on the Palmer and elsewhere on North Queensland mining fields. Historians have tended to ascribe such views to contemporary European ignorance of traditional Aboriginal life. Anthropologists have pointed to the inability of Aborigines to organise such campaigns among the groups they have studied. It is possible that the added variable of frontier conflict with belligerent and

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ruthless Europeans produced atypical or more frequent contacts and communications between the various groups on or near the frontier mining fields. European occupancy of the land was often transient or concentrated into the areas currently being exploited. Thus significant displacement of Aboriginal groups would have occurred. Alternatively, it is possible that such large gatherings of Aborigines were initially traditionally orientated, and that they were diverted to concerted acts of resistance because of the shared, widespread resentment of a no longer bearable European presence, or the lack of natural resources resulting from it. There is one reported eye-witness account of concerted resistance planned at a traditional gathering of the Kalkadoons of the Cloncurry District. The *Cooktown Courier* pointed out, in January 1878 and January 1879, that with the beginning of the wet season the Aborigines were migrating from the coast to the interior. Both of these migrations were associated with attacks on European property, especially the pulling down of telegraph wire which was used for spear points.<sup>57</sup> During May 1877, the dry season, a group of 300 Aborigines were reported killing cattle and horses close to Cooktown. Such a large number could easily have been gathered at the coast for ceremonial reasons and denied their normal food supply because of the large population of intruders on the Endeavour River.<sup>58</sup> The annual migrations and the driving off and systematic harvesting of horses possibly indicate both Aboriginal efforts to meet new challenges and their attempts to carry on their traditional pattern of life, while incorporating useful European additions to their environment.

There may have been factors in the traditional life of the Peninsula Aborigines that made them more dangerous enemies to the intruding settlers. A reading of contemporary European accounts suggests that the Peninsula Aborigines staged a prolonged and formidable resistance and supports the belief that the Aborigines often resisted in very large groups with perhaps more frequency than such large-scale resistances were recorded in the south. Yet much of the reputation of the Peninsula Aborigines can be put down to the nature of the industry and the nature of the terrain. The Native Police were unable to offer adequate protection and the miners were often unable to defend themselves effectively. In addition, the centres of the greatest mining population on each field moved about frequently, thus shifting the greatest challenge from one Aboriginal group to another. Although this must have had a chaotic effect on traditional Aboriginal life, it must also often have meant that Aboriginal resistance was not being completely broken by a stable population that had a vested interest in such an outcome. Thus, by the close of 1876, only three years after the Palmer was discovered, the number of Europeans seeking alluvial gold had dropped to 300 from 1,500 at the

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beginning of the year while, from 1877 to 1880, the Chinese population of the field had dropped from 17,000 to 3,000. The Gilbert, discovered in 1869, had a population of about 3,000 by August which had dwindled to about 150 by October. It was abandoned in 1873 with Aboriginal resistance still very great but re-opened by Chinese leaving the Palmer in 1878.<sup>59</sup>

Pastoralists sooner or later had to come to peaceful terms with the local Aborigines or wipe them out completely. The latter solution was rarely desired and possibly even more rarely possible. Moreover, financial and labour considerations often made a peaceful accord desirable. On mining fields, however, the industry could survive and attract optimists while there was still the lure of easy gold as long as Aboriginal resistance was inhibited to the stage where it was an acceptable risk. Indeed the difficulty of reaching an accord with the Aborigines may have resulted in the miners' resorting to the use of firearms more easily than even the pastoralists. Thus, in 1876, a party of prospectors chanced upon Mulligan's party at dusk on the Hodgkinson River and, thinking they were Aborigines, opened fire upon them. The explanation of the hostile action was accepted happily by Mulligan's party.<sup>60</sup>

The inhospitable terrain of Peninsula fields was a vital factor. It often favoured Aboriginal resistance especially as there were extensive areas where the miners were greatly outnumbered. It is not coincidental that the Aborigines of the Cloncurry mining field, where these two factors were also present, had a reputation to rival that of the Peninsula Aborigines. Thus as early as 1870, the Police Magistrate at Burketown reported the Chinese driven away from the old diggings at Cloncurry while those at the new diggings were being threatened. An ex-Native Police officer claimed that the Kalkadoons intended to combine to kill all Europeans on the stations in the district.<sup>61</sup> As the European firepower and mobility were so vastly superior to the Aborigines', it was only in such favourable areas as the Peninsula and the Cloncurry District that Aborigines could aggressively resist for an extended period.

Strangely enough, while the Aborigines of the North Queensland mining fields have attracted a romantic interest because of their fierce resistance, there is much ignored evidence available which suggests that the invaders' brutality and callousness provided much of the motivation. For apart from the Aborigines' natural resentment of the European and Native Police violence and the Chinese intrusion, there was similar extensive kidnapping of Aboriginal women and children to that encountered on the pastoral frontier. Frontier mailman and prospector, J.C. Hogflesh, asserted that the carriers on the Palmer Road were the worst offenders and Binnie's account of his life on the Palmer from 1876 to 1882 supports this. He described how one passing bullock team gave or sold a twelve-

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year-old black girl to the wife of the teamster transporting Binnie and his mother from Cooktown to the Palmer. The girl could not understand English and was very frightened, especially of the teamster who threatened to shoot two Aboriginal men working for him (and later did), fired shots at night to warn off local Aborigines, and horse-whipped her when she refused to fetch water from a nearby lagoon because of her fear that local Aborigines were hiding there. The disgusted teamster's wife gave her to the owner of a passing bullock team, asking that she be sent to a friend in Brisbane to be 'educated'.<sup>62</sup> Carrier W.H. Corfield recorded how the six-year-old survivor of a Native Police dispersal at the Laura River was retained by Sub-Inspector O'Connor's troopers as a camp pet but, 'Knowing I had no blackboy, he gave me the little fellow he had so well drilled'.<sup>63</sup>

Aborigines were very useful cheap labour for the teamsters and it was common practice to have at least one to look after the animals, help with the loading and unloading, and to help make and break camp each day. Children of both sexes and Aboriginal women were obtained on the goldfields in a variety of ways while 'civilised' male and female Aborigines from other areas were common. The women and adolescent girls were used often to satisfy the sexual needs of the teamsters and others on the predominantly male frontier. The Native Police here, as on other frontiers, commonly distributed orphaned Aboriginal children or children picked up after a 'dispersal' and presumed to be orphans.<sup>64</sup>

The disposal of Aborigines as if they were the property of the Europeans was thus very common on the goldfields as it was elsewhere in Queensland. However, on the mining frontier while Aboriginal resistance was unbroken and police protection inadequate, kidnapping local Aborigines was a dangerous provocation. In discussing events on the Cloncurry mining field of the late 1870s, an ex-Native Police Inspector wrote: 'I may mention that murders of whites by blacks were frequently, and properly so too, referred to as acts of retaliation for cruelty by the whites or revenge for interference with their gins.'<sup>65</sup> Referring to the Palmer, Binnie agreed: 'A great volume of the crimes committed against the whites could be attributed to revenge.'<sup>66</sup> On some goldfields, the Aborigines were in the happy position of being able to express their resentment.

On the goldfields, too, the Aborigines seem to have quickly adapted their defensive measures and to have used traditional skills to meet the challenge of the intruders. The first report from the Palmer claimed that though the Aborigines were very numerous they were not particularly hostile and 'had evidently never seen a white man before'. They dug in the sand like the whites to see what food the Europeans had been looking for.<sup>67</sup>

The first large-scale intrusions from the Endeavour River, however,

provoked determined hostility. Indeed two separate reports from the Palmer to the *Brisbane Telegraph* and to the *Cleveland Bay Express* describe objectively three separate clashes, two of which were probably initiated by the Aborigines. These clashes seem to have resulted in great loss of Aboriginal life.<sup>68</sup> Such frontal attacks with their ensuing heavy losses taught the Aborigines a lesson. In February 1877, the *Cooktown Courier* claimed the Aborigines were more wary but not cowed; they had learned the range and efficacy of a rifle bullet. A year later the same paper was still complaining that the Aborigines were more dangerous and audacious than they were the first year after opening the Palmer.<sup>69</sup>

The growing sophistication of the Aborigines in this frontier conflict situation was indicated in a variety of ways. A year after the initial rush to the Palmer, they were readily adapting European articles to suit a great variety of their needs. Bits of hoop iron were beaten out into knives and set in handles, the forehead band of a leather bridle was used as head-band, waggon lynch pins were beaten out into axes; in fact any metal object was carried away as a prize for later adaptation.<sup>70</sup> They also soon realised that the Chinese were generally less dangerous targets than the Europeans, presumably because they were usually poorly armed and unmounted and thus less capable of instituting reprisals. The Aborigines frequently attacked very large Chinese groups of fifty and more. Indeed, the series of successful attacks on the Chinese at the Gilbert River in late 1872 and in late 1873 indicated that the Aborigines were often contemptuous of the Chinese. Similar attacks were recorded on other fields. Attacks of this sort would have been attempted on large groups of Europeans only in the very early days of a new field if at all.<sup>71</sup>

The need of the Aborigines to be more circumspect with the better mounted and armed Europeans was increased by the disproportionate number of unprincipled adventurers attracted to the newest frontier. There was the promise of quick wealth otherwise beyond a poor man's dreams; and, as usual, anti-social ruffians who could not live happily within the normal constraints of European civilisation, or who would not be tolerated, were among the first to arrive. The goldfield warden at Palmerville asserted that some of the Palmer miners were the worst types in the colony, criminals who had escaped detection, while in his brief account of this goldfield from 1876 to 1882, Binnie gave examples of some miners' lawlessness.<sup>72</sup> W.R.O. Hill, who was a government official on most of the northern fields, described the Cape River as 'a decidedly rough locality', some of the miners being 'the scum of all the Southern goldfields . . . brutal fights . . . were a daily occurrence . . . I have seen a man kicked to death in the open daylight, the police and everybody else being powerless to interfere'.<sup>73</sup> Certainly the early days of a new rush were crude, hard-drinking, violent places but law and order for the colonists



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quickly followed.

In fact, law and order was demanded as a right. To the Europeans, Aboriginal resistance was one aspect of this and it was expected that the Aborigines should be pacified regardless of the cost in Aboriginal lives. Indeed the colonial government drew constant criticism for its inability to confine this atypical challenge within the normal framework of European police action. Once again, the colonists differentiated in their public utterances between killing Aborigines in pacified areas where it was regarded as a crime and killing Aborigines in areas where the Aborigines were 'bad'. Here it was an act of war forced on the colonist by frontier circumstances or a lax government. Some at the time regarded this bloodshed with disgust but it was generally approved. Thus Sub-Inspector Douglas of the Native Police was described with enthusiasm as 'the terror of the blacks' while Sergeant Devine was referred to humorously as an active and energetic 'black tracker'.<sup>74</sup>

The intensity of the conflict may be suggested, however inadequately, by the casualties inflicted by the Aborigines. Although the loss of non-Aboriginal life was many times less than the loss of Aboriginal life, the records for the former, though nowhere near complete, are generally the only ones available. Otherwise unauthenticated, and often it seems uninvestigated, claims of successful Aboriginal resistance commonly appeared in the newspapers, especially with reference to the Cooktown-Palmer District. Thus the Palmer correspondent to the *Cooktown Courier* claimed that the murder of solitary travellers and prospectors was 'neither few nor far between' while the *Palmer Chronicle* 'believed' five Chinamen had been killed by the Aborigines at Chinkies Gully.<sup>75</sup> Such casual asides indicate an acceptance of the view that widespread loss of life was occurring.

The first indication that Aboriginal resistance was a major problem to frontier miners came from the Gilbert. In April 1873, the goldfield warden, Dalrymple, reported ten miners and travellers had been killed, seven in the previous six months. Between 1 and 17 November 1872, at least five and possibly seven Chinese miners had been killed in several spectacular attacks by large numbers of Aborigines, the largest group being estimated at two to three hundred. Dalrymple reported 'nearly the whole Chinese population, which formed the valuable alluvial diggings of the field, left the district, leaving the valley of the Gilbert in undisputed possession of the Aborigines'.<sup>76</sup> A year later at least four miners were killed and as many more wounded on the Gilbert and two killed and two wounded on the adjacent Etheridge. As indicated previously in this chapter, the discovery of the Palmer and these Aboriginal raids led to the desertion of the Gilbert.<sup>77</sup> With the opening of the Palmer there began a period of conflict that lasted more than twenty years. In the first rush



9. Hell's Gate on the Road to the Palmer River, 1876: a common site for Aboriginal ambushes. *Illustrated Sydney News*, 3 March 1876 Mitchell Library.

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from the Endeavour River in October 1873, one miner, probably two others, and possibly a fourth were killed by the Aborigines.<sup>78</sup> By the end of 1874, at least twenty-four settlers were killed in the Cooktown-Palmer District, with the probability of five others and the possibility of another four. In fact, from October 1873 to the close of 1879, at least forty-one settlers were killed by Aboriginal resistance, probably another eleven, and possibly twenty more. During the 1880s, at least another twenty-one settlers were killed in the Cooktown-Palmer area, and from 1890 to June 1895, when the last death resulting from Aboriginal resistance was recorded, at least eight settlers were killed with possibly two more. In the Cooktown-Palmer mining region, in the period being studied, at least seventy settlers were killed, probably another eleven, and possibly twenty-two more. On all other frontier mining fields between 1869 and 1897 at least thirty-nine settlers were killed, probably another one, and possibly four more. Thus more than twice as many people were reported killed by Aborigines in the Cooktown-Palmer District than on all other North Queensland frontier mining fields. These figures help to explain the popular legends about bloodshed on the Palmer which will now be examined.

The Palmer especially has become part of frontier folklore and the conflict assumed heroic proportions.<sup>79</sup> Recent commentators have also been less than restrained in their accounts of the Europeans and Chinese killed by Aborigines. In the centenary history of Queensland, Cilento and Lack claimed 'thousands' of Chinese were killed and eaten by the Aborigines on the Palmer while Holthouse stated that 'hundreds' of Chinese were 'ambushed, captured, and taken away to be eaten at leisure'. He claimed that on one new rush 'Chinese were kidnapped by the dozen and taken away to be eaten'—again 'at leisure'. Holthouse also claimed that Aboriginal resistance cost 'hundreds' of white lives and elsewhere that 'dozens' of white diggers and carriers were killed.<sup>80</sup> These statements seem to be sensationalist exaggerations, although it is impossible to ascertain all the facts contributing to the legend; however, only thirty-four Chinese deaths have been attributed with certainty to Aboriginal resistance in the course of this research; that is fewer than half of the seventy deaths confidently accepted. Yet, because of the number of Chinese on the field in comparison with the European population, one can only conclude that the above statistics are misleadingly low for the Chinese. The deaths of Chinese miners were less thoroughly reported, possibly because of the racial bias of the contemporary newspapers, the limited contact between the Chinese and European populations, and the cohesive nature of the Chinese community which probably meant that they resorted less frequently to the doubtful benefits of Queensland law.


All commentators of the Palmer rush have stressed the loss of life but,

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while the number of European lives lost has always dramatised the seriousness of the conflict, the number of Chinese lives lost has sometimes been seen almost as comic relief to stress the ferocity of the Peninsula Aborigines. Thus the low salt diet of the Chinese was said to make them more appetising to Palmer River 'cannibals'; some even thought the diggers might have encouraged this belief among the Aborigines.<sup>81</sup>

It is of course the resistance of the Aborigines that is best recorded in the European records. Very rarely is a glimpse into the condition of Aboriginal society on the mining frontier obtained. The Aboriginal art sites recently discovered by Trezise in the rugged hill country around the Laura River have shown, however, that some Aborigines were trying to accommodate the presence of the intruders in their world picture. Among the last paintings executed by the Aboriginal artists were representations of aspects of the invaders' culture.

In a small gallery twenty miles north-west of Cooktown, there is a masted boat drawn in pipe-clay. The site had apparently been used after the European colonisation of the district. Trezise thinks that the drawing represents a lugger, probably used by an early *bêche-de-mer* fisherman. In another gallery, there is a representation of a horse, ten feet long and



10. Horse and Rider, Laura Gallery, Cooktown District. Reproduced with permission of Mr. P. Trezise.

six feet high. Just north of the Laura River, there is a painting of a policeman with a peaked-cap. In each of two other galleries, a ten foot long horse is represented in yellow ochre. A dark red booted figure seems



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to represent a rifle-carrying black policeman just thrown by his horse. Near the other horse is a representation of a pig. There are three horses represented in these galleries, two about life size and one an astonishing giant. Trezise also records the discovery of a steel tomahawk at one of the galleries made from a horseshoe broken into two pieces, sharpened, and hafted.<sup>82</sup>

It is difficult to state with any certainty the function of these drawings.



11. Horse and Rider with Traditional Subjects. Reproduced with permission of Mr P. Trezise.

Trezise suggests that the Aborigines, finding themselves unable to defeat the invaders physically, resorted to sorcery to try to destroy their enemies and that this explains at least some of the paintings mentioned. He concludes:

There is no doubt that these shelters, situated high up in rough country, were the last strongholds of the wild warriors. They retired to them after each attack on the access and supply routes to the Palmer goldfield, which wound along the valleys and creeks below. The large sorcery paintings illustrated the last dreadful chapters in a long history of art which had its beginnings way off in the Dreamtime.<sup>83</sup>

Other paintings, for example of the horses and the pig, may have been

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associated with increase ceremonies as these animals became important elements in the Aboriginal life and were probably subsumed into their totemic world picture as Sharp has indicated in his description of the Jirjoront.<sup>84</sup> It is possible that the representation of the white man, the Native Police, and their huge and terrifying horses were early attempts to placate these strange demons.

There is only one certain conclusion that can be reached. During the period of frontier conflict, the Aborigines had tried to understand the invaders in terms of their traditional philosophy. They had tried to accommodate to this newest, most revolutionary and most disruptive of alien influences. Their attack on the invaders and their animals was but part of a much wider cultural response.

The mining frontier persisted in parts of Cape York Peninsula throughout the period of this study. During this time there was apparently no appreciable change in the nature of race relations created by this moving frontier. The wave of small discoveries which sometimes at first promised other Palmers rolled up the Peninsula from Coen in 1878, to the Musgrave, to as far as the Batavia River in 1892 where there was a sizeable rush which soon disappointed. There were still 150 miners on that field at the end of 1892 and in 1894 the discoverer of the field, Baird, was killed there by Aborigines while two other prospectors were seriously wounded.<sup>85</sup> The distribution of the police indicated that the Peninsula Aborigines were still resisting the scattered pastoralists and miners. In 1889, when there was a very large reduction (approximately one-third) in the strength of the Native Police, there were 43 troopers in the Cooktown District (which included the far northern Peninsula) and another 16 at Port Douglas out of a total of 144, and in 1895 there were still 45 troopers or trackers in the Cook District.<sup>86</sup> In 1894, the *Cooktown Courier's* Mitchell River correspondent complained of the blacks being 'very troublesome' and threatening to cause the abandonment of country. They had even made an unsuccessful night attack on Sub-Inspector Poingdistre's Native Police detachment.<sup>87</sup> In the same month, the *Cooktown Courier* described, with low-key nonchalance, the escape of a besieged party of miners.<sup>88</sup> There seemed to be nothing unusual about this. The forty odd troopers were no doubt gainfully employed but by this time frontier problems seemed peripheral, even in Cooktown.

## 4

# Resistance from the Rainforest

Government policy towards Aborigines in Queensland was shaped principally by experience from the pastoral frontier, and was not significantly changed to meet the different requirements of the mining frontier. In the rainforest of North Queensland still different problems arose, and these at length did compel the government to modify its policy considerably.

Before European colonisation, rainforest covered most of eastern North Queensland from the headwaters of the Annan River to the lower Herbert River, its distribution depending on heavy rainfall, adequate drainage, and reasonably fertile soil.<sup>1</sup> It presented as formidable a barrier to the settlers as forests had to European expansion throughout the rest of the world. Of North America it was noted:

To the pioneer the forest was no friendly resource for posterity, no object of careful economy. He must wage a hand to hand war upon it, cutting and burning a little space to let in the light upon a dozen acres of hard-won soil, and year after year expanding the clearing into new woodlands against the stubborn resistance of primeval trunks and matted roots.<sup>2</sup>

To travellers, the fringe of the rainforest imposed often an almost impenetrable barrier of ferns, young trees, vines, and herbaceous nettles while beyond this the taller trees with their canopy of foliage produced a gloom which limited travelling to the midday hours when the sun was overhead. Through the foliage canopies protruded giant red cedar, kauri pine, and others that caught the attention of the early timber getters, the tallest trees growing near to water courses on the most fertile alluvial soils. The soft soil surface, covered by humus, fallen leaves and rotting logs, made the early settlers' transportation very difficult in wet weather.

Much of this chapter will be concerned with the relations of the settlers and Aborigines of what Birtles terms the Atherton and Evelyn Plateaus, commonly called the Atherton and Evelyn Tablelands or the Atherton Tableland. The Atherton Plateau has an area of 275 square miles and the Evelyn Plateau, 168 square miles. Most of this area was covered by rainforest characterised by a great variety of species but on the drier western side occurred open sclerophyll woodland dominated by eucalypts. Although the border between the two vegetation covers was very marked, the trees of the sclerophyllous woodland decreased in height and density westwards from the rainforest.

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Within the rainforest occurred pockets of sclerophyll forest. Many of these were the result of poor environmental conditions such as exposure to the strong south-east winds, poorer or shallower soils, or lower rainfall. Yet the majority of such pockets in the Atherton-Evelyn District were on fertile soils where one might expect rainforest. Birtles discussed four theories to explain the existence of these pockets, one being that they were made or perpetuated by the rainforest Aborigines. He concluded it was impossible to state positively that the Aborigines had created these pockets but it was noted that once the Aborigines were removed the rainforest tended to encroach on some.<sup>3</sup>

Irrespective of the origin of such pockets, there is ample evidence from early observers that rainforest Aborigines made systematic and sustained use of them. One of the earliest European intruders into the heart of the forest was Christie Palmerston, an experienced explorer and prospector. He entered these clearings while they were still being used and was quite convinced the Aborigines were responsible for perpetuating and, by implication, creating them. He noted in a diary of his expedition from Herberton to the Barron Falls in December 1884 and January 1885:

We reached a pocket—that is a piece of open country about a quarter of an acre in size, circular-shaped, used by the Aborigines for war dances and fighting. They take particular care to keep the place free from jungle, which would creep over it in a few seasons if allowed. There were several gunyahs around its margin, one of which we took possession.<sup>4</sup>

Palmerston was not dependent solely on his own observations. His Aboriginal guide, Willie, was 'a native of the jungles' and he frequently used rainforest Aborigines as porters and could communicate with them. All of these pockets were probably Aboriginal camp or ceremonial sites.

The early settlers found well-defined paths connecting the pockets and subsequently some of the settlers' roads followed the most useful of these, the pockets being readily utilised by the settlers. When the experienced explorer Mulligan approached the western fringe of the rainforest, he came upon a whole network of tracks linking Aboriginal camp sites where their huts were, of necessity, set out so compactly that he termed them 'townships'. He commented:

A splendid track, the best native track I ever saw anywhere. There are roads off the main track to each of their townships, which consist of well thatched gunyahs, big enough to hold five or six darkies. We counted eleven townships since we came to the edge of the scrub, and we have only travelled four miles along it . . . Their paths are well trodden, and we follow them sometimes for miles.<sup>5</sup>



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In 1886, Palmerston pushed into the rainforest of the southern part of the Evelyn Plateau from the South Johnstone River prospecting for gold on the upper reaches of the North Johnstone, Russell, and Mulgrave Rivers to the west of Mt Bartle Frere. In his diary, he also described the presence of Aboriginal paths connecting camp site and *bora* clearings situated in the densest jungles, in one of the wettest parts of Australia. His experiences of the rainforest and its Aborigines make fascinating reading. Thus a rather uneventful day is reported:


July 15th—Water was running both over and under us the whole of last night, and the rain seems of such sulky duration this morning it is impossible to break up camp. Two boys, Youngangoo, Nurrimpee, and myself, explored a few miles towards the south-east, and found it terribly high, broken granite mountains, capped with basalt, jungle darkly dense. My hands are sorely torn with thorns, and blood from leech wounds is trickling down my legs in continuous streams.<sup>6</sup>

It is not surprising that this difficult environment was to serve as a secure refuge to the Aborigines who had learned to live in it.

The earliest reliable account of the rainforest Aborigines is that of Lumholtz who, in 1882, lived for a period of fourteen months with Aborigines north and west of Ingham and encountered the rainforest Aborigines when he travelled into the ranges. He noted that there were marked differences between them and the Aborigines he was living with. Walter E. Roth, as Protector of Aborigines in North Queensland, included valuable accounts of the rainforest people in his ethnographic studies.<sup>7</sup> Half a century then elapsed before the rainforest Aborigines were again the subject of scientific investigation.

Tindale and Birdsell concluded from field work in the Cairns region that the twelve small tribes of rainforest Aborigines who occupied an area one hundred miles wide and 180 miles long from the Annan River in the north to near Cardwell in the south were Tasmanoid—related to the Aboriginal Tasmanians whom they had already described as ethnically distant from 'the Australian Aboriginal type'.<sup>8</sup> Support for the Tindale and Birdsell hypothesis of the Tasmanoids has recently been eroded by linguistic and biological studies of North Queensland Aborigines. Tindale and Birdsell had claimed that the languages of the rainforest Aborigines were basically different from other Australian languages. In his recent study of the Dyirbal and neighbouring languages of the North Queensland rainforest, Dixon concluded that Dyirbal was 'a typical Australian language' possessing six dialects spoken by five rainforest tribes and one that was partly rainforest.<sup>9</sup> The Barabaram tribe which Tindale and

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MAP 7 Distribution of tropical rainforest in north-east Queensland before European occupation. Reproduced with permission from T.G. Birtle, *Land Use, Settlement and Society in the Atherton – Evelyn District North Queensland, 1880-1914.*

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Birdsell believed linguistically to be 'one of the most characteristic of the tribes' was claimed by Dixon to have fairly recently undergone 'a series of rather drastic phonological changes', caused he suggested by the tribe's being displaced from its previous tribal area by population movements among the Dyirbal speaking people. Dixon commented on Tindale and Birdsell's hypothesis:

Tindale and Birdsell [1941] hypothesized that twelve 'rain forest' tribes were 'Tasmanoid' in physical type, and possibly in other respects. In support of this they maintained that the languages of these tribes were unAustralian. In fact eleven of the dialects cited (including the Dyirbal and Yidin languages) are typically Australian; the twelfth, Mbabaram (which is not in fact spoken in the rain forest region) appears aberrant on the surface, but . . . can be shown to have developed out of a language of the regular Australian pattern.<sup>10</sup>

Biological research has also undermined the Tindale and Birdsell hypothesis. After a cranial study of the Aborigines of Queensland, Macintosh and Larnach concluded: 'the rainforest skulls . . . fall unequivocally within the New South Wales coastal range. No trace can be detected of an alien component in the rainforest population and all the



12. Aborigines of the Atherton Rainforest. John Oxley Library.

evidence shows that they are Australian Aborigines.<sup>11</sup> Similarly, after a study of blood groups and gene frequencies of the Aborigines of Cape York Peninsula, Simmons noted: 'Our findings do not suggest that the Aborigines of the Cape York area are basically different from those found in all other parts of Australia, but are more admixed'.<sup>12</sup>

The physical characteristics of the twelve tribes that had provoked the theory are, however, undeniable and can be observed among their descendants to this day at Yarrabah or Palm Island. They were 'A people characterized by a high incidence of relatively and absolutely small stature, crisp curly hair, and a tendency towards a yellowish-brown skin colour.' There were other physical characteristics of hair texture, nasal structure, and lip shape which distinguished them from tribes on the more open surrounding country although Tindale and Birdsell admitted these tribes had mixed with and shared the culture of the Australian 'Aboriginal type'. As would be expected, this area also contained distinctive cultural elements. These twelve small tribes had a pre-contact population of about 3,000.<sup>13</sup> The area was enclosed in a half-circle by seven other tribes which included pygmoids but were more mixed and these in turn were surrounded by a belt of tribes which did not noticeably include pygmoids.

In several parts of North Queensland, Aboriginal resistance was prolonged by the availability of refuge in nearby areas of rainforest or thick scrub. In the rainforest areas north of Townsville, especially on the Atherton and Evelyn Plateaus, resistance was so effective that it led to the evolution of a completely new government policy.

The first Europeans to encroach upon the rainforest north of Townsville were timber-getters who were attracted to the Tully, Johnstone, Daintree, and Bloomfield Rivers as early as 1874. When clearing the scrub revealed the land's fertility, small selectors soon followed. The 1884 Land Act and its amendments in 1885 and 1886 made it easier for hopeful men of limited capital to take up land and retain it and thus led to an increase in such small selectors.<sup>14</sup> In the 1880s much of the best cedar on the Johnstone and Daintree became exhausted and, by 1881, the timbermen turned to the tablelands behind Cairns when the farming potential of this fertile area was soon revealed.

While timber-getters and selectors were encroaching upon the rainforest Aborigines from the east, denying them the rivers and river flats of the Daintree, Barron, Mulgrave, and the Johnstone, miners and newly-established small cattle stations on the west were restricting their access to hunting grounds and freshwater fishing. The thick uncleared scrub and forest provided a refuge, but one which had insufficient food. In 1878, the Police Commissioner reported that, from the Mulgrave to the Mossman, 'the natives [were] literally starving'.<sup>15</sup> After 1886, most of the

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available agricultural land around Cairns and on the Barron River had been taken up by selectors,<sup>16</sup> and the clearing of the scrub country of the Atherton and Evelyn Tablelands was going on apace. More and more restricted, and more and more hungry, the Aborigines of the rainforest found their ancient homeland producing maize, potatoes and bananas in abundance while unattended settlers' huts and timber-getters' camps were full of good things.

Nor were they safe from intruders in the depths of the scrub for even here prospectors were searching for and occasionally finding gold and other metals. In 1879 the Mulgrave Goldfield was discovered 38 miles from Cairns. In the 1880s, patches of alluvial gold were found on the Russell and Johnstone Rivers in the rainforest between the Atherton Tableland and the coast. In 1878, two discoveries of tin were made by the squatter, John Atherton, of Emerald End, on the Atherton Tableland. These discoveries resulted in rushes to Tinaroo Creek and the Wild River on whose banks grew up the town of Herberton.<sup>17</sup>

The penetration of the rainforest soon caused a confrontation with its Aborigines. Relations with the timber-getters seem to have varied. On the Daintree an unusually peaceful situation existed until three cedar-getters were killed in November 1874.<sup>18</sup> A seaborne party of eight cedar-getters was attacked by Aborigines at the Johnstone River in December 1877, their camp pillaged, and their boat confiscated. Eventually they made a 28 feet canoe out of a cedar log and escaped to Port Douglas after a five days' journey. They soon returned 'better equipped'.<sup>19</sup> The wealth of the forests was enough to make most timbermen take their chance with the Aborigines.

The miners were the first to encounter serious and sustained attack from the rainforest Aborigines. On the Mulgrave, the Aborigines were not at first regarded as dangerous although they were daring and successful camp robbers. Soon, however, the frontier miners of the rainforest aroused their antagonism as they had elsewhere. Within two months, the prospectors were reporting that they had to battle Aborigines almost daily and some missing miners were believed killed by the Aborigines. Often surrounded by dense scrub, fossickers found it essential to work at least in pairs to protect lives and property. In 1882, the normally restrained mining warden regretted 'the spearing of cattle and horses . . . have been of frequent occurrence' while, as late as 1888, the *Cairns Post* was still urging the necessity of protection for the handful of scattered miners on the Mulgrave who were being constantly robbed of blankets, tools, and food. Even though their lives were not in danger, the *Post* deplored that 'a revolver and rifle are as necessary adjuncts to the miner as a pick and shovel'.<sup>20</sup>

Herberton was only a year old when the citizens discovered their

vulnerability to ambush and sudden attack. In January or February 1882, three miners were speared, one fatally, while in April a pony express contractor was surrounded and killed in broad daylight only one mile from the small mining town of Nigger Creek and three miles from Herberton. A petition signed by 265 people pointed out their inability to protect themselves and requested that the Aborigines be driven from the district by the Native Police. The Police Commissioner was instructed to respond accordingly. A detachment of Native Police was moved to Herberton and two neighbouring detachments ordered to assist. In his recent research, Dixon referred to 'the almost instant elimination' of the Barbaram tribe situated on the Herberton tin field just west of the rainforest on an arid area of the Dividing Range. He attributed this to the influx of miners. His evidence for this is not given but, considering the petition of 1882, it is not surprising. Later that year after two more spearings and a spate of camp robberies, the *Herberton Advertiser* remarked: 'Verily we live in troublesome times and can hardly bring ourselves to consider the black police as the most effective instrument possible for the suppression of myalls.'<sup>21</sup>

The roads from Herberton across the forest-covered mountains to its ports, Cairns and Port Douglas, became yet another dangerous trade route whose importance was increased by further mineral discoveries, especially those of Irvinebank and Mont Albion.<sup>22</sup>

During 1884-5, Aboriginal resistance became more intense. The Aborigines seem to have been emboldened by their previous success and the realisation of their relative safety in the rainforest. Most probably, however, they were driven to desperation as the settlers—miners, timber-getters, farmers, and even pastoralists—increasingly penetrated and cleared their refuge areas, encroaching further upon their food supplies. In the heart of the rainforest, the Aborigines had already proved themselves difficult enemies. Nine Chinese miners had been killed on the Russell River while travelling from Cairns to the Johnstone River. The settlers on the Mulgrave River petitioned successfully for Native Police protection after crops were robbed, animals speared, properties broken into and robbed, and settlers occasionally killed.<sup>23</sup>

Further south on the Tully and Johnstone Rivers during 1884 and 1885 Aboriginal resistance brought the usual frantic telegrams and petitions for assistance. Three selectors had been driven from their homes, which were looted, at least one being burned. With the collapse of the sugar market in 1885, cattle baron Tyson, and his nephew, Isaac Henry, on the Tully River had turned from sugar to cattle as they considered this the only economically viable alternative for their rich agricultural lands because of the contemporary state of the transport facilities on the Tully. In ten months, however, Tyson had lost 69 cattle and Henry more than

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200. Some 'half-tame Blacks' had warned Henry the Aborigines intended to burn him out and kill his family. Both men threatened to abandon their selections. No doubt the prospect of Tyson diverting capital and interest elsewhere influenced Griffith, then premier and colonial secretary, to request Native Police protection. A detachment was stationed at the Johnstone to patrol both rivers.<sup>24</sup>

On the Johnstone the conflict was apparently more intense. As early as 1880 the Aborigines had earned official notice by attacking a government survey camp and killing a Pacific Islander. Four Chinese miners were killed during 1885 and prospecting on the Johnstone River diggings, where there were 150 Chinese and a few whites, was paralysed. The Chinese worked in groups of twenty and the *Queenslander* correspondent agreed that there 'the scrub and the blacks are "terrors"'.<sup>25</sup>

Further north around Port Douglas, especially along the Daintree and Mossman Rivers, Aboriginal raids were so frequent and successful that European exploitation of the district was hindered and at times stopped altogether, for a week in one district, to protect life and property from the Aborigines. The local government authority, the Port Douglas Divisional Board, took up the problem on behalf of the selectors after one man was surrounded and killed while clearing the scrub. More than twenty-five 'depredations' of the previous few months were listed precisely and objectively with the offer of detailed substantiation if required. Apart from the death of the selector, most would seem relatively unimportant compared with the conflict on the pastoral and mining frontiers; yet, in their way, they inhibited European progress just as effectively. A selector's working bullocks were killed, the camps of timber-getters and surveyors were 'cleaned out', one camp being robbed six times, selectors' huts and homes were robbed, and cattle were rounded up to be driven into the scrub. In some cases the Aborigines took away things that could have been of no use to them in an attempt to drive out the intruders. Another report from this district indicated that the Aborigines could speak English, had developed a taste for tobacco, and were becoming more audacious because they were aware of the settlers' vulnerability. In a scathing comment on the effectiveness of the Native Police in the rain-forests, the Divisional Board suggested that the existing strength be withdrawn from the district altogether as they deluded the selectors into a sense of false security. A whole detachment was needed constantly patrolling in the small area of Mossman, Daintree and Saltwater Districts alone. The harassed Police Commissioner acceded to their request even though he was unable to respond at this time to a demand from the Tully because no more Native Police were available. The *Herberton Advertiser* commented in sympathetic wonder that the settlers on the

Daintree were suffering even more than those in the Herberton District.<sup>26</sup>

In all the areas in the far north where selectors, miners, timber-getters and even the pastoralists encroached upon the extensive areas of thick tropical scrub and rainforest the resistance seems to have been similar. The Aborigines found refuge in the least accessible parts of their tribal lands; but, being denied the river valleys, the sea coast, and the more open fringing areas, and with even their woodlands being progressively cleared, they were denied sufficient food to survive. Of necessity they harvested the European resources placed temptingly before them. Starvation heightened their resentment of sacrilegious dispossession. In the areas examined, and even on the Lower Herbert further south, the tropical scrub and rainforest provided a fortress from which the desperate Aborigines could sally out, even at great risk, upon the property of the scattered and vulnerable intruders. Even close to Cairns where conflict had begun with the first settlement in 1876 and was soon 'very bad', rainforest Aborigines were still occasionally spearing horses within four miles of the town as late as 1886 while in the same year at Cape Grafton a selector's bailiff was killed. Nevertheless their power to resist was diminishing and they were about to admit defeat. Some had been 'let in' and, by June 1886, about one hundred male Aborigines came into Cairns seeking work with the settlers though they were too uncertain of their reception to bring women with them.<sup>27</sup>

There was a very different outcome on the Atherton and Evelyn Tablelands where the rainforest or dense scrub was much more extensive. In this area, Aboriginal resistance highlighted the inadequacy of government policy and produced a creative initiative from the settlers that the government hesitatingly adopted.

Here agriculture had developed slowly (see Table 2). The land was cleared, cultivated by hoe, and the crops sown among the stumps until these rotted, when a plough could be used. Maize was the main crop grown, primarily for fodder for the large number of horses used by the local timber-getters and packers; it could also be consumed by the settlers in the event of a food shortage. For these reasons maize was the first staple grown in most agricultural districts in Queensland. Other crops were experimented with, including oats, other cereals, vegetables, and fruit trees. English and sweet potatoes proved the most successful. Once the land had been cleared, much of it was let to Chinese tenant farmers who could pay the Europeans handsome rents and still earn satisfactory incomes for themselves while the Europeans continued to work as miners, packers, shopkeepers and publicans. As the Palmer and Hodgkinson mining fields petered out, such bailiff farming was practically the only way the displaced Chinese could support themselves.<sup>28</sup>



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Table 2  
Acreage of agricultural land cultivated in the Herberton  
Petty Sessions District, 1885-1901

Year	Area under cultivation	Area under permanent pasture of artificially sown grasses	Area of land under crop	Area planted with important crop			
				Maize	English potatoes	Sweet pot.	Pumpkins
1885*	917	0	911	512	76	77	—
1886	1,087	0	942	475	67	81	—
1887	819	0	749	366	49	77	—
1888	1,015	74	905	495	59	58	—
1889	1,279	48	1,252	625	120	82	—
1890	1,648	406	1,562	1,083	110	71	—
1891	2,492	485	1,820	1,302	113	96	—
1892	2,660	962	2,654	1,929	158	137	—
1893	3,418	758	3,407	2,481	190	179	—
1894	2,519	666	2,468	1,868	130	114	—
1895	2,200	720	2,087	1,590	111	87	—
1896	2,646	834	2,521	2,110	76	87	—
1897	2,979	898	2,896	2,375	72	81	—
1898	2,934	1,215	2,903	2,436	62	71	33
1899	3,179	1,097	3,160	2,756	59	10	9
1900	3,741	1,207	3,608	3,131	69	42	48
1901	5,204	490	5,145	3,875	59	73	123

\*Statistical data prior to 1885 have been incorporated in Cairns Police District returns.

Source: Government Statistician's Office, Queensland—*Statistics of the State (or Colony) of Queensland*. Brisbane: Government Printer. All years from 1885 to 1901.

Cited T.G. Birtles, *A Survey of Land Use, Settlement and Society in the Atherton-Evelyn District, North Queensland*, Table IV.

Despite the limited nature of the agricultural development in this area, before the end of 1884 the *Wild River Times* was lamenting that Aboriginal raids had

become so frequent in the neighbourhood of the scrub in the vicinity of Herberton (being indeed of almost daily occurrence) that their recital wearies us as well as our readers and it is only the more sensational cases that now find any interest outside of the victims of their thieving, destruction and bloodthirsty propensities.

At this time pioneer squatter of the Atherton Tableland, John Atherton, estimated his losses to Aborigines for the previous seven years at not less than £1 a day.<sup>29</sup> The evidence of such local journals as the *Cairns Post* and the *Herberton Advertiser* and of official government records indicate that, as the scrub was cleared, the Aboriginal resistance became more determined.

The incident referred to as the Irvinebank Massacre focused attention on the role of the rainforest Aborigines in inhibiting the development of the Atherton Tableland. The Nigger Creek Native Police detachment was removed after its involvement in the murder of a group of pacified Aborigines became publicly known. When the Police Commissioner decided not to replace the detachment, a protest meeting was called.

A numerous signed petition claimed that the earlier Aboriginal attacks on the mining field to the west of the rainforest had ceased following the placing of the detachment at Nigger Creek. It was feared these would be renewed as miners and settlers were scattered for forty miles around Herberton. Moreover, the settlers believed the Native Police patrols from the Mulgrave and Johnstone Rivers and the new rush to the Johnstone would drive the Aborigines to the Herberton District and inhibit the development of recent mineral discoveries. Because of the close settlement of this area, the Police Commissioner thought trackers stationed at the ordinary police stations at Herberton, Watsonville, and Irvinebank would suffice. In April 1885, the Tinaroo Progress Association of Herberton informed the Colonial Secretary that 'depredations' had increased alarmingly since the departure of the Native Police detachment; miners and settlers would be forced to leave the district and one settler already had. Travellers on the road to Cairns were occasionally threatened and selectors' crops were being destroyed and their cattle speared, while huts were frequently robbed. At this stage the residents were still demanding more Native Police protection. The police inspector at Port Douglas informed the Police Commissioner objectively: 'It must be borne in mind that as the axe of the white man gradually but surely destroys the strongholds of the natives, so are outrages likely to increase as their scope gets narrower and narrower.'<sup>30</sup> The pressure on the encircled rainforests was thus increasing.

From 1885 till early 1889, the pages of the *Herberton Advertiser* and the *Cairns Post* are studded with reports of horses and bullocks killed, sheds, huts, and houses broken into and robbed, camps robbed, and crops of corn and potatoes stolen.

Occasionally settlers were 'stuck up' and robbed. On one occasion, twelve Aborigines bailed up a selector in his own home with his own loaded revolver and fired at him unsuccessfully when he made a run for it. This was one of the rare occasions when frontier Aborigines in North Queensland used firearms. On another occasion, a miner's life was saved

when he lifted his hand to button his shirt. A spear skewered the surprised miner's hand to his chest.<sup>31</sup> It was the constant fear of such unexpected attacks from the surrounding scrub that deterred many settlers. One selector described how he chanced upon a German settler, with an old-fashioned holstered pistol at his waist, clearing the forest. A shouted greeting saw the German spin round with gun drawn ready to shoot. He had come to clear his selection with three months' provisions, tools for farm work, and a dog for protection, all of which he lost the first day he went out to clear scrub. This man was almost driven mad knowing he was constantly watched by unseen Aborigines. Another settler described the selectors' constant fear: 'When we go to work, [we] have to go armed carrying our lives in our hands; and when engaged in falling scrub, or doing any other work are liable to be speared or tomahawked any moment.'<sup>32</sup>

There were indications that the Aborigines of this district had become familiar with aspects of European life, partly because they had their enemies under observation at such close quarters but also because some miners and selectors had made attempts to come to terms with them. As on the pastoral frontier there are strong indications of a partial accommodation having been reached followed by an Aboriginal reversion to complete hostility as the Aborigines understood and rejected the nature of the accommodation. Thus Aborigines frequently took away arms and ammunition apparently to deprive the settlers of them since there are few instances of their being able to use them, despite settlers' fears. A group appeared at an isolated shop demanding flour, billy cans, etc., but were frightened off. A few months later at the same store, a group of Aborigines unsuccessfully sent a woman forward with stolen money to effect a trade. Such familiarity with the invaders' culture did not lead to a peaceful accommodation with the Aborigines of the Atherton and Evelyn scrubs.<sup>33</sup>

In 1886, the *Herberton Advertiser* claimed that the theft of the selectors' crops had become 'monotonous'. A year later this paper remarked they were weekly becoming more numerous and in June 1887 declared that relations between the settlers and the Aborigines were 'daily becoming more critical'.<sup>34</sup> It seems that Aborigines from more settled areas were seeking refuge in the rainforests of the Atherton and Evelyn District or had been driven there by the settlers. Thus sixteen Aborigines, 'powerful and well-conditioned people, beside whom the aboriginals of the scrub about Atherton look miserable beings' were raiding the settlers. They were later discovered to belong to 'the [Keramai] and Lower Johnstone River tribes'. If the seeking of refuge in the rainforest of the Atherton-Evelyn District by other tribes was widespread—and it is logical to assume it was although this is the only account found of such displace-

ment—there would have been competition for the food resources and probably inter-tribal conflict. Such dispossessed Aborigines would have been less able to get adequate sustenance and forced to raid the settlers more than did the local tribes. Thus, the sixteen Aborigines were said to have been troublesome to the settlers for a long time.<sup>35</sup>

The settlers flexed their political muscle, threatening the government with the two familiar alternatives if better protection was not provided: abandonment or a settler war of extermination. A petition was presented and Sub-Inspector Garroway arrived with his troopers with instructions to take whatever measures necessary to break Aboriginal resistance. Clearly he failed: in October 1887, the Aborigines were reported to be 'getting bolder' and their raids so unbearable that another petition requested the Minister for Lands to exempt the settlers from their residence requirement for twelve months as occupation was impossible. There was substance in this claim for it was by no means the only time that settlers complained of the difficulties the Aborigines posed to their fulfilling the residential requirements of the selection legislation. As one selector pointed out:

There are many of us that are compelled to live away somewhere in the immediate vicinity of our selections, not only for convenience and economy, but for [safety's] sake, on account of the well known danger we are in from marauding and murdering blacks.<sup>36</sup>

In January 1888, the local member of parliament, Mr Fred Wimble, and Mr Louis Severin, representing the local authority, formally confronted Premier Griffith on the problem when he visited Cairns. The Premier confessed that he had no idea the Aborigines were so troublesome to the Atherton settlers. Unfortunately there is no record of the settlers' reaction to this statement. However, Griffith encouraged them to appoint a deputation to wait upon the Minister for Mines, W.O. Hodgkinson, a few days later.<sup>37</sup>

This meeting was to have far reaching consequences for the Herberton District and for many others in North Queensland. Hodgkinson immediately promised a white trooper and a tracker for Atherton. He pointed out the difficulty of dealing with the 'Aboriginal problem' and agreed to support gladly any proposals the selectors might make. One member of the deputation then pointed out to the minister that, at Thornborough on the Hodgkinson goldfield, the residents had raised money which the government supplemented to provide food for the Aborigines. Hodgkinson thought this an excellent idea, promising a pound for pound subsidy for money raised locally. Two members of the deputation immediately donated £7 between them after which Hodgkinson delivered a homily on

the virtues of nineteenth century liberalism. He decried the lack of Queensland private initiative and Queenslanders' dependence on the government, using the problems of utilising artesian water and establishing a local school of mines as examples. The Herberton mining warden, who was also the police magistrate, was authorised to spend any reasonable sum to provide food for Aborigines willing to come to terms with the settlers.<sup>38</sup>

The Thornborough experiment was a good example of local initiative successfully bringing Aborigines to a peaceful accord. It had been supported by the government and reported in the warden's annual report to parliament. However, it was regarded as unique and not as indicating a new initiative to be taken with frontier Aborigines. The *Cairns Post*, by February 1888, had twice suggested a scheme in which government financed food would be distributed by volunteers, referring its readers to the practice in New South Wales which acted 'the part of a parental government'. In August 1888, that paper repeated its suggestion adding as further inducement that the Aborigines could be utilised as a labour force, thus benefiting them and soon relieving the government of the expense of the food. The article concluded: 'One thing is certain, the time for selectors to sow and blackfellows to reap has gone by'.<sup>39</sup>

The new policy must be clearly distinguished from instances in which the Queensland government had furnished rations, on local initiative, for already pacified, destitute Aborigines. Two years earlier the government had rejected a similar proposal. A pastoralist on Kirrama Station, west of Cardwell, applied to the government for rations to pacify Aborigines troubling him who were able to find refuge in the dense scrubs of the Cardwell Ranges. He cited the success achieved at Thornborough. The request was refused on the advice of the Cardwell Police Magistrate, who pointed out that the Scott brothers, on the Valley of Lagoons, had not succeeded in preventing raids by distributing food.<sup>40</sup>

It was a year after the deputation met Hodgkinson before this plan was implemented, in which time there were more Aboriginal raids, severe losses, more complaints, and more petitions. Some settlers had to employ men to guard their crops or their houses. In October 1888, another deputation of northern members asked the Colonial Secretary to formulate a scheme for giving relief and protection to the Aborigines. Yet another petition sought the old solution and called for the re-establishment of the Native Police detachment at Nigger Creek.<sup>41</sup>

Queensland's frontier policy, which had evolved as a result of the needs of the pastoral industry, was once again being tested in North Queensland. The problems confronting the selectors were now well-known to the

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government officials, especially the Police Commissioner who in Queensland had been entrusted with the implementation of Queensland's frontier policy since 1864. In the overall expansion of the British Empire, the army and its local commanders had played a vital part. In Queensland, the Native Police force, its commander, the Police Commissioner, and the police officers attempting to control the Aborigines were similarly agents of imperialist expansion. It was their duty to meet local challenges when economic 'progress' and expansion of settlement were being inhibited.<sup>42</sup> In the rainforest of North Queensland, the Police Commissioner was confronted with large-scale resistance which he had not been able to break by the customary use of the Native Police. The alternatives were to increase that force massively in the vicinity of the rainforests or to attempt to lure the Aborigines from their refuge to a peaceful accommodation as had been repeatedly urged by the northern residents.

The rainforest region posed many problems to the Native Police that most residents refused to consider. It was often impossible to move away from the beaten tracks on horseback. Patrolling through the thick scrub on foot became necessary but this was such unhealthy, energy sapping work that there were few officers who could do it satisfactorily. Inspector Isley, in charge of the Port Douglas police district, wrote:

The Mowbray Detachment has little mounted duty—the troopers being principally worked in the dense scrubs abounding in the patrol—to keep with the 'boys' requires an officer of more than ordinary endurance and Mr. Nowlan . . . is only fit for a mounted patrol . . . The only men I know fit to perform the patrol duties are Insp. Lamond and Little.<sup>43</sup>

This was a complete contrast with the methods of the force in the pastoral country. There a small body of mounted men armed with rifles had an enormous advantage over much greater numbers of Aborigines on foot and armed with only traditional weapons. In the rainforest, where horses could not be used and the advantage of rifles over spears was limited, the Native Police force's effectiveness was greatly diminished. Aboriginal troopers were essential to counter Aboriginal raiders yet even they were often so exhausted after a patrol that they had to spell before undertaking another one. Consequently a larger number of troopers was needed if patrols were to be always available. Indeed, Griffith had given 'the Northern Jungles [where] it was absolutely impossible for a white man to get through' as one of his reasons for not abolishing the Native Police altogether.<sup>44</sup>

Thus fundamental to the government's acceptance of the new policy was the realisation that the Native Police, who had proved effective on the

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pastoral frontier, were quite unable to break the resistance of rainforest Aborigines. Because of the difficulty of working in this densely timbered, mountainous region, patrol districts needed to be small with the detachment placed close to telegraphic communications. Consequently, instead of the two detachments, one at the Barron River and the other at the Mowbray, Inspector Stuart recommended three detachments with four extra troopers for each detachment, so that the three detachments could work with one another. He added: 'I regret to say that I find half measures of no use and that there is but one way of putting a stop to these outrages and the sooner and more effectively it is done the better.'<sup>45</sup>

When the heavy rains set in, movement in many directions became impossible because of flooded streams and boggy ground. The tracks of Aborigines would often be washed out and sudden floods could cut a detachment off from its supply of stores thus restricting its efficiency. Overriding all was the extensive area of dense scrub and rainforest which would have required an army of jungle fighters to subdue completely.<sup>46</sup> Yet the Police Commissioner realised that the Aborigines were compelled to raid the colonists on their tribal lands.

The Commissioner had informed the government of this truism publicly, in his annual reports, as early as 1879 and repeated it more emphatically in 1885 when he declared: 'It will be necessary to consider what means will have to be adopted to protect the aborigines from starvation, and so end what is now a source of constant trouble between blacks and whites'.<sup>47</sup> He repeated this privately to the Colonial Secretary and Premier, S.W. Griffith, in April 1885 with regard to the conflict in the Port Douglas District, and yet more emphatically in May 1885 concerning a Herberton petition and correspondence from the Tinaroo Progress Association. He reiterated that the Aborigines were starving and the settlers would be robbed 'no matter what strength of police may be in the district . . . the difficulty will not be solved by increasing the police force in those districts, unless at the same time measures are adopted to provide for the legitimate wants of the aborigines'. In June 1885, he repeated the burden of his argument, indicated how he would re-organise the Native Police force to staff the bush police stations, and admonished his minister: 'The question of dealing with the Aborigines has now I beg to submit, assumed such an importance as to require very serious consideration and some legislative action.'<sup>48</sup>

As Griffith was Colonial Secretary in 1885, it is surprising to find him proclaiming in 1888 that he had no idea the Aborigines were so troublesome to the Atherton settlers. The harassed Police Commissioner could hardly do more to effect a change in Queensland's frontier policy. The time must have seemed propitious: Griffith's liberal government had been antipathetic to the Pacific Islander labour trade; it had instituted a Royal

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Commission to expose the abuses in the New Guinea area; and Griffith had made it clear that he wanted to disband the Native Police force and replace it by white police with attached trackers.<sup>49</sup>

There were also strong indications that this ministry wished to exert a restraining effect upon settlers and Native Police, possibly as much because of Griffith's respect for the law and his ministerial responsibilities as because of humanitarian concern. Thus Griffith told parliament: 'The practice of the black police making raids through the country as in times past would not be allowed any longer. . . . It was intended to assimilate the system as nearly as possible to that of the white police.'<sup>50</sup> Certainly the northern settlers believed that Griffith's liberal government intended that they and the Native Police could no longer shoot with impunity. The trial of Sub-Inspector Nichols and his troopers for the massacre at Irvinebank was seen as implementing this new concern and the government's refusal to re-employ these men when they badly needed native troopers supports this.<sup>51</sup>

There were thus a number of different factors combining to bring about a change in policy regarding the distribution and usage of the Native Police which would allow the development of a new frontier policy to deal with the rainforest resistance. First, the Native Police force was manifestly unable to cope with it. Secondly, Griffith disliked the normal Native Police methods. Thirdly, the Police Commissioner realised that Aboriginal attacks resulted largely from encroachment upon traditional food resources. Fourthly, he realised that neither increasing the numbers of Native Police nor replacing them with white police and trackers would suffice. Finally, settlers on the Atherton Tableland advocated the policy of rationing which ran counter to Native Police policy and practice.

In May 1885, Colonial Secretary Griffith had even requested Seymour to report on the best means of completely substituting white police with trackers for Native Police. This was prompted by the request of Inspector Isley of Port Douglas for Native Police detachments on the Mulgrave River and at either the Barron River or Nigger Creek, additional to the one then being formed on the Mossman River. Both Isley and Seymour acknowledged the great expense of these proposals; Seymour, however, considered this expansion of Native Police strength would not pacify the Aborigines in this area. His placing of two trackers at each of the outside stations of Irvinebank, Watsonville and Herberton apparently caused Griffith to think that a proliferation of ordinary police stations with trackers might solve the problem of frontier conflict while doing away with the Native Police force which he so much disliked.

Seymour considered such a change might work well on the coast and in the more settled districts, although it would be costly, if responsible



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constables could be found who were good bushmen and able to work with the trackers. He doubted whether such men were available in sufficient numbers. He did not believe the Native Police could be replaced in the sparsely populated far north and west where the areas to patrol were so great and the Aborigines too numerous for small detachments. The problem of supplying a larger number of remote stations was also a consideration. Such a change in the personnel confronting the Aborigines was far short of the 'very serious consideration and some legislative action' Seymour had requested. In the official correspondence of Seymour and some of his police officers there was expressed dutiful concern for the need for restraint by the Native Police and disapproval of the settlers' expectations that the Native Police would destroy Aborigines on request. Yet this government did not accept the challenge to rethink its frontier policy. Aborigines were to remain British citizens to be shot by other British citizens who had the legal right to the land.<sup>52</sup>

From 1885 till 1889, Police Commissioner Seymour was left with the Native Police and the ordinary police to pacify the frontier. In 1885, with Griffith's instruction and no alternative, he again had to rationalise his resources. He was faced with two problems: firstly, getting suitable constables to staff the bush police stations and secondly, the fact that the Native Police were of little use suppressing crime other than that attributed to the Aborigines. Thus in settled districts he had to substitute the ordinary police of the colony. The Native Police force then consisted of thirteen detachments of one Sub-Inspector, one camp keeper, and six to ten troopers. In 1885, the annual cost, exclusive of horses, arms, and clothing, was £10,606.18s. He proposed to break up eight of the thirteen detachments and to substitute nineteen stations with one senior constable, one constable and three Aboriginal trackers. The new buildings, exclusive of paddocks and fencing, would cost an estimated £10,000.<sup>53</sup>

With this large reorganisation of his forces, Seymour had closed the gap even further between a large number of his police in bush stations and the much reduced Native Police force. Senior constables and sergeants with three trackers were now stationed at such places in Cape York Peninsula as the Mulgrave, Laura, and Moresby Rivers, which were in comparatively closely settled areas where a good deal of ordinary police work would be required, but which were yet troubled by Aboriginal resistance. This major reorganisation of the police force passed through parliament uncriticised and virtually unchallenged, presumably because no one doubted that settlers' rights would be protected when necessary whether it be by Native Police or ordinary police with trackers.<sup>54</sup>

Thus, the *Cairns Post* welcomed Senior Constable Whelan and his three troopers to the Mulgrave, pointing out to its readers that this was the first station established under the new system by which the Premier,

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Griffith, intended to supersede the present Native Police. The writer added: '[He] will be kept busily employed in protecting the settlers and bringing the country districts into a state of peaceful security.'

The paper clearly recognised Whelan's Native Police responsibility in describing one week's activities. He patrolled in the neighbourhood of two sugar plantations before arriving in town on 3 February 1886. On 4 February, he left for Barron River and Double Island where determined Aboriginal resistance had alarmed the settlers. He returned on the seventh. On the eighth, he went by pilot cutter to Cape Grafton to search for a missing man who had been killed by Aborigines. On the tenth, he was back in Cairns where he remained in charge while the commanding officer was absent.<sup>55</sup> This member of the ordinary police force was now performing functions of the Native Police. Perhaps the best, if extreme, example of the dual functions of the frontier policemen involved in this re-organisation was provided by the two officers at Atherton who were actively engaged in reaching a peaceful accord with the rainforest Aborigines. Constables Hansen and Higgins both used violent retaliatory measures if they considered them necessary and even enlisted the support of Aborigines from the local camp against resisting Aborigines. Thus Higgins requested another two troopers 'as two (2) rifles would not teach [a group of 200 Aborigines six miles from Atherton] sufficient lesson for the depredations [they] have committed all over the district'.<sup>56</sup>

Looking back over the first year's experiment Seymour wrote:

The arrangement which was proposed some time ago of substituting white police with native trackers in lieu of the native police has been tried during the last year and stations of this description were formed on the Laura, Moresby, and Mulgrave Rivers, and so far the system has worked satisfactorily; and I am arranging other similar stations thus reducing the native police by degrees.<sup>57</sup>

This rationalisation was in accord with Seymour's frontier policy and his concept of the role of the Native Police. He observed: 'Native Police were never intended for a settled district, but for the outside country where the distance between stations is so great as to prevent the residents from assisting each other.'<sup>58</sup> Thus the criterion for having a Senior Constable and three troopers rather than a Native Police officer and six troopers was the ability of the settlers to combine against the Aborigines or to solve their frontier 'Aboriginal problem' in any other way, not the pacified nature of the area. The closer settlement of the 1880s in such frontier areas as the north-east coast and the Cairns hinterland demanded more ordinary police work not necessarily less Native Police work.

However, closer settlement on the fringes of the rainforest and scrub

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did not always intimidate the Aborigines. The presence of a large number of settlers and the realisation of their firepower were not sufficient to offset their resentment, the advantage of their refuge, and the incentive of hunger. Their resistance had not been broken, mainly because they still had part of their land for economic, spiritual, social, and politico-military support.

Thus once again the government's expectations as enunciated by the Police Commissioner conflicted with both the situation in this area of North Queensland and the settlers' expectation. There is ample evidence that the settlers thought it was the government's responsibility to pacify the Aborigines even though they often assumed that the role themselves. It is also apparent that Seymour did not believe that the Queensland government could, or should, offer the same protection to the small selectors and miners as it did to the pastoralists. Thus he informed the Colonial Secretary in typical vein:

Miners that are scattered through the district cannot have their several tents watched for them while they are away prospecting; and selectors in or close to scrubs who leave their crops or cattle unprotected will suffer from the depredations of the blacks—who are always on the watch—no matter what strength of police may be in the district.<sup>59</sup>

It was as impossible for the selector to prevent Aboriginal raids on crops, cattle, houses, and sheds as it was for the frontier mining population to protect themselves adequately. Furthermore, Seymour considered most of their crimes 'petty' yet, to the small selector struggling to clear his land and get established, robbery of crops, tools, provisions, the contents of his home, and the spearing of his few cattle were anything but petty. Seymour confronted Griffith with the unpalatable truth. More intense police protection against starving Aborigines would lead to more Aborigines resisting arrest for petty 'crimes' whereupon they would have to be shot down or allowed to escape. Police Commissioner Seymour, who had commanded the Native Police since 1864 and never tried to restrain the settlers on the frontier, then added with affected horror: 'and even the most deeply injured settler would hardly demand that the blacks should be shot down for resisting capture for any charge short of a capital offence'.<sup>60</sup> It is difficult not to conclude that the experienced commander-in-chief was gently deriding his minister, the well-intentioned city lawyer, Griffith, and confronting him with the necessity of doing something more on the Queensland frontier than uphold the sanctity of British law.

The resistance of the Aborigines of the Atherton and Evelyn Tablelands would no doubt have been worn down in time but at a cost and delay in

economic exploitation that the settlers would find unacceptable. The initiative to find a quicker, peaceful accord with the Aborigines had not evaporated. In July 1888, when the Tinaroo Progress Association requested that the government end the continued 'depredations' of the Aborigines on the Barron River, it referred B.D. Morehead, Colonial Secretary in the government that had followed Griffith's, to the previous correspondence and the promise that a constable and a tracker would be stationed for this purpose, adding: 'there are means of dealing with the Black question without using severe repressive measures'.<sup>61</sup> In August 1888, after further concerted local pressure, the government responded by stationing two police constables at Atherton. Their prime task was to end the racial conflict in the Atherton-Evelyn District. A Constable Hansen was carefully chosen to establish a peaceful understanding with the Aborigines.<sup>62</sup> A.H. Zillman, who had been appointed to the post of police magistrate and mining warden at Herberton at the same time as the deputation was meeting Hodgkinson, placed maximum importance on the solution of this frontier problem, and gave the greatest possible support to Constable Hansen's initiative.<sup>63</sup>

Some idea of how Hansen established contact can be deduced from the few reports of his which have survived. His first report from Atherton Police Station, dated 25 November 1888, describes a nineteen day search through the rainforest for Aboriginal camps. He came across two occupied camps containing about thirty bushels of corn plus a variety of the settlers' property, including fourteen steel axes and three tomahawks. A number of old camps showed clearly that corn had become an important part of the diet of the rainforest Aborigines. Hansen tried to establish communications using an Aboriginal with some understanding of the local language and, before the end of December, he had brought several Aborigines in. Within two months, Hansen had contacted a group of over forty Aborigines. They were able to inform him of their hunger and he to tell them they could obtain food at Atherton. The government was then requested to provide rations for them.<sup>64</sup>

The settlers 'subscribed liberally' to provide the Aborigines with flour, sugar, tea, beef, tobacco and a couple of acres of sweet potatoes. Constable Hansen estimated there were two hundred more Aborigines ready to come in during the next week and believed he could bring all in if he could provide them with rations. Even this first request for government assistance contained the inducement that the settlers would soon employ the Aborigines, thus relieving the government of the expense of their rations. Neither the settlers nor the government clearly understood how the plan would develop. However, it is clear that the government thought it was providing food to meet a short-term emergency while the settlers were seeking a long-term solution. If regular rationing was needed,

the government would soon be expected to accept responsibility.

Zillman, John Newell, the Mayor of Herberton, and several other leading citizens who were very interested in any attempt to reconcile the Aborigines to their dispossession proceeded to Atherton to investigate the situation. Many people in the district now wanted the experiment tried. Zillman strongly urged government support to follow up Hansen's breakthrough in establishing communications with the resisting Aborigines and was granted a tentative £20.<sup>65</sup>

As another group of forty had already come in, and eighty more were anxious to, but restrained by Constable Hansen because of lack of rations, Zillman requested an increase in government expenditure, suggesting that in a month or two the Atherton Aborigines, like some on the Russell and Johnstone Rivers, would obtain employment. The Aborigines had agreed to cease raiding the selectors' crops if they were well treated and received some food and blankets. The Colonial Secretary cautiously allowed the scheme to continue.<sup>66</sup>

The government was under pressure to provide a permanent solution to the problem. They were strongly urged to establish a mission station or reserve to ensure that the Aborigines did not resume their raids for food. There were two hundred Aborigines on the Mulgrave and Russell Rivers wanting to come in. Once again, the colonists' recurrent nightmare appeared: that these Aborigines and the ones at Atherton would resume their hostile activities from their forest fastness, more sophisticated through contact with the settlers and more determined because of their newly acquired taste for 'the good things of civilisation'. It was to offset this that an influential police officer, Inspector Stuart of Port Douglas, recommended that the rationing be continued.<sup>67</sup>

The most influential man in developing the experiment was, however, Police Magistrate Zillman. Early in June 1889, he had already successfully indicated the necessity of continuing government expenditure 'until some permanent plan of dealing with them is formed'. On 18 June Zillman reported on the three months' old experiment. He commented on the 'good understanding' established with the Aborigines and indicated inadvertently that this was not a completely one-way process: he now believed that the chief inducement for raiding the settlers 'was to procure the means of subsistence for the old men and women'. The Aborigines had thus been able to communicate that they were in part forced to such dangerous measures to fulfil their traditional kinship obligations. Presumably the younger Aborigines had been able to eke out a living while foraging but could not bring back enough food to the old and feeble now confined to their rainforest camps. A good number of the young and able were already working for the selectors, who paid them in rations, tobacco and so on. Zillman now tried to ensure that the old people received

government rations.<sup>68</sup>

From the settlers' perspective, the economic success of the experiment was already manifest. Selectors began clearing and preparing land for crops which formerly had been considered too vulnerable to Aboriginal raids. Good crops were being harvested whereas previously only a small percentage, if any, could have survived. One selector had cleared £300 for produce in 1889 whereas in 1888 he had only received £50. Other settlers who had lost nearly all their crops in 1888 had good harvests with pleasing returns in 1889. The prospects for an accelerated development and expanded settlement of the district, where some of the colony's finest land had been revealed, were being fulfilled, and a dramatic expansion in the area of land under cultivation indeed occurred. Both Zillman and Hansen believed that a reserve for Aborigines was necessary to maintain security and to capitalise on the opportunity to 'civilize or tame' them and to use their labour.<sup>69</sup>

The experiment to pacify the Aborigines had already passed the point of no return. They rarely troubled the settlers and were allowed relatively free movement throughout the district. By August, the Native Police force in the district had been considerably reduced.<sup>70</sup>

It was not long before applications for similar assistance were made from other areas of Cape York Peninsula. Zillman tried to differentiate between those that were essential to pacify Aboriginal resistance and those that were not. Thus William Atherton's request for an allowance for rations for the Aborigines at Chillagoe Station was refused. Zillman admitted there was justice in the claim on the general principle that the Aborigines should be the responsibility of the state. This would however divert funds from 'the more intractable ones': 'At Chillagoe they have no scrub fastnesses into which they can penetrate and defy authority and are moreover not in that wild state which necessitates pacification in the first case.' Atherton had let the Aborigines in at Chillagoe for twelve months. As there were about two hundred in the tribe, he found maintaining them almost unbearably expensive. Despite the fact that the station had been abandoned for some years previously on account of Aboriginal resistance, the government had no intention of rewarding past initiatives.<sup>71</sup>

On Waroora Station, about thirty miles south of Herberton, the Aborigines had been kept out till May 1889. They had continually speared horses and cattle, despite harsh retaliation, until the owner was encouraged by the Sub-Inspector of Native Police to supply them with rations. From May till November, the station owner had killed 33 head of cattle for the Aborigines and had been allowed £8 per month by the government. On this station, a captured Aboriginal sent out by the Native Police Inspector, Brooke, and the owner had explained the new conditions

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to his fellow tribesmen but they were still so wary that they sent down to the coast for a 'half civilised nigger to come and talk' before approaching their former enemy. This apparently trivial incident provided one of the few examples of the Aboriginal attitude to this change of policy. Elsewhere Aborigines were described as responding automatically to the new European initiative whereas it must have often produced, as here, suspicion, caution, and an intelligent appraisal of the situation.<sup>72</sup> In September 1889, Zillman informed his Minister that he had

long since come to the conclusion that to establish friendly relations with the blacks is the best course to pursue. The strongest argument in [favour] of this course is, that it is almost impossible to get at them in any other way . . . Moreover past experience with retaliatory measures proves that such a course of treatment has not been successful. I cannot guarantee that the present system will be successful, but it is the more humane and is worthy of trial.<sup>73</sup>

At this stage the Colonial Secretary and Premier, B.D. Morehead, realised that there was a policy developing on the frontier that was (a) potentially costly and (b) in conflict with the previous policy based on 'dispersal' and assistance to the selectors 'to keep the blacks out' until their resistance was broken. Consequently he sent a police magistrate, G.P.M. Murray, from Brisbane to report upon 'the judiciousness or otherwise of this mode of dealing with the Blacks in this locality'. Murray's instructions stressed 'the temporary measures which have been taken, to conciliate' the Aborigines and the Colonial Secretary's realisation that 'the whole matter must be dealt with in a more comprehensive manner than hitherto'.<sup>74</sup>

Murray had long experience of the Queensland frontier as he had been a Native Police inspector in the 1860s. He believed, wrongly it seems, that the dense scrubs on the heads of the Johnstone, Tully, and Murray Rivers on to the Herbert contained a plentiful supply of food, but realised they were also the Aborigines' strongholds. Everyone he spoke to agreed that the raids had diminished greatly or ceased since the Aborigines had been let in and supplied with rations. Thus he recommended the continuation of the experiment despite the fact that numerous requests for government aid would come in. He believed that certain precautions could be taken to regulate the scheme. Thus only the Aboriginal group normally occupying a troubled locality should be fed, not Aborigines merely attracted by the rations. This would limit the rationing to vulnerable centres of European population. Secondly he stressed the rations should be given only to the aged men and women and the children. The strong must forage for their own food or work for the settlers. He main-

tained that these two precautions would prevent the scheme attracting the large groups of Aborigines still living traditional lives in the scrubs. Indiscriminate rationing, he believed, could result in groups of up to five hundred suddenly assembling. He successfully advised the Colonial Secretary not to accede to Zillman's idea of a small reserve where the Aborigines could become self-supporting, suggesting instead a large conveniently placed hunting reserve or, alternatively, a series of reserves from which rations could be distributed.<sup>75</sup> Local initiative to solve the particular problem posed by the rainforests had thus led to a temporary expedient which had been accepted as government policy.

Not all Murray's recommendations for this area were implemented. Thus the suggestion that a hunting ground be established was not gazetted because the land was required for agricultural development. Murray had also recommended that the local authorities distribute the rations. Although the concerned divisional boards agreed to do so, police supervision of local suppliers was finally preferred.<sup>76</sup>

The Europeans continued to report the experiment 'an unqualified success'. In September 1890, there were 250 to 300 rainforest Aborigines camping peacefully at Atherton, up to 200 being rationed, according to Murray's recommendations, on £12 per month. About 100 were employed by the settlers, who greatly appreciated this supply of cheap labour. Other Aborigines would have come in with encouragement. The expenditure had to be increased to £20 per month because of fluctuations in the Aborigines' traditional food supply and the seasonal availability of employment among the settlers. In 1892, 400 Aborigines were still being controlled by this expenditure.<sup>77</sup>

By this time the economic attraction of the scheme had become evident to the government officials. Sub-Inspector Lamond of Herberton estimated that by 1892 one constable and two trackers were effectively controlling the Aborigines of the Barron Valley scrubs with rations valued at £240 per year whereas before 1889 two or three detachments of Native Police had been unable to do so. He estimated this saving to the police department was between two and three thousand pounds per annum.<sup>78</sup>

Although each year more and more land was being cleared, there were over 1,800 square miles of rainforest still left as a refuge for the Aborigines around Atherton. Zillman was firmly convinced that they could not support themselves in the scrub especially as a large area of their hunting grounds had been taken from them. Thus if their food resources were not supplemented they would return to their former desperate measures. If traditional food became scarce, the Aborigines now expected to receive rations. The scheme was thus self-perpetuating. As late as 1895, the Herberton Police Magistrate was recommending the continuation of rationing to the Aborigines at Atherton, now more than 400, as the



settlers could not supplement the diet of such a large number.<sup>79</sup>

By the time of Murray's inspection in November 1889, rations were already being distributed at Atherton, Waroora Station about thirty miles south of Herberton, Thornborough on the Hodgkinson goldfield, Union Camp about sixteen miles from Thornborough and Mt Orient on the Mulgrave goldfield near Cairns and about thirty-six miles from Herberton. In October 1891, a group of Aborigines were let in on the Daintree River and given supplementary rations by a settler. After an official investigation the Colonial Secretary decided to assume this responsibility as an alternative to providing police protection. In 1892, rations were issued at California Creek west of Herberton to prevent the robbing of miners' camps while in 1896 supplementary rations were issued to a group of aged Aborigines, near Fisherton on the Tate River, who had refused to follow the young tribespeople to a mining camp thirty miles away. Unable to support themselves completely, these old people had been robbing the camps of the handful of old miners left at the Tate tin mines. Yet expenditure was always closely watched. Thus in 1893 the amount disbursed at Atherton was reduced from £20 to £15 per month on Zillman's recommendation. Officers were instructed to discontinue rations whenever sufficient natural food was available, and distribution centres were rationalised for administrative convenience wherever possible.<sup>80</sup>

The Atherton initiative succeeded in changing official attitudes and consequently government policy and practice. In 1893, twenty-four residents of the Murray and Tully Rivers petitioned for adequate police protection because rainforest Aborigines of the Cardwell Range were killing their dairy cattle. Horace Tozer, who was Colonial Secretary from 1890 to 1897, during which time Queensland developed its policy of paternalistic protection, accepted advice that the nearest Native Police detachment be instructed to patrol the area. In 1895, seventeen residents from the same area again requested police protection, pointing out that seven properties had been destroyed by fire by the Aborigines and an attempt made on the life of one of the settlers. This time Tozer again demand that the Police Commissioner provide protection, but added: 'If a distribution of food could be arranged by some competent person near this place all outrages would cease. I prefer this if it can be arranged to native police.' This was indeed a declaration of faith.<sup>81</sup>

This did not mean that he embarked upon a campaign to institute the scheme widely. To another request for aid in 1895 Tozer retorted: 'I am unable to supply all the blacks of Queensland with rations. When occasion calls for it a station is provided from which supplies are distributed. If a necessity exists for a station at Myola that fact must first be proved to me.'<sup>82</sup> Yet the system did develop not only in size but in complexity. The government, if pressed, began to accept responsibility for Aborigines who

were not necessarily providing an insurmountable problem of frontier resistance. Thus the Aborigines at Myola were old men, women, and children. They had been given supplementary rations by a settler who claimed the cost was too great; £10 a month was granted. At Bowen, in response to a complaint from a local clergyman and the recommendation of the police magistrate, some medicine was supplied by the medical officer for the Aborigines and an Aboriginal enlisted as a tracker to visit the Aboriginal camps bringing in cases of disease for treatment and reporting cases of destitution to the police magistrate. The discovery of about eighty starving old Aborigines and orphaned children near Thornborough produced a flurry of telegrams and the purchase of half a ton of flour within twenty-four hours. The police officers, the responsible minister, and his senior administrators regarded this as an urgent matter.<sup>83</sup>

Before the need to spend money on a comparatively large scale to pacify the Aborigines, the Queensland government had provided rations for destitute Aborigines sporadically and haphazardly. The new initiative on the Atherton Tableland had involved three Colonial Secretaries, their senior administrative officers, and local Police Magistrates, as well as two Commissioners of Police, some senior officers, and some local non-commissioned officers. An alternative was offered which in very difficult but settled terrain was much cheaper and more effective than the Native Police, provided that the local Aborigines believed coming to terms with the intruders was preferable to continued resistance.

The new policy, however, helped to focus a growing government awareness of problems posed to the settlers by Aborigines as a whole. Tozer was obviously interested in these problems and began to think in terms of an Aboriginal policy. Expenditure on the Aborigines associated with rainforest resistance was coupled with rationing Aborigines in inaccessible mountainous areas like Mt Orient and Thornborough. These were associated with occasional emergency rationing of destitute Aborigines, the supply of medicines at Bowen and Cloncurry, and financial grants which were especially designated for secular purposes to missions. A *de facto* Aboriginal policy had been emerging within the Queensland government bureaucracy from the late 1880s.<sup>84</sup> The emergence of a new frontier policy to cope with the rainforest resistance seems to have played an important part in making manifest the new needs of the administration. When Zillman wrote in November 1891 concerning starving but harmless Aborigines near Thornborough, 'The principle of feeding and caring for the blacks having been adopted by the Government there remains only now the necessity of making proper and satisfactory arrangements for the distribution of the allowance,' he was indicating that the initiative which began functioning in February 1889 had moved beyond the narrow confines then envisaged.<sup>85</sup>

The resistance of rainforest Aborigines had thus illustrated the inadequacy of Queensland's frontier policy. It had provided a settler response which aimed at controlling unpacified Aborigines by seeking their co-operation in a scheme in which the invaders agreed to compensate the Aborigines, in part, for the loss of the productivity of their land by the distribution of rations. The full significance of the experiment was not initially understood by either race, but certainly least by the Aborigines who thought they would retain ownership and use of their tribal territories. Regrettably, the Aborigines are shadowy actors in this drama. There is enough evidence to suggest that they intelligently assessed the situation and sought to accommodate the changed circumstances. During the period of frontier conflict they had utilised the products of the invader's culture in their rainforest existence. Constable Hansen found knives, axes, etc., in their jungle camps. There was also ample evidence that European foods such as maize had become an essential part of their diet. As noted previously, on one occasion the Aborigines had even approached an isolated shop to demand flour and billy cans and on another had tried to effect a trade with stolen money.<sup>86</sup> A more complex cultural response resulted from the displacement of those Aborigines who had occupied the fringes of the rainforest or parts of it which had been cleared. Such groups had moved to areas which still offered refuge from the invaders. Then, in an alien Aboriginal environment, they had begun to utilise the European material wealth, thus making a two-fold adaptation.

The dramatic success of the experiment to control frontier resistance by rationing depended on the willingness of the Aborigines to accept such a scheme. The Aborigines had only agreed to cease raiding the selections if they were well treated and received food and blankets as compensation. As Zillman had pointed out, 'a good understanding' had been reached. An important incentive for the Aborigines seems to have been their inability to meet their kinship obligations adequately in conditions of frontier conflict, especially with regard to the support of the aged members of the tribe. Indeed, the Aborigines obviously assessed the Atherton initiative and the alternatives available before accepting the truce with the invaders. The best example of such deliberation occurred at Waroora Station where they called in for consultation an Aboriginal from a coastal tribe who had experienced co-existing with the settlers.<sup>87</sup>

The truce forced on the settlers by the rainforest resistance was, of course, but a temporary victory for the Aborigines concerned. It had proved Queensland's frontier policy inadequate to cope with the colonisation of North Queensland's rainforest and resulted in a new frontier policy after thirty years of implementing the policy of Native Police dispersal inherited from New South Wales experience. However, as European control was effectively instituted following the accord neither

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the Europeans nor the Aborigines concerned realised the significance involved in changing from bullets to beef. The enthusiasm of Zillman and Tozer at having a more humane mechanism of control was but a very minor note in the dominant theme of dispossession.

## 5

# The Sea Frontier

The recurrent colonial fear encountered on the pastoral, mining, and rainforest frontiers that the settlers would have contacts with 'knowing' but hostile or potentially hostile Aborigines became a reality when the invaders were induced to exploit the wealth of the sea in North Queensland. From the early years of Australia's settlement *bêche-de-mer* fishermen had periodically intruded into North Queensland waters. By the 1840s a 'little trade' had been developed in the Torres Strait by vessels from Sydney and Hong Kong in *bêche-de-mer* and such items as tortoiseshell which could be obtained by barter with the natives. *Bêche-de-mer* had been a major item of New South Wales' very limited early trade with the far east while during the 1860s Captain Robert Towns had exploited the Barrier Reef to supply the local Chinese market. In the mid 1860s, *bêche-de-mer* boats occasionally put in to Somerset on the northern tip of Cape York Peninsula while the Prince of Wales Islanders, by 1869, were coming to Somerset to barter tortoiseshell for tobacco and other European merchandise.<sup>1</sup> After fluctuations in this industry it prospered when access to the large Hong Kong and Chinese markets was firmly established. In 1874, over 60 tons of *bêche-de-mer* worth at least £3,000 was obtained in the Torres Straits. In 1880, Queensland exported 198 tons 14 cwt valued at £18,343 and, in 1883, a nineteenth century record of 342 tons 1 cwt valued at £31,581 was exported, all except a few hundredweight going each year to the China market. Over 100 boats were licensed for the industry in 1889, 62 from Port Kennedy on Thursday Island, 27 from Cooktown, and another half-dozen each from Cairns, Ingham, and Townsville. Mackay was the southernmost point at which the *bêche-de-mer* fisheries had been worked. *Bêche-de-mer* was the second most important marine export after pearlshell, exceeding slightly in value the export of edible oyster from southern Queensland.<sup>2</sup>

The pearlshell industry developed from this earlier exploitation of the sea. The Torres Strait Islanders and Aborigines of Cape York Peninsula had early been observed to have pearlshell ornaments but it was not until 1868 that a Captain Banner revealed the existence of extensive beds of high quality pearlshell at Warrior Reef north-east of Thursday Island and about forty miles from the New Guinea Coast. Shortly afterwards shell was discovered in Endeavour Strait and in various other areas in or near the Torres Straits. In 1870, there were five vessels on the grounds em-

Table 3  
Return showing quantities and value of bêche-de-mer  
exported from Queensland, 1880-1889

	Queensland		Foreign New Guinea shipped from Queensland		Total	
	Weight cwt	Value £	Weight cwt	Value £	Weight cwt	Value £
1880	3,199	14,614	775	3,729	3,974	18,343
1881	4,971	23,336	1,264	5,950	6,235	29,286
1882	5,093	25,032	1,249	5,882	6,342	30,914
1883	4,299	21,208	2,542	10,373	6,841	31,581
1884	4,314	18,474	1,380	6,393	5,694	24,867
1885	4,028	19,209	1,156	4,571	5,174	23,780
1886	3,945	15,551	1,188	3,959	5,133	19,510
1887	3,255	12,959	502	1,570	3,757	14,529
1888	4,418	18,379	419	1,669	4,837	20,048
1889	4,190	18,349	1,445	4,391	5,635	22,740

Source: 'Bêche-de-mer and Pearl-Shell Fisheries of Northern Queensland', 1890  
*V. & P.*, III, p. 730.

ploying 160 indentured Pacific Islanders, commonly called 'kanakas' in the nineteenth century. They had collected fifty tons of shell by mid October.<sup>3</sup> The police magistrate at Somerset, C. D'Oyly Aplin, issued the first comprehensive report of the new industry early in 1875, pointing out that 'the enterprise . . . seems almost to have escaped notice in Queensland'.<sup>4</sup>

The pearl fisheries were almost completely within the maritime boundary of Queensland, which extended then to within about nineteen miles of New Guinea. There was some activity at Newcastle Bay immediately south of Somerset and along the west coast of Cape York Peninsula as far south as the Jardine River, but most of the fishing was to the north of Cape York. In 1874, eighteen vessels plus forty boats employing 707 people had raised 137½ tons of live shell valued in Somerset at £200 per ton and 8½ tons of dead shell valued at £40 per ton. The total, £27,840 for pearlshell and over £3,000 for bêche-de-mer at this time produced no revenue for the Queensland government in the form of duties or licences, yet increasingly the northern government outpost was having to service and exercise some supervision of the industry. The fishermen were

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already requesting that the government establishment be moved from Somerset to a more accessible central position among the islands. By this time pearl fishing stations, some of which were small villages, had been established at Warrior Island, Mount Ernest Island, Somerset, and Prince of Wales Island. In 1877, there were sixteen firms using 109 vessels and boats employing an estimated 700 non-Europeans and fifty Europeans. In 1875, 280 tons of shell were produced at an average price of £180 per ton and, in 1876, 460 tons but at an average price of £110 per ton so that the total value of shell, £50,600 was only £200 more than the previous year.<sup>5</sup>

Table 4  
Statistical table showing the value of the ten  
leading Queensland exports

Articles exported	1884	1885	1886	1887	1888
	£	£	£	£	£
Wool	1,889,504	1,779,855	1,413,908	2,368,711	2,258,365
Gold	923,010	1,119,170	1,232,330	1,432,376	1,662,639
Sugar	454,995	720,921	855,510	758,215	384,375
Tin	228,457	156,777	192,564	223,274	230,360
Hides	109,291	125,603	101,870	101,086	30,217
Pearlshell*	94,152	88,210	68,596	49,780	50,332
Livestock	78,400	4,461	43,113	37,295	3,089
Preserved meats	57,274	171,638	2,303	105,340	79,187
Tallow	76,031	97,706	33,434	99,094	75,193
Silver ore	24,756	20,601	22,127	22,422	7,297

\*Tortoiseshell, having an annual export value of from £400 to £500 only, is included with the sum representing pearlshell in the original statistical table quoted.

Source: W. Saville-Kent, *The Great Barrier Reef of Australia; Its Products and Potentialities*, p. 204.

Pearlshell had soon become Queensland's most important fishery and one of its more important export earners. From 1884 to 1888, pearlshell's average annual value was £69,000 and it occupied a position fluctuating between sixth and eighth on the list of most important exports. Queensland pearlshell attracted the highest prices on world markets. In the late 1880s there were about 100 craft licensed to collect pearlshell based at Thursday

Table 5  
 Pearlshell and bêche-de-mer fishery, Queensland, 1890-1910

Year	Pearl-shell	Value	Bêche-de-mer	Value	No. of vessels engaged
	Tons	£	Tons	£	
1890	632	64,666	104	9,691	157
1891	769	78,841	70	6,910	183
1892	931	92,598	61	4,556	190
1893	1,214	106,564	50	3,881	210
1894	1,190	94,350	53	3,522	203
1895	875	71,708	22	1,624	245
1896	1,085	94,836	30	2,421	252
1897	1,233	126,042	17	1,125	273
1898	1,061	109,401	15	1,282	333
1899	1,200	130,105	14	1,295	394
1900	1,212	125,294	13	1,255	361
1901	923	105,403	52	7,399	345
1902	910	107,434	71	9,444	331
1903	908	62,386	59	7,270	332
1904	778	107,434	45	5,865	367
1905	527	62,386	105	10,624	352
1906	427	47,061	131	13,938	207
1907	568	70,513	338	30,333	206
1908	423	50,714	289	19,420	198
1909	516	70,505	278	13,095	184
1910	587	82,991	222	12,785	192

Source: Q.S.A. HAR/48.

Island and, all told, about 1,000 people engaged in the industry.<sup>6</sup> The number of vessels engaged in the pearlshell and bêche-de-mer fisheries and the rewards won are indicated in Table 5 for the years 1890-1910. A large number of luggers left for the Aroe Islands in 1905 and did not return. The values were estimated by exporters for customs purposes.

The industry in North Queensland was primarily concerned with pearlshell, the pearls being appropriated by the diver, and sometimes other crew members, as a right. Although the pearls were generally inferior in quality to, and less numerous than, those collected in Western Australia,



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their value was not negligible. Working owners claimed that the pearls found paid their expenses; nevertheless, the prevailing custom had early become established and the marketing of the pearls was mainly beyond government control or supervision.<sup>7</sup>

The *bêche-de-mer* industry was carried on chiefly by small luggers of five or six tons which made daily voyages from the curing station to nearby reefs, or by a fleet of luggers which stayed in the vicinity of the reefs while one or more conveyed the catch to the curing station and brought back supplies. A few large schooners or ships of from twenty to fifty tons carried small boats and were fitted out as mother ships to cure the catch.

The *bêche-de-mer* were collected by wading or diving from the reefs during the low spring tides. Immediately upon their arrival at the curing stations, the *bêche-de-mer* were boiled in large iron cauldrons for twenty minutes, slit longitudinally, gutted, and dried in the sun. They were then placed for twenty-four hours in the smoke house which was generally made of corrugated iron with two or three tiers of wire netting upon which the *bêche-de-mer* were laid. Finally, the dried smoked product was packed and despatched to the nearest market.<sup>8</sup>

Throughout its history this industry needed a very large supply of cheap labour to gather the *bêche-de-mer* and to process it. Indeed, women and children, as well as the men, were used in both aspects of the industry. Aboriginal labour was early used although the number and proportion are not clear as commentators did not always differentiate between mainland Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders. One is often left wondering if the commentators estimating numbers employed in the industry have included all the mainland Aborigines or sometimes, especially when describing working conditions or rates of pay, whether they have taken them into consideration at all. As well as the more permanent employment there was much casual use of local Aborigines as opportunity and need arose. Thus, the Queensland Commissioner of Fisheries, W. Saville-Kent, remarked in 1890:

numbers of the natives at remote distances from the shipping ports, while willing to work for a month or two, or for a limited number of tides on the reefs in the immediate neighbourhood of their settlements, have a strong aversion to being transported to the shipping ports for registration.<sup>9</sup>

While John Douglas, Government Resident at Thursday Island for the last fifteen years of the nineteenth century, admitted, in 1890, 'very little is known of the natives casually employed on the stations'. He believed that, if any attempt was made to prevent such casual employment of

labour, the industry would be destroyed.<sup>10</sup>

The early failure of some commentators to differentiate between Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders was atoned for by the more precise observers like Saville-Kent, who was commissioned by the Queensland government to investigate the fisheries of Queensland in 1889 and 1890. He stated then:

The crews employed in gathering *bêche-de-mer* consist chiefly of mainland Aborigines, or 'Binghis', as they are termed in the North, with a frequent admixture of Torres Straits and South Sea Islanders and Manilla men; these latter are frequently entrusted with the command of the separate boats.

In earlier years Papuans were extensively used and highly regarded, but this labour was largely denied to the Queensland-based fishermen by a New Guinea ordinance in 1889, a fact greatly regretted by the fishermen, some of whom had ventured along the southern coast of New Guinea.<sup>11</sup>

It is probably impossible to estimate with any accuracy the number of Aborigines employed as regular labour in the *bêche-de-mer* industry in the early years. In 1898, when Walter Roth, the first Protector of Aborigines in North Queensland and a noted ethnographer, began his supervision of the industry, he estimated that about 300 Aborigines were employed in it. This apparently did not include Aborigines picked up for the boats without official knowledge. Douglas reported in the same year that there were about 300 Aborigines employed *on articles*. As Douglas refused to agree to the employment of women or children below the age of puberty, there must have been a significantly larger number working in the fisheries when those casually or illegally employed were taken into account.<sup>12</sup>

The precise number of Aborigines employed in the pearlshell industry is equally difficult to estimate. Until 1874 the shell was entirely obtained by 'swimming divers', non-Europeans who would gather the shell at depths of up to fifty feet. Boys of twelve to fourteen years of age could dive and bring up shell at depths of up to twenty-four feet. Much of the diving was done at low tide for about two to three hours. Such 'swimming diving' required a large unskilled work force and it seems that in these early years the fishermen in North Queensland water might collect *bêche-de-mer* as well as pearlshell. In 1874, several boats introduced diving suits which allowed depths of up to 90 and later up to 120 feet to be fished. By 1877, 63 out of 109 boats were equipped with diving apparatus. Despite the heavy capital outlay, for this time, of £200-£250 for each suit and pump, the working out of the shallower beds and the ability of one diver to stay under water for an hour or two soon established this as the stand-

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ard method of obtaining pearlshell. This change meant a need for fewer but more skilled and more reliable labour.<sup>13</sup>

Saville-Kent described the operations of the industry in 1890:

The vessels employed in the Queensland pearlshell fishery consists chiefly of strong lugger-rigged craft, averaging ten tons burden, supplemented in some instance by cutters of larger size, which serve as purveyors to the luggers and to bring the shell collected into port. The crews manning these luggers comprise the diver, who takes command and acts as sailing master, one tender, who holds the life-lines and attends to all signals from the diver when at work, and four working hands, who, in pairs, take alternate shifts at the manual pumping apparatus for supplying air to the diver. With but few exceptions, the entire crews consist of coloured men of various nationalities. Mainland aboriginals, South Sea Islanders, and natives from the Torres Strait Islands furnish the greater number; while some of the best divers are represented by Manilla-men, Chinese, Japanese, and Malays.

At this time, the industry employed approximately 1,000 men including boats' crews, those repairing boats and equipment, and those involved in preparing and packing the shell for export. Swimming diving was never wholly abandoned and at various times, for example in the late 1890s, when new pearlshell beds were discovered there was an upsurge in demand for Aborigines, experienced or inexperienced, to collect the shell.<sup>14</sup>

The Aboriginal way of life was obviously vulnerable to European intrusion from the sea as had been demonstrated by the early navigators, the various waves of seaborne colonists to Bowen, Cardwell, Cairns, Cooktown, Somerset, Burketown, etc., and the larger numbers of craft, small and large, which landed with impunity in the Aborigines' tribal land. There were circumstances, however, when European contacts rendered the Europeans vulnerable to Aboriginal reaction, such as when the Aborigines had superior aggressive or tactical capability, or when the settlers forced or prolonged an unwelcome liaison.

Indeed the first recorded fatalities from Aboriginal attack in North Queensland occurred on the sea frontier when two men on board the *Ellida* were killed at Shaw Island in the Whitsunday group after they had foolishly placed themselves at the mercy of an Aboriginal group whom they had then unintentionally alarmed. There were seven other examples revealed in this study where men in boats, who were not professional fishermen, were killed.<sup>15</sup> By the 1870s it had become part of the conventional wisdom of the sea frontier that boats must not anchor at night in

vulnerable situations. Thus, after an unsuccessful attack was made on the crew of the cutter *Prospect* off Hecate Point on 3 February 1879, the Sub-Collector of Customs at Port Hinchinbrook commented:

I would beg respectfully to state that the extremely treacherous nature of the blacks on this Coast [cannot] be too widely made known and that it is downright unsafe for any vessel to anchor off any of these Islands without the strictest watch being kept on land.<sup>16</sup>

Another group of people involuntarily placed themselves at the mercy of the Aborigines: those shipwrecked. It is impossible to determine how many castaways were succoured by the Aborigines and how many were killed by them. Instances of men like James Morrill and Narcisse Pelletier, who were accepted into widely separated tribes as relatives returned from the dead, are well known.<sup>17</sup> Others, however, were killed by Aborigines after surviving the shipwreck. This investigation has revealed nineteen castaways reliably claimed to have been killed and another four who were probably killed or abducted. The best known case involved the brig *Maria* which was wrecked on 26 February 1872 on a voyage from Sydney with a party of miners bound for New Guinea. Fourteen of the survivors of the shipwreck were killed by Aborigines to the north of Cardwell while others were treated most kindly by neighbouring Aboriginal groups. There were no doubt other unknown castaways killed by Aborigines and others unknown who were succoured for varying periods of time.<sup>18</sup>

The killing of Europeans so helplessly at the mercy of Aborigines appalled and infuriated the settlers and drew determined reprisals wherever this was possible. Such chance contacts with unpredictable Aborigines were, however, seen in some ways like acts of God which could only be prevented by extermination of the problem, a solution which was sometimes seriously urged at the height of passions.<sup>19</sup>

The fishermen of North Queensland were in a different position. They needed the labour of the Aborigines but knew that after a short time most Aborigines would want to return to their native lands. Indeed, it was the conventional wisdom of the sea frontier throughout the period of this study that even willing recruits, legally signed on, well-treated and receiving their promised wages would desert within a few months if the opportunity arose. The Aborigines' desire to return to their sacred tribal land, to participate in the religious ceremonies that sustained their way of life, to enjoy the warm social life and the varied economic pursuits was inexplicable to the fishermen. They dubbed it 'nostalgia' and were convinced that it could be such a severe malady as to cause death.<sup>20</sup>

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In the early years of the fisheries conditions were quite chaotic and the wishes and well-being of the native labour were commonly disregarded. Some of the earliest extant records reveal kidnapping and retention of Torres Strait Islanders against their will, while conflict was reported between the natives of New Guinea and some pearlshell fishermen who sent 'kanakas' out to plunder their villages. Indeed the British government's interest in the Pacific Islander labour trade focused a revealing light on the fisheries. An investigation by Captain J. Moresby of H.M.S. *Basilisk*, in 1872, indicated that a large number of Pacific Island labourers were employed under the British flag at the various fishing stations and some were being detained beyond their period of service. The fisheries were described as 'uncontrolled', which was literally true as it was more than twenty-five years since the Torres Strait Islands and the adjacent coasts had been visited by a man-of-war. Yet during this time trade had increased greatly.<sup>21</sup>

Some bêche-de-mer fishermen had settled on islands in the Torres Strait and were conducting their industry with kidnapped Islanders, principally women, from other islands. The Police Magistrate reported, 'They have already become a terror to the Natives of the smaller Islands in the Straits'. Thus, the mate of the *Margaret & Jane* was in the habit of compelling recruits to dive for shell by firing at them with a revolver and had shot two Torres Strait Islanders trying to escape. It was common not to put 'natives' on 'ship's articles', consequently the land-bound Police Magistrate at Somerset could not investigate rumours he heard of their deaths. Several vessels avoided Somerset to prevent official inquiries. Aborigines were rarely specifically mentioned in these early reports; however, it is clear they were also victims of such abuses. Thus, in August 1874, the then Police Magistrate, G.E. Dalrymple, reported that the captain of the schooner *J.S. Lane* was carrying and working 'natives of Queensland' without signing them on ship's articles and urged that action be taken to prevent this or no other master would go to the expense of shipping men at Somerset and they would then, as previously, be put ashore unpaid after a few months.<sup>22</sup>

The type of men in both fisheries in the early years was such that maltreatment of the Aborigines was to be expected. Police Magistrate Chester, in July 1877, whole-heartedly agreed with the opinion of his predecessor, Dalrymple, who had written: 'There are of course among these men some of excellent character and integrity of purpose; but there are others of whom to say that they are about as bad a lot as sail out of any port on the earth, is not to say too much.'<sup>23</sup> The pearlshell industry lost much of this reputation possibly because the higher capital investment dictated the need for more responsible management, and the need for more skilled and more reliable boat's crew left little scope for dragooned labour. The

bêche-de-mer industry retained its reputation throughout and beyond the period involved in this study. In his 1897 report, W.E. Parry-Okeden, the Police Commissioner, claimed the bêche-de-mer industry was 'dirty' but profitable, attracting the 'lowest class of whites and Manilla-men'. It should be noted, however, that whenever the pearlshell fishermen needed cheap Aboriginal labour as swimming divers to exploit newly discovered, shallow beds, they treated the Aborigines just as callously as the bêche-de-mer fishermen. Thus the nature of the intruders' industry seems to have been an important factor in determining race relations on the sea frontier as it was on the frontiers previously discussed in this study.<sup>24</sup>

There were three factors which exacerbated the situation. Firstly, as Captain Pennefather, Q.G.S. *Pearl*, noted, 'Drink [was] the great curse of the Straits'. This was not only at Thursday Island, where there were 'scenes of drunken rioting' when the boats congregated to meet the steamers, but also among the boats' crews at the fisheries. The disruptive effect heavy drinking had on this sensitive culture contact situation was indicated in nearly all of the law cases. Secondly, many outrages committed upon Aborigines, especially upon women, were never reported because they were unable or unwilling to come to Thursday Island or Cooktown to make complaints and give evidence. Thirdly, the fishermen usually would not bear witness against one another, especially on behalf of Aborigines. Pennefather reported that he knew of several men being killed and their bodies thrown overboard 'during these orgies on the boats' but the criminals went unpunished.<sup>25</sup> Thus in a very sensitive culture contact situation, many of the intruders were irresponsible and unrestrained while the Aboriginal labourers were almost completely denied legal protection.

It is difficult to estimate the proportion of the labour force that were initially kidnapped by force, the proportion that were duped into undertaking engagements in the fisheries, the proportion that misunderstood the nature of their future employment, the proportion of those who were initially willing to embark but later wished to return to their tribal land, and the proportion who were recruited willingly and remained contented with their employment. One can say with confidence, however, that the abuses associated with the fisheries were very serious, common, harmful to relations between the intruders and the Aborigines, destructive of the traditional Aboriginal societies, and a revealing reflection on the men associated with the industry and the government that failed to control the abuses known for thirty years.

In 1877, Brinsley Sheridan, Police Magistrate and Land Commissioner at Cardwell, brought to the notice of the government abuses concerned with the pearlshell and bêche-de-mer fisheries. Subsequently his submission was published in the *Votes and Proceedings* of the Queensland

Legislative Assembly.

I venture to bring under your notice the [practice], which I trust is not common of vessels engaged in the Pearl and Bêche-de-mer Fisheries in Torres Straits and its neighbourhood, kidnapping the natives along the coast and the adjacent islands, and forcing them to act as divers, etc. This offence is commonly known to the seafaring men frequenting the coast as 'shanghai-ing' [the natives].<sup>26</sup>

Sheridan described briefly four instances that had come under his notice when Aborigines had suffered at the hands of intruders from the sea. Two of these were associated with Dunk Island, one with Palm Island, and one with Townsville. He even proposed that the two islands mentioned above, the Family Islands, and an area of land on the coast north of Cardwell should be declared reserves for Aborigines and hoped that his report would 'put an end to an abominable traffic' and save the lives of whites and blacks involved in it.

Several well-documented examples will illustrate the nature of this 'abominable traffic' and educe the opinion of well-qualified witnesses as to the correctness of Sheridan's hope that kidnapping Aborigines was 'not common'.

The first example was termed the 'Douglas Tragedy' in the Queensland press and even in official correspondence because three Europeans were killed by Aborigines on board the schooner *Douglas* and three others were severely wounded. The term 'tragedy' is accurate, but for other reasons.

Captain Harris of the *Douglas* had experience in North Queensland waters and considered he knew at which islands he could obtain Aboriginal labour. After bringing a cargo from Melbourne to the new port, Cairns, on Trinity Bay the *Douglas* was to collect guano and bêche-de-mer at the Chilcot Islands. The Captain wanted ten or twelve Aborigines and had made various unsuccessful attempts to obtain them. After a month's delay at Cairns the *Douglas* had sailed to Dunk Island to obtain wood, water, and, if possible, Aborigines. Two Aborigines were induced on board, given pipes, tobacco, and biscuits, but allowed to leave in the hope that they would bring others. They understood no English and did not even understand the use of tobacco. Just as the *Douglas* was getting under way the following day these two Aborigines and two others rowed out from Dunk Island where they had been watching these apparently generous Europeans. Three were persuaded to come on board but the fourth refused though repeatedly asked. The *Douglas* set sail, stopped at Cape Upstart, and then passed through Flinders Passage to the guano islands. The Aborigines certainly did not understand where they were going or why they were on board.

They seemed contented on the boat doing light work and later, at the islands, collecting guano and bêche-de-mer. A brig, the *Alexandra*, was at the islands when the *Douglas* arrived, both boats being owned by the same man. The *Alexandra* departed six days after the *Douglas* arrived. By this time, the Aborigines had learned they were to be left at the islands to collect guano and bêche-de-mer when the *Douglas* set sail. In desperation, they tried to gain control of the boat.

On the night the *Alexandra* left and they decided to regain their freedom, two Aborigines slept ashore with two of the eleven man crew and killed them during the night with axes which the crew had habitually left lying about. In accordance with a pre-arranged plan, these two then joined the third Aboriginal on board the boat and attacked the nine sleeping members of the crew, killing one and wounding three. The captain and four others, including two of the wounded, barricaded themselves in the captain's cabin all night despite the fact that they had two loaded revolvers. The other three had been chased into the riggings by the axe-wielding Aborigines.

After a night of repeated but unsuccessful Aboriginal attacks, one Aboriginal was shot. The two surviving Aborigines conversed whereupon one dived overboard. The three Europeans in the riggings descended and were attacked by the remaining Aboriginal who was eventually killed by a concerted attack by the three crew. The other Aboriginal swam off and was not seen again.

There are several aspects here worthy of note. The Aborigines were only occasionally treated roughly. The captain was restrained in his dealings with the Aborigines and believed it was good policy to obtain willing recruits, if possible, as he had apparently done before. Despite the fact that the Europeans had kidnapped the Aborigines and were holding them in bondage, they took no precautions against Aboriginal resentment. They either were not expecting any or believed that, as the Aborigines were stranded remote from their own country, they were harmless. There are indications that the Aborigines were resentful of their situation but concealed this because of their dependence on the Europeans for a return to their homeland. The departure of the *Alexandra*, which meant the removal of a large proportion of the Europeans, plus the information that they were to be left to work on the island, caused them to adopt extreme measures. Their desperation is indicated by the fact that, had they succeeded in killing the eleven remaining Europeans, they themselves had almost no chance of a return to Dunk Island, or even of survival.<sup>27</sup>

The effect of such kidnapping on subsequent race relations on the sea frontier was illustrated before the year was out. Dunk Island Aborigines attacked another European craft, killing the crew and destroying the vessel. An inquiry revealed that this was 'in revenge for the kidnapping



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of the people on board of the *Douglas*'.<sup>28</sup>

The Water Police Magistrate at Cooktown who inquired into the *Douglas* tragedy, B. Fahey, commented in his report:

The abduction of natives from their Islands and haunts along the coast of Queensland by masters of pearl and [bêche-de-mer] fishing vessels, as well as those in search of guano and following various other pursuits has frequently resulted in the loss of life and valuable property and to this inhuman practice must undoubtedly be traced the murder of Coughlin, Mackintosh and Troy by the natives taken by Capt. Harris from Dunk Island.

He urged that those responsible for the *Douglas* kidnappings be punished to prevent a repetition of the offence as previously kidnapping had been carried on with impunity. Such action was supported by Fahey's departmental superior who regarded 'the conduct of the unfortunate blacks as above all praise . . . Had three white men attempted to free themselves from bondage in the same way they would have been exalted to be heroes of the first order'.<sup>29</sup>

The findings of the inquiry were forwarded to the Premier but no action was taken although the depositions and official comments suggested that kidnapping of Aborigines was not uncommon, was causing loss of European and Aboriginal lives, and loss of European property and capital.

Two cutters, tenders on the fishing smacks *Reindeer* and *Pride of the Logan*, left Cooktown about the end of January 1882 for Townsville to recruit 'boys' in company, returning to Cooktown at the end of February with eighteen Aborigines of both sexes varying in age from nine to forty years. Fahey, in his role as sub-collector of customs, reported they had been procured 'under very suspicious circumstances' from Hinchinbrook Island, Dunk Island, and in the vicinity of the Johnstone River. On arrival in Cooktown the two captains drafted the Aborigines

after the manner of sheep, each captain casting lots for nine, (9), mixed sexes, without reference to the inclinations or feelings naturally induced by the filial or friendly instincts of the parties concerned, some of whom, I know, manifested a strong aversion to their separation.<sup>30</sup>

Nothing of the above would have been known except that the mate of the *Reindeer* tender, Steve Barry, boarded the other boat and took possession of an Aboriginal girl aged between ten and twelve years of age claiming her as his own. He then literally dragged her through the main street of Cooktown and lodged her at a public house. He ignored Fahey's personal remonstrances, refused to obey the police inspector's orders, and only surrendered the girl when the police magistrate authorised the inspector

to take her into custody. She was then returned to Hinchinbrook Island. There was little doubt that Barry had already had sexual relations with her and intended to continue doing so at the fisheries. The remaining seventeen had to be engaged before Fahey under the Pearl Shell and Bêche-de-mer Fishery Act of 1881 despite his suspicions.

Fahey, like Sheridan in 1877, thought the Aborigines were 'far better off' when 'usefully employed', and believed in most cases they were willing to work for the fishermen, but added:

I would point out that the mode of obtaining their services should, in the interests of common humanity, be more legitimately pursued than 'indiscriminately decoying' them at every convenient spot along the coast and its Islands, irrespective of age or sex.<sup>31</sup>

Howard St George, then Police Magistrate at Cooktown, believed there were 'numerous instances' of Aborigines being induced on board vessels fishing in unfrequented parts of the coast and being taken to distant reefs or islands and detained there. He knew of at least three 'massacres' resulting from such forcible detention. Fahey and St George both stressed the need of a government vessel to check such abuses. The Police Inspector at Cooktown regretted he could not prosecute Barry and the Police Commissioner, Seymour, informed the Colonial Secretary that such was the case: 'This forcible carrying away of Gins is the cause of much of the ill feeling existing towards whites but I do not know any way of preventing it.'<sup>32</sup> An interesting flurry of minutes between Premier McIlwraith and the Attorney General's department had already revealed that the Imperial Slave Act 5 Geo. 4 was the only possible way of punishing these men, and, as Seymour had pointed out, this would not succeed. Once again Queensland law, even with the sympathetic interest of the Queensland government, was helpless to meet the challenge confronting it on the sea frontier.<sup>33</sup>

In February 1884, Andrew Anderson, the Master of the *Alarm*, was following the boat *Mary Lee*, captained by Frank Lee. Both men were bêche-de-mer fishermen. Off Cape Flattery, Anderson asserted, a canoe containing about ten Aborigines came out from the mainland. Lee changed direction, ran the canoe down, and sank it. Two of Lee's crew, Maryborough Aborigines, then dived into the water and captured three of the struggling Aborigines who were then detained on the *Mary Lee* in chains. Lee ordered three members of his crew to fire at the Aborigines struggling in the water, two of whom refused. However, shots were fired and blood was seen in the water but it could not be claimed with certainty that someone was hit.<sup>34</sup>

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The Colonial Secretary, Griffith, the Colonial Treasurer, the Inspector of Police and the Police Magistrate at Cooktown believed Lee guilty of kidnapping and attempted murder and made very determined efforts to have him convicted of a serious charge. He was charged with intent to murder and kidnapping. The charge of kidnapping had no chance of success as the Aborigines had not been taken beyond Queensland's three mile offshore limit although they had been taken over 150 miles from their tribal territory. Griffith recommended Lee's rearrest for assault and false imprisonment which were offences at common law. Lee was fined for a breach of the 1881 Pearl Shell and Bêche-de-mer Fisheries Act, charged as Griffith had advised, and committed for trial to the Circuit Court, but not convicted despite the enthusiastic determination of all concerned.

Police Magistrate Milman reported that kidnapping of Aborigines was 'rife' and urged that he be allowed to visit the fisheries. The concern shown by Griffith and reflected by his subordinates indicated in part the motivation behind the 1884 Native Labourers Act which ineffectually attempted to control recruiting.<sup>35</sup>

It is clear from these examples and the comments of experienced government officials that kidnapping was very common and that this abuse had a deleterious effect on Aboriginal-European relations. The early reports of Walter Roth, first Northern Protector of Aborigines, indicated that the situation had not changed significantly by the end of the century. Thus, in February 1898, he wrote:

The whole story of this bêche-de-mer trade which, until my arrival here and opportunity of enquiry, I could scarcely have credited, is one long record of brutal cruelty, bestiality and debauchery: my heart almost bleeds at what has come to my knowledge. I am determined however to remedy matters, and though it may take time, and many difficulties will have to be contended with, I feel confident of ultimate success.

Roth devoted a large section of his published report for 1899 to abuses associated with the pearlshell and bêche-de-mer fisheries.<sup>36</sup>

There are many facets of the forced labour trade in the fisheries that deserve special emphasis. It is clear that when recruiters first moved into a new area the Aborigines at the very least were deceived into entering into an engagement they would not have otherwise undertaken. With regard to an area where the Aborigines had little contact with the intruders, Roth remarked:

I may mention that the natives here are mostly 'myalls' not too safe

to travel amongst, and that in the absence of contact with 'civilizing influences' they can neither understand nor speak English; consequently no recruits are obtainable here except by strategem. It simply means that if unscrupulous people remove boys from here, the next to come will run greater chances of meeting with outrage.<sup>37</sup>

It is also clear that if decoying was not successful forcible abduction was resorted to if the opportunity and need arose as was the case with the *Mary Lee* and the cutters *Reindeer* and the *Pride of Logan*. In the latter case whether the Aborigines were decoyed or forcibly taken on board is not clear. However, their later disposal against their wishes and without consideration of family or tribal affiliations had much the same effect as forcible abduction. Even in the case of the *Douglas*, the fine line between decoying and forcible abduction blurs as once the Aborigines were on board they could leave only if the captain agreed. Finally, if communications with Aborigines could have been established and the nature of the employment fully explained, it is clear that uncontacted or little contacted Aborigines would not wish to be absent from their tribal lands for as long as most fishermen wanted them. This was stated as a truism in the Cairns fishermen's petition.<sup>38</sup>

The kidnapping of women not only for their labour but also to satisfy the sexual needs of an otherwise almost entirely male fishing population was very common on this frontier as on all the others. It also caused much conflict on the sea frontier. Thus, in his published report for 1892-93, John Douglas explained one example of conflict by pointing out that the 'Manilla men took their gins away from them'. In the *Cooktown Courier* in April 1890, a report explained that a bêche-de-mer fisherman had been attacked and severely injured by eight mainland Aboriginal employees in retaliation for the abduction of four of their wives by his 'Manilla men'. The article accepted the normality of this situation. Police Magistrate Chester at Thursday Island was informed by the police that six Aboriginal women were on a schooner, the *Tarrigal Pocket*, 'for the purpose of prostitution'. Chester could not obtain evidence of prostitution and fined the master £5 and costs for a breach of the 1881 Pearl Shell and Bêche-de-mer Fishery Act. He observed that most of the shelling boats carried one or more women for this purpose but that, as no complaint had hitherto been made, he had not interfered. He urged that the practice be stopped.<sup>39</sup>

If this practice was common on the shelling boats, it was almost universal in the bêche-de-mer trade. In almost any court case, the evidence revealed that, as well as the Aboriginal employees' commonly having their wives with them, each non-Aboriginal fisherman commonly had 'his gin'. Thus, a Japanese giving evidence at the trial of George Dillon, for fatally shooting an Aboriginal who refused to obey his order to pick up a rope,

remarked that he was working at Cockburn Reef with 'George Dillon and his gin, George Rotumah and his gin'.<sup>40</sup>

The trial of Edward Moran, alias Jerry, for the murder of an Aboriginal, Almah, was in many ways exceptional but it did indicate the normality with which non-Aborigines in North Queensland thought they could appropriate and discard Aboriginal women. Edward English, a collector of natural history, described how he met Moran of the *Jessie* and a Captain Walters of the *Ellengowan* in an oyster parlour in Cooktown. The three men returned in company to these boats in the Cooktown harbour. While at the *Jessie*, Captain Walters said: 'That is a nice looking gin, I should not mind having her'. Moran told Walters he could have her despite the fact that she was the wife of an Aboriginal called Dick. Moran then took her struggling and screaming to the *Ellengowan*. The Aboriginal, Almah, on the *Irish Lass* then shouted: 'what for take'm gin, police, police; what for takem gin, what for wakem up altogether; plenty white women what for takem gin'. The woman was then returned to the *Jessie* but someone in the *Ellengowan* again urged that she be brought over. Moran then rowed over to the *Irish Lass* and shot dead the vociferous Almah.

Moran's claim that the Aboriginal had committed suicide fell down mainly on the evidence of Captain Wallace and his wife of the missionary cutter, *Fairy Queen*, who observed the proceedings and informed the police. The Supreme Court Judge, Justice Cooper, virtually advised the jury to convict the prisoner of murder and compensated for the surprising verdict of manslaughter, by sentencing Moran to penal servitude for life.<sup>41</sup>

A similar case was revealed in 1888 when Christie Christison was charged with feloniously assaulting George Rotumah on the high seas and stealing a Martini Henry rifle, that is with piracy. In the evidence it was revealed that Christison offered to trade his 'gin' for 'Rotumah's gin' and, when refused, had fired several shots into the boat and on either side of Rotumah's head. Rotumah had then advised the Aboriginal woman to go with Christison or she would be shot. Christison then ordered 'his gin' to change boats which she did after a shot was fired in her direction. Christison later claimed he was drunk at the time. He returned the woman to her employer with the rifle several days later when he was informed Rotumah was going to complain to the Cooktown police. Once again the charge of abduction was not pressed. There were a number of white men on Christison's vessel who would apparently have supported him in court.<sup>42</sup>

The whole of the fishing industry in North Queensland was suffused with the abuse of Aboriginal women. The water police magistrate at Cooktown informed his Colonial Secretary and Premier, McIlwraith, that this was one of the revolting features of recruiting Aborigines along the coast of North Queensland. McIlwraith instructed shipping masters not to enter women on ship's articles but the problem was far from solved.

It was claimed that the Aboriginal men had every right to have their wives with them and would not enrol without them.<sup>43</sup>

Moreover they could with impunity be carried with or without the women's wishes in defiance of government intentions. Abduction was normally only discovered by accident. The Government Resident, Douglas, pointed out that even then it was impossible to sustain the charge in a court of law to the satisfaction of the judge and jury. To obviate this, the kidnapping of Aboriginal women could be dealt with on a lesser charge. Thus in a clear cut case of abduction for the purposes of prostitution, the 'Manilla men' involved were sentenced to six months' imprisonment on a charge of criminal assault. Such legal stratagems were publicly reported. Despite McIlwraith's edict, the paternalistic concern of the Government Resident, Douglas, and Northern Protector, Roth, the callous abuse of Aboriginal women still persisted in 1900.<sup>44</sup>

Another facet of the fishing industry was the frequent refusal of the masters of the boats to return the Aborigines they had recruited to their tribal homeland. There were various reasons for doing this. Firstly, it would often require time and hence labour and expense unless the boats happened to be passing the area on the return voyage. Secondly, by dismissing them at an alien port the fishermen were often assured of retaining their services for another voyage, thus saving the effort and expense of recruiting. For either of these two reasons an experienced labour force was gradually built up, some of whom probably became satisfied with or used to the life on the boats. From the evidence taken at the trials mentioned above it is clear that some Aborigines were veteran fishermen.<sup>45</sup>

In Roth's first reports in January 1898, he emphasised the seriousness of this problem even at that late date:

In connection with [the *bêche-de-mer*] trade it has come to my knowledge . . . that there are blacks from certain districts outside the Cook who are practically *forced* to go on these vessels: thus, they have originally been shipped, say, from ports lower south, but notwithstanding their agreements to be returned to the places whence they were shipped (according to the *Bêche-de-Mer* Act) have been re-shipped at the expiration of their time on Articles from another port, either through the carelessness or passiveness of previous Shipping Masters.

When Roth wrote, there were eight or ten Aborigines from the Johnstone River who dared not go overland because of the intervening hostile tribes and could not stay in Cooktown for the same reason. They were thus obliged to return to the fisheries.<sup>46</sup>

In his report for 1899 he reported similar circumstances at Thursday

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Island, despite Douglas's efforts since 1885 to have the Aborigines returned to their homes. Even with co-operation between Douglas and the missionaries at Mapoon and Weipa, Douglas was not able to control recruiting in that area. Lacking effective legal control, Douglas had made local regulations *ultra vires* which he believed the fishermen obeyed. As Dr Roth remarked sadly: 'his confidence in the recruiters became grossly abused and his voluntary self-imposed labours in the interests of the aborigines practically emasculated . . . Often, the blacks were never returned at all'. Dumped at Thursday Island they too had no choice but to reship. Roth cited two examples of Aboriginal boys of school age from these mission stations who had been recruited in January and September 1898, and two other children who had been recruited in 1895 and 1896. None had been returned although three of the recruiters were known. If recruiters refused to return Aborigines to Mapoon and Weipa, where there was co-operation between concerned Europeans there and at the government establishment at Thursday Island, there can be little doubt that even at the end of the century this abuse was common.<sup>47</sup>

As so many Aborigines were virtually imprisoned in the fisheries, many others detained longer than they expected or wished, and still others incensed at the treatment they or their women received on board boat, it is not surprising that they often ran off with boats. They also frequently attacked the non-Aboriginal members of the crew either in retaliation for their previous suffering or to enable them to escape in the boats. Sometimes no doubt both motives were present. In his 1888 report, the Government Resident mentioned the 'outrages of the natives', adding: 'on more than one occasion, the crews have decamped with the boat—in one instance leaving their employers to perish on a reef and on another occasion mercifully killing them before they cleared out'.<sup>48</sup>

The Government Resident believed that this had been to a great extent responsible for the decrease in *bêche-de-mer* production, as did the Commissioner of Fisheries, Saville-Kent. He noted in his 1890 report:

A matter demanding serious attention with relation to the *bêche-de-mer* fisheries of Northern Queensland is associated with the employment of native labourers. Of late years, and in the Torres Straits district more particularly, outrages committed by these labourers, in which the boat-owners or their agents have been assaulted and lost their lives, or the boats with stores on board have been stolen, have become so frequent as to paralyse the industry to a very large extent.

He claimed in this Queensland publication that occasionally the outrages had been provoked by unjust treatment or interference with the Aboriginal



13. Aboriginal Carpenters with Rev. Nicholas Hey, Missionary at Ma-poon. About 1904. Presbyterian Board of missions Archives.

women but in most cases the temptation of obtaining loot had been the motive. Yet in his very important book, *The Great Barrier Reef*, published afterwards in England, he wrote:

Doubtless, many a tale could be told throwing discredit on their trustworthiness: tales of . . . boats and stores decamped with, and of the European or Manilla 'boss' being marooned on a coral islet, or left to perish on a temporarily exposed reef. There is usually, however, an obverse side to these tragic pictures, which show that the aboriginal was not the initial aggressor.

He went on to specify frequent kidnapping, forced detention, interference with Aboriginal women and wages not being paid as such provocations but implied these abuses were more controlled by Queensland's 'excellent regulations'. Saville-Kent had helped to formulate these.<sup>49</sup>

Yet Douglas, in his 1894 report, linked the 'languishing condition' of the *bêche-de-mer* industry with the sudden increase, during 1893, in the number of Aboriginal attacks upon the non-Aboriginal members of the crew. Seven men (four Europeans and three 'coloureds') had been killed in waters under the jurisdiction of the Thursday Island administration. Douglas lamented that it was impossible to supervise the *bêche-de-mer*



trade properly and as a result the indigenous people and the fishermen both suffered.<sup>50</sup>

Indeed, in the course of this research a surprisingly large number of non-Aboriginal deaths, resulting from Aboriginal resistance, have been discovered in the pearlshell and *bêche-de-mer* fisheries of North Queensland. Before 1873 only two deaths have been discovered. This was probably caused by, firstly, the small number of boats working in the waters and, secondly, the fact that the fisheries were still virtually unsupervised at this time and, thus, such deaths might not have been recorded. With the establishment of both the 'swimming' pearlshell industry and the *bêche-de-mer* industry in the early 1870s, there was apparently an increased demand for Aboriginal labour, inevitably in areas where there had been very limited contact previously. There was soon conflict in the fisheries. In 1873, Aborigines killed at least seven fishermen. Throughout the 1870s twenty-five deaths have been reliably recorded, probably another two, and possibly three others.<sup>51</sup>

The most flourishing period of the Queensland *bêche-de-mer* trade before 1907 occurred between the years 1881 and 1883 when record catches were reported. This whole decade, however, saw great activity in this trade which was followed by a great dropping off in 1890 which accelerated during the 1890s with an even more marked dropping off from 1895 onwards. It is probably no coincidence that the decade of the 1880s saw an increase in the number of deaths caused by Aborigines at sea. In 1879 five fishermen were killed at Raine Island in one incident and in 1880 one possible death was recorded. In the high activity years of 1881 to 1885, twenty-six deaths have been reliably reported with the possibility of another two. From 1880 to 1889, thirty-nine deaths were recorded, probably another one, with the possibility of six more. From 1888 to 1890, eleven fishermen were killed by Aborigines, and probably another one, this being the period when Douglas and Saville-Kent complained that men were frightened of participating in the industry.<sup>52</sup>

During 1891, two deaths have been discovered in this investigation and none in 1892. Douglas associated the lull in Aboriginal attacks with his attempt at Thursday Island to win the friendship and confidence of the mainland Aborigines and the influence of the Mapoon missionaries. Flour and tobacco had been sent to some Aboriginal groups and some leaders induced to visit Thursday Island.<sup>53</sup>

The events of 1893 soon destroyed his optimism. This study has revealed reliable reports of thirteen deaths resulting from Aboriginal attacks, seven of which Douglas admitted had occurred in waters under his jurisdiction. Yet Douglas reported that, from 1890 to 1893, the number of *bêche-de-mer* boats had dropped from sixty-five to forty-three. Mapoon Mission had been founded in 1891 and local fishermen, who were resent-

ful of the missionaries' influence on their free access to labour, blamed them for disturbing the relationship between the fishermen and the Aborigines on that area of the coast. Douglas dismissed this charge completely and claimed the late loss of life and property was due to specific causes such as the abduction of Aboriginal women. He added that, significantly, all the clashes were involved with boats, implying that the Aborigines concerned were removed from both the direct influence of their tribe and the missionaries. Douglas's lament that it was impossible to supervise the *bêche-de-mer* industry indicated his belief that the industry's use of Aboriginal labour was responsible.<sup>54</sup>

There is, however, another possible factor. There was a great increase in activity in the pearlshell industry with a corresponding increase in the number of boats. From 1890 to 1893, the production of pearlshell almost doubled, the production of *bêche-de-mer* more than halved, while the number of boats requiring labour increased by almost one-third. As those in the *bêche-de-mer* industry had decreased, the increase in craft solely engaged in pearlshelling must have been proportionately greater. It is possible that the increasing demands made on the labour supply by the more prosperous pearlshell industry forced the *bêche-de-mer* fishermen to tap new or less reliable sources of labour. There is some, although by no means conclusive, evidence to support this hypothesis.<sup>55</sup>

Firstly, the *bêche-de-mer* industry could only survive if it had very cheap labour, indeed the cheapest possible labour. After the loss of life and property during 1889 and 1890, the Government Resident, Douglas, had recommended some natives of Saibai then visiting Thursday Island to a respectable *bêche-de-mer* man for employment as being 'infinitely more trustworthy than the "Bingi" [Aboriginal] natives'. Douglas suggested that they were well worth £2 a month but the fisherman confessed he could not afford more than £1 a month, a wage which Douglas considered unacceptable for such good workers. In 1879, the tenders and crew on the pearlshelling boats were 'mostly Kanakas, Malays, Australian blacks, and natives of the islands about the Straits', the 'kanakas' and Malays manning the pumps almost invariably receiving £2 per month while the Torres Strait Islanders and the Aborigines received from ten shillings to £1 per month, the wage in that year tending towards the higher figure. In 1891, Douglas had reported that it would not pay to employ labour in the *bêche-de-mer* industry at a higher scale than ten shillings a month 'which is the usual covenanted scale for the natives'. It would thus seem that as the *bêche-de-mer* industry languished in the 1890s its ability to attract and hold labour diminished as its need for the cheapest possible labour grew.<sup>56</sup>

Secondly, the *bêche-de-mer* fishermen continued to recruit at areas such as the Batavia River and Cape Grenville where the Aborigines had a

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reputation for 'treachery'. In 1890, Douglas believed both of these areas should be prohibited for recruiting purposes. 'These Bingi natives [of the Batavia River and Cape Grenville] are most treacherous, and when they see a chance will inevitably take it'. Yet, after Batavia River Aborigines had killed one fisherman in June 1888, John Williams, in July 1889, recruited from this area although he was warned, and believed, that one of the Aborigines was 'a dangerous character'. In August 1890, after several more 'outrages' involving Batavia River and Cape Grenville Aborigines, a fisherman named Andrew Johnson recruited two Aborigines from the Batavia one of whom, 'Charley', had a particularly bad reputation with the fishermen. They ran off with the lugger. In 1893, the bêche-de-mer fishermen were still recruiting at Batavia River as well as forty miles south of this at Pine River. In June, two 'Manilla men' were killed by two Batavia River Aborigines whom they shipped, apparently because they stole the Aboriginal women. On 24 July, seven Pine River Aborigines attacked the four 'Manilla men' who had recruited them, killing one. On 4 October, Batavia River Aborigines attempted to kill their captain. On 24 October, Pine River Aborigines killed two men in revenge for an incident in which the captain brutally struck one of the tribesmen. On the 25 November 1893, a bêche-de-mer fisherman, Bruce, with a crewman, Rowe, recruited eight Aborigines who had no experience of the fishing industry from Jardine's inland cattle station, Bertie-haugh, on the Ducie River. Jardine warned him these Aborigines were 'dangerous' and Bruce was well aware of the risk he ran. The Aborigines either left Bruce and Rowe to drown or killed them, ran off with the boat, and made their way back to Bertie-haugh.<sup>57</sup>

The cases referred to above are, admittedly, a select group of those who were killed by Aborigines in waters under the jurisdiction of the Thursday Island Government Resident; however, they do suggest a degree of desperation. Other fishermen were also recruiting at the Batavia and Pine Rivers. It seems likely that the bêche-de-mer fishermen were finding labour difficult to attract and were being forced to recruit in areas where the Aborigines were least likely to tolerate for long the life on these boats with these men.

After 1893, only two incidents have been discovered in this study involving deaths from Aboriginal attack. This did not mean the mainland Aborigines were completely contented nor that maltreatment of Aboriginal labour had ceased. In his report for 1894-5, Douglas reported that boats had occasionally been run away with simply to allow the Aborigines to escape but that they were recovered intact. He still had found no way of taking effective legal action against the stealing of Aboriginal women as 'the only way in which the law can be vindicated is by a prosecution for abduction which is a most clumsy and almost impracticable method'. As

has been observed, according to Roth, Douglas was unaware of many of the abuses. It can be seen from Table 5 that from 1895 to 1900 there was a great contraction in the *bêche-de-mer* industry. The number of fishermen moving out of this industry was probably the biggest single factor leading to the diminution of European fatalities. In 1896, Douglas reported the industry in the doldrums adding: 'I only know of one successful *bêche-de-mer* fisherman, and I think on the whole he deserves his success. He treats the natives fairly and he gets willing work from them.'<sup>58</sup>

There were other factors that had led to such a great change from the situation existing in the 1880s when the industry had been paralysed by Aboriginal retaliation. Indeed, important changes in the relationship between Aborigines and *bêche-de-mer* fishermen were ignored when Douglas reported to a government commission in 1897 of the 'untouched Myalls': 'They do not understand our ways and are apt to run away with the boats, and in the old days they did not stop at knocking on the head the owners of boats to get possession of them. Those days I think have completely passed.'<sup>59</sup> The autumnal tone of the last sentence reflected only the effect of the industry on the intruders.

When it became evident that the intruders' visits were more than accidental and occasional, the Aborigines reacted intelligently to the new situation in a variety of ways. Firstly, as has been indicated above, they sometimes retaliated against the intruders if they were still in striking range or against the next vulnerable intruders, who often did not suspect their enmity. Secondly, after the customary initial stage of recruiting by force or deception, some Aborigines were returned to their tribal territories or taken back to act as willing or unwilling intermediaries to recruit more labour. It is clear that, in many areas, recruiting was normalised so that kidnapping by force or decoy was not needed at all, or only seldom, as the Aborigines came to understand the nature of the fishing industry.

Significantly, the first detailed accounts of recruiting such as that of the *Douglas* suggest that certain places like Fraser Island, the Whitsunday Islands, Palm Island, and Dunk Island where the Aborigines had already had some contact with passing vessels were resorted to for recruiting. In fact, by December 1876, the Whitsunday Islands had already developed a reputation for producing 'particularly intelligent natives' who understood what was required of them. It was not long before there were references to recruiters frequenting such places as the Jardine River, the Batavia River, and Cape Melville.<sup>60</sup> Roth's report of 1900 indicated that recruiting had progressively moved from one area to another to satisfy the needs of the fishing industry. By 1900, all Aborigines on the eastern side of Cape York Peninsula from the tip of Cape York to as far south as the Thursday

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Island recruiters would care to go were familiar with the industry and, relative to the uncontacted Aborigines, 'able to take care of themselves'. Roth clearly believed the damage to traditional Aboriginal life in this area was already irreparable.

On the western side of Cape York Peninsula, Roth differentiated three stages of contact, graded in degree of contact from south to north. The first was from Cape York to Port Musgrave near Mapoon Mission, which was at the same stage of contact as the east coast. The second from Port Musgrave to Albatross Bay near Weipa Mission was then the main recruiting area. It was also the main sphere of influence of these two Presbyterian missions, Mapoon and Weipa, which had become by this time consistent opponents of the recruiters. While Roth stayed at Mapoon for two weeks, eleven boats arrived to recruit not only for the *bêche-de-mer* industry but also for the pearlshell industry which had experienced a revival in swimming diving in newly discovered beds in this area. The third area was from Albatross Bay to beyond the mouth of the Archer River. Roth described the Aborigines in this area as '“myalls” not too safe to travel amongst' who could only be recruited 'by stratagem'. He had been informed by a missionary, in May 1898, of some recruiters in the pearlshelling industry who had locked eight recruits of this kind in the hold of the ship with their hands tied. The Aborigines had managed to escape by untying their bonds and forcing the hatch.<sup>61</sup>

With the example of the other areas before him and the fear of Aboriginal reprisals, Roth decided to disallow recruiting in this area. This move itself at this late stage when government legislation, government protectors, adjacent missions, and some seaborne supervision had been instituted reflected gravely on the nature of the industry's use of labour and on the previous efforts of the Queensland government to mitigate the abuses.<sup>62</sup>

The progressive nature of opening up new recruiting areas can be further illustrated. The Jardine River is situated on the western side of the Peninsula in the area Roth designated at the same level of contact as the east coast, thus requiring no special consideration from Roth, while the Batavia River was in the second area, that most resorted to by recruiters, yet in early 1887, Acting Government Resident Hugh Milman wrote: 'The Natives in the neighbourhood of the Jardine and Batavia Rivers are a most determined and savage race . . .'. The necessity for opening up new areas was also indicated by Roth in another report in 1899 when he noted that the area on the west coast from Cape York to Port Musgrave was 'becoming more and more worked out'. This fact, together with the danger to the recruiters involved in opening up a new area, contributed to the popularity of the middle area between the two missions. The missionaries believed that their presence had pacified the Batavia River Aborigines which, in turn, attracted more recruiters. Roth

believed he could protect this area of coast from the recruiters only by having the area between the two missions proclaimed an Aboriginal reserve. The extension of Aboriginal reserves along the west side of Cape York Peninsula was in large part a deliberate attempt to deny the recruiters access.<sup>63</sup>

There would seem to be conflict between the accepted belief that Aborigines would desert their employers if they could and the fact that, once an area was opened up, recruits were more readily obtained and conflict on the boats was less likely. The observations of the missionaries and Roth in this area soon clarify the problem.

Firstly, such abuses as kidnapping, forced detention and the refusal to return Aborigines to their tribal territory persisted but were less necessary. Traditional values and tribal cohesiveness were changing. The recruiters sought mainly young men and boys because they worked better and were more tractable. The tribal elders were often only too willing to use their influence to provide such recruits: they were no doubt convinced of their powerlessness to prevent such contacts and wished to appease the recruiters. Moreover, in a situation where their authority was seriously challenged by the intruders they were provided with a new opportunity for wealth and power.

An initially sceptical Roth was surprised to discover that the labour of a large proportion of these young men was traded to the recruiters by the old men of the tribe, the exchange rate generally being a bag of flour and, perhaps, a pound of tobacco. The missionary, Hey, estimated that fewer than 50 per cent went willingly and, when Roth examined three new recruits, he found that not one wished to go. When he prevented their leaving, the 'Manilla man' recruiting lost his temper and informed Roth he had already paid a bag of flour for each. Another recruiter also admitted 'buying' his labour.<sup>64</sup>

Nor were Roth and the Presbyterian missionaries the only witnesses to the practice of Aboriginal elders selling their children's labour. In June 1882, the Colonial Treasurer was informed that, at Thursday Island, 'At present any man, white or black, can go over to the coast and secure a number of natives by means of a bag or two of flour. The men come willingly enough as they are in a state of semi-starvation . . .'. It is not clear who received the payment but it is probable that at least some went to the dependants of the recruits. In his first report from Thursday Island, John Douglas observed 'that a lot of mere children had been purchased from their relatives on the Jardine and Batavia Rivers'. The routine nature of the process was indicated when the recruiters even brought them to Thursday Island to place them on ship's articles. Douglas ordered them to be returned to their homes at the recruiter's expense. Thereafter the fishermen apparently took more trouble that Douglas should not find

out their recruiting procedures. At Cooktown, Roth himself discovered a child from the Starcke River who had been sold to a *bêche-de-mer* fisherman by his father for a bag of flour, a pound of tobacco and a pipe. How widespread this practice was it is difficult to say but the evidence spans eighteen years and suggests that it was common.<sup>65</sup> It also helps to explain the acceptance of the recruiters in an area where one might have expected continued overt hostility.

The motives of the Aboriginal elders can only be guessed at. Roth saw the trade as a means by which the old men gained material wealth for themselves as well as an increased share of the women of the tribe. He believed that with the surplus of unattached women, they discarded their older wives taking the wives or betrothed of the men at sea: 'Indeed, it is to the personal and selfish interest of the aged males that the younger ones be kept out of the way as long as possible.' This is too simple an explanation.

It is clear from Roth's reports that the recruiters, even at Mapoon, used a great deal of direct and indirect intimidation. They anchored for a week or more at a time and visited the camps of the Aborigines with guns, sometimes firing them to frighten or impress their hosts. On one day, Roth reported five boats anchored in front of the Mapoon Mission seeking recruits. It is not difficult to imagine the potential threat of such a body of intruders, either in co-operation or competition, especially as the number available for the fisheries had greatly diminished. While Roth was at Mapoon, four Aborigines were so terrified by one of the recruiters who visited their camp daily trying to force them to sign on with him that they sought Roth's assistance. In his report to Parliament in 1900 Roth asserted that the recruiter was commonly offered a bonus of 30 shillings by his employer for each Aboriginal recruited, an incentive which must have resulted in much harassment of the Aborigines. It is unclear whether Roth believed there was a separate class of men who recruited Aborigines or whether some employees specialised in recruiting for their employers as the need arose. The latter seems more likely. In 1884, the Police Magistrate at Cooktown had informed the Griffith government 'that a regular traffic takes place on the coast for smart young lads, the current price being £4'. There was thus considerable financial advantage in obtaining Aboriginal recruits.<sup>66</sup>

In the face of such an overt threat to Aboriginal society offered by the fishermen, it is difficult to decide whether the elders were trying to adapt to the new situation while preserving their own authority which they might have seen as conserving the knowledge of ritual and religion entrusted fully to them alone; whether they were trying to accept the fishermen into trading or kinship relationships; or whether they entered into these agreements fully expecting that the children and young men would benefit and be returned. It is unlikely that Aboriginal elders would

be able to trade any but their closest kin and unlikely they would act as heartlessly as Roth believed. Finally, it is possible that sometimes the Aborigines were finding it so difficult to earn a subsistence that a spell on the boats might have seemed desirable to the elders, the young men, or both groups. There were references to the Aborigines being better off on the boats than half-starving at home. Thus Milman, the Acting Government Resident at Thursday Island in 1886, wrote:

That much kidnapping *has* gone on of natives from the mainland is undoubted, but there is no question that the natives so employed improve much in their general appearance and physique after being a very few months away from their homes, where they are half-starved and in a miserable state.

Often the intruders were responsible for the impoverished economic circumstances; however, Aboriginal tribes, undisturbed by alien intrusion, also experienced famines and the recruiter may have profited from them.<sup>67</sup>

There was very little benefit to anyone else but the fishermen. The elders and their dependants received the bag of flour which was consumed in a few days. The recruit, regardless of the wage he was signed on at, returned home with nothing or almost nothing to show for his six months or more on the boats. Douglas had insisted the recruits be paid off at the shipping office where the Aborigines received what was due to them. There are several witnesses to testify to the adequacy of the payment of the recruits.<sup>68</sup> However, in the only area where Europeans could observe tribal Aborigines returning with their pay, the situation seemed very different. As Roth remarked:

Now, whatever may be done at Thursday Island there is no doubt that there is often a leakage somewhere, for, by the time the boy arrives at Mapoon he rarely has anything adequate to show for the results. He *may* have a bag of flour, a tomahawk, some clay pipes, a lb. of tobacco, a cheap blanket, and a pair of trousers. But this is the rare exception, for as I am assured by Mr Hey, who is in the best position to judge, the supply of goods which is brought back here would be dear at twenty shillings.

While Roth was at Mapoon he saw one time-expired Aboriginal recruit return with one bag of flour and two tomahawks. Another four were given only five shillings bonus each for two months' extra labour. Roth also saw another example where an Aboriginal was credited with having received a coat that he and his companions denied he had ever received. There was even one case where the Aborigines working for a fisherman were persuaded or forced to buy their goods to take home at his store, associated



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presumably with his fishing station. One can imagine how easy it would be to effect this. The opportunities for channeling much of the Aborigines' wages back to the employer are even easier to imagine.<sup>69</sup>

A variation of this theme of robbing Aboriginal recruits of their rightful wages was simple and long standing. Just before the end of the cruise the skipper would anchor close to land and manufacture an excuse to quarrel violently with recruits until they deserted the ship in fear of their lives. If the boat waited for two days and the Aborigines did not return, the captain could charge them with desertion and confiscate any unpaid wages. There were also captains who simply discarded such tribal Aborigines at the end of a voyage before putting into port and claimed desertion. Thus, Government Resident at Thursday Island, John Douglas, noted: 'Desertions often take place not long before the expiree of agreements and the wages due thus become forfeited to the employer . . .'. There is no satisfactory way of calculating how often such stratagems were used: but Roth felt the question important enough to warrant a special clause in legislation then being drafted, and was supported by Douglas and the shipping master at Thursday Island.<sup>70</sup>

From the evidence of the missionaries and Roth it appears that many Aborigines were working for their keep and a small bonus at the end of their voyage, some only for their keep, before they were forced to leave the vessel. Their elders in the kinship structure might also have received a small bonus at the beginning of their voyage.

It must again be stressed that this same report which indicated recruiting procedures also indicated, in the same area, kidnapping by deception and force, detention for longer periods than the Aborigines wished, and refusal to return the Aborigines to their tribal areas. Thus Roth gave examples of Aborigines having completed service on one boat being stranded at Thursday Island and forced to ship again. He even gave one example of Aborigines being diverted from one boat to another. Again one probably only sees the tip of the iceberg with regard to practices of this sort as the victims were rarely able to complain and the employers little likely to discuss the practice openly. The 30 shillings or £4 incentive for each recruit obtained offered by employers to the recruiters was an obvious inducement to recruit in whatever way was possible and easy.

Alongside unmistakable evidence that kidnapping persisted in the labour traffic to the end of the nineteenth century, there is also evidence of willing volunteering. By 1900, near Mapoon, which had been the most favoured recruiting area in the far north since the 1880s, even the missionary, Nicholas Hey, admitted that approximately 50 per cent of the recruits would volunteer willingly for service in the fisheries. This was

not due solely to the attractions of the new life. Often conditions at home were unsatisfactory. Returning recruits frequently found their wives or betrothed had been appropriated by other Aborigines, generally the elders who had not been recruited. This led to altercations and general dissatisfaction, especially as those recruited realised they had brought little of permanent value off the boats. The recruiters were frequently able to profit by such unrest with the result that the young men could return to the fisheries to escape the authority of the elders, altercations, or a tribal life that was now less satisfying. J.G. Ward, a missionary at Mapoon, testified that the fishermen liked to strike a camp just after a big quarrel as the weaker party was often anxious to enlist en masse in the first available boat.<sup>71</sup>

A large number of Aborigines joined the fisheries in the belief that only a brief voyage was involved, but this cannot have happened for long at any popular recruiting centre. Others joined with the intention of making the voyage brief and it is to this aspect of recruitment that we now turn.

It soon became clear that some Aborigines were embarking for the adventure of a short spell on board the boats. They enlisted with the firm intention of absconding with a boat at the first opportunity although the earliest instances were doubtless not planned from the outset. Thus, in 1891, Douglas described the conflict between the attraction of the glamorous new life and the Aborigines' yearning for their homeland:

They are recruited often willingly enough. They have heard strange tales of the sea from their friends, and they are willing to go on a cruise for a time. They are shipped with the vaguest possible idea of their duties or their obligations. They perhaps work willingly enough for a time, especially if they are well fed. But whether they are fed well or ill, whether they are badly treated or not, there comes over them long before the expiry of their legal agreement, an irrepresible desire to return to their own country and to the tribal usages.<sup>72</sup>

However, there seems little doubt that, in time, successful desertions convinced some Aborigines they could satisfy both yearnings. Thus there is evidence that the Batavia River became 'an Alsatia' for recruits who had run off with boats. Indeed, Saville-Kent noted the frequency with which 'individuals known to have been associated with previous massacres and outrages [had] been re-engaged by other employers'. He described a recognised refugee trial by which absconders recruited on the west coast of Cape York Peninsula at the Batavia River, ran off with boats and stores on the opposite east coast at Cape Grenville, and made their way back, via the Ducie River, to the Batavia River. There, when they felt so inclined, they would enlist on another boat. The Mapoon missionary, Nicholas Hey, testified that 'many' Aborigines intended running away

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and had only recruited to get the bag of flour paid to their relatives. Their confidence derived from the fact that they had succeeded 'so many times in stealing boats for their journey home, without receiving punishment'.<sup>73</sup> The fishermen found it difficult to accept the ingenuity of the Aborigines and found a scapegoat in the missionaries. Thus their spokesman, the *Torres Strait Pilot*, remarked:

The natives [who had absconded with a boat] have not this time committed any great crime; and they can consequently be accepted with full confidence in to the hallelujah band at the Batavia River until they are again tempted to get a free cruise to this port and out again to some island, from whence they can elope with a good supply of stores.<sup>74</sup>

The evidence of such planned desertions after a brief adventure on the boats is convincing: it comes from reliable witnesses with varied attitudes towards Aborigines. In the virtually uncontrolled contact situation on the sea frontier, some Aborigines were obviously exploiting the exploiters. However, as the Rev. J.G. Ward of Mapoon remarked in 1893 during one of the Torres Straits' most dramatic outbreaks of Aboriginal resistance:

The boys were of course unreliable, but their services were ever in demand, which showed that their labour was worth more to the trader than the remuneration they received, or the cost they occasioned when a fit of homesickness induced them to make off with a boat.<sup>75</sup>

The risk to life and property was inescapable if the fishermen had to use tribal Aborigines to harvest the produce of the sea.

Indeed, Ward has indicated clearly the symbiotic situation which was developing. The coastal Aborigines were used to the sea and many soon found the idea of limited periods in the fisheries attractive. Some employers accommodated to this situation. They returned valued workers to their homes, waited for them for up to a fortnight, and then recruited them again. Thus not only was the value of Aboriginal labour indicated but also the understanding that could develop between recruiter and recruits.<sup>76</sup>

There were developments as well in the fisherman's exploitation of Aboriginal women. As has been noted, women were as capable of working in the fisheries as men. They often accompanied their husbands on the boats and were frequently used willingly or unwillingly to satisfy the sexual needs of the fishermen. This practice persisted beyond the period of this research and was the cause of much Aboriginal hostility. Indeed, Douglas believed that the fact that the *bêche-de-mer* industry had asso-

ciated with it 'a good deal of illicit intercourse with native women' was one of its attractions to some fishermen. In addition to this ruthless exploitation of Aboriginal women for sexual purposes on boats, there was also a good deal of what Europeans saw as systematic prostitution ashore. Thus in a report on the pearlshell fisheries in 1879, Lieutenant Commander Thomas DeHoghton noted that the shellers were generally very healthy but added: 'The chief sickness amongst the shellers is, I believe, venereal, which they pick up from the native women, there being camps of natives along the Australian coast where regular prostitutes are kept who are badly diseased.'<sup>77</sup>

Prostitution did not exist in any really strict sense in Aboriginal society. Therefore the prostitution referred to above probably arose as an extension of the Aboriginal practice of proffering the sexual services of selected women as a means of ending or averting hostility with another group. It is thus likely that the principal consideration of the Aboriginal groups concerned was keeping the majority of their women free from molestation. Clearly such limited prostitution could be maintained only as long as traditional values remained strong. Thus, at such places as Palm Island where small vessels regularly anchored, the crews habitually landed and had intercourse with the women in exchange for tobacco and other articles of trade. Indeed, there is one reference which indicated that two young Aboriginal men were exploiting this situation whether the women were willing or not.<sup>78</sup> At much frequented recruiting areas, such as the Batavia River, the prostitution of the women completely disrupted the camps and was a major factor in changing the traditional way of life, second only to recruitment itself. Thus, at Mapoon under the eyes of the missionaries and the Northern Protector of Aborigines, fishermen of all races went to the Aboriginal camps or took women on board their boats for varying periods of time. Roth commented:

The continual presence of these recruiters on this particular portion of coast line—eleven boats visited at Mapoon during my fortnight's stay there—was also having a demoralizing effect on the Aboriginal women; these creatures used similarly to be bought, for temporary use, flour and tobacco being brought into requisition.<sup>79</sup>

The effect of the exploitation of the fishing industry on the traditional life of Aborigines on the sea frontier of far north Queensland was unequivocally disastrous despite the fact that they were left in possession of their tribal lands. After nine years as Government Resident at Thursday Island, Douglas commented:

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The natives have gained little or nothing from their schooling; their women have been debauched and appropriated; their young men have in too many instances been taught the accomplishments of drinking and swearing, and some tribes have been so decimated that there is nothing of them left but the old people and the young children.

Despite the claims that those Aborigines employed in the fisheries were better off because they would at least be well fed, Douglas pointed out that for everyone 'Life on board one of these boats, or at the stations on the islands which are resorted to, is unspeakably squalid and dirty'.<sup>80</sup>

In October 1899, Roth was able to describe the adverse effects of life on the boats in the region that had been the most frequented recruiting area for the Torres Strait fisheries since probably the middle 1880s, that near Mapoon. He was informed by the missionary, Hey, that there were 600 Aborigines between Mapoon Mission at Cullen Point and Weipa Mission at Albatross Bay. These were categorised as follows:

- A. 200 women designated as females over puberty.
- B. 200 old men designated as useless for boats.
- C. 100 young and middle aged men, all of whom except about 10-14% were then on the boats.
- D. 100 children designated as males and females under puberty.<sup>81</sup>

Although this is not a detailed analysis, three factors stand out: firstly, the sexual imbalance above the age of puberty where there are 300 males to 200 females; secondly, the absence of almost everyone in category C at the fisheries—the remainder in this category were being urged to recruit at the time; thirdly, the small number of children under the age of puberty. The society had already been much disturbed.

It is difficult to account for the dearth of females in category A in comparison with the males in categories B and C, except by suggesting that some, at least, had been taken away to the fisheries and not returned. Douglas had commented that by 1891: 'Most of the young men and many of the young women [near Mapoon] had been carried off as food for the fisheries'. Since the recruiting had commenced in this area in the 1880s it is not impossible that by 1899 there had been an average, permanent loss of three to seven young women a year. However, it is surprising that Roth and Hey did not emphasise this aspect of the fisheries.<sup>82</sup>

Roth gave seven examples of boys of school age not being returned to the mission, three having been kidnapped or taken without their parents' consent. Five were taken and had not yet been returned in 1899, two in 1898, one in 1896, and one in 1895. Another had just arrived back by a

process of reshipping. In fact the missionary, Hey, at Batavia River had informed Roth earlier that each year some young Aborigines were not returned. This was then a constant drain on the area's limited number of young men.<sup>83</sup>

Roth pointed out: 'The boys who are actually recruited here constitute the pick and flower of the tribe'. There were about 100 young and middle-aged men then on the boats and only about another twelve who would be available for the boats if willing. Boys below the age of puberty had already been prevented from recruiting. The withdrawal of almost the whole of this age group must have had a profound effect on the life of the tribe socially and economically; for these were the males who would have been most important in the hunting and fishing expeditions and the support, through kinship obligations, of a large number of dependants, especially older women. In addition, about one-third of the hundred recruits were married and thus their wives and young children were denied their contribution to the family economy.<sup>84</sup>

The situation at the Batavia River was ameliorated greatly by the presence of Mapoon, which was established in 1891, a few years after this region became the most favoured recruiting area for the Torres Straits. The missionaries found themselves supporting the numerous relatives dependent on the absent recruits although they received nothing of what Roth estimated was a minimum of £300 wages the recruits should have received. In a similar situation at Clump Point on the east coast near the present town of Tully, the Cutten brothers had claimed the Aborigines on and near their property were destitute because the able-bodied men had been recruited for the *bêche-de-mer* fisheries in a time of drought. It would thus seem that, even if the recruits benefitted physically from their work in the fisheries, the tribe was economically weakened. It must also have had its social relationships weakened, especially as, according to Roth, their wives or betrothed had been appropriated by others, mainly the older men. The quality of the religious life must also have been threatened because of the absence of the younger initiates and of the non-traditional influences upon these men.<sup>85</sup>

Life on the boats was not as beneficial as some had alleged. Douglas pointed out that there were known cases of gross ill-treatment of Aboriginal labour generally involving a starvation allowance of food, but sometimes involving physical and psychological cruelty. There is no way of estimating the frequency of such conditions but it is relevant to notice, as Douglas observed, 'it is quite impossible to exercise any such supervision as is found necessary in the employment of gangs of South Sea Islanders or other coloured labourers on sugar plantations'. With the type of men involved in the *bêche-de-mer* industry and the constant economic need to employ the cheapest labour, it would not be surprising if working

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conditions and rations, and the availability of medical aid, were at a worse standard than in the earliest days of the 'kanaka' labour trade in Queensland.<sup>86</sup>

Roth claimed that many returned in poor health, even seriously ill. He listed eight deaths over a period of two and a half years of boys and young men who had recently returned from the fisheries that he attributed directly to exposure and the life led on the boats. All were apparently in sound health when they left; all returned with similar symptoms of a similar duration: coughing, spitting blood, pains in the back and chest, and general emaciation. No deaths associated with similar symptoms resulted in this age group among Aborigines who had not recruited. Roth suggested that the extreme youth of the dead recruits was an important factor as no deaths had occurred since the missionary, Hey, had prevented recruiting at such an early age.<sup>87</sup> It seems apparent that some very young Aborigines found the constant diving for shell or *bêche-de-mer* an exhausting, unhealthy occupation, a situation that might well have been exacerbated by a lengthy period of unbalanced diet and exposure to exotic diseases. The deaths that had occurred at Mapoon were almost certainly a feature of the fisheries in less supervised areas and would have been another drain on the tribe's human resources.

There were others, Roth reported, who came back too ill to hunt for their own food. The bag of flour they brought back was shared out according to kinship obligations, and soon eaten whereupon the ill recruit became a burden on the community or the mission. Hey informed Roth that after about four years' work on the boats, they were not fit enough for diving. Roth also attributed the low birth rate to the absence of 'the actively virile portion of the community'. Thus he made a survey of 100 females of childbearing age and found that, though they had given birth to 225 children, 109—almost half—had died. Roth apparently believed that the older men had fathered more children, and that as a consequence the women had given birth to feebler children. There seem to be two misconceptions here. Firstly, Roth believed that healthy babies were not produced by fathers of advanced age, and secondly, he did not realise the high infant mortality rate among uncontacted Aborigines. Abbie reported that 13 per cent of all children were dead within their first year and 25 per cent by the end of their fifth year. Near the fisheries, the birth rate had probably been lowered by venereal disease and the survival rate by the malnutrition of the infants. It is also probable that an increase in deformed births associated with venereal disease led to increased infanticide. Regardless of the factors involved, it was apparent to contemporary observers that the populations of Aborigines contacted by the fishermen were markedly diminished. Although the missionaries at Mapoon tried at first to co-operate with the interests of the fishing industry, they found it a destructive influence on Aborigines within their sphere of influence and

welcomed the assistance of the protectors appointed as a result of the 1897 Aborigines Protection Act in controlling it.<sup>88</sup>

When the fishermen had virtually unchecked contact with the Aborigines, they left in their wake diseased, depleted, and demoralised tribes. Thus on the north-east coast of Cape York Peninsula and on the north-west coast, to as far south as Port Musgrave, Roth reported that the Aborigines were rapidly decreasing in number and were past the stage where his concern for their participation in the fisheries could be of much permanent benefit to them. Although they were still in possession of their land, Roth already regarded them as 'a doomed race' because of their contact with the fishermen. Their death rate was high and infant survival rate low. He believed they were 'able to take care of themselves' in the same manner as Aborigines in pacified areas further south had been able to take care of themselves. He added by explanation:

I do not mean they are on as high a scale of civilization as the Torres Strait islanders, but having been so long used to the presence of the boats, they know what drink is; they recognize and appreciate the monetary value of their women; they suffer markedly with venereal disease; they have picked up the vices of their visitors, with the result that they are rapidly diminishing in numbers.<sup>89</sup>

This was the area influenced most markedly by the fisheries of the Torres Strait but all along the east coast of North Queensland were areas which also must have been affected by the fisheries based on Cooktown, Townsville, Cairns and Ingham—such places as the Whitsunday Islands, Palm Islands, Hinchinbrook Island, Dunk Island and the numerous other inhabited islands as well as some areas on the mainland such as Bloomfield River and the Johnstone River. Records of the effect of the fisheries on such areas are almost non-existent. However, Archibald Meston, the first Southern Protector of Aborigines, who had edited newspapers in several northern towns and knew the fisheries well, informed the Police Commissioner:

I would most earnestly advise that no women be allowed to go in any boats in the *bêche-de-mer* or any other trade . . . My ten years northern knowledge of the *bêche-de-mer* men and average pearling crews have strongly prejudiced me against any Aborigines being allowed in their service at all.<sup>90</sup>

Thus, both the northern and the southern protectors desired to deny the fishermen all access to Aboriginal labour where the Aborigines were living viable traditional lives. Unfortunately, the coasts of North Queensland



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had been virtually naked before the depredations of the fishermen for the previous fifty years despite token government attempts to introduce some controls on recruiting from as early as 1879.<sup>91</sup>

Although it went unnoticed at the time among the prophecies of the doom of those Aboriginal tribes with extensive contact with the fisheries, there were indications that new, changed Aboriginal societies were emerging in these very areas. Depleted, often very greatly, in population by exotic diseases and the permanent or semi-permanent loss of their human resources to the fisheries, most of the Aboriginal tribes were not doomed to complete extinction. Thus Lauriston Sharp was able to describe aspects of the totemism of north-eastern Australia by interviewing members of many of the tribes in the late 1930s.<sup>92</sup> The various Aboriginal tribes were experiencing extremely rapid culture change through contact with the fisheries.

Saville-Kent had noticed the attraction of the new way of life:

The attachment of the aborigines to fishing pursuits is practically demonstrated by the persistence with which the same families, or individuals, will year after year seek re-engagement at the hands of honest employers.<sup>93</sup>

Although direct evidence is not available, there can be little doubt that their own way of life now lacked the security and satisfaction it had once held: economically, socially, and religiously. Thus there was this willingness to absent oneself or one's family from activities that had once seemed the only reality.

The fisheries must have offered to many a new, if often unpredictable, social and economic security. To the boys and young men, Aboriginal religion must have seemed less relevant. Their religious knowledge was incomplete and they were removed for such long periods from the influence of their elders. Their role in the fisheries with powerful aliens, who were yet dependent on them, must have provided some emotional and social security. The sustaining philosophy of Aboriginal religion found no adequate substitute but the spiritual vacuum was replaced for some with a purpose for life associated with the fisheries. Then there were the exotic blessings brought by the intruders that could make one forget home, relatives, and tedium: travel, tobacco and alcohol, sugar and tea, new foods, new material wealth, and sexual licence. Frequently uninitiated children were taken away because they were regarded as more tractable and, no doubt, less dangerous if detained against their will. These, especially, were susceptible to non-traditional influences. At Palm Island, which had such a long association with traders and fisher-

men, the oldest man indigenous to the island spoke warmly, if with an old man's nostalgia for his youth, about his people's involvement in the *bêche-de-mer* fisheries, the existing tradition being that they had provided a life of freedom and adventure.<sup>94</sup>

Aborigines, with little or no previous contact with non-Aborigines, were brought into intimate contact with Europeans, Asiatics, South Sea Islanders, Torres Strait Islanders, Aborigines regularly recruited from as far south as Bowen, and Aborigines much more familiar with European culture who had become veteran members of the cheap coloured labour work force. Aborigines who had never left their tribal area found themselves stranded in Cooktown or Thursday Island or living on an island in Torres Strait for six months or more. Direct evidence as to the effect of such new experiences on the Aborigines is lacking but the effect must have been profound.

Indirectly, Hey, the missionary in charge at Mapoon, witnessed to the dynamic force that had entered into the lives of the Aborigines when he had to allow the recruiters to come to the mission. Had he excluded them, he was aware that many Aborigines would have moved away from the mission to areas where he could exert no supervision. In 1896, Douglas reported 'that the number of Australian aboriginal natives who have become efficient sailors has increased'. It was a truism of the industry that once an area had been opened for recruiting for a period, there were fewer attacks by the Aborigines on the rest of the crew and fewer examples of their running away with boats. By 1890 the Torres Strait fisheries were notorious mainly because they had to use Aborigines from areas where the recruiting for the fisheries was not as well accepted, despite the fact that the area between Port Musgrave and Albatross Bay had been the most popular recruiting area for the Torres Strait fisheries for some years. Thus, it can be seen that many important changes relevant to the European observers were noticed in the lives of the Aborigines. It is reasonable to believe that there were other important changes in the very fabric of tribal life that were occurring unrecorded. Lauriston Sharp's description of the effect of the introduction of steel axes upon the Yir Yoront on the western side of Cape York Peninsula strongly supports this idea despite the fact that his emphasis was on the destruction of traditional society rather than the emergence of a changed society.<sup>95</sup>

In fact, it was the swiftness with which raw recruits gained an insight into the fishermen's way of life and understood some of its mysteries that posed one of their biggest problems. Aborigines learned how to handle the boats and could run off with them and, once back in their own territory, were extremely difficult to punish. Indeed it was alleged of the Torres Strait fisheries by an objective witness like Saville-Kent that 'the impunity with which they have been committed . . . has contributed materially to

the increase of these originators of these outrages of late years'. Some Aborigines—Saville-Kent claimed 'many'—who had been responsible for the loss of life of the fishermen re-enlisted, presumably drawn back to the fisheries by the attraction of the life or the attraction of the possibility of more spoils. Thus, the intruders were made more vulnerable by the awareness that uncowed Aborigines rapidly gained of their culture.<sup>96</sup>

The growing acculturation of the Aborigines was exhibited in a variety of ways, especially the ability to exploit the contact situation and to resist the dominance of the intruders. This was evidenced in the record of Aborigines running off with boats and killing obstructive seamen. There are some other records which enable the historian to catch glimpses of such developments. In 1887, the killing of the owner of the cutter *Chance*, apparently for robbery, at the Jardine River led to the capture of six Aborigines 'well known as great ruffians' who had been the terror of the district for four years. The acting Government Resident, Hugh Milman, described two of those arrested, Bannis and Brown, as 'notorious scoundrels' and the Jardine and Batavia River Aborigines as 'most determined and savage'. As Bannis was the 'chief' or leader of one large camp, it would seem that the Jardine River Aborigines, who had been enlisting for the fisheries since the 1870s, were involved in not only exploiting the vulnerability of the fishermen but in aggressively resisting the intruders through this exploitation. All of the Aborigines arrested were known by name and were alleged to have a long list of previous offences. There was also the suggestion that Aboriginal men from inland camps were moving to the coast to participate similarly in the fisheries.<sup>97</sup>

When Dunk Island was in a similar stage of contact, a bêche-de-mer boat, the *Captain Cook*, fishing in the islands off Cardwell, saw portions of wrecked vessels and cedar logs washed up on the shore. When the boat pulled in to Dunk Island hoping to discover any castaways, they were met by three adult male Aborigines and two boys giving all appearance of amity. They soon understood the purpose of the boat's visit to Dunk and led a party of sailors into a well-prepared ambush of about thirty men and women from which they were lucky to escape. One Aboriginal who had been to the boat and received presents grappled with the captain who had the only gun they had taken, trying to take this off him. The ability to mount this determined, co-ordinated resistance in such a short time suggests more than a desire for loot.<sup>98</sup>

There were many examples in which the Aborigines' ability with boats was used to the detriment of the intruders. In one incident, a lugger stolen by certain Batavia River Aborigines was recaptured by the Queensland Government Steamer *Albatross* after the Aborigines tried to outrace and outmanoeuvre her. In the 'Wild Duck massacre', a South Sea Islander and eighteen Aborigines killed four Europeans, using one boat to move to

another to attack those on board, sank one boat, robbed the three boats of the fishing station of everything valuable, and then all embarked in the *North Star*. They disembarked the Flinders Island Aborigines at their home with a share of the spoils, three others landed at Restoration Island in a dinghy, and the others sailed to Townsville where the South Sea Islander and four of the Aborigines were captured. Here was a combination of experienced sailors and recruits to the fisheries, the Flinders Island Aborigines apparently doing most of the killing. In another incident, a South Sea Islander in charge of the lugger *Annie* was killed and two fishermen on another boat were attacked and seriously wounded. The Aboriginal attackers then made off in a cutter, the *Adha*, and tried to take off the Aboriginal women at the distant station. They were prevented from doing this but all afternoon sailed the cutter among the nearby islands before sailing away. Such skills were attained by Aborigines in their initial stage of acculturation and were potentially dangerous to the fishermen.<sup>99</sup>

Another skill that was easily learned on board ship was the use of guns. It was an ever present fear on the frontier that Aborigines would become familiar with the use of guns but it was on the sea frontier that this was most possible and where this occurred to a limited extent. On the other frontiers, Aborigines frequently stole guns and ammunition when they were robbing a hut or a mining camp because they understood how the settlers used these even if they themselves could not. One example has been discovered where one of the Aborigines on the Barron River who had not been let in stuck up and fired at a man whose pistol he had taken. There was also a report that a group of about one hundred Aborigines, some armed with rifles, attacked the camp of fourteen Chinese on the Johnstone River, shooting one, carrying off one severely wounded, and stealing among other things a revolver, a rifle, and some ammunition. Significantly both of these reports are associated with the rainforest resistance where the contact situation was more complex than in most areas of North Queensland.<sup>1</sup>

On the sea frontier there are reports of the Aborigines being able to use guns and more reason to accept these as significant because of the contact situation they, in part, illustrated: Aborigines worked with fishermen who regularly used guns. In an attack in early 1887 on the two prospectors, Goodshaw and Thompson, on a boat at the Jardine River, one of the attacking Aborigines fired at the wounded men with a Snider rifle. The police had found these Aborigines with loaded Snider rifles which they did not use, apparently considering themselves in an inferior tactical position. In another incident, a police party seeking the killers of the crew of the *Lenora* exchanged shots with one of the runaway Aborigines before killing him. The gun he used belonged to one of the fishermen on the

*Lenora.*<sup>2</sup>

Although the above were the only examples discovered of the Aborigines using guns against the intruders, there were other indications that the Aborigines were much more aware of the use of guns on the sea frontier. The Police Magistrate at Thursday Island in 1882, Henry Chester, was alarmed to discover the master of the schooner, *Rover*, had been supplying Aborigines near Cape Grenville with firearms and ammunition, presumably to those working for him but possibly to others associated with them. His Aboriginal workers may have demanded guns as payment for their labour, which was apparently Chester's worry: 'If this is the case the light ships may be attacked at any time'.<sup>3</sup> There were also reports of the Aborigines stealing firearms and ammunition. When attacking the fishermen, the Aborigines normally used weapons they were familiar with or implements similar to their own, such as steel axes, but there is some indication that the fishermen's fear that the Aborigines would turn their own weapons against them was better founded than on the other frontiers in North Queensland.<sup>4</sup>

It is regrettable that the evidence of partial acculturation derives largely from what is relevant to the intruders but there is enough of this, even, to suggest that this process was taking place in a situation that did not involve dispossession. The effects of the intrusion of the fishermen in large numbers from the early 1870s were profound. Traditional Aboriginal society was experiencing dramatic changes only superficially discernible to the historian and, as yet, largely ignored by the anthropologist and archaeologist. Interdependent societies were developing in and near the Torres Strait that were removed largely from the influences of the other frontiers of dispossession. Into this frontier came the missionaries and the protectionist bureaucrats to establish yet another frontier in North Queensland.

The fishermen asserted their authority which was gradually accepted by the Aborigines in one area after another, partly through necessity and partly through the attraction of the new way of life the fishermen forced them to experience. The intruders were dependent on the Aborigines for their labour and their women. The Aboriginal tribes met these needs because they, themselves, had generated new needs of their own: psychological, social, and material. The vulnerability of the fishermen to Aboriginal resistance resulted in a surprisingly large loss of life and property but never enough to make the industry a totally unacceptable risk. The industry could not have continued if the younger Aborigines, after their first experience of it, found the life on board boats totally distasteful and if the older Aborigines had not been willing to allow their children to go to the fisheries. The necessity of kidnapping all, or even a majority of the recruits, with the subsequent Aboriginal reprisals, would probably

have destroyed the industry. There are indications that even the badly fragmented societies left in the wake of the recruiters were accepting the presence of the fishermen and adapting to meet the new challenges. A generation of partially acculturated but unconquered Aborigines was being produced. The culture the Aborigines were being introduced to was not representative of the rest of the colony but was in fact that of a group of many nationalities who were fringe dwellers in that society. Rough and crude, and often cruel and vicious, they had nevertheless accepted their dependence on the Aborigines and lived in intimate contact with them on their small boats and isolated stations. These men, too, were being partially acculturated by their life on the sea frontier in contact with Aborigines especially through their association with Aboriginal women. The result of another generation of such uncontrolled contact would have been interesting. But that was not to be. Queensland's sea frontier was to be brought under the influence of a paternalistic bureaucracy supported by an equally paternalistic theocracy. The price of protection, necessary though it may have been at the time, was the loss of freedom.

# 6

## The Decent Disposal of the Native Inhabitants

'One of the troubles of a colonising nation is the decent disposal of the native inhabitants of the country, of which the latter have been dispossessed.'

NORTH QUEENSLAND REGISTER  
11 October 1893

On each of the frontiers examined in this study, European colonists asserted their control over the Aborigines they contacted. On the pastoral, mining, and rainforest frontiers, the primary aim was to dispossess the Aborigines of their land to exploit its resources. They achieved this on the pastoral and mining frontiers by using the methods developed in southern Queensland, New South Wales, and Victoria: governmental support of the settlers' use of force, not least by the provision of the Native Police force. When these methods proved too slow and costly in the rainforests of North Queensland, the colonists modified their approach. They made a treaty with the resisting Aborigines by which they were able to expedite the process of dispossession. On the sea frontier, the fishermen were primarily interested in exploiting Aboriginal labour. This they were able to do by force or meagre economic incentives when the industry promised sufficient reward to make risk to life and property seem worthwhile. However, it was clear by 1897 that the colonisers' government had to exert greater control not only for the protection of the Aborigines exposed to the exploitation of the fishermen but also for the more effective functioning of the industry.

In the wake of the frontier in most areas, the breakdown of many traditional values and group cohesiveness was accompanied by a squalor previously unknown, by disease, unhygienic living conditions, unbalanced diets and malnutrition, a declining birth rate, and by the exploitation of Aboriginal women and children. In these circumstances, the use of such cheap, readily available, tension-releasing drugs as alcohol and opium was understandable, a symptom of the stress of the rapid culture

change with its associated demoralisation and loss of hope and purpose. Their ready availability among the European and Chinese populations of Queensland not only greatly exacerbated the condition of the Aborigines, they also provided the colonists with another very effective means of control and exploitation. In North Queensland, as elsewhere in Australia, the Aborigines seemed to the settlers a doomed race, a doom that had been violently foreshadowed on the frontier.

This, however, was an illusion that obscured the dynamic changes occurring behind the frontier throughout Australia; for the rush towards extinction was not completed. Indeed, the frontier assumed an encompassing and enduring significance in the area of race relations for it created a multi-racial society in which the Europeans and Aborigines were related as coloniser and colonised, conqueror and conquered. It created therefore a multi-racial society with a superior white caste and an inferior black caste, a caste system that is still regrettably with us.

The nature of this stratified system was made clear to the Aborigines immediately upon the cessation of hostilities. After about eight years of frontier conflict, J. Hall Scott of Strathbogie Station informed the Colonial Secretary: 'We had made terms of friendship with the Native Blacks and have admitted them upon our stations'.<sup>1</sup> Such terms varied, but included a guarantee not to spear or disturb the cattle, or to fire the grass. On Strathdon Station, near Bowen, the Aborigines had to promise as well to keep to certain parts of the run and not to hunt when cattle were nearby.<sup>2</sup>

In each district when the decision was made to 'let the blacks in', there was a variety of factors operating. There were often humanitarian settlers eager to end the hostilities but clearly their voices were not heeded until there had been a significant change in the balance of power on the frontier. Although the colonists were still outnumbered, in many areas the number of Aborigines had declined as had their will and ability overtly to resist the colonisers. As settlers were aware of this, communal fear was not as great an incitement to violence.<sup>3</sup>

There was as well a strong economic incentive for the colonist to make 'terms of friendship'. It not only removed the costs inherent in the frontier conflict situation; it also provided a large pool of readily available, cheap labour, so useful to the pioneer colonists. Indeed, Charles Eden defined the 'letting in' of Aborigines to a station in purely economic terms which clearly indicated their inferior status:

let in . . . that is, allowed and encouraged to come and make themselves useful, shepherding a few sheep, chopping wood, stripping bark, and a thousand odd jobs to which they are adapted, receiving in return protection as long as they behaved well, and little presents of blankets, tomahawks etc.<sup>4</sup>



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Thus Aborigines were often very useful for certain kinds of rough, menial, or casual labour which no one else would do, or do economically. Increasingly attracted to a subsistence based at least partly on European goods, they worked for pastoralists, miners, and small farmers; for teamsters and packers, sawmillers, and sugar planters, as well as for fishermen in the pearlshell and *bêche-de-mer* industries.<sup>5</sup> They were also widely employed in the towns growing up behind the frontier, a fact that social historians seem to have ignored. Thus, when the government announced



14. Aborigines, probably of Mackay District, soon after being let in. NLA.

its intention of establishing an Aboriginal reserve at Bowen, the editor of the local newspaper immediately urged: 'It should not be too far from the town, as the blacks are very useful for certain kinds of rough work, and the townspeople have as much right to their services as country residents'.<sup>6</sup>

Most contemporary colonists referred to the 'Blacks' Camps' which grew up adjacent to their settlements simply as unsightly nuisances and their inhabitants as mere parasites on white society; they were in fact fulfilling an important economic role. For though the settlers in the towns were willing to let the Aborigines live and die in unhygienic, degrading conditions out of sight, they were still eager to exploit their labour. Poland, a Lutheran missionary at Hope Valley, just north of Cooktown, described the interaction in that town in 1896:

During the night the blacks are separated from Cooktown by the river, which is fairly wide. Early in the morning this northern shore is a hive of activity. The blacks have left the camp and are preparing to come across the water. They come over in groups, mostly family groups, using canoes, which mostly leave only when they are very fully occupied. Once they reach the town they seem to be




15. Burdekin River Aboriginal, about 1870. Oxley Library.

audible and visible everywhere: dirty and very scantily clad, they shout and chatter, but they know where they are heading for. Many of them are being expected. . . . The wife of the Clerk of the Court is calling one black girl.

'Come on, Annie, quickly, it's Saturday, I have a lot of work for you today, you have to sweep all through the house for me.'

'Tobacco, missy, just a little bit!'

'Afterwards, Annie, as much as you like, afterwards; but now get



16. Aborigines in Transition Kennedy, *The Black Police*, p. 16.



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on with it!

And elsewhere: Long Ah Kong, the jovial plump Chinese, is beckoning to a black lad, while carefully tucking up his long plait: 'Billy, lad, come and sweep my store for me. I'll give you a lovely watermelon!'

There is a third, Tommy, who does not need to be told what to do. He has some wood to split every morning for C., the publican, and he doesn't mind doing it, because the reward is well and truly worth it . . . beer!<sup>7</sup>

The racial stratification that developed during the nineteenth century was given legal form in the 1897 Aboriginal Protection Act. However, this had already been given bureaucratic form long before by such government instrumentalities as the police, health, and education departments whose services were tailored to delimit the inferior status of the Aborigines.<sup>8</sup>

Thus, it might have been expected that the nineteenth century hospital system would have accepted an obligation to treat suffering Aborigines. As the *Cooktown Courier* remarked in an editorial: 'The Hospital is not for



17. 'A Blacks' Camp' Kennedy, *The Black Police*, p. 268.

the wealthy models of morality, but is for the poor, for the thriftless, and for those on whom misfortune, whether from their own fault or not, has laid its heavy hand . . . The distressed of all nations find a refuge.<sup>9</sup> The Aborigines rarely found such refuge and at least one hospital in North Queensland, the Ravenswood Hospital, explicitly refused to treat Aborigines because of their race no matter how desperately ill they were.<sup>10</sup>

As far as the government had any policy on this matter, it left the decision to the local hospital board and the government medical officer to whom it refused extra remuneration for work among Aborigines. There are a few examples of doctors' claiming to have treated Aborigines at their own expense<sup>11</sup> and a sprinkling of cases where Aborigines were admitted to hospitals, but invariably there were special circumstances such as Europeans' interposing on their behalf, the sick Aborigines being trackers or troopers, or the Aborigines suffering attack or accident.<sup>12</sup>

When Aboriginal health problems were forced upon hospitals, local autonomy resulted in a variety of responses that emphasised the racism of the local decision-makers and the acceptance of it by the government. Thus, in Cooktown, at the request of the government medical officer, a ward was built for Aborigines separate from the main buildings.<sup>13</sup> Within one year of the erection of the Aboriginal Ward, the Visiting Committee reported that the wardsman had neglected its cleanliness and sanitation.<sup>14</sup>

At Bowen, when the health problems of the Aborigines, probably venereal disease, were brought to the attention of the government, the Colonial Secretary agreed to pay for the medicines prescribed for Aborigines by the government medical officer.<sup>15</sup> After a later Colonial Secretary, Tozer, ordered these payments to cease, the Secretary of the Hospital Board informed the Colonial Secretary:

We cannot look for any revenue from the blacks and we submit that it is unfair that we should be saddled with the expense of providing medicine for them . . . Recently we have had several aboriginals in the Hospital, 2 of which had broken legs and cost no small sum to cure.

Tozer agreed to continue the payment for medicines if they were provided 'at reasonable rates under the supervision of the [Government Medical] Officer' but added 'I will certainly not pay nor authorize chemists to provide medicine without supervision and at charges usually made to whites'.<sup>16</sup> At Thornborough, the Aboriginal population was increased by Aborigines driven there by settlers to the south. As a consequence, Aborigines admitted as indoor patients were alleged to be placing a strain on the hospital's meagre resources although it appears there had been very few when the complaint was made. There were then two in the hospital, one

suffering from wounds received in a fight with other Aborigines and one with a broken leg. The Committee feared Aborigines who learned of the treatment their companions had received would inflict wounds upon themselves to be admitted to hospital as the Aborigines had 'no little difficulty in procuring the necessaries of life'. The Committee, which readily admitted whites injured in brawls, asked: 'Is it imperative that the Hodgkinson District Hospital Committee should admit the wounded to be nursed, fed, and cured?' The Colonial Secretary replied: 'It is not imperative to *admit* Aborigines to the Hospital. The Medical Officer (government) must treat them. The government will pay a fair amount to the Hospital for their keep [if they have hospital attention].'<sup>17</sup>

It is important to note that no one gave cultural or hygienic reasons for not admitting Aborigines as patients. It was clearly believed that Aborigines as a race had no claim upon the resources of the hospital. Yet those whites who used the hospitals were generally objects of charity and often social outcasts: cases of gonorrhoea and syphilis, which carried strong moral disapproval, were regularly admitted.<sup>18</sup>

Nor were Aborigines alone in being discriminated against. Hospitals were most reluctant to accept responsibility for Pacific Islanders. In this case there was some reason for expecting that employers would foot their employees' medical bill or provide medical care on plantations, but an aversion to admitting Pacific Islanders on racial grounds was also very evident. Thus at Bowen it was suggested there should be a separate ward for 'kanakas'<sup>19</sup> and another for all 'coloureds',<sup>20</sup> while time expired Islanders posed a problem only comprehensible on racial grounds.<sup>21</sup> Perhaps a measure of the racism was found in a report of the Annual General Meeting of the Kennedy District Hospital: 'The old bathroom—most inconveniently situated at some distance from the wards, and unprovided with a covered approach—has been changed into a kanaka ward.'<sup>22</sup>

It is clear that only a tiny percentage of suffering Aborigines were catered for in the hospitals of North Queensland. A major reason was, of course, their reluctance to present themselves for treatment. However, it is evident that the hospital committees and the government did not consider Aborigines to have an equal claim to the service offered and would not have received them had they presented themselves in numbers even remotely commensurate with their medical problems. The appointment of a medical officer, Walter Roth, as first Northern Protector of Aborigines and his complaints about these hospitals amply support this.<sup>23</sup>

However, it was, perhaps, the Queensland Education Department which most clearly expressed the rationale for the racial stratification that had begun on the frontier. In 1896, the objection of two-thirds of the parents whose children attended Buderim Mountain school, in southern

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Queensland, to the admission of children of Pacific Islander men and Aboriginal women brought forth a classical racist response which encompassed all of Queensland. Indeed the *Charters Towers Mining Standard* editorialised the subject, fully supporting the protesting parents.<sup>24</sup>

The Chief Clerk of the Education Department reported that there always had been a small number of 'half-caste' children in Queensland schools whose presence had 'not been greatly objected to'. This was because one parent had been 'very white'. Indeed, it seemed that a regulation had been framed especially to take them into account. The children had all been the progeny of a white father and an Aboriginal mother or of a Chinese father and a white mother. The Chief Clerk noted:

2. I think there is a clear distinction between the offspring of such races as the Chinese, Japanese, and Hindus on the one hand, and the children of Kanakas and Aborigines on the other in the respect of a claim to be admitted to Queensland schools. The former are resident, settled, intellectual, civilized, in comparison with the latter who are non-resident or nomadic, of inferior intellectual capacity, and barbarous in manners, morals, and habits.
3. This Dept. is not organized to educate the children of Aborigines and Kanakas; and the uneducated children of these races cannot be regarded as neglected children, in the sense that we do not provide schooling for them.
4. The schooling of our schools is of no use to these children—or so little as to be a quantity neglectable. What they need is teaching in religion, moral duty, decent behaviour, and habits of perseverance in settled industry.

The Chief Clerk believed that the admission of numbers of Aboriginal and Pacific Islander 'half-castes' would lead to the 'almost certain risk of physical and mental contamination to the white pupils for whom the [school] was instituted'.<sup>25</sup>

Such a racist Bill of Rights hardly needs comment. It is clear that Aborigines were normally denied the right of entry into Queensland schools and that only a few part-Aborigines were admitted depending upon their whiteness and an interested white parent. Fusing living conditions, hygiene, and morals, the *Charters Towers Mining Standard* supported the charge of one parent that

Living in miserable structures . . . of but one room, in which all the family live and sleep together, the Aboriginal women and children are totally ignorant of the use of soap or comb. Yet these are the miserable waifs that are sent to school among innocent little white children.



18. Aboriginal children taken into settlers' homes. National Library of Australia.



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The newspaper was also appalled that miscegenation would degrade Queensland society: 'Kanakas and Chinese are inbreeding, disease will result, and the last state of the country will be worse than the first'.<sup>26</sup>


It has been suggested that European racism was one of the factors contributing to the unrestrained violence of the North Queensland frontier but that there were other factors such as economic competition and fear which obscured this element. In the pacified areas where Aborigines offered no such strong motives for European actions, the racist component of the action is much more obvious as has been observed above with regard to the Queensland Education Department's refusal to accept as educable Aborigines, Pacific Islanders, and most part-Aborigines.

Such racist stratification was negatively evident in the European agencies that accommodated the needs of the Europeans but not those of the Aborigines. Thus the local authorities apparently did not conceive that their brief included Aborigines with regard to such matters as sanitation and public health unless Aborigines became objectionable to the white colonists.<sup>27</sup> Benevolent Societies made no attempt to encompass Aboriginal poverty.<sup>28</sup> Indeed, the rarity with which a European social agency dealt with Aborigines emphasised the normal unconcern. A young 'gin' who had been accidentally burnt to death was buried by a Catholic priest.<sup>29</sup> An Aboriginal girl from Grafton was gaoled in Townsville as a vagrant.<sup>30</sup> An Aboriginal was misreported to be arrested on 'Cobb's Coach' which caused a northern newspaper to remark: 'We thought it strange at the time that an aboriginal should be allowed to ride on a coach "same as whitefellow"'.<sup>31</sup> A drowned Aboriginal was the subject of a magisterial inquiry, which itself was a rare occurrence, and buried in the Bowen cemetery at a cost of £4 to the government. A journalist claimed he should have been buried in a hole in the sand to obviate such extravagance.<sup>32</sup> Before the successful establishment of North Queensland missions, a Christian who conceived of the Aboriginal as fully worthy of Christianity was a rarity.<sup>33</sup> Indeed, Bishop Stanton, the Anglican Bishop of North Queensland, supporting 'Hospital Sunday', wrote: 'In this happy colony our hearts are never touched by the sight of half-starved poor struggling for health'.<sup>34</sup> This churchman, known for his concern for Aborigines, could not envisage that the nineteenth century hospital system, conceived mainly as a charity for the indigent, could encompass Aborigines.

The institution of marriage with its deep cultural and, to many, religious sanctions clearly indicated the racial superiority the white settlers felt towards the Aborigines. The sexual and domestic convenience of liaisons between white men and black women, referred to in the nineteenth century as 'comboism', could be tacitly accepted, if publicly criticised, but a marriage which would give the Victorian seal of approval to such a match was looked upon as a degradation of the race.<sup>35</sup> The Com-

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missioner of Police, Parry-Okeden, acclaimed for his interest in the Aborigines and one of the framers of the 1897 legislation, was shocked when a Justice of the Peace married two Aboriginal women to white men: 'the impropriety and inexpediency of effecting such unions is so obvious that I am surprised a Justice of the Peace could be found to celebrate them'. The Police Commissioner informed his officers that the new act was to be administered in such a way that 'the status quo should not be dis-




19. Queen's Birthday at Brisbane. Distribution of blankets to the Aborigines. Australian Sketches, 12 July 1883 (NLA).

turbed . . . I do not think there should be any desire for such marriages'.<sup>36</sup> Thus, the institution of 'comboism' was not to be attacked unless the Aboriginal women were maltreated; white men should not feel they had to marry their black partners and in fact were to be discouraged from so doing.

Thus the dominance asserted by the colonists at the frontier was perpetuated in the emerging multi-racial society by a clearly elaborated social and economic stratification. This racial caste system was enshrined in the 1897 Aboriginal Protection Act where, not surprisingly, the colonists perpetuated their control over Aborigines.

In 1895, the Colonial Secretary, Horace Tozer, increased the estimates for 'the relief of aboriginals' from £2,000 to £3,000, explaining that he wished to continue 'the systems begun in the North of trying to get at the aboriginals by providing them with food'. He later added that he proposed to bring in a bill, if time allowed, to set up three unpaid boards to control

the expenditure of the Aboriginal vote so as to provide 'the best help that could be given, either by way of food or otherwise'.<sup>37</sup> No bill resulted for another two years and, when it did, it rejected the concept of unpaid boards. As a result of the discussions in the parliament in 1895 and of his growing determination to devise a system to ameliorate the condition of the Aborigines, Tozer requested Queensland's most famous authority on



20. Daintree Aborigines with Archibald Meston in 1895. Meston was primarily responsible for framing the Aboriginal Protection Act of 1897. John Oxley Library.

the Aborigines, Archibald Meston, to report upon the matter.<sup>38</sup>

For many years Meston had contributed numerous articles and letters on the Aborigines to the Brisbane press. In his brief term in the Queensland legislature from 1878 to 1881, he had pointed out the need for special legislation and in later years, on three separate occasions, requested the Premier, Sir Thomas McIlwraith, to appoint a Protector of Aborigines. In 1895, Meston drew up the report that Tozer had requested. He had been asked 'to submit a comprehensive scheme for the improvement and preservation of the aboriginals so as to pave the way for practical legislation'.<sup>39</sup>

Meston's report, *Queensland Aborigines—Proposed System for their Improvement and Preservation*, was printed and distributed to members of both houses of the legislature. While stressing the urgency of effecting some solution, the report promised spectacular results almost immediately. In his introductory address to Tozer and in the body of his work, he rejected the 'doomed race' theory 'as the shameful subterfuge in which strong races have endeavoured to take refuge from their crimes on the

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weak'. Preservation of the Aboriginal race, he stressed, was dependent, where possible, upon their complete segregation on reserves from white society. Those not on reserves would have their welfare supervised by local protectors. He stressed that the reserves would soon become self-supporting and in three years would have available five hundred labourers for the unskilled work then performed by Pacific Islanders. On the reserves, he envisaged the creation of a settled, self-contained, Europeanised rural community which would retain some aspects of Aboriginal life 'which do not interfere with the harmonious management of the community'. Meston thus envisaged immediate results under white supervision but stressed that it would require three or four generations of complete social isolation before the Aborigines could work as well and steadily as white men. They then 'would settle in the agricultural stage, useful to themselves and mankind'. Yet, while reserves were to be regarded as the permanent home of the Aborigines, thus decently disposing of unwanted native inhabitants, they were always to be available as a source of labour.<sup>40</sup> These concepts of (a) prolonged tutelage while socially isolated from European society and (b) the usefulness of Aborigines as a source of unskilled labour were to be two of the most important assumptions of Queensland's policy.

In 1896, Tozer appointed Meston Special Commissioner and sent him to report on the value the government was receiving for its investment in Aboriginal welfare in North Queensland. He inspected the mission stations, Hope Valley (now Hopevale), Bloomfield River, Mapoon, and Yarrabah, as well as the food distribution centres and reported on the use of Aboriginal labour in the fisheries, the conflict between the settlers and the Aborigines on the frontier in Cape York Peninsula, and the general condition of the Aborigines. He also made recommendations for a comprehensive solution to the Aboriginal question.<sup>41</sup>

From the first he had been confronted by the abuse of Aboriginal labour in the fisheries. Whereas in 1895 he had suggested that Aboriginal men could be made available for such employment for up to six months at a time on clearly defined fair terms, he now recommended:

Absolute prohibition of all aboriginal labour on pearlshell, bêche-de-mer, and tortoise-shell fishing boats under any condition whatever . . . [because of] the impossibility of any regulations, however stringent, ensuring protection to the aboriginal crews after they shipped. The few masters who treat them properly will have to suffer for those who treat them badly. In no case does the aboriginal benefit by his experience.<sup>42</sup>

Fearing correctly that this recommendation would not be accepted, he suggested an alternative involving strict regulations and close supervision.

The 'total abolition of the native police' was recommended because of its continuing use as an aggressive force against the Aborigines. He further recommended: 'No native police officer under the old system, and no constable in any way connected with that system, should be retained for police duty among aboriginals under the proposed new order of things'. Continuing his indictment of Queenslanders' exploitation of Aborigines, he urged imprisonment for anyone found guilty of selling drink or opium to Aborigines, severe penalties for whites found in possession of Aboriginal blankets, and total exclusion of Aborigines from townships except for those in regular, regulated employment of whites.<sup>43</sup>

The 'new order of things' was briefly sketched and followed closely his 1895 recommendations. Referring to Canadian and American experience, he urged the creation of Aboriginal reserves in south, central, and northern Queensland 'where certain of the aboriginals can be collected to form a permanent home'. Such segregation was 'the only possible method of saving any part of the race from extinction'. He suggested the appointment of two full-time protectors, the Chief Protector to be stationed in the north 'where the most difficult and serious work is to be done', the Assistant Protector to look after the 'scattered remnants' in the south. He also urged that missions be utilised by the government as food distributing centres and that the overland telegraph stations threaded throughout Cape York Peninsula be used as food distributing centres and places of refuge in place of their existing policy of preventing the Aborigines from approaching them. Finally he strongly recommended legislation 'of a very concise and simple character' to enable the government to limit the present 'unfettered liberty' of the Aborigines.<sup>44</sup>

Where Aborigines occupied country not required for settlement, Meston advised: 'leave them alone'; but those Aborigines living in pacified areas who were not gainfully employed were to be forced to adapt to 'the new scheme of things':

There is no hardship to them [the Aborigines] in this enforced residence in one locality. In any case the old order of things is passing away, and they must adapt themselves to the changed environment . . . Their land has been taken from them on no other title than the law of the strongest, and they must make the best of any alternative the strongest chooses to offer.<sup>45</sup>

Meston's attack on the Native Police was rivalled in stringency only by his criticism of settlers. He mentioned groups of Aborigines who had been exterminated; narrated how he was informed by the police that, at three small townships, the Aborigines frequently came running in at night to escape armed men intent on raping the women; described how opium

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supplied by Chinese and Europeans was killing Aborigines or reducing them to complete dependence on the suppliers; noted the widespread virulence of venereal disease; and reported the common and unchecked kidnapping of Aboriginal children and women. Finally he pointed out the inadequacies of the missions for dealing satisfactorily with the Aborigines in their own area, implying they were no substitute for direct governmental involvement.<sup>46</sup>

The publication of this report with such obvious ministerial approval was a challenge to and an encouragement of sweeping parliamentary action. As well, Meston had inadvertently issued a challenge to the recently appointed Police Commissioner, W.E. Parry-Okeden. Frequent successful Aboriginal attacks in Cape York Peninsula had caused some pastoralists to complain to the Home Secretary (formerly called the Colonial Secretary) of the inefficiency of the Native Police. Parry-Okeden was requested to inquire into the matter personally and, as it was Tozer's wish 'that a systematic attempt should be made to improve the general condition of the aborigines in Queensland', the Police Commissioner was asked to investigate this subject and make recommendations accordingly.

Parry-Okeden delayed his departure so that he could read Meston's report. The criticisms of the Native Police force and especially of its officers aroused Parry-Okeden's ire despite Meston's attempts to praise the new Police Commissioner and exempt him from blame. Parry-Okeden felt he had to be loyal to his subordinates, both those still in the Native Police, like Inspector Lamond, and those who had transferred to the ordinary police force. Thus he strongly defended its personnel, blaming any excesses on individual examples of poor officering not on the nature of the force itself. Yet he had to admit, 'As the Native Police has been lately working, it has apparently confined its operations to retaliatory action after the occurrence of outrages, and seems to have dropped all idea of employing merely deterrent or conciliatory methods; but I intend to change all that'. Elsewhere he noted 'though I condemn the Native Police system, *as at present working*, and because it is unfortunately true that grave wrongs have occasionally been done in the past, it is not for a moment to be inferred that I in any way join in the wholesale implications against the force, that I know are not justified'. Yet at the beginning of his report, he acknowledged the Native Police force was still functioning under 'Instructions' issued in 1866 and quoted extracts that indicated the force could be nothing but an instrument of aggression. For example, troopers were to be prevented from having any communication with the Aborigines of their locality and detachments were 'at all times and opportunities to disperse any large assemblage of blacks without unnecessary violence'.<sup>47</sup> That this could not be done without violence was obvious: the qualification of 'unnecessary' was largely academic. Reports being



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submitted from Cape York Peninsula even as Parry-Okeden wrote demonstrated that he was right in labelling as 'a new regime' his intended use of the Native Police as a conciliating force.<sup>48</sup>

Although Parry-Okeden attempted to cast doubt upon Meston's report by pointing out alleged errors, and referred to it scornfully on a number of occasions, his own report depicted as serious a state of affairs but emphasised, not the Native Police, but the brutality of the settlers and the effects of disease. Thus of the Aborigines at Normanton he wrote: 'They were the most miserable disease-stricken wretches I ever saw, but I was assured these were "kings and queens" compared with those to the south-west and further along the coast west of and around Burketown.'<sup>49</sup>

He made probably the most vigorous public criticism by a government official of the men on the North Queensland frontier when he attacked Meston's scheme of replacing the Native Police by increasing the number of ordinary white policemen:

To find even a few such men it would be necessary to recruit from the stations in the far North—that is, from a place and from a class where and among whom at the present time are to be found, masquerading under white and yellow skins, some of the blackest scoundrels alive—wretches who have wrought deeds of appalling wickedness and cruelty, and who think it equal good fun to shoot a nigger at sight or to ravish a gin. So long as such villains escape hanging and live in our country, the blacks must be—and shall be, if I have a free hand and my Native Police—protected.<sup>50</sup>

This eleventh hour indictment of the settlers revealed only too starkly the treatment the Aborigines had endured throughout North Queensland from the settlers for the previous thirty-six years, as did Meston's report of the Native Police. Indeed, as Rowley has pointed out, persistence of frontier brutality until 1897 largely determined 'the rigidity of the restraints assumed necessary to save the race from extinction'.<sup>51</sup>

While Parry-Okeden supported Meston's criticism of the *bêche-de-mer* fishermen, he was much more sympathetic to the missions and suggested the creation of others with government advice and assistance. In his report, the Police Commissioner virtually prepared the ground for Dr Walter Roth's appointment as Northern Protector of Aborigines, the position Meston obviously coveted and expected. Parry-Okeden stressed the necessity of appointing an itinerant government medical officer for the Aborigines of North Queensland, the urgent need to give opportunities to Roth and others to undertake ethnological research among them, and the excellence of Dr Roth's *Ethnological Studies Among the North-West-Central Queensland Aborigines*.<sup>52</sup>

Both Meston and Parry-Okeden submitted draft bills to Tozer. Although

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elements of both were incorporated in the legislation, it is obvious that Meston's was the more influential. Meston consulted the American laws and the acts of the other Australian colonies but claimed to have found them of no use whatsoever.<sup>53</sup>

The Home Secretary used the debate on Supply to prepare the way for his bill. He pointed out how during 1897 he had divided the colony into two parts, the north administered by the Police Commissioner where the policy of distributing food and tobacco to unpacified Aborigines had been extended by the Native Police under the direction of Inspector Lamond. Apart from the Native Police's conciliating these Aborigines living on and beyond the then sparsely populated frontier and preventing whites from corrupting them, the Aborigines 'were to be allowed to retain their pristine habits' as Meston had suggested. In the south, Meston had persuaded about one hundred and twenty indigent or diseased Aborigines, many of them opium addicts, to live on a newly created reserve on Fraser Island. Deebing Creek Reserve near Ipswich, which had been run since 1892 by concerned trustees with government assistance, accommodated about two hundred Aborigines and Durundur in the Moreton District, fifteen miles from Caboolture, was being prepared as another government reserve. Meston's self-acclaimed success at Fraser Island at little cost had convinced Tozer of the possibility of gathering needy Aborigines upon a few reserves where they could be cared for and controlled. Tozer informed the members: 'He had heard a great deal said about blacks not being willing to leave their own particular localities, but he found that when they were brought to a comfortable home and given plenty of tobacco they were perfectly happy under their new conditions.'<sup>54</sup>

Completely bipartisan discussion of the problems confronting Aborigines continued at some length in the debate on supply until one member remarked that the Home Secretary must be 'quite sick of the aboriginal question'. Addiction to opium received most attention and seemed to pose the most urgent problem for the proposed bill to solve.<sup>55</sup>

When Tozer introduced the bill, he could safely say there was no need for him to prove the necessity of the bill. No member of either house opposed the major intentions of restricting the supply of opium to Aborigines, segregating on reserves Aborigines unwanted by the European communities, and regulating employment of Aborigines so that no European employer, except those blatantly inhuman, would be inconvenienced.<sup>56</sup>

The 1897 Act defined its problem firstly in terms of race rather than in terms of the problems created by culture contact. Thus all Aborigines and, for some clauses, all 'half-caste Aborigines' were placed under the protection and restrictions of the Act rather than those judged to be in need of such protection and restriction. This was perhaps understandable



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at the time, given the magnitude of the problems and the prevailing racial attitudes. A half-caste, when the Act came into effect, living with an Aboriginal as wife, husband, or child was deemed to be Aboriginal as was any other half-caste who habitually lived with or associated with Aborigines. Significantly, by clause 3, 'half-caste' was defined as any person being the offspring of an Aboriginal mother and other than an Aboriginal father. Those who were deemed Aboriginal by clause 4 were, of course, excluded. It was either unthinkable for an Aboriginal man to father a half-caste or so rare as to be not worth inclusion in the term. Alternatively it may have been thought that a European mother should be responsible for such offspring.<sup>57</sup> By clause 9, it was lawful for the minister to remove any Aboriginal to a reserve or from one reserve to another.<sup>58</sup> The Minister also had the power to remove any half-caste (not defined as an Aboriginal) to a reserve for a period he could specify and remove him from a reserve. He could also grant a certificate of exemption from the provisions of the Act to any half-caste he considered not in need of the protection of the Act. No Aboriginal could gain such exemption.<sup>59</sup>

The power to remove Aborigines to reserves and from one reserve to another against their will which became such a dominant characteristic of Queensland's policy and practice in the twentieth century was explained with naive optimism by Tozer at the second reading and imprecisely clarified in committee. What he described as the intention of the Act was very different from its effect in practice. Thus Tozer said in the second reading:

I propose to establish reserves, and those reserves in the Southern portion of the colony I hope to make as attractive to them as possible, not to bring force or pressure to bear upon them to compel them to remain there, but to show them such kindness and consideration as will induce them to go back there when they have no chance of getting such work as they choose for themselves. I desire that the aboriginals shall have the same freedom of life and action as they had before the whites came here.<sup>60</sup>

Yet, in committee, Tozer declared that clause 9, as it subsequently appeared in the Act, was one of the most important in the bill. He went on to speak of the need to bring Aborigines 'under some sort of discipline and curative treatment' when they were suffering from diseases, mainly venereal, and, presumably, if they were addicted to opium or alcohol and were judged to need restraint. He pointed to Fraser Island where he alleged the Aborigines were 'healthy and content, and not one of them desired to go to the mainland'. He assured members that 'While he wished to get power to take the aboriginals to [reserves] . . . yet whenever the existing conditions were in accordance with the laws of humanity, and

some pretence at a home was provided, no interference would take place'. Only one member tried to have the clause negated, correctly arguing that it treated the Aborigines as 'criminals'.<sup>61</sup>

The discretionary power which Tozer claimed he would use with wisdom and restraint would, of course, inevitably be in the hands of the protectors appointed under this act. As Tozer was also determined to implement the act as cheaply as possible, these were to be the senior police officers in each district and mission superintendents. Its administration was thus in the hands of men who had been appointed to positions for other reasons than to administer this act. The fate of Aborigines throughout Queensland was, without appeal, mainly in the hands of part-time white administrators.<sup>62</sup>

The bill's principle of embracing all because of the problems of some extended to the protection of all Aborigines and half-castes in employment. Thus 'to prevent half-caste girls being kept on stations [and elsewhere] for no moral purpose' all half-castes had to obtain a work permit of twelve months' duration, which could be renewed or revoked by the local Protector. Tozer agreed, however, to limit work agreements which specified the nature of the service, its duration, 'the wages or other remuneration', and the nature of the accommodation to Aborigines and half-caste females because half-caste males not deemed Aboriginal were alleged to be capable of looking after their own interests.<sup>63</sup>

At the second reading, the Home Secretary assured the members that it was not intended to allow Aborigines to compete with whites for employment or to stringently regulate employment as the government had done for other races, referring, no doubt, especially to the Pacific Islander regulations. Tozer assured members there would 'not be a single word in [the act] attempting to interfere with the rate of wages, or dictating whether they are to be paid in gold, silver, or copper . . . Sometimes it may be clothing, sometimes food'. Thus, by the clauses regulating employment, the government and employers gained control of Aboriginal labour while the Aborigines lost their freedom to change or leave employment for the duration of their agreement and gained a perfunctory supervision of their employment which could only detect the most blatant abuses.<sup>64</sup>

The 1897 Act aimed at preventing Aborigines from obtaining alcohol and, especially, opium: six of its thirty-three clauses were concerned with suppression of this illicit trade. As well as imposing stiff penalties on those supplying opium to Aborigines or half-castes (or, indeed, to anyone else) except for medicinal purposes, only qualified medical practitioners, pharmaceutical chemists, and wholesale drug dealers could legally sell, dispose of, or possess opium.<sup>65</sup>

To enable this act to be implemented, Tozer allowed immense scope

for making regulations which could be proclaimed by the Governor in Council. Seventeen areas were left for later definition and proclamation, including the duties of protectors and superintendents; the granting of entry to reserves; the apportioning of the wages of Aborigines and half-castes living on a reserve 'amongst, or for the benefit of aboriginals or half-castes' living on that reserve; providing for the care, custody, and education of Aboriginal children; placing Aboriginal or half-caste children in service; prescribing the conditions by which the minister could authorise any half-caste to reside on a reserve and limiting the period of that residence; providing for the control of all Aborigines and half-castes living on a reserve; maintaining discipline and good order upon a reserve; imposing imprisonment for up to three months upon any Aboriginal or half-caste guilty of breaching such regulations; allowing a Protector to inflict summary imprisonment of up to fourteen days upon Aborigines or half-castes on his reserve or within his district for 'any crime, serious misconduct, neglect of duty, gross insubordination, or wilful breach of the Regulations', and 'Prohibiting any aboriginal rites or customs that, in the opinion of the Minister, are injurious to the welfare of Aborigines living upon a reserve'.<sup>66</sup>

Thus all Aborigines and half-castes defined as Aborigines could be ruled by decree. Any half-caste was under threat of being deemed an Aboriginal on the recommendation of local protectors. Aborigines and half-castes living close to white settlement had to find a role in that society satisfactory to the protectors to escape being removed under the act. The need for protection was obviously very great and, given the settlers' simplistic view of the problem, it was understandable that they would not seek a more sophisticated solution. The legislature did not consider the possibility of the Aborigines retaining their civil rights while the informal accommodation that had developed was supervised, the admittedly massive health problems treated, diet and accommodation prescribed, working conditions and wages regulated, and legal protection against abuse guaranteed, despite the fact that, in Queensland, by the 1890s large numbers of Pacific Islanders were comprehensively protected.<sup>67</sup> With the Aborigines, the problem seemed more complex, and the economic and political incentives to find solutions were negligible. Thus the possibility of the Aborigines demanding their unrealised civil rights was negated by this act as the members, only concerned with the problems of the present, legislated a draconian solution which directly determined future developments until, at least, 1965.<sup>68</sup>

It is interesting to study the legislators' rationalisation for the necessity of the 1897 Act. Despite the far reaching implications of this legislation for the protection and control of Aborigines in Queensland, it seems clear that the legislators first saw themselves as belatedly doing their duty by

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the people they had dispossessed. When the bill was introduced and justified in the second reading in both the lower and the upper house, it was in these terms. Tozer began: 'I take it that everyone in this House is animated by the sentiment given expression to by one of the first Governors of Australia, and will admit that there is a duty owing by the white races to the black races.'<sup>69</sup> This sentiment was specifically mentioned by a number of members in both houses and implied by the large number of members who criticised the inaction of previous governments or pointed out the eleventh hour introduction of the bill.<sup>70</sup> Yet there is little doubt that, at a deeper level, there was a feeling of blood-guilt which reflected on the honour of the colony. This Tozer acknowledged at the end of his introductory speech:

I hope the result of this legislation will be to show the civilized world that however black may be the page of history in Queensland on account of the past, there is a bright page to be written, and that bright page will be written by the legislature in a determined effort to ameliorate the condition of the aborigines.<sup>71</sup>

One member recounted how Aborigines were shot down for sport from the verandah of Fassifern Station; another thought there was 'a slur' on Queensland that would remain for ever. Indeed, Tozer's earlier claim that previous colonial secretaries had done as much as they could to care for the Aborigines seemed not only to reflect his determination to defend Queensland's honour but also to indicate that violent dispossession was inescapable.<sup>72</sup> With this conclusion, most members would no doubt have agreed.

The time had come for Queensland to dispose decently of its native people and this it did with a perfunctory debate in the lower house and unseemly haste in the upper house. The citizenship rights of Aborigines were ignored, probably because all members accepted that previously these had been illusory; they certainly did not think the Aborigines capable of exercising them in the future. The Aborigines had to be treated as children, protected from vice, and not allowed to sin. Thus Tozer justified giving protectors and superintendents of reserves the power to inflict summary punishment of up to a month's gaol: 'If a person will not conform to the rules, I think the superintendent should be empowered to say, 'Go to your room.'<sup>73</sup>

The frontier was, by this time, remote from the capital and frontier crudity and conflict an embarrassing reminder of things past as the reports of Meston and Parry-Okeden had indicated. The once treacherous and murderous blacks were now declared to be faithful, trustworthy, and affectionate if treated properly.<sup>74</sup> The doomed race theory still dominated

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the thinking of most legislators: the optimism of Meston's report was exceptional. Therefore what was needed was a charitable organisation for an ailing and feeble-minded people and it was in these terms that Tozer explained his plans. Previously, indigent Aborigines had depended on the charity of individuals. Now it was time for the state to assume its full responsibility. As Tozer explained, 'This Bill endeavours to do as a charity organisation does: focus the assistance in some definite channel'.<sup>75</sup> The Aborigines had been declared to be inmates in perpetuity.

The problems confronting Aborigines were thus taken out of the public arena to be accommodated by a bureaucracy with the aspirations for their inmates of a nineteenth century charitable organisation; the self-made experts, Meston and Roth, were charged with running the enterprise as economically as possible. This philosophy of paternalistic protection on the cheap was to control Queensland's Aborigines throughout the twentieth century.

## Appendix A

### The Atherton Initiative and the Emergence of a *de Facto* Policy for the Aborigines of Queensland, 1889-1896

N.B. Numbers indicating grants of money are in pounds sterling unless otherwise indicated.

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PLACE	1888	1889	1890	1891	1892	1893	1894	1895	1896
Bloomfield River (M)	10 pm	12.10pm						250 pa	
C. Bedford (M)	10pm	200 pa							10pm
Marie Yaamba (M)	20pm								
ATHERTON		12pm	18pm						
MT ORIENT			20pm			15pm			10pm
THORNBOROUGH		8pm							
		5pm							90pa
Bribie Is. (M)			Grant		250pa	300pa			
Westwood			1/10/-					1/6	
Bowen			pm					p. dpy	
			Med. &						
			ration						
BUTCHERS HILL(?)				2/10/-					
				pw	100pa				
Mapoon (M)				500					
				20pm					
Calliope				14/16/-					
				pa					
CARDWELL(?)				19pa					180pa
Cloncurry				1/10/-pa					
				medic.					
				7/6pw					
Dugandan				30pa	72pa	50pa			50pa
DAINTREE/PT DOUGLAS				Few pds pm				20/16/8	
Deebing Creek (M)				2pw				pm	
LAURA-MOSSMAN(?)									

	12pm	10pm
UNION CAMP /WATERFORD		
Townsville		
CALIFORNIA CREEK		gradually reduced
MONTALBION	1/7/-grant	
	43/6/8	
	5pm	
	Few pds pm	
	3 grants	
Taroom		
Croydon Miscellaneous		
Thursday Is.		
Gympie		
MYOLA		10pm
Banana		6
Whitsunday Is.		5 pm
Christmas Cr.		3/4/8
Fisherton		5 pm
Mein		2/10/- pm
MAREEBA		5 pm
Coen-Mein-Musgrave		5 pm

- 1 Grants associated directly with the Atherton Initiative are printed in capital letters.  
A question mark indicates insufficient information as to origin but believed associated with Atherton initiative.
- 2 (M) — Mission; pm — per month; pa — per annum.
- 3 Changes in funding indicated on bar graph.
- 4 Above expenditure does not include money spent on blankets or salaries of officials associated with the distribution of money or rations.

SOURCE: Register of Relief Given to Aborigines 1891-1896, Q.S.A. COL/463.



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Relief of Aborigines 1892-93

	£	s.	d.
Atherton (recently reduced from £20 pm to £15 pm)	232	5	6
Bloomfield at £12/10/— pm	137	10	—
Butchers Hill, Cooktown, at £8/6/8 pm	108	6	8
Queensland Aboriginal Protection Society Grant pa	250	—	—
Cape Bedford, Cooktown, £200 pa	133	6	8
Cullen Point, Batavia River, £20 pm	213	4	10
California Creek, Herberton, 100 lb meat p. week	32	17	6
Cardwell, about £4/15/— p quarter	13	8	6
Dugandan	21	17	6
Daintree River, Blacks around Masterton's Selection receive rations £30 pa Port Douglas reduced from £6 to £4/3/4 pm	92	—	4
Deebing Creek near Ipswich Grant of aid of Missionary's House £100 Rations at £250 pa	262	6	7
Mackay United German and Scandinavian Lutheran Mission (Mari Yamba)	240	—	—
Mount Orient near Cairns, £8 pm	104	—	—
Montalbion, £5 pm now discontinued	46	16	9
Thornborough, £5 pm now discontinued	27	1	6
Union Camp and Waterford (Formerly £12 pm, distribution at Waterford discontinued)	143	8	—
Westwood at 1/6 pd	27	7	6
Bowen, now discontinued	8	8	3
Croydon, Rations	2	6	—
Taroom, at 1/6 pd	33	18	—
Const. J. McGrath, Townsville. Maintenance of Aborigines picked up by S.S. <i>Aramac</i> off Cape Upstart from 16 Feb. to 22 April	19	16	—
	<u>£2,150</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>1</u>

pa = per annum

pm = per moth

pd = per day

Source: Q.S.A. COL/139.

*Ministerial authority required for the continuation or otherwise of the following payments in connection with Relief to Aborigines for the financial year 1898-9.*

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H. Meston	Superintendent Frazers Island Salary £100 per annum. Maintenance no limit.
Atherton	£10 per month under Supervision of the Police Magistrate Herberton.
Ayton, Helenvale, Rossville, Tablelands & 8 mile	£3 per month under Supervision of Police.
Banana	£2 per month under Supervision of Police.
Blackridge (Rockhampton district)	£1 per month under Supervision of Police.
Batavia River (M)	£20 per month under Supervision of the Government Resident Thursday Island.
Bellenden Kerr (M)	£10 per month Superintendent the Reverend E.R. Gribble.
Bloomfield (M)	£200 per annum.
Bowen district	Medicine provided by Hospital about £4 per annum.
Butchers Hill	£4 per month.
California Creek	£5 per month under Supervision of the Police Magistrate Herberton.
Cape Bedford (M)	£5 per month under Supervision of Police.
Coen	£10 per month under Supervision of Police.
Cardwell district	£180 per annum under Supervision of Police.
Daintree River	£50 per annum under Supervision of Police.
Deebing Creek (M)	£550 per annum Grant also Maintenance at 8d per day & Salary of Matron at £20 per annum.
Fisherton	£4 per month under Supervision of Police Magistrate Herberton.

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Highbury	£5 per month under Supervision of Police.
Lawn Hill, Turn Off Lagoon (Normanton district)	£100 per annum under Supervision of Police.
Mareeba	£70 per annum under supervision of Police Magistrate, Herberton.
Marie Yaamba, [sic] Mackay (M)	£100 per annum.
Maytown	£2 per month Rations for travelling Blacks under supervision of Police.
Montalbion	£5 per month under supervision of the Police Magistrate, Herberton.
Moreton (Cook district)	£10 per month under supervision of Police.
Mein	£5 per month under supervision of Police.
Mungindi	£80 per annum under supervision of Customs Officer.
Myola	£100 per annum under supervision of Police Magis- trate, Cairns.
Thornborough	£65 per annum under supervision of Police. Dr Wilkie allowance of £5-5-0, per annum for supplying medicine.
Thursday Island Natives	£5 per month under supervision of the Government Resident. Natives doing duties on various islands receive also £1 per annum each for Uniform.
Whitsunday Island, Bowen	£60 per annum under supervision of the Police Magistrate.

W.H.R.

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*Minute 1/8/98:* 'The Commissioner of Police will please report on the whole position of vote for aborigines after he has completed his projected trip of Inspection. Meanwhile continue . . . as heretofore, subject to such alterations as may hereafter appear necessary'.

*Source:* Q.S.A. COL/139, 10081 of 1898.

## Appendix B

### Settlers and their Employees Reported Killed as a Result of Aboriginal Resistance in North Queensland Between 1861 and 1897: a summary

These figures do not claim to be complete or free of error. This Appendix lists, where possible, the identity of each person reported killed, the site of the death, and the references from which the report is derived. There were no doubt many people killed by Aborigines whose deaths were not reported: isolated travellers, prospectors, fishermen, or victims of shipwreck, who left no clues as to their fate. Indeed, fellow colonists sometimes may have not even been aware that they were missing. This was probably more likely in the 1860s and in the first years of the settlement of new districts, especially the frontier mining fields. Sometimes isolated employers or companions may not have been able to report the death or not bothered to because of the trouble involved. Although I have not found evidence that pastoralists who had difficulty getting workers did not report such deaths, it is possible that some were so tempted.

I have attempted to indicate the degree of my acceptance of the reports encountered. Often the nature of the evidence has convinced me of the reliability of the report and these I have marked 'accepted'. I have marked those of which I am reasonably certain but for which I would have liked firmer evidence as 'probable'. 'Possible' indicates a greater lack of certainty and has been used especially to avoid the possibility of counting twice when there are two or more references which may indicate two or more separate deaths or may possibly be referring to the same death. A lack of precision as to the number of deaths has also been indicated by the term 'possible'.

There have been other factors involved in the acceptance of reported deaths resulting from Aboriginal attack. Several references to the same attack do not guarantee its authenticity as colonial newspapers frequently derived reports from other newspapers. These were generally, but not always, briefly acknowledged but it is often difficult to tell which of possibly more than one report the second newspaper is referring to. One report indicating the possibility of attack may have been seen in the course of research. A subsequent report confirming or denying it may not have been seen, possibly because that edition is missing. There is a similar

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doubt about several references, some derived from primary and some from secondary sources. The secondary sources may be based on the same primary sources without the researcher being aware of this fact. The reliability would then depend on the primary sources. The discovery of only one reference to a death provides another problem of interpretation. It would be misleading to doubt its reliability simply because other references have not been recorded. One has to assess that reference, taking into account the details provided, the state of Aboriginal-European relations in that district at that time, and any other factors that seem relevant. Sometimes when the sources are meagre it is difficult to determine whether the death results from Aboriginal resistance, a revival of Aboriginal resistance, or some other motivation. This is especially so in districts normally regarded as behind the frontier.

The attempt to indicate the racial origins of those killed has resulted in the least reliable information in this table. Frequently there has been little or no indication of the race of the deceased. More importantly, however, it seems that the deaths of non-Europeans were less consistently reported than those of Europeans. Sometimes it appears they were reported almost by accident such as when a European settler complained of the lack of police protection and listed all possible deaths. Then one might discover, for example, that four Aboriginal pastoral workers had been killed in one Aboriginal attack. The death of three European sailors who were involved in kidnapping Aborigines was, however, dubbed the 'Douglas Tragedy', widely reported, and officially investigated.

This table then cannot claim to be an accurate assessment of the loss of life resulting from Aboriginal resistance. Even the assessment of available evidence has been highly subjective and no doubt more detailed research of any one area of North Queensland will reveal errors and omissions.

Finally the appendix does not even attempt to list the Aborigines killed in resisting the invasion by Europeans, Chinese settlers and their employees of other races. To suggest that at least ten times as many Aborigines were killed for every intruder killed seems very conservative when one considers that Aborigines were often killed to drive them from runs and river valleys and for merely disturbing or killing cattle and horses, let alone killing or wounding settlers. One also has to remember that Native Police detachments were constantly involved in punitive raids and dispersals from 1861 to 1896 in North Queensland and that the settlers were unrestrained in their use of force throughout this period. Thus to suggest that at least 4,000 Aborigines died as a result of frontier resistance in North Queensland between 1861 and 1896 is probably so conservative as to be misleading.

## Abbreviations used in this table:

- P = Pastoral
- M = Mining
- R = Rainforest
- S = Sea
- U = Unknown
- E = European
- C = Chinese
- Ab = Aboriginal Employee
- K = 'Kanaka'
- O = Other
- A = Accepted
- Pr = Probable
- Po = Possible

Note: When a death was occurred within the context of two frontiers, e.g. 'Rain-forest and Mining, this has been indicated in the table. The frontier *underline e.g. R*, is the one to which it has been credited for interpretation and statistical purposes.

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Summary

Year	Frontier of Death					Race of Deceased					Reliability of Information		
	P	M	R	S	U	E	C	Ab	K	O	A	Pr	Po
1861				2		2					2		
1862	1					1					1		
1863													
1864	18			1		19					15	4	
1865	3					3					2		1
1866	12					11	1				9	1	2
1867	9			4		13					7		6
1868	16					8	2	4	2		16		
1869	7	1		2		10					10		
1870	6	1		1		6			2		6		2
1871	11	1				10		1	1		12		
1872	4	7		16		19	6	2			25		2
1873	1	19		9		17	9	2	1		20	5	4
1874	6	29		1		29	2	3	2		30	3	3
1875	5	22		1	2	17	8	5			17		13
1876	3	6				2	5	2			4	2	3
1877	3	7	3	3		16					15	1	
1878	1	12	1	8		12	9	1			14	5	3
1879	9		2	6		12	2	3			9		8
1880			1	5	1	5			2		7		
1881	3	1		9		7	5		1		12		1
1882		2	7	4		2	7	4			6	7	
1883	4	1	9	4		7	9	1	1		17		1
1884	5	3	3	6		11	4	2			16		1
1885	2	14	5	3	2	12	12	2			24		2
1886	1	4	5	2		5	4	3			12		
1887	2	1	6			6	2		1		7		2
1888	1	4	1	2	1	6	3				7	2	
1889	3		4	5		10	1	1			12		
1890	5	4	1	5	1	6	4	5	1		15		1
1891		2		2		2	2				4		
1892		1	1			1	1				2		
1893		1		14		8		1		6	13		2
1894	3	1		1	1	5				1	5		1
1895		3	1	3		2	4	1			6		1
1896	1					1					1		
1897	1					1					1		

## Summary in decades

Years	Frontier of Death					Race of Deceased					Reliability of Information			Total
	P	M	R	S	U	E	C	Ab	K	O	A	Pr	Po	
1861-1869	66	1		9		67	3	4	2		62	5	9	76
1870-1879	49	104	6	45	2	140	41	19	6		152	16	38	206
1880-1889	21	30	41	40	4	71	47	13	5		120	9	7	136
1890-1897	10	12	3	25	2	26	11	7	1	7	47		5	52
1861-1897	146	147	50	119	8	304	102	43	14	7	381	30	59	470



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SETTLERS AND THEIR EMPLOYEES REPORTED KILLED AS A RESULT OF ABORIGINAL RESISTANCE IN NORTH QUEENSLAND BETWEEN 1861 AND 1897

P	M	R	S	U	E	C	Ab	K	O	A	Pr	Po	Identity	Site	Reference
1	27.8.1861	P		S	E					A			Henry Irving, passenger and pastoralist, on ketch <i>Ellida</i> .	Shaw's Island, Whitsunday Passage.	Rockhampton Bulletin, 11.10.1861; Q.S.A. JUN N3 65 of 1861; Byerley to Col. Sec., 23.9.1861, encl. Q.S.A. COL/A22, 2787 of 1861; Dalrymple to Col. Sec., 10.10.1861, Q.S.A. COL/A22, 2787 of 1861.
2	27.8.1861	P		S	E					A			Nicholas Millar, a seaman, of ketch <i>Ellida</i> .	ibid.	ibid.
3	mid 1862	P		S	E					A			Mr Roberts in ketch <i>Presto</i> , carrying supplies to McKay's station.	Near Cape Hillsborough, north of Mackay.	P.M., Rockhampton, to Col. Sec., 14.6.1862, Q.S.A. COL/A30, 1618 of 1862.
4	27.1.1864	P			E					A			Ronald McDonald, pastoral employee.	Bowen District.	P.D.T., 5.3.1864.
5	13.9.1864	P		S	E					A			Marine, Somerset garrison.	Somerset, near Cape York.	Q.S.A. GOV/24, p. 305.
6	September (?) 1864	P			E					A			Shepherd.	McLellan's Station, Upper Burdekin.	P.D.T., 8.10.1864; P.D.T., 22.10.1864; Black to Col. Sec., 5.12.1864; Q.S.A. COL/A62, 3415 of 1864.

	P	M	R	S	U	E	C	Ab	K	O	A	Pr	Po	Identity	Site	Reference
7	ibid.					E					A			ibid.	Victoria Downs, Lower Burdekin.	P.D.T., 19.11.1864; Spry to Pinnock, 23.1.1865, encl. Q.S.A. COL/A64, 449 of 1865; Black to Col. Sec., 5.12.1864, Q.S.A. COL/A62, 3415 of 1864.
8	October (?) 1864					E					A			Pastoral employee of J.M. Black.		
9	ibid.					E					A			ibid.		ibid.
10	late 1864 or early 1865					E					A			Pastoral employee.	Natal Downs, Cape River, on main road Cape River to Flinders.	Kellet to P.M., Bowen, 26.2.1865, encl. Q.S.A. COL/A64, 449 of 1865; P.M., Bowen, to Col. Sec., 13.2.1865, encl. Q.S.A. COL/A64, 499 of 1865.
11	ibid.					E					A			ibid.		ibid.
12	ibid.					E					A			ibid.		ibid.
13	ibid.					E					A			ibid.		ibid.
14	ibid.					E					A			Shepherd.	About 20 miles from main station Natal Downs, near Cape River.	ibid.
15	ibid.					E					A			ibid.		ibid.

INVASION AND RESISTANCE

	P	M	R	S	U	E	C	Ab	K	O	A	Pr	Po	Identity	Site	Reference
16	ibid.					E					A			Gibbs, pastoral employee.	70 miles west of Natal Downs, Cape River.	ibid.
17	ibid.					E					A			Pastoral employee.	Near Cape River, Natal Downs.	ibid.
18	1862-1868					E(?)						Pr		Shepherd.	Natal Downs.	Palmer, <i>Early Days in North Queensland</i> , p. 14: mentions 18 shepherds killed in first few years of settlement. Palmer was normally accurate.
19	ibid.					E(?)						Pr		ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
20	ibid.					E(?)						Pr		ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
21	ibid.					E(?)						Pr		ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
22	late 1864					E					A			German Shepherd.	Valley of Lagoons, Upper Burdekin.	P.M., Cardwell, to Col. Sec., 26.12.1864, Q.S.A. COL/A63, 157 of 1865.
23	July or August 1865					E(?)					A			Barney (?)	On way to Flinders, probably near Bogie River.	P.D.T., 19.8.1865.
24	mid 1865					E							Po	Shepherd.	On Flinders.	P.D.T., 4.10.1865.

	P	M	R	S	U	E	C	Ab	K	O	A	Pr	Po	Identity	Site	Reference
25 late 1865	P					E					A			Master, Schooner, Nightingale.	At mouth of Burdekin, Cape Bowling Green, shipwrecked.	Hall-Scott to Col. Sec., 26.10.1865, Q.S.A. COL/A72, 2993 of 1865; Q.S.A. COL/A55, 1696 of 1865.
26 1865-1867	P					E					A			A young man Briggs.	At Skeleton Creek, before reaching Hughenden.	Palmer, Early Days of North Queensland, p. 132.
27 June(?) 1866	P					E					A			Shepherd.	Near Mackay.	P. D. T., 23.6.1866.
28 July(?) 1866	P					E					A			Shepherd.	Natal Downs, Cape River.	P. D. T., 28.7.1866.
29 Early March 1866	P					E					A			Pastoral employee.	Avon Downs, Suttor River, west of Nebo.	Queenslander, 7.4.1866; Pol. Com. To Col. Sec., 30.4.1866, Q.S.A. COL/A79, 1213 of 1866. (Several murders, i.e. at least 3).
30 June or July 1866	P					E					A			Kelly, a shepherd.	Natal Downs, Cope River. Mentioned in an article 'From the Suttor'.	ibid.; P. D. T., 28 July 1866; 'From the Suttor'.

INVASION AND RESISTANCE

P	M	R	S	U	E	C	Ab	K	O	A	Pr	Po	Identity	Site	Reference
31	Between February and Nov. 1866	P			E(?)					A			A shepherd.	Suttor River report 3 shepherds killed in this area since Feb. 1866, plus a squatter's brother.	ibid.; P.D.T., 21.11.1866.
32	October (?) 1866 or early 1867	P			E					A			H. Clark, brother of pastoralist, Dartmoor.	Dartmoor, near Suttor River.	ibid.; P.D.T., 15.6.1867, letter from W. Clark; Queenslander, 3.11.1866.
33	August or September 1866	P				C				Pr			Chinese shepherd.	Mackay hinterland, possibly on or near Suttor River.	ibid.; P.D.T., 26.9.1866, from M.M.
34	Feb. to November 1866	P			E							Po	Shepherd.	On or near Suttor River.	ibid.
35	mid 1866	P			E					A			Neuman.	The far north, Lake Hope.	P.D.T., 12.9.1866, 'The Far North'.
36	1866(?)	P			E						Po		One of 3 men camped on the river.	On or near Canobie Station, Cloncurry District.	Corfield, <i>Reminiscences of Queensland 1862-1899</i> , p. 22. (May refer to 50).

	P	M	R	S	U	E	C	Ab	K	O	A	Pr	Po	Identity	Site	Reference
37	ibid.					E					A			ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
38	1867					E					A			Skeletons of McDuff and Ross found, dead five years.	Mt. Stewart, near Townsville.	Queenslander, 9.11.1872, from Cleveland Bay Express; P. D. T., 27.3.1867.
39	ibid.					E					A			ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
40	early 1867					E							Po	One of two missing men.	On or near Woodstock Station, near Townsville.	ibid.
41	ibid.					E							Po	ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
42	May(?) 1867					E					A			Joseph E. Peate, shepherd.	John S.H. Yeates' station, 15 miles from Bowen.	P. D. T., 1.6.1867 P. D. T., 15.6.1867; M. M., 10.8.1867; Gregory, Bowen, to Col. Sec., 10.6.1867, encl. Q. S. A. COL/A91, 1433 of 1867.
43	June(?) 1867					E					A			Pastoral employee, clothes found.	Woodstock Station, south of Townsville.	Queenslander, 13.7.1867.
44	ibid.					E					A			ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
45	Sept., Oct.(?) 1867			S		E							Po	One of four white men, crew of shipwrecked Eva.	Hinchinbrook Island or Palm Islands.	P. D. T., 26.10.1867.
46	ibid.			S		E							Po	ibid.	ibid.	ibid.

INVASION AND RESISTANCE

	P	M	R	S	U	E	C	Ab	K	O	A	Pr	Po	Identity	Site	Reference
47	ibid.			S		E							Po	ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
48	ibid.			S		E							Po	ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
49	Late 1867 or early 1868	P				E			A					Todd.	Mt. Surprise Station, west of Ingham.	Queenslander, 12.2.1868, from Cleveland Bay Express.
50	1867	P				E			A					One traveller.	On Cloncurry River, Burke District.	Brodie Bros. to Col. Sec., 18.4.1868, Q.S.A. COL/A106, 1720 of 1868; Queenslander, 23.5.1868, letter 'The Poor Blacks'; P.M., Burketown, to Col. Sec., 18.4.68, Q.S.A. COL/A106, 1788 of 1868; C.C.L., Burketown, to Col. Sec., 6.9.1867, Q.S.A. COL/1401; p. 187 Laurie, 'Black War in Queensland'; 'a number of Chinese'.
51	1867 or 1868	P				E		Ab			A			One of four Aboriginal employees returning to east after droving stock.	Burke District.	ibid.

	P	M	R	S	U	E	C	Ab	K	O	A	Pr	Po	Identity	Site	Reference
52	ibid.							Ab			A			ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
53	ibid.							Ab			A			ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
54	ibid.							Ab			A			ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
55	March 1868					E					A			Shepherd, probably W. Cannon.	Burke District, if Cannon, on Little & Hetze's station, on 12.3.1868.	ibid.
56	March, April 1868					E					A			European, probably Cameron.	Burke District.	ibid.
57	ibid.						C				A			'Chinaman.'	Burke District, on road to Normanton.	ibid.
58	Before 20.3.68					E					A			R. Manson	Burke District, probably on Little & Hetze's station.	ibid.
59	Before 18.4.68					E					A			One of 'three men' referred to by P.M., Burketown, to Col. Sec., 18.4.1868.	Near Gibson's station.	ibid.
60	Before 18.4.68					E					A			ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
61	Before 18.4.68					E					A			ibid.	ibid.	ibid.



INVASION AND RESISTANCE

	P	M	R	S	U	E	C	Ab	K	O	A	Pr	Po	Identify	Site	Reference
62	March					E					A			R. Whitman, shepherd.	Broken River, about 1 mile above junction with the Dart River.	P.M., Bowen, to Col. Sec., 22.4.1868, Q.S.A. COL/A107 Q.S.A. JUS/N19, 119 of 1868.
63	10.7.68	P							K		A			'Kill Kill', Polynesian labourer.	Head of Capsize Creek, Strathbogie station, Bowen District.	M.M., 29.7.1868; Q.S.A. JUS/N19, 157 of 1868.
64	ibid.	P							K		A			'Lawrie', Polynesian labourer.	ibid.	M.M., 29.7.1868; Q.S.A. JUS/N19, 156, of 1868.
65	October (?) 1868	P											A	Chinaman	Jarvisfield, Burdekin River.	P.D.T., 17.10.1868; Queenstander, 7.11.1868, from P.D.T.
66	About 22.12.68	P				E					A			J.T. Cooper (Collins?) owner of North Creek station, Nebo.	North Creek Old Head Station, Nebo, Fort Cooper.	Q.S.A. JUS/N23, A38 of 1869; P.D.T., 23.1.1869; Laurie, 'The Blacker War in Queensland', p. 167.
67	January (?) 1869	P	M			E					A			A man.	Logan Downs on way to Cape Diggings.	P.D.T., 23.1.1869.
68	January (?) 1869	P				E					A			Shepherd.	Bowen District (?).	P.D.T., 6.2.1869.

P	M	R	S	U	E	C	Ab	K	O	A	Pr	Po	Identity	Site	Reference
69	6.7.69	P			E					A			James Wilson, alias Cranky Jemmy.	Road to Brook Station, Burketown.	Q.S.A. JUS/N21, 92 of 1869.
70	August (?) 1869	P			E					A			One of three 'murders'.	At or near Cloncurry.	P. D. T., 28.8.1869.
71	ibid.	P			E					A			ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
72	ibid.	P			E					A			ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
73	April/ May 1869	P			E					A			Unknown.	130 miles from Mackay.	Wheeler to Col. Com., 10.5.1869, Q.S.A. COL/A125, 2011 of 1869.
74	21.9.69	P			E					A			John Maher	1 mile from Wandoo station, Nebo.	Q.S.A. JUS/N21, 78 of 1869.
75	Dec. (?) 1869		S		E					A			One of two white men.	Cape Grenville, in an 8 ton cutter.	Chester to Col. Sec., 24.12.1869, 'Somerset letter- book', 28.7.1869- 11.10.1871.
76	ibid.		S		E					A			ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
77	January (?) 1870		M		E					A			Mick Delaney.	Gilberton.	Queenslander, 22.1.1870.
78	Early 1870		S		E						Po	John Morris.	Sailing from Gladstone to Mackay in a ten ton boat — believe boat found at Cape York is his.	M.M., 12.3.1870.	

## INVASION AND RESISTANCE

	P	M	R	S	U	E	C	Ab	K	O	A	Pr	Po	Identity	Site	Reference
79	23.3.70	P				E					A			Arthur Murray shepherd.	Gunnawarra, near Glendhu, Ingham District.	Jones, Cardwall Story, p. 160, refers to Death Register, Ingham (See 81 below).
80	April(?) 1870	P				E					A			A 'murder'.	Alalong Station, near Nebo, Mackay District.	P.D.T., 30.4.1870; M.M., 7.5.1870, from P.D.T.
81	April(?) 1870	P				E							Po	Shepherd.	Glendhu Outstation.	M.M., 7.5.1870. (See 79 above).
82	August (?) 1870	P							K		A			'Kanaka' labourer.	Fairlight Station, Flinders River, Hughenden District.	Queenslander, 3.9.1870; Brisbane Courier, week ending 3.9.1870, from Cleveland Bay Express.
83	4/5 Nov. 1870	P				E					A			Robert Thompson, Cook.	8 miles from Houghton River, on new road to Ravenswood.	Q.S.A. JUS/N27, 208 of 1870; P.D.T., 19.11.1870; Queenslander, 19.11.1870.
84	November (?) 1870	P							K		A			'Kanaka' labourer.	Allingham's Waterview Station, between Townsville & Cardwell.	Queenslander, 3.12.1870; confirmed by Ms. Anne Macintosh, James Cook University.

	P	M	R	S	U	E	C	Ab	K	O	A	Pr	Po	Identity	Site	Reference
85	19.3.71	P			E			A						Nicholas Burrows, alias Little Dan.	The Company Huf', Landsborough River, Leichhardt Station, Burke District.	Q.S.A. JUS/N30, 104 of 1871.
86	31.5.71	M			E			A						John Corbett, Storekeeper, Normanton.	Robertson River, travelling Western Creek to Gilberton.	P.M., Western Creek, to Col. Sec., 12.6.1871. Q.S.A. COL/A158, 1462 of 1871. Q.S.A. JUS/N30, 106 of 1871.
87	June 1871	P			E			A						George Lombion, manager, employed by Robert Towns & Co.	10 miles from Strathalbyn Station, Collinsville.	Q.S.A. JUS/N30, 108 of 1871.
88	June 1871	P			E			A						George A. Longfield, employed by Robert Towns & Co.	ibid.	ibid.
89	20.7.71	P			E			A						Archibald McLeod, Stockman.	Dalgally Station, Julia Creek, north-east of Cloncurry, near Gillios River.	Q.S.A. JUS/N34, 112 of 1872; Q.S.A. L.W.O./A34, 112 of 1872.
90	ibid.	P					Ab							'Ned'.	ibid.	ibid.

INVASION AND RESISTANCE

P	M	R	S	U	E	C	Ab	K	O	A	Pr	Po	Identity	Site	Reference
91	15.10.71	P			E					A			Unknown man.	90 miles from Normanton road to Gilberton, near Gum Swamp and Bostead Lagoon.	Q.S.A. JUS/N34, 114 of 1872.
92	10.12.71	P			E					A			Henry Murdock.	38 miles from Burketown on road to Barkly Tableland.	Q.S.A. JUS/N34, 113 of 1872; R.M., 27.4.1872.
93	ibid.	P			E					A			E.M.M. Huey (one report: Crefield).	ibid.	ibid.
94	ibid.	P						K		A			Vagora, Pacific Islander.	ibid.	ibid.
95	17.12.71	P			E					A			George Cessford (Sesford?)	Rocky Creek, near Mt. Dryander, Bowen.	Q.S.A. JUS/N32, 119 of 1872.
96	Dec/Jan 1872	P			E					A			A man.	Mouth of Gregory River.	P. D.T., 13.1.1872.
97	13-15.1.72		S		E					A			Charles Clements.	Gould Is., 11 miles from Cardwell.	P.M., Cardwell, to Col. Sec., 3.2.1872; Q.S.A. COL/A166, 254 of 1872; Q.S.A. JUS/N32, 22 of 1872; P. D.T., 10.2.72; Jones, Cardwell Story, p. 160.

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	P	M	R	S	U	E	C	Ab	K	O	A	Pr	Po	Identity	Site	Reference
98	ibid.	S		E			A							Harry Smith.	ibid.	ibid.
99	Late Feb. 1872	S		E			A							One of 14 Europeans shipwrecked in <i>María</i> .	South of Innisfail, <i>María</i> Creek.	' <i>María</i> ' and New Guinea Expedition', enclosing 'Report', 1872 V. & P., N.S.W., unpaginated; P.D.T., 28.3.1872.
100	ibid.	S		E			A							ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
101	ibid.	S		E			A							ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
102	ibid.	S		E			A							ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
103	ibid.	S		E			A							ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
104	ibid.	S		E			A							ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
105	ibid.	S		E			A							ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
106	ibid.	S		E			A							ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
107	ibid.	S		E			A							ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
108	ibid.	S		E			A							ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
109	ibid.	S		E			A							ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
110	ibid.	S		E			A							ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
111	ibid.	S		E			A							ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
112	ibid.	S		E			A							ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
113	3.4.72	P					Ab						Po	Aboriginal 'Mickie'.	One mile from Ravenswood near Townsville Road.	Q.S.A. JUS/N33, 75 of 1872.

INVASION AND RESISTANCE

P	M	R	S	U	E	C	Ab	K	O	A	Pr	Po	Identity	Site	Reference
114					E								Frederick Maier, murdered by Aboriginal Tambo.	15 mile sheep station, Aramac Creek Run, Marathon.	Q.S.A. JUS/N34, 187 of 1872.
115					E					A			John Cook.	Weatherley's Old Station on road from Norman to Cloncurry.	Q.S.A. JUS/N35, 271 of 1872.
116	July				E					A			Daniel Ryan, miner.	Near head of Percy River, Gilberton District.	Q.S.A. JUS/N34, 164 of 1872; R.M., 14.9.1872; Queenslander, 10.8.1872.
117	1.11.72					C				A			Ah Pie.	Gilbert River.	Q.S.A. JUS/N35, 230 of 1872; M.M., 30.11.1872.
118	6.11.72					C				A			Chang Lang.	Gilbert River.	Q.S.A. JUS/N35, 230 of 1872; M.M., 30.11.1872.
119	12.11.72					C				A			Nug Cow.	Gilbert River.	Q.S.A. JUS/N35, 238 of 1872.
120	12-13.11.72					C				A			Ah Cook.	Gilbert River.	Q.S.A. JUS/N35, 241 of 1872.
121	17.11.72					C				A			Cum Ty	Gilbert River.	Q.S.A. JUS/N35, 242 of 1872.
122	1872					C				A			'Another Chinaman'.	Near Gilbert River.	Ramsay to Col. Sec., 16.10.1873, Q.S.A. COL/A195, 1142 of 1872.

	P	M	R	S	U	E	C	Ab	K	O	A	Pr	Po	Identity	Site	Reference
123	4.11.72	P						Ab			A			Native Police trooper, Johnny.	¼ mile from Police Station, Charters Towers.	P.D.T. 16.11.1872, from N.M.; Q.S.A. JUS/N35, 224 of 1872.
124	Before 22.4.73	M				E					A			One of ten miners and travellers.	Gilbert River.	ibid.; Dairyample to Col. Sec., 22.4.1873, Q.S.A. COL/A183, 1009 of 1873; M.M., 7.12.1872.
125	Before 22.4.73	M				E					A			One of ten miners and travellers.	Gilbert River.	ibid.
126	16.3.73	P				E					A			Henry Maxwell.	Skull Creek Dam, Lake Elphinstone, Leichhardt District, 35 miles from Nebo.	Q.S.A. JUS/N36, 71 of 1873; P.D.T., 22.3.1873.
127	April 1873	M				E					A			A man.	On way from Etheridge.	Queenslander, 3.5.1873.
128	12.4.73		S			E					A			William Rose, cutter Good-Will.	Killed by three Palm Island Aborigines at Green Island.	N.M., 10.5.1873; Q.S.A. JUS/N36, 92 of 1873; N.M., 24.5.1873; P.D.T., 3.5.1873.
129	ibid.		S			E					A			William _____, cutter Good-Will.	ibid.	ibid.
130	May 1873		S					Ab				Pr		Aboriginal employee of Good-Will.	Point Cooper.	N.M., 24.5.1873.



INVASION AND RESISTANCE

P	M	R	S	U	E	C	Ab	K	O	A	Pr	Po	Identify	Site	Reference
131	May	1873	S				Ab			A	Pr		ibid.	ibid.	
132	10.7.73		S	E						A			John Finlay, bêche-de-mer fisherman, <i>Eliza</i> .	Green Island, near Cairns.	Q.S.A. JUS/N37, 174 of 1873; M.M., 9.8.1873; P.D.T., 2.8.1873; Queenslander, 9.7.1873.
133	ibid.		S	E						A			James Mercer, bêche-de-mer fisherman, <i>Eliza</i> .	ibid.	ibid.
134	ibid.		S	E						A			Charles Reeves, bêche-de-mer fisherman, <i>Eliza</i> .	ibid.	ibid.
135	ibid.		S					K		A			Polynesian labourer, bêche-de-mer boat, <i>Eliza</i> .	ibid.	ibid.
136	1873	Nov.(?)	S	E						A			J. Atkins, pearlshelling fisherman.	At camp, 8 miles from Somerset.	Beddome, P.M., Somerset, to Col. Sec., 11.11.1873, 'Records of Somerset', Spencer Library.
137	13.11.73		M			C				A			Ah Bow (Pow?), About 12 miles from Mill- chester, Charters Towers.	About 12 miles from Mill- chester, Charters Towers.	Q.S.A. JUS/N38, 252 of 1873; M.M., 6.12.1873; Queenslander, 29.11.1873.

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P	M	R	S	U	E	C	Ab	K	O	A	Pr	Po	Identity	Site	Reference
138	ibid.	M				C				A			Sam Cloy,	ibid.	ibid.; Q.S.A. JUS/N38, 253 of 1873.
139	Oct. 1873	M			E					A			Henry Williams, engineer and owner, Caledonia Crushing Machine.	One mile from Walshtown, Etheridge Goldfield.	Q.S.A. JUS/N37, 182 and 183 of 1873; M.M., 27.9.1873 and 11.10.1873; Ramsay to Col. Sec., 10.10.1873. Q.S.A. COL/A195, 1142 of 1872.
140	ibid.	M			E					A			Samuel Blackall, blacksmith, Caledonia Crushing Machine.	ibid.	ibid.
141	24.11.73	M				C				A			One of two Chinese miners.	Gilberton.	Cameron to Col. Sec., 18.12.1873. Q.S.A. COL/A195, 1142 of 1874; M.M., 6.12.1873; P.D.T., 6.12.1873.
142	ibid.	M				C				A			ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
143	ibid.	M				C					Po		Chinese miner.	ibid.	ibid.
144	ibid.	M				C					Po		ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
145	ibid.	M				C					Po		ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
146	ibid.	M			E						Pr		Southern mailman.	ibid.	ibid.

## INVASION AND RESISTANCE

	P	M	R	S	U	E	C	Ab	K	O	A	Pr	Po	Identity	Site	Reference
147	6.12.73	M					C				A			One of two Chinese miners.	ibid.	Cameron to Cal. Sec., 18.12.1872, loc. cit.
148	ibid.	M					C				A			ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
149	After 26.10.73	M				E					A			One of party of five miners.	First expedition Cooktown to Palmer.	Jack, Northmost Australia, Vol. II: pp. 421, 423; R.M., 6.12.1873.
150	ibid.	M				E						Pr		ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
151	ibid.	M				E						Pr		ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
152	ibid.	M				E							Po	ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
153	15.1.74	M				E					A			Alfred _____.	Deighton Creek, about 50 miles from Endeavour River.	Q.S.A. JUS/N39, 90 of 1874.
154	ibid.	M				E					A			Matthew Wright (alias Harry).	ibid.	ibid.
155	Jan.(?) 1874	M				E					A			Body, skull fractured, arms and feet cut off.	15 miles south of Endeavour River.	P.M., Townsville, to Col. Sec., 8.2.1874, Q.S.A. COL/A191, 347 of 1874.
156	Feb./ March 1874.	M				E					A			Remains of a white man speared by blacks, supposed to have been eaten.	Sub. Inspectors Douglas and Thompson's route to Palmer.	P. D. T., 28.3.1874.

	P	M	R	S	U	E	C	Ab	K	O	A	Pr	Po	Identity	Site	Reference
157 Shortly before 12.3.74		M				E					A			Bernard Porsk (?)	Normanby Range, Cooktown-Palmer region.	Hamilton to Col. Sec., 12.3.1874, encl. Q.S.A. COL/A192, 471 of 1874.
158 Feb./Mar. 1874	P						C				A			One of two Chinese.	South of Bowen towards Belyando River.	P.D.T., 21.3.1874.
159 ibid.	P						C				A			ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
160 June (?) 1874			S			E					A			Old Bill Smith.	Green Island, near Cairns.	M.M., 4.7.1874.
161 1870's or early 1880's	P							K			A			One of two Pacific Islanders.	Near Mackay on Finch-Hatton's Station.	Finch-Hatton, Advance Australia, p. 147.
162 ibid.	P							K			A			ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
163 After Nov. 1873		M				E	(?)				A			Miner.	Palmer Goldfield.	P.M., Palmerville, to Col. Sec., 4.8.1874. Q.S.A. COL/A197, 1680 of 1874; P.D.T., 30.1.1874; Q.S.A. JUS/N39, 95, 100, of 1874; M.M., 18.4.1874; M.M., 2.5.1874.
164 Jan.(?) 1874		M				E	(?)				A			'Another murder'.	ibid.	ibid. (Especially P.D.T., 30.1.1874).
165 5.2.1874		M				E					A			James Sowter	ibid.	ibid. (Especially Q.S.A. JUS/N39, 95 of 1874).

INVASION AND RESISTANCE

P	M	R	S	U	E	C	Ab	K	O	A	Pr	Po	Identity	Site	Reference
166	12.3.74	M			E					A			Adolf Dobitz.	ibid.	ibid. (Especially Q.S.A. JUS/N39, 100 of 1874).
167	Mar./Apr. 1874	M			E (?)					A			A miner.	ibid.	ibid. (Especially M.M., 18.4.1874.)
168	April 1874	M			E (?)					A			A miner.	Going for beef to Comissioner's comp.	ibid. (Esp. M.M., 2.5.1874).
169	Between Nov. 1873 & 4.8.74	M				Ab					Pr		One of three Native Police deserters.	Palmer Goldfield.	P.M., Palmerville, to Col. Sec., 4.8.1874, loc. cit.
170	ibid.	M				Ab					Pr		ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
171	ibid.	M				Ab					Pr		ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
172	22.7.74	M			E					A			Cornelius Hurford, body taken away by Aborigines.	Canable (sic) Creek, Palmer Goldfield.	Q.S.A. JUS/N41, 225 of 1874; C.C., 22.8.1874; P.M., Palmerville, to Col. Sec., 4.8.1874, loc. cit.
173	About 5.8.74	M			E (?)					A			A miner, cooked and eaten by Aborigines.	Gregory's Gully, Palmer Goldfield.	C.C., 15.8.1874.
174	5-14.8.74	M			E (?)					A			Miner	Upper Camp, Palmer Goldfield.	ibid.
175	Before 7.11.74	M			E (?)						Po		Rumours of remains of a party of miners (i.e. at least three).	Head of Palmer River.	C.H., 7.11.1874.
176	ibid.	M			E						Po		ibid.	ibid.	ibid.

P	M	R	S	U	E	C	Ab	K	O	A	Pr	Po	Identity	Site	Reference
177	ibid.	M			E							Po	ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
178	About 16.8.74	M			E					A			Remains of two Europeans found about 16.8.1874 by C.M. Mcdonald.	Sandy (or Cannibal) Creek, Palmer Goldfield.	C.H., 5.12.1874.
179	ibid.	M			E					A			ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
180	Aug.(?) 1874	M			E					A			Party of six attacked, one killed.	Palmer Goldfield.	P.D.T., 29.8.1874.
181	Aug./ Sept. 74	M			E (?)					A			'A murder'.	Near Palmer River, Palmer Goldfield.	P.D.T., 19.9.1874.
182	Sept.(?) 1874	P			E					A			Station Cook, named Holland.	St Ann's Station, near Ravenswood Station.	M.M., 19.9.1874; M.M., 19.12.1874, from R.M.
183	Early Oct. 1874	P			E					A			William Scanlon or Thompson (of unsound mind).	On eastern side of Leichhardt River, Burke District.	Q.S.A. JUS/N43, 58 of 1875; M.M., 7.11.1874.
184	17.10.74	M			E					A			John Strau	Palmer Road, Palmer Goldfield.	M.M., 7.11.1874; C.H., 21.10. 1874; Q.S.A. JUS/N41, 274 of 1874.
185	ibid.	M			E					A			Bridget Strau	ibid.	ibid.
186	ibid.	M			E					A			Anne Strau, 5-6 years old.	ibid.	ibid.
187	Nov./ Dec. 74	M			E (?)					A			A recent 'double murder'.	Palmer River.	P.D.T., 19.12.1874.

INVASION AND RESISTANCE

	P	M	R	S	U	E	C	Ab	K	O	A	Pr	Po	Identity	Site	Reference
188		M				E					A			ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
189		M				E					A			J.M. Blair	Laura River.	Q.S.A. JUS/N43, 32 of 1875; C.C., 28.1.1875; M.M., 30.1.1875; C.H., 3.2.1875.
190		M				E					A			Alexander Mann, cattle and mine owner.	Laura River.	Q.S.A. JUS/N43, 60 of 1875; M.M., 13.3.1875; P.M., Cardwell, to Col. Sec., 24.2.1875; Q.S.A. COL/A215, 229 of 1875.
191	Around New Year 1875	M				E							Po	One of two packers.	Normanby or Kennedy Rivers.	Corfield, Reminiscences, p. 62.
192	ibid.	M				E							Po	ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
193	Early Feb. 1875	M				E							Po	One of three miners missing from camp.	Eight Mile, near Cooktown.	C.H., 13.2.1875.
194	ibid.	M				E							Po	ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
195	ibid.	M				E							Po	ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
196	About 25.3.75	P				E					A			Frederick Toll.	Goorganga Station, O'Connell River, near Bowen District.	Q.S.A. JUS/N44, 176 of 1875; M.M., 17.4.1875; Waite to George Waite, England, 8.5.1875, encl. Q.S.A. COL/A217, 57 of 1876.

## APPENDIXES

P	M	R	S	U	E	C	Ab	K	O	A	Pr	Po	Identity	Site	Reference
197	After						Ab			A			Station 'gin'.	On or near Crystal Brook Station.	Waite, Crystal- brook, to G. Waite, England, 8.5.1875, and 'Pol. Com., to Col. Sec., 5.1.1876, Q.S.A. COL/A217, 57 of 1876.
198	ibid.						Ab			A			ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
199	ibid.						Ab			A			ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
200	ibid.						Ab			A			Little Aboriginal boy.	ibid.	ibid.
201	2.4.75	M			E					A			Henry Scharfs (Sharp?).	Two Mile Creek, Normanby Rush.	Q.S.A. JUS/N44, 161 of 1875; C.H., 3.4.1875.
202	7.4.75		U	E						A			Mr William Conn.	Williamsbrook, Hinchinbrook Channel.	Q.S.A. JUS/N45, 244 and 246 of 1875; M.M., 24.4.1875.
203	ibid.									A			Elizabeth Conn.	ibid.	ibid.
204	About 3.6.75	M				C				A			'Chinaman', disembowelled and hacked to pieces.	Right Hand Branch of Palmer.	C.C., 12.6.1875.
205	About 8.9.75	M				C				A			'Chinaman'.	Cooktown- Palmer region.	C.C., 15.9.1875.
206	22.9.75	M			E					A			'Ned', surname unknown.	At Hell's Gate, Palmer Road.	Q.S.A. JUS/N46, 356 of 1875; M.M., 30.10.1875; 'several murders are reported'.



INVASION AND RESISTANCE

	P	M	M	R	S	U	E	E	C	Ab	K	O	A	Pr	Po	Identity	Site	Reference
207	12.10.75 approx.	M							C				A			A Chinaman.	Cooktown-Palmer District.	C.C., 23.10.1875; M.M., 30.10.1875.
208	23-28.10.1875	M							C				A			Chinaman killed.	Cooktown-Palmer District.	C.C., 28.10.1875; M.M., 30.10.1875.
209	Late Oct. 75			S						Ab			A			Aboriginal employee from Frazer Island.	Crew of Pennefather's Crinoline, Torres Strait.	P.M., Somerset, to Col. Sec., 28.10.1875, p. 329. Somerset Letter Book (M.L.)
210	Oct.(?) 1875	M					E (?)							Po		General comment: 'several murders are reported to have been committed'.	Cooktown-Palmer District.	M.M., 30.10.1875, possibly referring to 206, 207, 208.
211	ibid.	M					E(?)							Po		ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
212	ibid.	M						C(?)						Po		ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
213	2.11.75	M					E						A			James Flannery	Hell's Gate, Douglas Track.	M.M., 13.11.1875; Q.S.A. JUS/N46, 391 of 1875.
214	Oct./Nov. 75	M					E							Po		The blacks are very trouble-some; there have been many murders of European and Chinese.	Cooktown-Palmer District.	M.M., 13.11.1875.
215	ibid.	M					E							Po		ibid.	ibid.	ibid.

	P	M	R	S	U	E	C	Ab	K	O	A	Pr	Po	Identity	Site	Reference
216	ibid.	M					C						Po	ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
217	ibid.	M					C						Po	ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
218	ibid.	M					C						Po	ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
219	Jan. 76	M					C			A				'Chinaman'.	2 miles from Byerstown.	C.C., 22.1.1876.
220	Feb./ Mar. 76	M					C (?)						Po	'Several murders'.	The Palmer Goldfields.	Queenslander, 18.3.1876.
221	ibid.	M					C(?)						Po	ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
222	ibid.	M					C(?)						Po	ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
223	31.3.76	P				E						Pr		William McFetteridge, killed by Aboriginal helping him.	Western River, Marathon District, west of Hughenden.	Q.S.A. JUS/N49, 120 of 1876.
224	16.5.76	M				E								Thomas K. Donaghy	Byerstown.	Q.S.A. Inquest, 123 of 1876; C.C., 20.5.1876; Queenslander, 3.6.1876.
225	June (?) 1876	M						Ab		A				Flinders River Aboriginal.	Happy Valley, Kelsey Creek, near Proserpine.	P.D.T., 10.6.1876.
226	16.10.76	P						Ab			Pr			Aborigine killed by own countrymen.	Dotswood Station.	Q.S.A. Inquests, 258 of 1876.
227	26.12.76	P					C							Ah Shong, shepherd.	Cambridge Downs, Burke District.	Q.S.A. Inquests, 58 of 1877.

INVASION AND RESISTANCE

	P	M	R	S	U	E	C	Ab	K	O	A	Pr	Po	Identity	Site	Reference
228 Jan.(?) 1877		M				E						Pr		George Rushton (Reshton?)	Cooktown- Palmer District.	C.C., 10.1.1877
229 Jan.(?) 1877	P					E (?)					A			'A murder'	North Creek, Grosvenor Downs, Mackay District.	M.M., 13.1.1877; M.M., 5.5.1877.
230 Jan. 1877		M				E					A			Grinn, a prospector.	Cape Sidmouth, landed from cutter Ida.	P.D.T., 27.1.1877.
231 ibid.		M				E					A			Healy, a prospector.	ibid.	ibid.
232 ibid.		M				E					A			Reilly, a prospector.	ibid.	ibid.
233 22.2.77		M				E					A			Donald McQuarrie.	Hell's Gate.	Q.S.A. Inquests, 47 of 1877; C.C., 28.2.1877.
234 ibid.		M				E					A			Hugh McQuarrie.	ibid.	ibid.
235 22.2.77			S			E					A			Alexander Macintosh	Crew, schooner Douglas, at island, Great Barrier Reef.	Q.S.A. Inquests, 50 of 1877; C.C., 28.2.1877.
236 ibid.			S			E					A			Patrick Troy.	ibid.	ibid.
237 ibid.			S			E					A			Humphrey Coughlan.	ibid.	ibid.
238 7.4.77	P					E					A			James Dunn.	Cowan Downs, Normanton District.	Q.S.A. Inquests, 118 of 1877.

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P	M	R	S	U	E	C	Ab	K	O	A	Pr	Po	Identity	Site	Reference
239	July	M			E					A			William Wade.	Branch of Mitchell River, new track to Hodgkinson Goldfield.	H.M.N., 21.7.1877; H.M.N., 28.7.1877.
240	15.11.77	R			E					A			Thomas Hanley, a timbergetter.	17-18 miles up Daintree River.	M.M., 24.11.1877; C.C., 17.11.1877; C.H., 17.11.1877; P.M., Cairns, to Col. Sec., 19.11.1877, Q.S.A. COL/A248, 5357 of 1877; H.M.N., 1.12.1877; Queenslander, 17.11.1877 and 1.12.1877.
241	ibid.	R			E					A			John Kegan (Regan?)	ibid.	ibid.
242	ibid.	R			E					A			George _____	ibid.	ibid.
243	10-14. 12.1877	P			E					A			William Batten	Nicholson River, about 35 miles from Gregory River.	M.M., 6.2.1878; Queenslander, 26.1.1878; Q.S.A. Inquests, 326 of 1877.
244	10.1.78	M			C					A			Ah Woh.	A few miles from Cooktown.	Q.S.A., Inquests, 11 of 1878; P.D.T., 12.1.1878; H.M.N., 26.1.1878.
245	Feb. 78	M			E							Po	A packer 'speared'.	Range, west of Cairns.	Queenslander, 16.3.1878.

INVASION AND RESISTANCE

P	M	R	S	U	E	C	Ab	K	O	A	Pr	Po	Identity	Site	Reference
246	7.5.78	M			E					A			Manuel Yous.	Near Georgetown, Etheridge Goldfield.	Q.S.A. Inquests, 131 of 1878; 1879 V. & P., Vol. II, Report of the Etheridge and Gilbert Goldfields; Queenslander, 1.6.1878.
247	June(?) 1878	M			E					A			A miner.	Near Georgetown, Etheridge Goldfield.	W. Steele, Georgetown, to P.O. Sullivan, M.L.A., Burke, 4.7.1878, Q.S.A. COL/A262, 2935 of 1878; 1879 V. & P., Report of the Etheridge and Gilbert Goldfields.
248	15.7.78	P			E					A			James Arthurs.	Within 1 mile of Ravenswood.	P.D.T., 27.7.1878.
249	Aug. 78		S		E					A			John Morrison, cook.	Louisa Maria, Whitsunday Passage.	P.D.T., 17.8.1878; P.D.T., 24.8.1878; C.C., 14.8.1878; M.M., 14.9.1878.
250	Aug. 78		S		E					A			Price, fisherman.	Mulgrave Is.	Queenslander, 24.8.1878.
251	Aug. 78		S	(?)	E					A			One of two human beings found 12.9.1878.	Mainland, opposite King's Reef.	Q.S.A. Inquests, 240 of 1878.

	P	M	R	S	U	E	C	Ab	K	O	A	Pr	Po	Identity	Site	Reference
252	ibid.			S(?)		E(?)					A			ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
253		R						Ab			A			Aboriginal 'Monday'	Smithfield, near Cairns.	Const. J. Delaney, Cairns, to Insp. Isley, Cairns, 6.9.1878, Q.S.A. POL.
254			S		E					A				One of crew of wrecked <i>Eliza</i> .	Between Cardwell and Townsville.	P.D.T., 14.9.1878.
255	ibid.		S		E					A				ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
256	Sept. 78		S		E								Po	One of crew of wrecked <i>Eliza</i> .	Not stated.	M.M., 18.9.1878.
257	ibid.		S		E								Po	ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
258	22.9.78	M				C				A				'Chinaman'	Sandy Creek Palmer District.	C.C., 28.9.1878.
259	Nov. 78	M				C						Pr		One of five Chinese.	Chinkies Gully, Palmer Goldfield.	P.D.T., 16.11.1878, from Palmer Chronicle.
260	ibid.	M				C						Pr		ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
261	ibid.	M				C						Pr		ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
262	ibid.	M				C						Pr		ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
263	ibid.	M				C						Pr		ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
264	Nov. 78	M				C				A				One of two Chinese.	14 miles from Cooktown.	C.C., 23.11.1878.
265	ibid.	M				C				A				ibid.	ibid.	ibid.

INVASION AND RESISTANCE

	P	M	R	S	U	E	C	Ab	K	O	A	Pr	Po	Identity	Site	Reference
266	25.12.78 -March 1879					E					A			Molvo	Sulieinan Creek, Cloncurry District.	Queenslander, 8.3.1879; M.M., 5.3.1879; P.D.T., 10.5.1879; A. Laurie, <i>Black War in Queensland</i> , p. 170.
267	ibid.	P				E					A			Kelly	ibid.	ibid.
268	ibid.	P				E					A			Burlier.	ibid.	ibid.
269	ibid.	P				E					A			Holmes.	ibid.	ibid.
270	To May 1879	P				E				Po				One of 8 men reported killed, Queensland.	North-western Queensland, P.D.T., 10.5.1879, see four above.	
271	ibid.	P				E				Po				ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
272	ibid.	P				E				Po				ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
273	ibid.	P				E				Po				ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
274	Feb.(?) 1879	P				E				Po				B. Gruscott, an elderly man.	Disappeared Lower Flinders River.	Queenslander. 1.3.1879.
275	Sept. 79		M	R		E				Po				Keating (?).	Mulgrave River, south of Cairns.	Sub. Insp. Stuart to Sub. Insp. Nowlan, 1.10.1879, and 2.10.1879, Q.S.A. POL/12B/G2.
276	ibid.		M	R		E				Po				Harvey(?).	ibid.	ibid.
277	27.10.79			S		E					A			J.H. English, bêche-de-mer fisherman.	Raine Island, about 60 miles from Cape York Peninsula.	C.C., 19.11.1879; Queenslander, 22.4.1879.

## APPENDIX E

	P	M	R	S	U	E	C	Ab	K	O	A	Pr	Po	Identify	Site	Reference
278	ibid.			S			C				A			One of two Chinese.	ibid.	ibid.
279	ibid.			S			C				A			ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
280	ibid.			S				Ab			A			Aboriginal man.	ibid.	ibid.
281	ibid.			S				Ab			A			Aboriginal woman.	ibid.	ibid.
282	ibid.			S				Ab			A		Po	Aboriginal.	ibid.	ibid.
283	16.2.80				U				K		A			George Neumane, visiting and antagonizing 'blacks' camp.	Ross Island, Townsville.	Q.S.A. Inquests, 48 of 1880.
284	Aug (?) 80		R						K		A			Pacific Islander at a survey camp.	Johnstone River.	P.M., Cairns, to Col. Sec., 3.9.1880, Q.S.A. COL/A298, 4813 of 1880.
285	Before 31.1.81			S		E (?)					A			One of two men.	Jardine River, Cape York Peninsula.	Chester to Col. Sec., 31.1.1881, Q.S.A. COL/A310, 1394 of 1881.
286	ibid.			S		E(?)					A			ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
287	1875-80			S		E(?)					A			A man.	ibid.	ibid.
288	1875-80			S		E(?)					A			A man.	ibid.	ibid.
289	1880-81			S		E					A			Antonio.	At Red Island.	Act. Gov. Res., Thursday Is., to Chief Sec., 25.2.1887, Q.S.A. COL/A492, 1884 of 1887.



# INVASION AND RESISTANCE

	P	M	R	S	U	E	C	Ab	K	O	A	Pr	Po	Identity	Site	Reference
290	23.2.81	P			E						A			George Dyas, Sub. Insp. of Native Police.	Normanton District.	Q.S.A. Inquests, 49 of 1881; Australasian Sketcher, 13.3.81.
291	27.5.81	P			E						A			William Turner.	Normanton District.	Q.S.A. Inquests, 154 of 1881.
292	Aug. 81		S		E						A			One of two fishermen.	Cairncross Island.	Fahy, to Under Sec. Treasury, 9.11.1881, Q.S.A. TRE/A24, 2070 of 1881; P.M., T.I., to Col. Sec., 28.11.1881, Q.S.A. COL/A327, 5351 of 1881.
293	ibid.		S		E						A			ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
294	14.9.81	P			E						A			H.I. Kaye, Sub. Insp. of Native Police.	Middle Park Station, a few miles from Woolgar.	Q.S.A. Inquests, 259 of 1881; P.D.T., 24.9.1881; Whittington, 'The Queensland Native Mounted Police', p. 517.
295	Oct. 81	M			C						A			'A Chinaman'.	Normanby Diggings.	P.M., Cooktown, to Col. Sec., 28.10.1881, Q.S.A. COL/A324, 4709 of 1881; P.D.T., 5.11.81.

P	M	R	S	U	E	C	Ab	K	O	A	Pr	Po	Identity	Site	Reference
296	22.10.81		S					K		A			Pacific Islander, a camp keeper, bêche-de-mer station.	Barrow Point.	N.M., 5.11.1881; P.D.T., 5.11.1881; B. Fahey, Customs, Cooktown, to Under Sec., Treasury, 2.11.1881, Q.S.A. TRE/A24, 2030 of 1881.
297	Oct. 81		S		E				A				Mary B. Watson.	Lizard Island.	Q.S.A. Inquests, 373 of 1881; Fahey to Under Sec., Treasury, 14.11.1881, Q.S.A. TRE A26, 2119, of 1881. ibid.
298	ibid.		S		E				A				T.F. Watson, a child.	ibid.	ibid.
299	ibid.		S		C				A				Ah Sam.	ibid.	ibid.
300	ibid.		S		C				A				Ah Leung (Leong).	Mainland near Lizard Is.	ibid.
301	Oct. (?) 1881		S		C				A				One of in de- finite number of Chinese.	Murdoch Point.	N.M., 10.11.1881.
302	ibid.		S		C						Po		ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
303	Jan. (?) 1882	M			E				A				Prospector killed 'a few months back'.	Herberton District.	Petition, Herberton, to Premier, 3.4.1882, Q.S.A. COL/A335, 2409 of 1882.

## INVASION AND RESISTANCE

	P	M	R	S	U	E	C	Ab	K	O	A	Pr	Po	Identify	Site	Reference
304 Mar. (?) 1882				S				Ab			A			One of 4 Aboriginal employees of bêche-de-mer boat.	North of Cooktown.	P.M., Cooktown, to Col. Soc., April 1882, Q.S.A. COL/A334, 1684 of 1882.
305 ibid.			S					Ab			A			ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
306 ibid.			S					Ab			A			ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
307 ibid.			S					Ab			A			ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
308 Mar. (?) 1882	M				E						A			John Ward Skene.	Four miles from Herberton.	P.D.T., 8.4.1882.
309 Nov. 82	M	R				C						Pr		One of 7 Chinese travellers.	Between Granite Creek and Cairns.	Towers Herald, 2.12.1882.
310 ibid.	M	R				C						Pr		ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
311 ibid.	M	R				C						Pr		ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
312 ibid.	M	R				C						Pr		ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
313 ibid.	M	R				C						Pr		ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
314 ibid.	M	R				C						Pr		ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
315 ibid.	M	R				C						Pr		ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
316 Jan. 83	P				E						A			George Butcher.	Between Boulia and Cloncurry.	P.D.T., 27.1.1883; Whittington, 'Queensland Native Mounted Police', p. 519.

## APPENDIXES

P	M	R	S	U	E	C	Ab	K	O	A	Pr	Po	Identity	Site	Reference
317	24.1.83	P			E					A			Marcus Beresford, Sub. Insp. of Native Police	Cloncurry District.	P.D.T., 17.2.1883; Whittington 'Queensland Native Mounted Police', p. 519; Q.S.A. Report: 'Deaths Caused by Aborigines 1882-1900'.
318	8.3.83	M			E					A			Charles DeSailly	Hodgkinson Goldfield.	Q.S.A. Report: 'Deaths Caused by Aborigines 1882-1900'; 'Hodgkinson Goldfield Warden's Report', 1884 V. & P., p. 192.
319	Mar. 83		S		E (?)					A			One of unspecified number killed.	South of Jardine River.	P.M., Thursday Island, to Col. Sec., 26.4.1883, Q.S.A. COL/ A360, 2256 of 1883.
320	ibid.		S		E(?)					A			ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
321	ibid.		S		E(?)							Po	ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
322	23.4.83		S				K			A			J. Nieve, a Pacific Islander.	ibid.	ibid.
323	Aug(?)83	P			E					A			W. Clark.	Mitchell River.	P.D.T., 8.9.1883.
324	ibid.	P					Ab			A			Employee of above.	ibid.	ibid.

INVASION AND RESISTANCE

	P	M	R	S	U	E	C	Ab	K	O	A	Pr	Po	Identity	Site	Reference
325	26.8.83		R				C				A			One of 9 Chinese travellers.	Near Russell River.	N.M., 5.9.1883; P.D.T., 8.9.1883, 'Telegraphic News, Brisbane', 5.9.1883.
326	ibid.		R				C				A			ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
327	ibid.		R				C				A			ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
328	ibid.		R				C				A			ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
329	ibid.		R				C				A			ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
330	ibid.		R				C				A			ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
331	ibid.		R				C				A			ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
332	ibid.		R				C				A			ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
333	ibid.		R				C				A			ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
334	20.1.84	P				E					A			George Foster alias Melbourne George.	Normanton District.	Q.S.A. Report: 'Deaths Caused by Aborigines, 1882-1900'.
335	April(?) 1884			S		E					A			Mr Louis, in charge of béche-de-mer station.	Warrior Island.	Chester to Col. Sec., 21.4.1884, Q.S.A. COL/A389, 3311 of 1884.
336	1884	P				C					A			Chinese cook.	Dugald River, Granada Station, Cloncurry District.	Whittington, 'Queensland Native Mounted Police'; H. Fysh, 'Taming the North', p. 182.
337	9.6.84		M			C					A			Jah Lin.	Etheridge Goldfield.	Q.S.A. Report: 'Deaths Caused by Aborigines, 1882-1900'.

P	M	R	S	U	E	C	Ab	K	O	A	Pr	Po	Identity	Site	Reference
338	About				E					A			James White Powell.	Calton Hills, Cloncurry District.	ibid.; Whittington, 'The Queensland Native Mounted Police'; Towers Herald, 22.7.1884.
339	July 84		S		E					A			Steve Barry.	On Great Barrier Reef.	C.P., 14.8.1884; Fahey to Under Sec., Treasury, 1.1.84, Q.S.A. TRE/A28, 2534 of 1884.
340	ibid.		S				Ab			A				ibid.	ibid.
341	ibid.		S				Ab			A				ibid.	ibid.
342	Aug. (?) 1884	R			E					A			John Conway.	McManus Selection, Russell River.	C.P., 14.8.1884; C.P., 21.8.1884.
343	Sept. (?) 1884				E					A			Morgan.	Walsh River, 60 miles from Mitchell River.	H.A., 8.10.1884; H.A., 8.11.84.
344	ibid.	P			E					A			Bailey.	ibid.	ibid.
345	Oct. 84	M				C				A			One of two Chinese.	Hell's Gate, Palmer Goldfield.	T.H., 25.10.1884.
346	ibid.	M				C				A			ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
347	Dec. (?) 1884		S		E (?)					A			One of two men.	Cape Grenville.	Williams to Under Col. Sec., 19.12.1884, Q.S.A. COL/A410, 9077 of 1884.

INVASION AND RESISTANCE

	P	M	R	S	U	E	C	Ab	K	O	A	Pr	Po	Identity	Site	Reference
348 Dec.(?) 1884			S		E	(?)					A			ibid.	ibid.	
349 21.12.84		R			E						A			Donald McAulay.	Selecter, Mulgrave River.	C.P., 1.1.1885; H.A., 31.12.1884; T.H., 10.1.1885; Q.S.A. Report: 'Deaths Caused by Aborigines, 1882-1900'. C.P., 29.1.1885.
350 Aug-Dec. 1884		R			E								Po	A selector.	Mulgrave River.	
351 Mar.(?) 1885			S		E	(?)					A			Owner of bêche-de-mer boat.	Hannibal Bay.	P.M., Thursday Island, to Col. Sec., 25.3.1885. Q.S.A. COL/A419, 2256 of 1885.
352 ibid.			S		E(?)						A			Tender.	ibid.	ibid.
353 13.3.85		R			E						A			Sydney Algernon Bernard.	Mossman River.	Q.S.A. Report: 'Deaths Caused by Aborigines, 1882-1900'; C.P., 26.3.1885; Q.S.A. COL/A437, 6952 of 1885.
354 Mar.(?) 1885	P				E						A			Charles Massey.	Lallah Rook Station, Cape York Peninsula.	H.A., 15.4.1885; Queenslander, 7.11.1896, p. 880; Jack, Northmost Australia, Vol. 2, p. 644.

P	M	R	S	U	E	C	Ab	K	O	A	Pr	Po	Identify	Site	Reference
355	Mar.(?)			U	E							Po	In this issue no less than six murders by the blacks are recorded. Perhaps in the newspaper reporting Massey's murder. Probably includes four above.	Unknown.	H.A., 15.4.1885.
	1885			(?)											
356	ibid.			U	E(?)							Po	ibid.	Unknown.	ibid.
357	8.3.85	M		E						A			George Woods.	Cooktown District.	Q.S.A. Report: 'Deaths Caused by Aborigines 1882-1900'.
358	14.4.85	M			C					A			One of four Chinese in last 12 months. See above 337, 338.	Palmer District.	Telegram to Col. Sec., 17.4.1885, Q.S.A. COL/A422, 3031 of 1885.
359	ibid.	M			C					A			ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
360	May 85	P	M	E						A			One of three white men.	Van Dieman's River.	Charters Towers Herald, 6.6.85 referring to telegram to Pol. Com.
361	ibid.	P	M	E						A			ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
362	ibid.	P	M	E						A			ibid.	ibid.	ibid.



INVASION AND RESISTANCE

	P	M	R	S	U	E	C	Ab	K	O	A	Pr	Po	Identity	Site	Reference
363	ibid.	P	M					Ab			A			One of two Aborigines with the above.	ibid.	ibid.
364	ibid.	P	M					Ab			A			ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
365	July(?) 1885			S		E (?)					A			One of crew of bâche-de-mer boat, North Star.	Not started, presumably near Cooktown.	Queenslander, 8.8.1885, p. 208; Telegram to Col. Sec., 5.8.1885, Q.S.A. COL/A432, 5718 of 1885.
366	Oct.(?) 1885		R				C				A			One of 4 Chinese	Jahnstone River.	C.P., 1.10.1885; Queenslander, 13.3.1886.
367	ibid.		R				C				A			ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
368	ibid.		R				C				A			ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
369	ibid.		R				C				A			ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
370	17.10.85	P				E					A			Paddy Byrne.	Normanton District.	Q.S.A. Report: Deaths Caused by Aborigines, 1882.1900.
371	Nov.(?) 1885		M				C				A			One of three Chinese.	Stewart's Creek below Palmerville.	H.A., 4.12.1885; Petition to Col. Sec., January 1886, Q.S.A. COL/A453, 552 of 1886.
372	ibid.		M				C				A			ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
373	ibid.		M				C				A			ibid.	ibid.	ibid.

	P	M	R	S	U	E	C	Ab	K	O	A	Pr	Po	Identity	Site	Reference
374	1885	M					C				A			One of 8 Chinese killed within last twelve months. See above 350, 351, 363, 364, 365.	Palmer Goldfield.	Petition to Col. Sec., January 1886, loc. cit.
375	ibid.	M					C				A			ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
376	ibid.	M					C				A			ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
377	5.1.86		R		E						A			Charles Henry Townsend.	Cape Grafton.	Q.S.A. Report: 'Deaths caused by Aborigines 1882-1900'; Queenslander, 20.1.1886.
378	Jan. (?) 1886			S	E						A			Frank Triblet, a bêche-de-mer fisherman.	Not stated.	H.A., 19.3.1886.
379	Mar. 86	P						Ab			A			Stockman.	On Macdonald's Conway Station.	P.D.T., 3.4.1886; P.D.T., 24.4.1886.
380	July 1886		M		E	(?)					A			One of two missing after hut ransacked.	Battle Camp, Cooktown-Palmer Road.	Queenslander, 7.8.1886, p. 205.
381	ibid.		M		E(?)						A			ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
382	Mid 1886			S	E						A			John Thompson, master of Pioneer.	Basilisk Island.	Telegram, Cooktown, to Col. Treasurer, 16 June 1886, Q.S.A. COL/ A469, 4609 of 1886.

## INVASION AND RESISTANCE

	P	M	R	S	U	E	C	Ab	K	O	A	Pr	Po	Identity	Site	Reference
383 Aug. 86		M					C				A			One of two Chinese.	Between Cooktown and Bloomfield River.	M. Lohe, 'Missionary John Flierl', Lutheran Almanac: Year-book of the United Evangelical Lutheran Church. Australia 1966, pp. 41, 42.
384 ibid.		M					C				A			ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
385 6.9.86			R					Ab			A			One of two of Christie Palmerston's Aboriginal carriers.	Russell River rainforest.	Queensland Figaro, 12.3.1887.
386 ibid.			R					Ab			A			ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
387 Dec.(?) 1886			R				C				A			One of two Chinese.	Johnstone River.	H.A., 10.12.1886.
388 ibid.			R				C				A			ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
389 Jan. 87		M					C				A			Chinese miner.	Lower Palmer.	Queenslander, 15.1.87, p. 87.
390 18.2.87			S				E				A			Robert Goodshaw.	Jardine River.	Act. Govt. Res., Thursday Is., to Chief Sec., 25.2.1887, Q.S.A. COL/A492, 1884 of 1887.

P	M	R	S	U	E	C	Ab	K	O	A	Pr	Po	Identity	Site	Reference
391			S		E							Po	Frank	Mainland near Thursday Island. See 285, 286.	ibid.
392			S		E							Po	Unknown white man.	ibid.	ibid.
393	June					C				A			Pastoral employee.	Kalkah Station.	Queenslander, 7.5.87, p. 725.
394	July									A			James Ferguson.	Between Norman River and Croydon.	H.A., 15.7.1887.
395	Oct. (?)		S					K		A			George Manjia, of cutter Lizzie.	Not stated.	Queenslander, 15.10.87, p. 606.
396	11.10.87		S							A			Andrew Anderson, manager bêche-de-mer station.	In or near Tarres Strait.	Queenslander, 22.10.1887, p. 610; Q.S.A. Report: Deaths Caused by Aborigines 1882-1900.
397	Oct. (?)		S							A			Joseph McNair, probably of Spiffire.	Conflict Island.	P.M., Cooktown, to Col. Sec., 15.11.1887, Q.S.A. COL/A525, 9041 of 1887.
398	9.1.88									A			Alfred Wright.	Palmer Goldfield.	Q.S.A. Report: Deaths Caused by Aborigines 1882-1900; Charters Towers Times, 14.1.1888.

## INVASION AND RESISTANCE

	P	M	R	S	U	E	C	Ab	K	O	A	Pr	Po	Identify	Site	Reference
399 Mar.(?) 1888		M					C				A			Chinese leper.	Union Camp, between Thornborough & Cooktown.	C. C., 22.5.1888; H. A., 4.5.1888.
400 June 1888	P				E						A			Manager, Bertiehaugh Station.	Cape York Peninsula.	Charters Towers Times, 26.6.1888.
401 June 1888		M					C				A			Market gardener(?).	Normanby River, Palmer Goldfield.	C. C., 3.7.1888.
402 24.6.88			S		E							Pr		C. Mogg of lugger Tam O'Shanfer.	Torres Strait.	C. C., 17.8.1888; 1890 V. & P., Vol. II, p. 1565.
403 Aug. 88				U	E							Pr		Edward Maher, contractor.	Near Geraldton (i.e. Innisfail).	C. P., 25.8.1888; P. D. T., 25.8.1888.
404 8.9.88		M					C				A			Low Young.	Palmer Goldfield.	Q. S. A. Report: 'Deaths Caused by Aborigines 1882-1900'.
405 7.11.88			S		E						A			William Massop.	In or near Torres Strait.	Q. S. A. Report: 'Deaths Caused by Aborigines 1882-1900'.
406 1888 or 1889			R		E						A			John Clifford.	Boar's Pocket, Cairns.	Q. S. A. Report: 'Deaths Caused by Aborigines 1882-1900'.
407 Jan.(?) 1889				S	E						A			One of 4 whites of Wild Duck.	Great Barrier Reef.	Queenslander, 30.3.1889, p. 591; C. C., 26.4.1889; C. C., 3.5.1889; C. C., 26.11.1889.

P	M	R	S	U	E	C	Ab	K	O	A	Pr	Po	Identity	Site	Reference
408	ibid.		S		E					A			ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
409	ibid.		S		E					A			ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
410	ibid.		S		E					A			ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
411	15.2.89	P			E					A			George Torrent.	O'Beirne's Station, near Normanby River.	C.C., 22.2.1889; Queenslander 2.3.1889.
412	Apr.(?) 1889	P			E					A			Mr. E. Watson.	Fox's Pine Creek Station on head of Archer River.	C.C., 14.5.1889; Queenslander, 1.6.1889, p. 1013.
413	About 13.7.89		S		E					A			John Williams, bêche-de-mer fisherman.	In or near Torres Strait.	Queenslander, 27.7.1889, p. 150; 1894 V. & P., Vol. II, p. 1505; Q.S.A. Report: 'Deaths Caused by Aborigines 1882-1900'.
414	About 13.7.1889	R				C				A			Friend of Lee Lan.	Port Douglas District.	'Occurrence Book July 1889-12 September, 1892, Police Station, Pt. Douglas', Q.S.A. POL/12D/ NI, 13.7.1889.

INVASION AND RESISTANCE

P	M	R	S	U	E	C	Ab	K	O	A	Pr	Po	Identity	Site	Reference
415	23.7.89	M	R		E					A			Frank Pask, one of 3 miners.	Russell River Goldfield.	H.A., 26.7.1899, Const. Higgins, Atherton, to Insp. Stuart, Pt. Douglas, 26.7.89, Q.S.A. POL/128/N1, 25 of 1889; J. McCrahan, memorandum, 26.7.1889, Q.S.A. POL/12D/N1.
416	ibid.	M	R		E(?)					A			One of 3 miners.	ibid.	ibid.
417	ibid.	M	R		E(?)					A			ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
418	Aug(?)89	P					Ab			A			Pastoral employee.	Employed by Mr F. Hann.	P. D. T., 7.9.1889.
419	3.1.1890		S		E					A			James Pratt of Omega.	Torres Strait.	Queenslander, 18.1.1890, p. 101; 1894 V. & P., Vol. II, p. 1566; Q.S.A. Report: 'Deaths Caused by Aborigines 1882-1900'.
420	Feb.(?) 1890	P					Ab			A			One of 2 pastoral employees.	Robinson's Woorora Station near Herberton.	Queenslander, 8.3.1890, p. 439.
421	ibid.	P					Ab			A			ibid.	ibid.	ibid.

## APPENDICES

P	M	R	S	U	E	C	Ab	K	O	A	Pr	Po	Identity	Site	Reference
422			S				K			A			Charles Weir of Annie.	In or near Torres Strait.	Q.S.A. Reprt; Deaths Caused by Aborigines 1882-1900; C.C., 20.5.1890; 1894 V. & P., Vol. II, p. 1567.
423			P		E					A			John Rowe.	Grenada Station, Cloncurry	Queenslander, 16.8.1890, p. 293; Queenslander, 1.11.1890, p. 842; Fysh, Taming the North, p. 184.
424			R		E					A			George Hobson.	Lower Barron.	H.A., 1 August 1890.
425			S		E					A			Captain J. Roberts (Robinson?) of cutter Ruby.	M Reef.	Queenslander, 22.11.1890, p. 1002; C.C., 18.11.1890; C.C., 27.1.1891; P.D.T., 29.11.1890.
426				S	E					A			Joe _____ a Scandinavian.	ibid.	ibid.
427				S			Ab(?)			A			Black fisherman.	ibid.	ibid.
428					U	E					Po		Michael Whooloohan.	On way to Maytown.	C.C., 11.11.1890; Queenslander, 29.11.1890.
429							Ab			A			One of 2 employees.	Warroora Station, Herberton District.	H.A., 21.12.1890.



## INVASION AND RESISTANCE

	P	M	R	S	U	E	C	Ab	K	O	A	Pr	Po	Identity	Site	Reference
430	ibid.							Ab			A			ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
431	1890-1891	M				C					A			One of 5 Chinese killed in 12 months.	Palmer Goldfield.	Queenslander, 19.3.1891, p. 534. 'Petition to the Government'.
432	ibid.	M				C					A			ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
433	ibid.	M				C					A			ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
434	ibid.	M				C					A			ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
435	1.5.91	M				C					A			Chinese gardener.	Palmerville.	C.C., 12.5.1891; Queenslander, 23.5.1891.
436	Oct. 91		S		E						A			One of 2 white men.	Mapoon.	Periodical Accounts, Sept. 1892, p. 584, M.L. MSS 1893 carton no. 4.
437	ibid.			S		E					A			ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
438	4.11.91	M				C					A			Long Ching (Chong?)	Palmerville.	Q.S.A. Report: 'Deaths Caused by Aborigines, 1882-1900; C.C., 6.11.1891; Queenslander, 14.11.1891.
439	Feb./Mar. 1892	M				C					A			Sup Gee.	Palmer Goldfield.	C.C., 11.3.1892.

P	M	R	S	U	E	C	Ab	K	O	A	Pr	Po	Identity	Site	Reference
440	Before Aug. 92	R			E					A			A white man.	Myola, near Cairns.	Notebook 'Important re Rev. J.B. Gribble 1891', A.B.M. Archives, Box 111, entry 22.8.1892.
441	May 1893	S				O				A			Yamasaki, member of crew of béche- de-mer boat run by G. Williams.	Not stated.	C.C., 26.5.1893; C.C., 30.5.1893.
442	May 1893	M					Ab				Po		Smoke.	Near Mt. Cook, Cooktown.	N.Q.R., 31.5.1893.
443	May(?) 1893	S			E					A			George Waters.	Forbes Is., north of Weymouth Bay.	N.Q.R., 31.5.1893; Queenslander, 27.5.1893, p. 992; P.D.T., 3.6.1893.
444	Before June 93	S			E (?)					A			One of the crew of the <i>Miranda</i> .	East Coast of Cape York Peninsula.	N.Q.R., 21.6.1893; Queenslander, 17.6.1893; P.D.T., 17.6.1893.
445	ibid.	S			E(?)					A			ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
446	ibid.	S				O(?)					Po		ibid.	ibid.	ibid.
447	May(?) 1893	S				O				A			Pascal, one of two Manila men on Leonora.	Not stated, probably in or near Torres Strait.	ibid.; 1894 V & P., Vol. II, p. 912.

INVASION AND RESISTANCE

P	M	R	S	U	E	C	Ab	K	O	A	Pr	Po	Identity	Site	Reference
448	ibid.		S						O	A			Kintur, one of two Manila men on Leonora.	ibid.	ibid.
449	24.7.93		S						O	A			Conception, Manila man, near Torres Strait.	Not stated, probably in or near Torres Strait.	ibid.
450	Oct. (?) 1893		S		E (?)					A			Peter Mobeck, bêche-de-mer fisherman.	Northern Gulf of Carpentaria.	Queenlander, 28.10.1893, p. 823; P.D.T., 28.10.1893; N.Q.R., 25.10.1893; 1894 V. & P., Vol. II, p. 912.
451	ibid.		S						O	A			Martin Oien, bêche-de-mer fisherman.	ibid.	ibid.
452	Oct. (?) 1893		S		E					A			Harry Greenlaw of Beryl.	Near Barrow Point.	P.D.T., 16.11.1893; C.C., 15.12.1893; Queenlander, 23.12.1893.
453	ibid.		S		E(?)					A			Mate of the above.	ibid.	ibid.
454	About 20.11.93		S		E					A			Charles Bruce, bêche-de-mer fisherman.	In or near Torres Strait.	1894 V. & P., Vol. II, p. 912; Q.S.A. Report: Deaths Caused by Aborigines 1882-1900; C.C., 15.12.1893; N.Q.R., 24.11.1893.

P	M	R	S	U	E	C	Ab	K	O	A	Pr	Po	Identity	Site	Reference
455			S		E					A			Samuel Rowe, bêche-de-mer fisherman.	ibid.	ibid.
456	April(?) 1894	M			E					A			Bill Baird, discoverer of Batavia River Goldfield.	Batavia River Goldfield.	C.C., 4.5.1894; C.C., 1.6.94; Queenslander, 12.5.1894.
457	May 1894	P			E					A			Mr Du Moulin	Menlana Station, Cape York Peninsula.	C.C., 29.5.1894.
458	Before May 1894	P			E							Po	Mr Ferguson.	ibid.	ibid.
459	Aug. 94		S						O	A			Pedro, Manila man of lugger Pollywog.	South of Cairncross Is.	Queenslander, 8.9.1894, p. 439; Telegram, Thursday Is., to Pol. Com., 29.8.1894; Q.S.A., COL/A779, 9960 of 1894; P.D.T., 1.9.1894.
460	2.9.94	P			E					A			Walter Nathan.	On or near Carandotta Station near Boulia.	Q.S.A. Report; 'Deaths Caused by Aborigines, 1882-1900'; P.D.T., 24.11.1894.
461	Sept.(?) 1894			U	E					A			A Police Constable.	Near Montalblion.	Queenslander, 15.9.1894, p. 487; Queenslander, 13.10.94.

INVASION AND RESISTANCE

P	M	R	S	U	E	C	Ab	K	O	A	Pr	Po	Identity	Site	Reference
462	1895	June								A			A 'Chinaman'.	Palmer Goldfield.	Queenslander, 22.6.95, p. 1158, C.C., 25.6.1895.
463	June 95												A 'Chinaman'.	Maytown.	ibid.
464	Aug. (?)	1895			E					A			Bannon, Rocky-Coen mailman.	Between Rocky Goldfield and Coen, Cape York Pen.	C.C., 13.8.95; Queenslander, 23.11.95, p. 967; 1897 V. & P., Vol. II, 'Report of the Commissioner of Police for the Year 1896'.
465	Aug. (?)	95								A			A Chinaman.	Near Mareeba.	Queenslander, 10.8.1895.
466	About	Dec. 95	S		E					A			Frank Lee.	In or near Princess Charlotte Bay.	Q.S.A. Report: 'Deaths Caused by Aborigines 1882-1900'; Queenslander, 28.12.95, p. 1207; Queenslander, 25.1.96; p. 151.
467	ibid.		S			C				A			Ah Lee, employee of above.	ibid.	ibid.

P	M	R	S	U	E	C	Ab	K	O	A	Pr	Po	Identity	Site	Reference
468			S				Ab			A			Jimmy, .. employee of Frank Lee.	ibid.	ibid.
469	29.4.96	P			E					A			Donald Mackenzie.	Lakefield Station, Kennedy River.	Q.S.A. Report: 'Deaths Caused by Aborigines 1882-1900'; Jack, Northmost Australia, Vol. II, p. 639; Queens- lander, 9.5.96.
470	15.4.97	P			E					A			Mr Jack Cole.	Cloncurry District.	Q.S.A. Report: 'Deaths Caused by Aborigines 1882-1900'; M.M., 29.4.97; M.M., 29.9.97; Fysh, Taming the North, p. 210.

## Notes

### Introduction

- 1 See N.A. Loos, 'Aboriginal-Dutch Relations in North Queensland, 1606-1756' *Queensland Heritage* III (1974), pp. 3-8.

### Chapter 1

- 1 E.C. Chapman, *Longmans Australian Geographics, North Queensland* (Melbourne, 1963), p. 1. This brief account of North Queensland is largely derived from this simple text as well as from: C.J. Sale, *The Island Continent and Its Smaller Neighbours* (Sydney, 1971), Part 1; A.C.B. Allen, *Interior Queensland* (Sydney, 1972); A.D. Tweedie, *The Regions of Australia* (Melbourne, 1968); Australian Government Publishing Service, *Resources and Industry of Far North Queensland: Report by the Commonwealth Department of National Development and the Queensland Department of Industrial Development* (Canberra, 1971); R.H. Greenwood, *Regions of Queensland* (Brisbane, 1971); F.H. Bauer, *Historical Geographical Survey of Part of Northern Australia* (2 vols., Canberra, 1959-64), Vol. 1.
- 2 D.S. Davidson, 'An Ethnic Map of Australia', *American Philosophical Society Proceedings*, 79 (1938), p. 653. He has derived his findings from A.R. Radcliffe-Brown, 'Former Numbers and Distribution of the Australian Aborigines', in *Official Year Book of the Commonwealth of Australia*, Vol. 23 (Canberra, 1930). These population estimates refer only to historic times.
- 3 A.P. Elkin, *The Australian Aborigines: How to Understand Them* (Sydney, 1974), p. 24. See also R.M. and C.H. Berndt, *The World of the First Australians* (Sydney, 1963), p. 26, and D.J. Mulvaney, *The Prehistory of Australia* (London, 1969), pp. 40, 41. In support of the belief that North Queensland was densely populated, see, for example, R. Lawrence, 'Habitat and Economy: A Historical Perspective', in D.J. Mulvaney and J. Golson (eds.), *Aboriginal Man and Environment in Australia* (Canberra, 1971), p. 259.
- 4 Davidson, 'Ethnic Map of Australia', p. 656. See N.A. Loos, *Aboriginal-European Relations in North Queensland, 1861-1897* (Ph.D. thesis, James Cook University of North Queensland, 1976), p. 15, for a discussion of Radcliffe-Brown's estimates.
- 5 K. Maddock, *The Australian Aborigines: A Portrait of their Society* (London, 1972), p. 26. This brief sketch of Aboriginal life has been based largely on Maddock's recent monograph.

- 6 L.R. Hiatt, 'Local Group Organization among the Australian Aborigines', *Oceania*, 32 (1962), pp. 267-86; L.R. Hiatt, 'The Lost Horde', *Oceania*, 37 (1966), pp. 81-92; W.E.H. Stanner, 'Aboriginal Territorial Organization: Estate, Range, Domain, and Regime', *Oceania*, 36 (1965), pp. 1-26; J.B. Birdsell, 'Local Group Composition among the Australian Aborigines: A Critique of the Evidence from Fieldwork Conducted since 1930', *Current Anthropology*, II (1970), pp. 115-42.
- 7 Maddock, *The Australian Aborigines*, pp. 32, 33.
- 8 Birdsell, 'Local Group Composition among the Australian Aborigines'.
- 9 Maddock, *The Australian Aborigines*, pp. 32-4. See above, n. 6.
- 10 Elkin, *The Australian Aborigines*, p. 59. See pp. 56, 57 for characteristics which may help to define a tribe: (i) inhabit and own a usually definite area of country (ii) use a language or dialect peculiar to themselves (iii) know themselves, or are known by a distinct name (iv) possess customs and laws which often vary in some degree from those of neighbouring tribes (v) have their own rites and beliefs which frequently differ from those of neighbouring tribes.
- 11 N.B. Tindale, 'Distribution of Australian Aboriginal Tribes: A Field Survey', *Transactions of the Royal Society of South Australia*, 64 (1) and N.B. Tindale, *Aboriginal Tribes of Australia* (Canberra, 1974), p. 4; R.M. and C.H. Berndt, *The World of the First Australians*, pp. 28, 35. See pp. 34-9 for their description of the characteristics of a tribe.
- 12 Elkin, *The Australian Aborigines*, p. 59.
- 13 R.M. Berndt, 'Law and Order in Aboriginal Australia', in R.M. and C.H. Berndt (eds.), *Aboriginal Man in Australia* (Sydney, 1965), pp. 204-7.
- 14 Maddock, *The Australian Aborigines*, p. 44.
- 15 Berndt, 'Law and Order in Aboriginal Australia', p. 202.
- 16 See Loos, *Aboriginal-European Relations in North Queensland*, pp. 22-34 for a discussion of Torres Strait Islander Influence.
- 17 J.E. Heeres, *The Part Borne by the Dutch in the Discovery of Australia 1606-1765* (London, 1899), pp. 19-21, 40-1. This is a book of documents containing the extant journals and other records of the Dutch East India Company relevant to the discovery of Australia.
- 18 See Loos, *Aboriginal-European Relations in North Queensland*, pp. 73-93.
- 19 *Ibid.*, p. 91.
- 20 J. Macgillivray, *Narrative of the Voyage of H.M.S. Rattlesnake, commanded by the late Captain Owen Stanley . . . , during the years 1846-1850, including discoveries and surveys in New Guinea, and the Louistade Archipelago, etc. To which is added the account of Mr. E.B. Kennedy's expedition for the exploration of the Cape York Peninsula [by William Carron]* (2 vols., London 1852, Australiana Facsimile Editions No. 118, Adelaide, 1967), Vol. I, pp. 121-7, 300, 310-13; Vol. II, pp. 29-30.
- 21 Loos, *Aboriginal-European Relations in North Queensland*, pp. 81-2, 90.
- 22 Macgillivray, *Narrative of the Rattlesnake*, pp. 97-100.
- 23 Bowen Historical Society (ed.), *The Story of James Morrill* (Bowen Independent, 1964), pp. 1-19. See also R. Cilento and C. Lack, 'Wild White Men' of *Queensland* (Brisbane, n.d.), pp. 25-7. Morrill was requested so often to tell his story that he dictated his reminiscences to journalist R.E. Johns, and these



were published in 1863.

- 24 See Chapter 2.
- 25 G.C. Bolton, *A Thousand Miles Away: A History of North Queensland to 1920* (Brisbane, 1963), pp. 10, 11; L. Leichhardt, *Journal of an Overland Expedition from Moreton Bay to Port Essington, A Distance of Upward of 3,000 miles, During the Years 1844-1845* (London, 1847, Australiana Facsimile Editions No. 16, Adelaide, 1964), 'Introduction', p. xi. The Legislative Council had recommended £1,000 for equipment of an expedition to be led by Mitchell but there was delay in communicating with the Secretary of State.
- 26 Leichhardt, *Journal*, pp. 209, 241-3.
- 27 Bolton, *A Thousand Miles Away*, p. 12. Bolton quotes the *Sydney Morning Herald*, 1 January 1847.
- 28 A. Chisholm, *Strange New World: The Adventures of John Gilbert. and Ludwig Leichhardt* (Sydney, 1955), p. 165; Leichhardt, *Journal*, pp. xiii, xvii.
- 29 Leichhardt, *Journal*, pp. 234, 313.
- 30 *Ibid.*, p. 233.
- 31 *Ibid.*, pp. 306-9, 340; Chisholm, *Strange New World*, pp. 203, 207-8. In his diary, Phillip revealed that the Aborigines had quarrelled on 28 August when the story had come out. See also Macgillivray, *Narrative of the Rattlesnake*, Vol. I, p. 313. Macgillivray had heard a similar story.
- 32 Leichhardt, *Journal*, pp. 328, 347.
- 33 A.C. and F.T. Gregory, *Journals of Australian Explorations* (New York, 1968, originally published [Brisbane], 1884), pp. 99, 175, 188.
- 34 *Ibid.*, pp. 173, 174. This conflict occurred on the Leichhardt River at latitude 18° 11' 50"S. 'Shipped' was commonly used in the nineteenth century to indicate that the Aboriginal had placed the spear in the woomera and drawn his arm back to throw. It was commonly accompanied by a shake or rattle which apparently indicated to the Aborigines that the spear was securely engaged. 'Minutes of Evidence', 1861 V. & P., p. 40.
- 35 Gregory, *Journals*, pp. 166-7, 190.
- 36 E. Beale, *Kennedy of Cape York* (Adelaide, 1970), pp. 52-3, 142-3. The maps pp. 106, 107, and endpapers clearly show the grand design and the previous explorations Kennedy was to link up with.
- 37 W. Carron, *Narrative of an Expedition Undertaken Under the Direction of the late Mr. Assistant Surveyor E.B. Kennedy, for the Exploration of the Country Lying between Rockingham Bay and Cape York, To Which Are Added*
1. *The Statement of the Aboriginal Native Jackey Jackey, Who Accompanied Mr. Kennedy.*
  2. *The Statement of Dr. Vallack and Captain Dobson, Who Rescued the Survivors of the Expedition: and*
  3. *The Statement of Captain Simpson, of the 'Freak', Who Proceeded in Search of Mr. Kennedy's Papers, etc.*
- (Sydney, 1849, Australiana Facsimile Editions No. 9, Adelaide, 1965), p. 295, E. Beale, *Kennedy Workbook: A Critical Analysis of E.B. Kennedy's 1848 Exploration of Cape York Peninsula with a Transcript of Fragments of His Journal* (Wollongong University College, 1970), p. 3. Kennedy had the second leg of his journey in mind.

- 38 Carron, *Kennedy's Expedition*, p. 23; Beale, *Kennedy of Cape York*, p. 179. See map pp. 170, 171.
- 39 Carron, *Kennedy's Expedition*, pp. 26, 47, 50, 52, 57, 60. I have retained Carron's dates when that book is referred to even though Beale, *Kennedy Workbook*, pp. 2, 8, has pointed out that these are often a day or so out. See also Beale, *Kennedy of Cape York*, p. 195.
- 40 Carron, *Kennedy's Expedition*, pp. 28, 31, 41, 55, 61.
- 41 *Ibid.*, pp. 58, 65.
- 42 Beale, *Kennedy of Cape York*, pp. 204, 207, 211-19.
- 43 *Ibid.*, p. 230; Carron, *Kennedy's Expedition*, pp. 66-78.
- 44 Beale, *Kennedy of Cape York*, p. 217; Macgillivray, *Narrative of the Rattlesnake*, Vol. II, pp. 1, 2.
- 45 F.J. Byerley (ed.), *Narrative of the Overland Expedition from Rockhampton to Cape York, North Queensland. Compiled from the Journal of the Brothers* (Brisbane, 1867), pp. 78-9.
- 46 G.C. Bolton, 'The Exploration of North Queensland: Some Problems', *Royal Australian Historical Society Journal*, 46 (1960), pp. 352-8.
- 47 F. Walker, *The Original Journal of Fred Walker 1861-2* (Manuscripts No. 23, National Library, Canberra), p. 28.
- 48 *Ibid.*, pp. 4, 33, 52, 56, 57, 70, 94.
- 49 J. McKinlay, *Journal of Exploration in the Interior of Australia (Burke Relief Expedition)* (Melbourne, 1862 [?], Australiana Facsimile Editions No. 1, Adelaide, 1962), p. 98.
- 50 G. Phillips, 'Ernest Henry', *Historical Society of Queensland*, II (1923), p. 109. When Ernest Henry was surrounded by menacing Aborigines, he did not use his revolver 'out of deference to Landsborough who always deprecated the use of firearms, except in extremity'. W. Landsborough, *Journal of Landsborough's Expedition from Carpentaria in Search of Burke and Wills With a Map Showing His Route* (Melbourne, 1862), pp. 41-4, 68, 83, 92, 96, 102; Walker, 1861-2 Journal, p. 77.
- 51 Byerley (ed.), *The Jardines' Journals, passim*. 'Extracts from correspondence Re Proposed Station Near Cape York', 1863 V. & P., Session 2, pp. 679-84. In a despatch from Governor Bowen to Sec. of State, 6 September 1861, eight reasons were given for establishing Somerset: 1. A harbour of refuge. 2. Provisioning passing ships. 3. A coal depot for steamships. 4. To inhibit the Torres Strait Islanders from committing outrages thus fostering the growth of commerce in the area. 5. A base for geographical research, missionary enterprise, and British colonisation to the north and south. 6. Defence. 7. To preserve and extend British political dominance from northern Australia to India and China. 8. To be the Singapore of the North.
- 52 Byerley, *The Jardines' Journals*, p. 19: on 14 November 1864, Aborigines menaced the party for three miles but there was no outbreak of violence; p. 22: on 20 November 1864, no deaths recorded, possibly some; pp. 22, 23: on 22 November 1864, three Aborigines were killed; on 23 November, possibly some deaths; p. 25: 27 November, two separate attacks on the divided party in which F. Jardine killed one and the rest of the party killed 'some' and wounded 'some' seriously; p. 34: on 16 December, eight or nine Aborigines

- were killed; pp. 35, 36: 18 December, termed the Battle of the Mitchell by Byerley, about 30 Aborigines killed for certain but 'Many more must have been wounded and probably drowned, for fifty nine rounds were counted as discharged'. I have taken a minimum of six and a maximum of ten killed for 'many more'; p. 37: on 21 December, Aborigines who were stalking the party were chased for two miles for sport but not fired upon; pp. 39, 40: on 28 December, 'some' Aborigines were killed when they stood firm, apparently unable to comprehend the destructiveness of the firearms; p. 48: on 14 January two Aborigines were killed. For the minimum figure I have considered only the entries where it was definitely stated that Aborigines were killed and interpreted 'some' as two. In the 'Battle of the Mitchell', above, hostile Aborigines were decoyed back to the main party of explorers. They had thrown all their spears and were trapped with their backs to the fast flowing Alice River, a large anabranch of the Mitchell. The ten explorers then fired the fifty-nine shots into the weaponless Aborigines.
- 53 B. Bridges, *Aboriginal and White Relations in New South Wales 1788-1855* (M.A. thesis, Sydney University, 1966), pp. 710, 717; C.D. Rowley, *The Destruction of Aboriginal Society: Aboriginal Policy and Practice—Volume 1* (Canberra, 1970), pp. 39-42. For a discussion of 'dispersal' see p.22.
- 54 'Report of the Select Committee of the Legislative Assembly, 1860 V. & P., pp. 535 ff. See 'Report from the Select Committee on the Native Police Force and the Condition of the Aborigines Generally Together with Proceedings of the Committee and Minutes of Evidence', 1861 V. & P., pp. 393 ff. As the pages are not numbered consecutively throughout the whole book, I shall refer to the page number of the 'Native Police Report' or the 'Minutes of Evidence', 1861 V. & P.
- 55 'Native Police Force Report', 1861 V. & P., pp. 2, 4.
- 56 R. Evans, K. Saunders, K. Cronin, *Exclusion, Exploitation and Extermination: Race Relations in Colonial Queensland* (Sydney, 1975), pp. 27-66; Bridges, *Aboriginal and White Relations*, pp. 731-9; W. Cowin, *European-Aboriginal Relations in Early Queensland 1859-1897* (Final Honours thesis, Queensland University, 1950), pp. 2 and 3. See also W. Coote, *History of the Colony of Queensland from 1770 to the Close of the Year 1861* (2 vols., Brisbane, 1882), Vol. I, pp. 93, 142.
- 57 Cowin, *European-Aboriginal Relations in Queensland*, pp. 3-6; 'Minutes of Evidence', 1861 V. & P., p. 127; W. Cowper, Toowoomba [to Chief Sec.], 10 April 1862, enclosing J. Downes Woods, Toowoomba, to Chief Sec., 12 March 1862, Q.S.A. COL/A28, 1118 of 1862; R. Cilento and C. Lack, *Triumph in the Tropics: An Historical Sketch of Queensland* (Brisbane, 1959), p. 186.
- 58 'Minutes of Evidence', 1861 V. & P., p. 72. See also pp. 15, 23 for similar expectations.
- 59 H. Fysh, *Taming the North* (Sydney, 1964), p. 125. These reminiscences of Alexander Kennedy were first published in 1933.
- 60 Bridges, *Aboriginal and White Relations in N.S.W.*, pp. x-xiii, 209, 246, Ch. 13; P. Corris, *Aborigines and Europeans in Western Victoria* (Canberra, 1968), *passim*.

- 61 'Minutes of Evidence', 1861 V. & P., pp. 10, 11, 18, 42, 44.
- 62 C. Eden, *My Wife and I in Queensland: An Eight Years' Experience in the Above Colony with some Account of Polynesian Labour* (London, 1872) pp. 113, 114. See also 'Six Years in the North' in *P.D.T.*, 2 January 1869.
- 63 Queensland Government Authority, *Our First Half Century: A Review of Queensland's Progress* (Brisbane, 1909), p. 14.
- 64 A study of the 'Police Commissioner's Reports' (whenever the distribution is shown) in the *Votes and Proceedings of the Queensland Parliament* reveal these sizes as the most common although, of course, with desertions etc. there is quite a deal of variation. For a fuller account see N.A. Loos, *Frontier Conflict in the Bowen District 1861-1874* (M.A. Qualifying thesis, James Cook University of North Queensland, July 1970).
- 65 'Instruction of Commandant to Officers and Camp Sergeants of Native Police' in 'Minutes of Evidence', 1861 V. & P., pp. 151, 152.
- 66 W.R.O. Hill, *Forty-five Years' Experience in North Queensland 1861-1905* (Brisbane, 1907), p. 24. Hill had been a Lieutenant in the Native Police. See also 'Minutes of Evidence', 1861 V. & P., pp. 120, 135.
- 67 'Measures Recently Adopted for the Amelioration of the Aborigines', 1897 V. & P., Vol. II, p. 143. The Home Secretary, Tozer, gave a brief history of the force.
- 68 'Minutes of Evidence', 1861 V. & P., p. 17, Lt Wheeler's definition of 'disperse', 16-18, 29, 39, 100-1.
- 69 40 Vic. no. 10.
- 70 1867 V. & P., pp. 983 ff. It is clear that Aubin's immediate superior thought the grounds for dismissal inadequate. *Towers Herald*, 20 November 1884 and 11 December 1884; 'Minutes of Evidence', 1861 V. & P., p. 30; Cowin, *European-Aboriginal Relations*, p. 43. See especially *Cooktown Courier*, 18 October 1876: 'Of course we all know that it is ridiculous to expect a white man to be hanged for the murder of a black in Queensland. Wheeler's friends applied that he be let out on bail; application was granted, and when the trial came on the accused was, as everyone expected he would be, not to be found'. See also Q.S.A. COL/A320, 3821 of 1881 for Sub-Inspector Carroll's dismissal from the force after he had directed the illegal execution of one of his troopers.
- 71 Hill, *Forty-Five Years' Experience in North Queensland*, pp. 37-9. Hill described with remarkable candour how he had considered whether execution or flogging was a fitting punishment for a trooper who had murdered a four-year-old Aboriginal. See 'A Magisterial Enquiry into the Disappearance of Trooper Sam, a Deserter', Q.S.A. COL/A202, 2615 of 1874. See also Inspector Armstrong to Police Commissioner, 29 June 1876, Q.S.A. COL/A320, 3821 of 1881.
- 72 'Minutes of Evidence', 1861 V. & P., pp. 33, 38, 62, 83, 87, 136.
- 73 *Ibid.*, pp. 13, 39, 61, 62, 83, 148. See also E.B. Kennedy, *The Black Police of Queensland: Reminiscences of Official Work and Personal Adventure in the Early Days of the Colony* (London, 1902), pp. 120-3 for 'marriage' after massacre.
- 74 'Minutes of Evidence', 1861 V. & P., pp. 18, 28, 29, 55, 64, 65, 81, 150.

- 75 Ibid., pp. 8, 10, 64-5, 150; 'Native Police Report', 1861 *V. & P.*, p. 10.
- 76 R. Gray, *Reminiscences of India and North Queensland 1857-1912* (London, 1912), p. 79. See also 'Minutes of Evidence', 1861 *V. & P.*, p. 109.
- 77 'Proceedings of the Committee', 1861 *V. & P.*, p. 12. This clause was omitted from the final report. See also 'Minutes of Evidence', p. 40 where Surveyor General A.C. Gregory agreed. The inquiry was instituted because of three charges made against the Native Police of outrages committed in the performance of their duties. These were supported by influential Brisbane newspapers. See 'Minutes of Evidence', 1861 *V. & P.*, pp. 63, 142.
- 78 'Report on the North Queensland Aborigines and the Native Police with Appendices', 1897 *V. & P.*, Vol. II, pp. 36-8. Most of the Native Police correspondence has been lost or destroyed. Determined efforts to locate these records at the Queensland State Archives and the Police Commissioner's office have been unsuccessful despite the approval and co-operation of the then Police Commissioner, Mr Whitrod. However, published parliamentary papers and debates, surviving correspondence found mainly in the Colonial Secretary's files in the Queensland State Archives, and the columns of newspapers established in small towns close to the frontier have revealed much of this force's activities in North Queensland.

## Chapter 2

- 1 Minute, Minister for Lands, R.R. Mackenzie, 18 December 1859, 1860 *V. & P.*, pp. 577-8. See also J. Farnfield, *Frontiersman: a Biography of George Elphinstone Dalrymple* (Melbourne, 1968), pp. 12-25 for Dalrymple's plan and expeditions. 'Report of the Proceedings of the Queensland Government Schooner "Spitfire" in Search of the Mouth of the River Burdekin, on the North-Eastern Coast of Australia; and of the Exploration of a Portion of that Coast Extending from Gloucester Island to Halifax Bay', 1860 *V. & P.*, pp. 5-7, 9, 21-2, 36-7. Dalrymple referred back to his 1859 expedition. See also his evidence that a chain of police outposts would be necessary to allow safe, white settlement in 'Final Report from the Select Committee of Police together with Proceedings of the Committee and Minutes of Evidence', 1860 *V. & P.*, p. 562.
- 2 B. Kingston, 'The Origins of Queensland's "Comprehensive" Land Policy', *Queensland Heritage*, I, no. 2 (1965), pp. 3-8. See also *Government Gazette*, 20 November 1860.
- 3 Loos, Frontier Conflict in the Bowen District, Chapter III. See also Bolton, 'The Exploration of North Queensland', p. 353, and H.L. Roth, *The Discovery and Settlement of Port Mackay, Queensland* (Halifax, England, 1908), p. 38, for the outer limit of settlement.
- 4 G. Dalrymple, Commissioner for Crown Land, Kennedy District, to Col. Sec., 24 April 1861, Q.S.A. COL/A16, 1261 of 1861; Dalrymple to Col. Sec., 23 February 1861, Q.S.A. COL/A13, 660 of 1861; G. Bolton, *A Thousand Miles Away: A History of North Queensland to 1920* (Brisbane, 1963), p. 20 mentions 'more than a dozen' squatters.

- 5 Dalrymple to Col. Sec., 20 May 1861, Q.S.A. COL/A17, 1527 of 1861; Dalrymple to Lt Powell, in charge of Native Police detachment, Bowen, 27 April 1861, encl. Q.S.A. COL/A17, 1527 of 1861; Dalrymple to Col. Sec., 28 April 1861, Q.S.A. COL/A16, 1262 of 1861.
- 6 *Queensland Legislative Council Journals*, Vol. IV, 1862, 'Minutes of Evidence taken before Select Committee on the Crown Lands Act'; Bolton, *A Thousand Miles Away*, p. 27.
- 7 Roth, *The Discovery and Settlement of Port Mackay*, pp. 32-4, 42, 45, 50, 54. John Mackay's journal is reproduced. The Allinghams also set out from Armidale in June 1859 with a flock of sheep arriving at the just established Bowen settlement in April 1861. See Bolton, 'The Exploration of North Queensland', p. 353.
- 8 G. Bolton, 'The Valley of Lagoons: A Study in Exile', *Business Archives and History*, IV (1964), pp. 102, 104-5, 109. See also Farnfield, *Frontiersman*, pp. 54-7.
- 9 Walker, *1861-2 Journal*, p. 69; Landsborough, *1861-2 Journal*, pp. 8, 22, 62, 65; McKinlay, *1861-2 Journal*, pp. 99-101, 115.
- 10 E. Palmer, *Early Days in North Queensland* (Sydney, 1903), pp. 118, 131; E. and O. de Satge, *Pages from the Journal of a Queensland Squatter* (London, 1901), p. 147.
- 11 *Cunmmins and Campbell Magazine*, July 1951. Palmer, *Early Days in North Queensland*, pp. 104, 120, 124-5.
- 12 Bolton, *A Thousand Miles Away*, pp. 25, 27; J.G. MacDonald, *Journal of J.G. MacDonald on an Expedition from Port Denison to the Gulf of Carpentaria and Back* (Brisbane, 1903); Palmer, *Early Days in North Queensland*, p. 102.
- 13 Byerley, *The Jardines' Journals*, p. v.
- 14 Lt Powell to Dalrymple, 9 December 1861, encl. in Dalrymple to Col. Sec., 9 December 1861, Q.S.A. COL/A23, 3151 of 1861. See also Dalrymple to Lt Powell, in charge of Native Police detachment, Bowen, 27 April 1861, encl. Q.S.A. COL/A17, 1527 of 1861; and Dalrymple to Col. Sec., 28 April 1861, Q.S.A. COL/A16, 1262 of 1861.
- 15 Dalrymple to Col. Sec., 14 May 1862, Q.S.A. COL/A29, 1428 of 1862; John Bligh, Commandant of Native Police, to Col. Sec., 6 August 1862, Q.S.A. COL/A32, 2044 of 1862.
- 16 Commandant Bligh's Monthly Return of Native Police Force, 1 July 1863, to Col. Sec., Q.S.A. COL/A42, 1557 of 1863. The Kennedy District's high rate of desertion was not atypical.
- 17 Dalrymple to Col. Sec., 20 May 1861, Q.S.A. COL/A17, 1527 of 1861.
- 18 *P.D.T.*, 20 November, 1869. The article is entitled 'A Black Protector'. Much less restrained descriptions had been published in this newspaper by opponents of the system.
- 19 *P.D.T.*, 13 April 1867. A.L. McDougall referred to the regulation when replying to the Under Colonial Secretary. The letters were reproduced in the newspaper.
- 20 James Morrill, 'Journal of an Expedition to Rockingham Bay', *P.D.T.*, 26 March and 2 April 1864. See also Farnfield, *Frontiersman*, pp. 67-9.
- 21 Little and Hetzer, Urilla Station [near the junction of the Saxby and Flinders

- Rivers] and Brodie Brothers, Donors Hill Station [near the junction of the Cloncurry and Flinders Rivers] to Col. Sec., 18 April 1868, Q.S.A. COL/A106, 1720 of 1868.
- 22 *P.D.T.*, 9, 20 September, 18, 25 October 1865; 29 August 1866.
- 23 *P.D.T.*, 27 February 1867, 4 July 1868; C.C.L., Burke Town, to Col. Sec., 6 September 1867, Q.S.A. CCL/14G1, pp. 184-7; Pol. Com., to Col. Sec., 12 June 1868, with enclosures, Q.S.A. COL/A106, 1788 of 1868; Brodie Bros. and Little and Hetzer to Col. Sec., 18 April 1868, Col. Sec.'s minute, 9 June 1868; Telegram, Acting C.C.L., Burketown, to Minister for Lands, 17 December 1874, Q.S.A. CCL/14G2.
- 24 Brodie Brothers and Little and Hetzer to Col. Sec., 18 April 1868, loc. cit.; C.C.L., Burketown, to Col. Sec., 6 September 1867, Q.S.A. CCL/14G1, p. 187. See also P.M., Burketown, to Col. Sec., 18 April 1868, Q.S.A. COL/A106, 1788 of 1868.
- 25 Brodie Brothers and Little and Hetzer, 18 April 1868, loc. cit.; *Queenslander*, 23 May 1868, letter 'The Poor Blacks'; P.M., Burketown, to Col. Sec., 18 April 1868, Q.S.A. CCL/A106, 1788 of 1868; *P.D.T.*, 27 February 1867, for discovery of belongings of such people in Aboriginal camps.
- 26 C.C.L. Burketown, to Col. Sec., 6 September 1867, Q.S.A. CCL/14G1, pp. 184-7; Pol. Com. to Col. Sec. (with enclosures), 12 June 1868, Q.S.A. COL/A106, 1788 of 1868; Brodie Brothers and Little and Hetzer to Col. Sec., 18 April 1868, loc. cit. See Col. Sec.'s minute, 9 June 1868.
- 27 *P.D.T.*, 4 July 1868. From Burketown correspondent to the *Brisbane Courier*. Other newspapers reprinted this article e.g. *Queenslander*, 13 June 1868, 'Carpentaria'. The name 'Liddle' seems to be 'Little' in a letter which has been previously referred to.
- 28 Brodie Brothers and Little and Hetzer to Col. Sec., 18 April 1868, loc. cit.; *P.D.T.*, 27 February 1867; Minutes of Evidence', 1861 V. & P., p. 43 for A.C. Gregory's opinion of *bora* ceremonies.
- 29 *P.D.T.*, 20 November 1869: 'A Black Protector'. See Loos, Aboriginal-European Relations in North Queensland, Appendix C.
- 30 See, for example, C.S. Rowe's 'Memoranda' in W.J., Doherty, *The Townsville Book: A Complete Sketch of the History, Topography, and Prominent Early Residents of Townsville* (Brisbane [1920]), pp. 108, 109; Walker, 1861-2 *Journal*, pp. 28, 33, 52, 70, 94 for initial violent conflict near the Gulf of Carpentaria.
- 31 *The Story of James Morrill*, pp. 16, 17: Morrill reported Aborigines communicating over considerable distances precise details of the arrival of the first settlers and their subsequent actions. See also Byerley, *Jardines' Journals*, p. 78. Aborigines later interviewed by the Jardines at Somerset could describe in precise detail the death of the expedition's mule that had occurred almost five hundred miles south and had articles in their possession from the mule's pack saddle. Other details narrated made Frank Jardine believe these Aborigines had followed them this distance. It is more likely, however, that the information and the articles were transmitted from tribe to tribe.
- 32 Lammermoor was one of the few in North Queensland. See M.M. Bennett,

- Christison of Lammermoor* (London [1927 or 1928]), pp. 56-60, 67, 81, Lammermoor was renowned because it was the exception to the rule.
- 33 G. Dalrymple, C.C.L., Kennedy District, to Col. Sec., 24 April 1861, Q.S.A. COL/A16, 1261 of 1861.
- 34 Dalrymple, 'Burdekin Expedition Report', 1860 *V. & P.*, p. 33; Dalrymple to Col. Sec., 25 May 1861, Q.S.A. COL/A17, 1526 of 1861; Dalrymple to Col. Sec., 24 April 1861.
- 35 Dalrymple to Lt Powell, in charge of the Native Police Detachment, Bowen, 27 April 1861, encl. Q.S.A. COL/A17, 1527 of 1861; Dalrymple to Col. Sec., 28 April 1861, Q.S.A. COL/A16, 1262 of 1861.
- 36 *P.D.T.*, 1 May 1869, 'Shall We Admit the Blacks'. No one disagreed despite the fact that the author was then involved in a controversy on the subject.
- 37 Dalrymple to Col. Sec., 14 May 1862, Q.S.A. COL/A29, 1428 of 1862.
- 38 Byerley, *Jardine's Journals*, pp. 19, 22, 23, 25, 34-40, 48.
- 39 'Report of Commissioner of Police Upon Tour of Inspection', 1868 *V. & P.*, pp. 51, 52.
- 40 Bolton, *A Thousand Miles Away*, pp. 38-42, for an account of the commercial depression; R. Stewart, J.P., Southwick Station, Dalrymple, to Police Commissioner, 20 October 1868, encl. Q.S.A. COL/A116, 100 of 1869; 'Police Commissioner's Report', 1868 *V. & P.*, pp. 51, 52.
- 41 *The Story of James Morrill*, pp. 15-26.
- 42 Q.S.A. Governor's correspondence, outward despatch, 77 of 1865, Bowen to Sec. of State, Cardwell, 4 December 1865.
- 43 J. Bonwick, *The Wild White Man and the Blacks of Victoria* (Melbourne, 1863, 2nd edition), p. 17. Bonwick has a brief comment on Morrill inserted in his monograph just before publication. *P.D.T.*, 1 November 1865.
- 44 Q.S.A. Governor's correspondence, outward despatch, 74 of 1861, 16 December 1861; *P.D.T.*, 10 June 1865.
- 45 *The Story of James Morrill*, p. 26; A.A. Abbie, *The Original Australians* (Sydney, 1969), pp. 191, 199.
- 46 *P.D.T.*, 21 July 1866; 1875 *V. & P.*, p. 624; *P.D.T.*, 24 August 1872. An article: 'The Blacks—A Suggestion' commented on the Native Police who 'wreak their vengeance on the first blackfellows they meet and thus punish the innocent for the guilty'.
- 47 *P.D.T.*, 16 June 1866.
- 48 *M.M.*, 7 September 1867; Eden, *My Wife and I in Queensland*, pp. 108, 211-12 for an example of two squatters who 'took a fancy to a certain gin'.
- 49 Eden, *My Wife and I in Queensland*, pp. 308-9. R.H. Anning, Sun on the Right (unpublished typed manuscript, written 1960s) p. 12. A draft in the History Department library, James Cook University.
- 50 *M.M.*, 7 September 1867.
- 51 Interviews with Mr Dick Hoolihan at Townsville on 8 April and 14 April 1972. Interview with Mr Harry Gertz at Valley of Lagoons Station on 14 October 1972. Interview with Mr Alf Palmer at Palm Island on 19 December 1972. When interviews were made, Mr Hoolihan was approximately 65 years old, Mr Gertz 84 years old, and Mr Palmer 82 years old.



The above were not kidnapped.

- 52 Eden, *My Wife and I in Queensland*, p. 211, Charles Eden, referring to a station near Bowen, probably F. Bode's Strathdon, where this had occurred in 1869, considered it 'a very bad plan indeed' because he thought it ended in 'wholesale massacre'. He was no doubt thinking back to the Wills and Fraser 'massacres' in southern Queensland. He thought conflict first arose over Aboriginal women. At the time he wrote, many squatters were beginning to adopt the practice.
- 53 W.R.O. Hill, *Forty-five Years' Experience in North Queensland 1861-1905* (Brisbane, 1907), p. 31. Hill's pastime was conducting the church choir wherever he went.
- 54 Quoted in J. Black, *North Queensland Pioneers* (Charters Towers, [1931?]), p. 48.
- 55 C.C., 5 April 1876. 'It is not because they have restricted their outrages as yet to horses, and an occasional man or two, that they will not improve the occasion and commence slaughter on a wholesale principle'.
- 56 Appendix B, for an assessment of deaths attributable to Aboriginal resistance.
- 57 Black, *North Queensland Pioneers*, p. 27, article on Curr. See also Rowe's 'Memoranda', in Doherty, *The Townsville Book*, p. 105.
- 58 Byerley, *The Jardines' Journal*, pp. v, vi, 36; *P.D.T.*, 4 October 1865. Quoted from the *Empire*. In this instance no one was hurt on either side.
- 59 *P.D.T.*, 16 June 1866; 28 September, 5 October 1867; *M.M.*, 14 September 1867.
- 60 Bennett, *Christison of Lammermoor*, p. 98.
- 61 *M.M.*, 10 August 1867. See also *P.D.T.*, 6 February 1869: A shepherd was killed and 1,800 sheep driven off; R.T. Wood (Frederick Smythe), *Bush and Town or Twelve Months in Northern Queensland* (unpublished novel, c. 1868), pp. 93-5. At Mitchell Library in 'R.T. Wood Papers, 1857-1879'. R.T. Wood, 1845-1895, married Catherine Stockwell, 1879, daughter of James Stockwell, a solicitor of Bowen, Queensland. Much of this is obviously non-fiction. See also *P.D.T.*, 19 November 1864, editorial: two shepherds murdered and 2-3,000 sheep scattered; 'Petition from John S. Yeates to the Legislative Assembly', 1867 *V. & P.*, p. 997.
- 62 *P.D.T.*, 16 June, 26 September 1866; *M.M.*, 14 March, 21 March, 28 March 1868; Crystalbrook Station was in the Proserpine District and Merri Merriwah Station adjacent to Ravenswood Station. P. Pinnock, P.M. Bowen, to Col. Sec., 2 February 1865, encl. Q.S.A. COL/A64, 499 of 1865; Eden, *My Wife and I in Queensland*, pp. 135-8.
- 63 *M.M.*, 24 August 1867; 11 January 1868; 3 April 1967; Bolton, *A Thousand Miles Away*, p. 37.
- 64 *M.M.*, 3 April, 6 July 1867; 11 January, 7 March 1868.
- 65 Wood, *Bush and Town*, pp. 93-5; Eden, *My Wife and I in Queensland*, p. 221; I. Henry, Cardwell, to Col. Sec., 9 September 1885, Q.S.A. COL/A347, 6925 of 1885. Eden is not always reliable on matters of detail; but to reject this story out of hand while accepting much of his other observations would be tantamount to holding preconceptions of what Aborigines were capable of doing.

- 66 Wood, Bush and Town, p. 93; Interview with Mr Harry Gertz at the Valley of Lagoons Station on 14 October 1972. Mr Dick Hoolihan, also once of the Valley of Lagoons Station, was present at this interview and participated in it.
- 67 J.W. Collinson, *Early Days of Cairns* (Brisbane, 1939), p. 64. Collinson was editor of the *Cairns Post* and apparently derived much of his material from the early years of this journal.
- 68 D.S. MacMillan, *Bowen Downs 1863-1963, issued by 'The Scottish Australian Company Limited', to mark the Company's Part in Establishing Bowen Downs Station on the Landsborough Runs in 1863* (Sydney, 1963), p. 20. Bowen Downs is in central Queensland but used Bowen as a port throughout the 1860s. Const. J.D. McGuire, Police Station, Thornborough, to P.M., Herberton, 24 January 1893, encl. Q.S.A. COL/A139, 823 of 1895; Sgt J. Whiteford, Musgrave Station, to Insp. J. Lamond, Cooktown, 24 July 1897, encl. Q.S.A. COL/140, 12117 of 1899; E.M. Curr, *The Australian Race: Its Origins, Languages, Customs, Place of Landing in Australia and the Routes by Which It Spread Itself over That Continent* (4 vols., Melbourne, 1886), Vol. III, pp. 20, 21. Pacified Aborigines accidentally starting a fire were shot dead forthwith. See J.C. Beaglehole (ed.) *The Endeavour Journal of Joseph Banks 1768-1771*, 2 vols. (Sydney 1962), p. 96, for description of fire being used aggressively against Cook.
- 69 I. Henry, Cardwell, to Col. Sec., 9 September 1885, Q.S.A. COL/A347, 6952 of 1885.
- 70 R. Kellet, Natal Downs, to Col. Sec., 26 January 1865, and I.M. Spry, Mt McConnell Station, to P.M., Bowen, 23 January 1865, encl. Q.S.A. COL/A64, 499 of 1865. See minute, 13 February 1865, D.T.S. [Police Commissioner], P.M., Bowen, to Col. Sec., 2 February 1865, encl. Q.S.A. COL/A64, 499 of 1865.
- 71 Bennett, *Christison of Lammermoor*, pp. 56-60, 67, 81, 83. In the 1880s Edward Palmer had forbidden the Native Police to come on to his run in Cape York Peninsula. See Under Col. Sec. to E. Palmer, Gamboola Station, Mitchell River, 17 November 1882, Q.S.A. COL/G19, 2091 of 1882, encl. file: E. Palmer, Linden, Parramatta, to Col. Sec., 13 March 1883, Q.S.A. COL/A356, 1303 of 1883.
- 72 N. Corfield, *The Development of the Cattle Industry in Queensland* (B.A. Honours thesis, University of Queensland, 1959) pp. 39, 64; R.D. Allan, *Land Utilisation and Settlement in Queensland 1859-1901* (B.A. Honours thesis, University of Queensland, 1957), pp. 14-16. To some extent, this financial stress so early in the development of a run was lessened by a failure to enforce the regulation rigidly. See J.D. Farnfield, *George Elphinstone Dalrymple—His Life and Times in Queensland 1859-1874* (Ph.D. thesis, Queensland University, 1968), pp. 105-7; Eden, *My Wife and I in Queensland*, p. 57. The delay in inspecting runs could be ten months and was commonly four to six months. Farnfield, *Frontiersman*, pp. 47-8, gives an account of how 'run-jobbers' sold out options on a run in the delay between the application for a run and Dalrymple's inspection.
- 73 Bolton, *A Thousand Miles Away*, pp. 34-42, for a description and analysis of the 1866-1870 depression. Walter Scott wrote: 'Cattle are certain ruin, but

- sheep are a little quicker'.
- 74 Palmer, *Early Days in North Queensland*, p. 129; Bolton, *A Thousand Miles Away*, p. 40; Corfield, *The Development of the Cattle Industry in Queensland*, pp. 67-72.
- 75 Farnfield, Dalrymple, p. 218; Bolton, *A Thousand Miles Away*, pp. 38-9.
- 76 F. Hamilton, Hinchinbrook Station, North Kennedy, to Col. Sec., 18 March 1868 and enclosure, F. Hamilton to John Marlow, Native Police, Bowen, 18 March 1868, Q.S.A. COL/A104, 1033 of 1868. See first minute A.W.M., 16 April 1868 [Under Col. Sec.]: 'The Inspector of the District will do his utmost with the force at his disposal to patrol every portion of his district and to meet any special demand for protection'. Second minute [probably the Police Commissioner]: 'Have not got any money. Mr. Marlow must do the best he can'. See Table 1, p.41.
- 77 *P.D.T.*, 25 April 1868.
- 78 D.T. Seymour, Pol. Com., to Col. Sec., 6 January 1868, and enclosures: Insp. J. Marlow, Port Denison, to Pol. Com., 9 December 1867, and Chief Inspector Murray, Northern District, to Pol. Com., 6 January 1868, Q.S.A. COL/A100, 56 of 1868. Seymour's minute: '[Marlow's] plan would be far more merciful to the blacks than any other plan as yet tried'. 'Report of Commissioner of Police' Upon Tour of Inspection', 1868 *V. & P.*, pp. 51-2.
- 79 'Petition from John S. Yeates to the Legislative Assembly', 1867 *V. & P.*, p. 997; I.A. Gregory, Solicitor, Bowen, to Col. Sec., 17 June 1867, enclosing Petition of J.S. Yeates, Mayor of Bowen and Grazier, Q.S.A. COL/A91, 1433 of 1867. Minute A.W.M. [Under Col. Sec.].
- 80 *P.D.T.*, 7 September 1867, letter from John Yeates; 31 August 1867, letter from 'A Squatter'; 20 November 1869; Hill, *Forty-Five Years in North Queensland*, p. 30. See Eden, *My Wife and I in Queensland*, p. 67, where he comments on the shepherds' need to carry guns. See 'Report on the Aborigines of Queensland', 1896 *V. & P.*, Vol. IV, p. 727, where Meston observed that the government houses along the overland telegraph line in Cape York Peninsula were loop-holed with spear-proof gates to close at night. See also J.E. Davidson, *Journal 1865 to 1868* (Copy, James Cook University), pp. 39-43.
- 81 R. Gray, *Reminiscences of India and North Queensland 1857-1912* (London, 1913), pp. 160-2.
- 82 *Queensland Daily Guardian*, 24 July 1866. Quoted A.A. Morrison, 'Queensland Colonial Society 1860-1890', *Queensland Heritage*, I, No. 5 (1966). See also *P.D.T.*, 23 December 1865.
- 83 Gray, *Reminiscences of India and North Queensland*, p. 77; *P.D.T.*, 19 November 1864; 28 October 1865, editorial; 'Petition from John S. Yeates to the Legislative Assembly', 1867 *V. & P.*, p. 997; I.A. Gregory, Solicitor, Bowen, to Col. Sec., 17 June 1867, enclosing 'Petition of J.S. Yeates, Mayor of Bowen and Grazier, Q.S.A. COL/A91, 1433 of 1867; Davidson, *Journal 1865 to 1868*, p. 39.
- 84 Palmer, *Early Days in North Queensland*, pp. 134, 135; Corfield, *The Development of the Cattle Industry in Queensland*, p. 77. The Barkly Tableland was reoccupied after 1877.
- 85 'Pastoral Country Abandoned in Unsettled Districts'. 1871 *V. & P.*, First

- Session, p. 549; Palmer, *Early Days in North Queensland*, p. 136; Eden, *My Wife and I in Queensland*, p. 75.
- 86 C.C.L., Norman, to Chief C.C.L., Brisbane, 12 August 1870, Q.S.A. CCL/14G1, p. 451. See also Palmer, *Early Days in North Queensland*, p. 136.
- 87 Bolton, *A Thousand Miles Away*, pp. 40-2; Macmillan, *Bowen Downs*, pp. 26-8, 32.
- 88 W. Hickson, Vane Creek, Belyando River, to Col. Sec., 7 June 1869, Q.S.A. COL/A127, 2455 of 1869; W. Chatfield, Natal Downs, to P.M., Bowen, 6 January 1869, enclosed Q.S.A. COL/A121, 1483 of 1869.
- 89 *P.D.T.*, 6 February, 20 February, 3 April, 15 May 1869.
- 90 'Report from the Acting Commissioner of Police for the Year 1872', *1873 V. & P.*, p. 918; Pol. Com. to Col. Sec., 3 March 1874, Q.S.A. COL/A192, 452 of 1874; 'Report of the Commissioner of Police for the Year 1889', *1890 V. & P.*, Vol. I, pp. 978, 979.
- 91 'Report of the Commissioner of Police for 1874', *1875 V. & P.*, Vol. I, p. 617. For routine of bush patrols to encompass Aborigines, see 'Diary of Duties and Occurrences Cloncurry 18 November 1894-13 June 1896', Q.S.A. POL/14B1; 'Duty Book 26 August 1893-26 January 1895 Police Department, Port Douglas Station', Q.S.A. POL/12D/N2; 'Letterbook 7 September 1897-20 June 1899, Police Department, Port Douglas', Q.S.A. POL/12D/G2; 'Occurrence Book July 1889-12 September 1892, Police Station Pt. Douglas', Q.S.A. POL/12D/N1.
- 92 *1875 V. & P.*, Vol. I, p. 617. See also 'Police Commissioner's Report for 1875', *1876 V. & P.*, Vol. I, p. 963; 'Report of the Commissioner of Police for 1879', *1880 V. & P.*, p. 707; 'Report of the Commissioner of Police for 1878', *1879 V. & P.*, p. 752; 'Distribution of Police', *1881 V. & P.*, Vol. I, p. 198. See also *P.D.T.*, 30 October 1880; 26 February 1881.
- 93 'Report of the Commissioner of Police for 1883', *1884 V. & P.*, Vol. I, pp. 542, 543.
- 94 *P.D.T.*, 25 September 1880, editorial. See also *P.D.T.*, 30 October 1880; 26 February 1881.
- 95 *P.D.T.*, 24 August 1878 (Bowen District); *P.D.T.*, 26 February 1881 (Bloomsbury District); *M.M.*, 12 December 1874 (Charters Towers District); police inquiry into the death of John Maher, digger, on 21 September 1869, Wandoo Station, Nebo: Q.S.A. JUS/N21, 78 of 1869; *P.D.T.*, 9 January 1875 (Proserpine District); *P.D.T.*, 1 June 1878 (Nebo District); *P.D.T.*, 11 January 1879 (Proserpine District); *P.D.T.*, 10 June 1876 (Proserpine District); *P.D.T.*, 11 January 1879 (Prosperine District); inquest into death of Frederick Toll on Amhurst Selection, O'Connell River, Bowen District, about 25 March 1875, Q.S.A. JUS/N44, 176 of 1875; Fysh, *Taming the North*, pp. 88-95, 121-2 (Cloncurry District).
- 96 *Queenslander*, 15 November 1879, p. 626; *P.D.T.*, 24 August 1878, article beginning 'Mr. Larry ...'.
- 97 *N.M.*, 29 April, 29 September 1897; Fysh, *Taming the North*, p. 210; *P.D.T.*, 10 April 1869; Eden, *My Wife and I in Queensland*, pp. 211-12.
- 98 *P.D.T.*, 1 June 1878. See also *P.D.T.*, 24 August 1878, 'Mr. Larry'.
- 99 *P.D.T.*, 2 October 1880.

- 1 *P.D.T.*, 12 June 1869.
- 2 *Ibid.*; Petition of Bowen farmers to Col. Sec., 22 May 1872, Q.S.A. COL/A169, 1020 of 1872; *P.D.T.*, 2 October 1880, letter signed 'Tete A Tete'; 9 January 1875; 10 June 1876; 16 June 1878, from *M.M.*; 11 January 1879, letter from E.G. Smith, Suttor Hotel; 18 March 1871; 30 October 1880.
- 3 *M.M.*, 12 December 1874.
- 4 *M.M.*, 12 December 1874; *P.D.T.*, 1 June, 8 June, 24 August 1878. See also R. Cannon, *Savage Scenes from Australia: Being a Short History of the Settlement at Somerset, Cape York* (Valparaiso, 1885), p. 23, for F. Jardine's use of a stockwhip to intimidate Aborigines, and pp. 29, 30, for his use of the rifle. It was alleged he cut notches in the stock of his rifle.
- 5 'Dark Doings with the Sable Savages', *H.M.N.*, 31 August 1878. See also *P.D.T.*, 21 February 1874; Black, *North Queensland Pioneers*, p. 57, 'Reminiscences of Mrs. Halfpapp'; *Queenslander*, 13 September 1890; 22 June 1895.
- 6 Fysh, *Taming the North*, pp. 93-5, 141-7, 182-4. See also Anon., *Pioneering in the North-West. A Few Rambling Notes of Happenings in the Far North-West of Queensland 40 to 45 Years Ago* (typescript, M.L., n.p., 1920), pp. 2, 3.
- 7 *P.D.T.*, 5 March 1881, letter from W. Chatfield.
- 8 'Queenslander', *The Way We Civilize; Black and White; The Native Police* (Brisbane, 1880), p. 7. Originally published in *Queenslander*, 29 May 1880; *P.D.T.*, 25 September 1880, editorial.
- 9 See *M.M.*, 7 June 1873; 22 May 1875; 18 March 1876; 13 March, 4 May, 22 May 1878; 21 September 1880; *P.D.T.*, 29 August 1874; 7 August, 14 August, 27 August, 11 September, 30 October 1880; 26 February 1881. See also file Pol. Com. to Col. Sec., 5 January 1876, Q.S.A. COL/A217, 57 of 1876, for account of attack on Crystalbrook Station near Proserpine by an estimated 300 Aborigines.
- 10 *P.D.T.*, 14 August 1880; *M.M.*, 21 August 1880; P.M., Cardwell, to Col. Sec., 3 February 1872, Q.S.A. COL/A166, 254 of 1872; *P.D.T.*, 17 April 1875; P.M., Cardwell, to Col. Sec., 10 November 1874 [telegram] Q.S.A. COL/A200, 7384 of 1874: 'blacks very bad north of town'. See also *Queenslander*, 11 October, 13 December 1879, for resistance in Cardwell area.
- 11 See file W. Scott, Sydney, to Col. Sec., 5 August 1873, Q.S.A. COL/A184, 1430 of 1873, especially Pol. Com. to Col. Sec., 26 June 1873; P.M., Cardwell, to Under Col. Sec., 16 September 1886, encl. Q.S.A. COL/A483, 7578 of 1886.
- 12 *M.M.*, 19 September 1874. St Ann's Station, near Ravenswood, was 'stuck up', by 15 or 16 Aborigines and the cook killed. See file: Pol. Com. to Col. Sec., 5 January 1876, Q.S.A. COL/A217, 57 of 1876 for attack by an estimated 300 Aborigines on Crystalbrook Station, near the present town of Proserpine. Four Aboriginal employees and a European neighbour were killed in this series of attacks. In the late 1890s stations in Cape York Peninsula were still being attacked. See *Queenslander*, 13 July 1895 and 6 June 1896.
- 13 Appendix B.
- 14 *P.D.T.*, 22 April 1882: mentions cattle spearing on Gregory Downs on

- Gregory River, 80 miles from Gulf of Carpentaria; Petition from Burke District [168 signatures] to Premier of Queensland, May 1885, Q.S.A. COL/A422, 3021 of 1885. See Fysh, *Taming the North*, pp. 94-7, 120-5, 140-8, 153, 182-4, 210 for the conflict in the Cloncurry District. For this district see also *M.M.*, 5 March 1879: *P.D.T.*, 10 May 1879; 27 January, 17 February 1883; Q.S.A. Inquest, Cloncurry, into death of J.P. White about 13 July 1884; *Queenslander*, 16 August 1890, p. 293 and 1 November 1890, p. 842; Q.S.A., Inquest, Carandotta (Bouli District), 2 September 1894 into death of Walter Nathan; and *M.M.*, 29 April, 29 September 1897; Q.S.A., Inquest, Cloncurry, 15 April 1897, into death of Jack Cole. These largely corroborate the account in *Taming the North*. See also Anon., *Pioneering in the North-West*, pp. 1-5.
- 15 *Herberton Advertiser*, 14 January 1885, reprinting letter from *Palmer Chronicle*, 20 December 1884.
  - 16 *C.C.*, 14 May, 18 June 1889.
  - 17 Insp. J. Lamond, Cooktown, to Pol. Com., 15 April 1897, encl. Lamond, Cooktown, to Pol. Com., 8 June 1897, Q.S.A. COL/140 [typed copy].

## Chapter 3

- 1 Bolton, *A Thousand Miles Away*, pp. 44, 45. He quotes the *Weekly Herald*, 5 May 1866. The Townsville residents hoped in this way to guarantee their port against the competition of Cardwell and Bowen. Because of the limited nature of the field, only £500 was subsequently awarded. There had been promise of a payable goldfield near Bowen in 1865. See P. Pinnock, P.M. Bowen, to Col. Sec., 7 November 1865, Q.S.A. COL/A72, 3031 of 1865.
- 2 Hill, *Forty-Five Years' Experience in North Queensland*, pp. 47, 53. Hill had been clerk of Petty Sessions at Cape River (1863-70), Ravenswood (1870-4, 1878-82), Georgetown (1874-5), The Palmer (1876-8).
- 3 Bolton, *A Thousand Miles Away*, p. 47. The alluvial gold had been worked out, there was a shortage of water, and 'Gulf fever' was raging.
- 4 *Ibid.*, p. 50.
- 5 This expedition pushed north into the then unknown areas of southern Cape York Peninsula to as far north as Princess Charlotte Bay. The party's aim was to ascertain the character of the country and its mineral resources with a view to future settlement. See 'Report from Mr. W. Hann, Leader of the Northern Expedition', and 'Copy of a Diary of a Northern Expedition under the leadership of Mr. William Hann', 1873 *V. & P.*, pp. 1031-70. For the discovery of traces of gold on the Palmer see p. 1049.
- 6 J.V. Mulligan, *Guide to the Palmer River and Normanby Gold Fields, North Queensland . . . And Journal of Explorations* (Brisbane, 1875), pp. 9, 10; Bolton, *A Thousand Miles Away*, pp. 52, 69. Both of these figures are probably underestimates as much gold was allegedly not reported. The Chinese, especially, were accused of smuggling gold from the country so it is probable

- that the Palmer's production is the more underestimated because of its large Chinese population.
- 7 Bolton, *A Thousand Miles Away*, pp. 55-60. See *H.M.N.*, 19 January 1878, for estimate of eighteen to twenty thousand Chinese on the Palmer in June 1877 and 1876. *V. & P.*, Vol. II, pp. 212-18; *H.M.N.*, 26 May, 23 June, 30 June 1877; 2 June 1879.
  - 8 J.H. Binnie, *My Life on a Tropic Gold Field* (Melbourne, 1944), pp. 35, 36; Bolton, *A Thousand Miles Away*, pp. 54-8 for a description of the Chinese on the goldfields. See also *C.C.*, 21 November 1874, for an estimate of expenses at £(3-4) a week.
  - 9 Bolton, *A Thousand Miles Away*, pp. 59-62; *H.M.N.*, 30 June 1877; *Queenslander*, 6 May 1876, 'The Hodgkinson Rush'.
  - 10 Palmer, *Early Days in North Queensland*, pp. 136, 137. During the 1870s old runs were taken up and new ones applied for encouraged by the Pastoral Leases Act of 1869.
  - 11 Bolton, *A Thousand Miles Away*, p. 92; 'Stock Depastured in Runs in Settled Districts', 1879 *V. & P.*, Vol. II, p. 999. By 1880 runs were being taken up between the Hodgkinson and Mitchell Rivers by pastoralists of the settled districts. They sought second properties as those further south were becoming stocked to their nineteenth century capacity.
  - 12 *C.C.*, 6 April 1878, a letter signed 'Magnum Bonum'; 28 February 1877.
  - 13 *Queenslander*, 8 June 1878, 'Cost of Gold; Or the Murder of Manuel Yous'.
  - 14 D.T. Seymour, Pol. Com., to Col. Sec., 30 April 1876, encl. in Q.S.A. COL/A195, 1142 of 1874.
  - 15 Pol. Com. to Col. Sec., 30 April 1874, and the rest of this file, ten letters in all, Q.S.A. COL/A195, 1142 of 1874. See Col. Sec. minute, 1 December 1873, John Cameron, Gilbert Brown and P. McCardett, Gilberton, to Col. Sec., 26 November 1873 (telegram).
  - 16 Mulligan, *Guide to the Goldfields*, p. 4.
  - 17 'Police Commissioner's Report for 1881', 1882 *V. & P.*, Vol. I, p. 419. See also 'Police Commissioner's Report', 1876 *V. & P.*, Vol. I, p. 903.
  - 18 *C.C.*, 5 December 1874.
  - 19 *Queenslander*, 25 December 1875, 'Christmas Eve in the Black's Country'.
  - 20 Q.S.A. JUS/N41, 274 of 1874. Inquest into deaths of John, Bridget, and Anne [Strau] on 17 October 1874; *M.M.*, 7 November 1874; J.C. Hogflesh, Herberon, to B.D. Morehead, Chief Sec., 8 October 1889, Q.S.A. COL/A595, 9567 of 1889; W.H. Corfield, *Reminiscences of Queensland 1862-1899* (Brisbane, 1921), p. 56.
  - 21 See *C.H.*, 1 July 1874, 'The Blacks Again', for a frank account of how a party of six teamsters scoured the country to find and attack a large Aboriginal camp. See also *P.D.T.*, 21 October 1882; Corfield, *Reminiscences*, pp. 57, 58.
  - 22 Palmer, *Early Days in North Queensland*, p. 183.
  - 23 Binnie, *My Life on a Tropic Gold Field*, pp. 20-2, 31.
  - 24 *Ibid.*, p. 18.
  - 25 A.C. Bernerker, Mount Hogan (15 miles from Gilberton), to A.H. Palmer, Col. Sec., 17 December 1873, encl. Q.S.A. COL/A195, 1142 of 1874.
  - 26 Palmer, *Early Days in North Queensland*, p. 184; *Argus*, 19 February 1876

- (M.L. *Newspaper Extracts 1875-1880*, Vol 1).
- 27 C.C., 3 February 1877. See also Q.S.A. JUS/47 for the inquest.
  - 28 *Ravenswood Miner*, 6 December 1873; 10 January 1874.
  - 29 C.H., 24 June 1874, 'The Black Police'.
  - 30 P.M., Palmerville, to Col. Sec., 4 August 1874, Q.S.A. COL/A197, 1680 of 1874.
  - 31 'Etheridge Gold Field Report', 1881 *V. & P.*, p. 222; 'Etheridge Gold Field Report', 1885 *V. & P.*, Vol. III, p. 57.
  - 32 W. Steele, Georgetown, to P. O'Sullivan, M.L.A. Burke, 4 July 1878, Q.S.A. COL/A262, 2933 of 1878; *Queenslander*, 8 June 1878, 'Cost of Gold; or the Murder of Manuel Yous'.
  - 33 1879 *V. & P.*, Vol. II, pp. 397-8.
  - 34 A regulation in 1878 forbade Chinese entering a new field until three years after its proclamation. See Bolton, *A Thousand Miles Away*, p. 57.
  - 35 Palmer, *Early Days in North Queensland*, pp. 139-41.
  - 36 Petition of 217 residents of the Palmer River Goldfield to S.W. Griffith, Col. Sec. [January 1886], enclosed Q.S.A. COL/A453, 552 of 1886; C.C. 18 August 1875; *H.M.N.*, 14 July, 1 December, 22 December 1877; 21 December 1878; 14 June 1879.
  - 37 *H.M.N.*, 10 November 1877; *Queenslander*, 8 December 1877; Pol. Com. to Col. Sec., 21 October 1880, Q.S.A. COL/A311, 1506 of 1881.
  - 38 C.C., 16 July 1874; 28 February 1877.
  - 39 Pol. Com. to Col. Sec., 18 October 1877, Q.S.A. COL/A247, 5055 of 1877; *P.D.T.*, 19 February 1876, extract from *Cooktown Herald*; *P.D.T.*, 18 March 1876, 'The Palmer', from *Cooktown Courier*. For the Hodgkinson tracks to Trinity Bay and Port Douglas, see *H.M.N.*, 2 April, 30 June, 7 July, 14 July, 4 August, 11 August, 24 November, 22 December 1877; 2 March, 30 March, 4 May, 22 June, 17 August, 2 November 1878; 1 February, 6 December, 13 December 1879.
  - 40 Corfield, *Reminiscences*, p. 59; C.C., 2 March 1878. Although carrying to the fields paid very well in the early days of a rush, it soon tapered off. By 1876 there was much more competition to the Palmer, especially as the Chinese were using Coolie gangs to handle their own and others' merchandise. By 1878, the profitability had fallen further and Corfield turned to the far west. See Corfield, *Reminiscences*, pp. 54, 60, 70, 71.
  - 41 C.H., 24 June 1874, subeditorial.
  - 42 Petition of 265 businessmen, mine-owners, miners, and residents generally of the Herberton District to T. McIlwraith, Premier and Colonial Secretary of Queensland, Q.S.A. COL/A335, 2409 of 1882; G.E. Dalrymple, Gold Commissioner, Gilberton, to Col. Sec., 22 April 1873, Q.S.A. COL/A183, 1009 of 1873; Pol. Com. to Col. Sec., 21 October 1880, encl. Petition of 111 residents of Hodgkinson Goldfield to Col. Sec. [n.d.] Q.S.A. COL/A311, 1506 of 1881; 'Police Commissioner's Report', 1872 *V. & P.*, p. 1494; 1873 *V. & P.*, p. 918; 1875 *V. & P.*, Vol. I, p. 617; 1876 *V. & P.*, Vol. I, p. 903; 1879 *V. & P.*, Vol. I, p. 751; *Brisbane Courier*, 10 January 1876.
  - 43 C.C., 1 January 1878, 'Our Aborigines'. See also C.C., 16 July 1879; 21 February, editorial, 28 February 1877, editorial.



- 44 C.C., 21 February 1877, editorial.
- 45 C.C., 10 January 1877. The editor was critical of ministers of religion who remained arm-chair critics of frontier violence. C.C., 28 February 1877, editorial; 11 January 1878, 'Our Aborigines'.
- 46 H.M.N., 29 December 1877: 'The ukase issued from the Department of the Colonial Secretary (which has the administration of all matters relating to the Native Police and the aboriginals) some three or four months back has proved very pernicious in restraining sub-Inspector Douglas' troopers from making the reprisals for the determined cattle spearing of which the natives have been guilty since they have discovered the present punishment, if punishment it can be called, of rounding them up has supplanted the vigorous plan of following up and dispersing them in the old style, breaking up their camps, and destroying their weapons of offence'. C.P., 7 August 1884, letter from John Atherton, Emerald End: 'I am not aware . . . that he and his troopers were stationed in the district to protect the blacks, not to punish them . . . if this is really the case . . . I fail to see what use he is to the white population here . . .'.
- 47 See C.C., 2 March 1878, and P.D.T., 21 October 1882; C.C., 17 July 1879.
- 48 Petition from the Herberton District, Q.S.A. COL/A335, 2409 of 1882. There were 265 signatures.
- 49 'Police Commissioner's Report', 1876 V. & P., Vol. I, p. 903; R.M., 6 December 1873; P.D.T., 19 February 1876.
- 50 Maitland Mercury, 25 November 1875 (M.L. Newspaper Extracts 1875-1880, Vol. I), p. 38.
- 51 M.M., 27 September 1873, an article entitled misleadingly 'The Gilbert'. See Q.S.A. JUS/N37, 182 and 183 of 1873: Inquests into deaths of Henry Williams (engineer) and Mr. Sam Blake (owner and blacksmith) of Caledonia Crushing Machine, about one mile from Walshtown, Etheridge; M.M., 6 December 1873 (Telegraphic News, Georgetown, 22 November) and P.D.T., 6 December 1873, 'The Etheridge', from Cleveland Bay Express. See also J. Cameron, Mt Hogan (near Gilberton), to Col. Sec., 18 December 1873, enclosed Q.S.A. COL/A195, 1142 of 1874. See also the rest of this file.
- 52 M.M., 17 January 1874, quoting a telegram from Etheridge, 27 December 1873, to the Cleveland Bay Express. See also file Q.S.A. COL/A195, 1142 of 1874.
- 53 M.M., 14 February 1874. (Telegraphic News, Rockhampton, 13 February 1874.)
- 54 C. Francis, Acting Lands Commissioner, Normanton, to Minister for Lands, 17 December 1874, Q.S.A. CCL/14G2, 29 of 1874 (telegram).
- 55 Queenslander, 12 April 1879, p. 467.
- 56 M.M., 14 February 1874, quoting from the Northern Miner.
- 57 Fysh, Taming the North, pp. 122-5; C.C., 30 January 1878 and 25 January 1879.
- 58 C.C., 5 May 1877.
- 59 Bolton, A Thousand Miles Away, pp. 47, 58-61; 'Palmer Goldfield Report for 1879', 1880 V. & P., p. 598 and H.M.N., 30 June 1877.
- 60 Quoted in R.L. Jack, Northmost Australia, 2 vols. (Melbourne, 1922), Vol. 2,

- p. 464, from J.H. Heaton, *Australian Dictionary of Dates and Men of the Time* (Sydney, 1879).
- 61 [Anon.], *Pioneering in the North-West*, pp. 1, 2. The writer claimed to be an ex-Native Police Officer, possibly Sub-Inspector Eglinton. See also Fysh, *Taming the North*, pp. 94-7, 117, 120, 124, 140-8, 182-4; W. Landsborough, P.M., Burketown, to Col. Sec., 7 April 1870, Q.S.A. COL/A147, 2311 of 1870.
- 62 J.C. Hogflesh, Herberton, to B.D. Morehead, Chief Sec., 8 October 1889, Q.S.A. COL/A595, 9567 of 1889; Binnie, *My Life on a Tropic Gold Field*, pp. 8-11.
- 63 Corfield, *Reminiscences*, p. 59.
- 64 *Ibid.*, pp. 46, 47, 59; Davidson, *Journal 1865-1868*, p. 30; Rev. I.V. Black, Trinity Parsonage, Bowen, to Col. Sec., 7 September 1868, Q.S.A. COL/A111, 974 of 1868, and Col. Sec's reply, Q.S.A., *Letterbook of Miscellaneous Letters 2 January 1868-28 December 1870; P.D.T.*, 3 February 1877, from *Cooktown Courier*. A naked twelve-year-old girl, brought back by blood bespattered troopers after a dispersal, was given or sold to a Cooktown resident 'whose property she has now become'.
- 65 [Anon.], *Pioneering in the North-West*, p. 3.
- 66 Binnie, *My Life on a Tropic Gold Field*, p. 12.
- 67 *R.M.*, 11 October 1873, 'The Palmer Goldfield'.
- 68 *R.M.*, 6 December 1873, 'A Trip to the Palmer', from *Cleveland Bay Express; Brisbane Telegraph*, 20 January 1874, 'The Palmer'; T. Hamilton, P.M., Cooktown, to Col. Sec., 28 March 1874, enclosing (1) a sworn statement from 16 members of the Palmer Expedition, dated 26 March 1874, (2) an article from the *Brisbane Telegraph*, 20 January 1874, 'The Palmer', and (3) A. Davidson, Aborigines Protection Society, Brisbane, to A. Macalister, Col. Sec., 23 January 1874, Q.S.A. COL/A194, 701 of 1874. See extracts from W. Webb's account of the journey from Cooktown to the Palmer in Jack, *Northmost Australia*, Vol. II, pp. 420-3, and *C.H.*, 19 August 1874.
- 69 *C.C.*, 28 February 1877; 2 March 1878.
- 70 *Mailand Mercury*, 25 November 1875 (*M.L. Newspaper Extracts 1875-1880*, Vol. I).
- 71 Binnie, *My Life on a Tropic Gold Field*, p. 13, refers to the Aborigines' lack of fear of the Chinese. See Q.S.A. JUS/N35, 230 of 1872, inquests into deaths of Ah Pio and Chang Sang, miners, speared by Aborigines at the Gilbert River on 1 November 1872; 238 of 1872, Hug or Ah Cow, miner, speared by Aborigines at the Gilbert River on 12 November 1872; 241 of 1872, Ah Cook, miner, speared by Aborigines at the Gilbert River on 12 November 1872; and 242 of 1872, Cum Ty, miner, speared by Aborigines at Gilbert River on 17 November 1872. See also Palmer, *Early Days in North Queensland*, p. 183.
- 72 Goldfield Warden, Palmerville, to Col. Sec., 23 March 1875, Q.S.A. COL/A208, 1111 of 1875; Binnie, *My Life on a Tropic Gold Field*, pp. 13, 14, 17.
- 73 Hill, *Forty-Five Years' Experiences in North Queensland 1861-1905*, p. 47.
- 74 *C.C.*, 1 January 1878. See also J. Cameron, Gilbert River, to A.H. Palmer, Col. Sec., 24 November 1873, Q.S.A. COL/A195, 1142 of 1874; J.C. Hogflesh to Chief Sec., 8 October 1889, loc. cit.; *C.C.*, 20 June 1874;

- Maitland Mercury*, 25 November 1875 (M.L., *Aboriginal Newspaper Extracts 1875-1880*, Vol. I).
- 75 *M.M.*, 31 October 1874, 'The Palmer' from *C.C.*, 20 September 1874; *Maitland Mercury*, 25 November 1875; *P.D.T.*, 16 November 1878, from *Palmer Chronicle*.
- 76 G.E. Dalrymple, Gold Commissioner and P.M., Gilberton, to Col. Sec., 22 April 1873, Q.S.A. COL/A183, 1009 of 1873; *M.M.*, 30 November 1872. See also inquests Q.S.A. JUS/N35 and N38, 1872: 230, Chang Lang and Ah Pie (plus one other Chinese miner?); Nug Cow; 241, Ah Cook (plus one other Chinese miner?); 242, Cum Ty.
- 77 J. Cameron, Mt Hogan, via Gilberton, to Col. Sec., 18 December 1873, Q.S.A. COL/A195, 1142 of 1874; *M.M.*, 27 September 1873. See also Q.S.A. JUS/N37, 182 and 183 of 1873.
- 78 Jack, *Northmost Australia*, Vol. II, pp. 421, 423.
- 79 Fysh, *Taming the North*, p. 148; H. Holthouse, *River of Gold: The Story of the Palmer River Gold Rush* (Sydney, 1967), p. 72; R. Cilento and C. Lack, *Triumph in the Tropics: an Historical Sketch of Queensland* (Brisbane, 1959), p. 203; Bolton, *A Thousand Miles Away*, p. 57.
- 80 Cilento and Lack, *Triumph in the Tropics*, p. 203; Holthouse, *River of Gold*, pp. 32, 36, 93, 126, 127. See Appendix B for a detailed study of the lives of settlers and their employees lost as a result of Aboriginal resistance.
- 81 Fysh, *Taming the North*, p. 148; Holthouse, *River of Gold*, p. 72; Cilento and Lack, *Triumph in the Tropics*, p. 203; Bolton, *A Thousand Miles Away*, p. 57.
- 82 P.J. Trezise, *Quinkan Country: Adventures in Search of Aboriginal Cave Paintings in Cape York* (Sydney, 1969), pp. 58, 63, 77, 126, 127, 148.
- 83 *Ibid.*, pp. 119, 148. See p. 63 for reference to sorcery.
- 84 R.L. Sharp, 'Steel Axes for Stone Age Australians', in Spicer E.H. (ed.) *Human Problems in Technological Change: A Casebook* (New York, 1952) *passim*.
- 85 *C.C.*, 4 May, 1 June 1894. See Bolton, *A Thousand Miles Away*, p. 61 and Jack, *Northmost Australia*, Vol. II, pp. 466-7, 703-4.
- 86 'Police Commissioner's Report for 1889', *1890 V. & P.*, Vol. I, pp. 978, 979; 'Police Commissioner's Report', *1895 V. & P.*, Vol. I, p. 1047.
- 87 *C.C.*, 11 September 1894.
- 88 *C.C.*, 28 September 1894.

## Chapter 4

- 1 T.G. Birtles, *A Survey of Land Use, Settlement and Society in the Atherton-Evelyn District, North Queensland* (M.A. thesis, Dept of Geography, Sydney University, 1967), Preface, iii. See map, p. 242.
- 2 R.A. Billinton (ed.), *The Frontier Thesis: Valid Interpretation of American History?* (New York, 1966), p. 27. Quoted Birtles, *Land Use, Settlement and Society* Preface iii.
- 3 Birtles, *Land Use, Settlement and Society*, pp. 19-22.
- 4 C. Palmerston, 'From Herberton to the Barron Falls, North Queensland',

- Royal Geographical Society of Australasia, New South Wales Branch, Transactions and Proceedings*, (1885-86), p. 232. See also p. 233: 'we emerged upon another scrupulously cleaned pocket. It . . . has a floorlike appearance'.
- 5 J.V. Mulligan, 'Expedition in Search of Gold and Other Minerals in the Palmer Districts, by Mulligan and Party', *1877 V. & P.*, Vol. III, p. 399; Palmerston, 'Herberton to Barron Falls', pp. 232, 233, 241, 242, also commented on the network of paths north of this area.
  - 6 *Queensland Figaro*, 12 February 1887.
  - 7 C. Lumholtz, *Among Cannibals* (London, 1889), pp. 128-31, 135-6; W.E. Roth, *North Queensland Ethnography. Bulletins 1-8* (Brisbane, 1901-5); 'Bulletins 9-18' in *Records of the Australian Museum*, VI-VIII (1907-10). See especially 'Food, Its Search, Capture, and Preparation', *North Queensland Ethnography, Bulletin 3*; 'Superstition, Magic and Medicine', *ibid.*, *Bulletin 5*; and 'Miscellaneous Papers', *ibid.*, *Bulletin 11*. Roth also submitted reports on three groups of Aborigines of the Atherton-Evelyn District and a report on the Aborigines of the Lower Tully River. These were not published in full although extracts were used in the *North Queensland Ethnography Bulletins*. The unpublished material is in the Mitchell Library, Sydney [uncatalogued manuscript 216]. Copies of these are now held at James Cook Library.
  - 8 N.B. Tindale and J.B. Birdsell, 'Tasmanoid Tribes in North Queensland: Results of the Harvard-Adelaide Universities Anthropological Expedition, 1938-39', *South Australian Museum Records*, 7 (1914), pp. 1-3. Unlike most earlier observers, who saw the Aborigines as peculiarly homogeneous, Tindale and Birdsell argued that the mainland Aborigines came from two distinct strains, each separate from the Tasmanians. This view has not generally been accepted by more recent anthropologists. See R.M. and C.H. Berndt, *The World of the First Australians*, p. 16. Berndt refers to a number of reputable critics of this theory: McCarthy, Abbie, and Macintosh.
  - 9 R.M.W. Dixon, *The Dyirbal Language of North Queensland* (Cambridge, 1972), pp. 2, 22, 340; Tindale, *Aboriginal Tribes of Australia: Djirabal*.
  - 10 Dixon, *The Dyirbal Language*, p. 348. See pp. 347-51; Tindale and Birdsell, 'Tasmanoid Tribes in North Queensland', p. 6.
  - 11 N.W.G. Macintosh and S.L. Larnach, 'A Cranial Study of the Aborigines of Queensland with a contrast between Australian and New Guinea Crania', in R.L. Kirk (ed.), *The Human Biology of Aborigines in Cape York* (Canberra, 1973), p. 4.
  - 12 R.T. Simmons, 'Blood Group Genetic Studies in the Cape York Area', in Kirk (ed.), *The Human Biology of Aborigines*, p. 23.
  - 13 Tindale and Birdsell, 'Tasmanoid Tribes in North Queensland', pp. 1-8. Some rainforest people were sent to Palm Island. See Loos, *Aboriginal-European Relations in North Queensland*, p. 251, for a discussion of population estimates and tribal boundaries. The text should read: 'a census undertaken in 1896 indicates a population of at least 2,300' not '... at least 2,634'.
  - 14 Bolton, *A Thousand Miles Away*, pp. 77, 135, 145, 147. See also Birtles, *Land Use, Settlement and Society*, pp. 68, 120-3, and *Cairns Post*, 11 April 1888, editorial. The 1876 and 1884 Land Acts required five years' residence

- on the selection although the later Act allowed for an initial two years' period when the selector could allow a bailiff to reside on the new block to work it before commencing his stipulated five years' residential period.
- 15 'Police Commissioner's Report for 1878', *1879 V. & P.*, p. 752.
  - 16 Collinson, *Early Days of Cairns*, p. 62; *C.P.*, 11 April 1888, editorial.
  - 17 Bolton, *A Thousand Miles Away*, pp. 61, 110, 117-18; *P.D.T.*, 30 August 1879; 4 December 1886, 'Importance of Gold Discovery on Russell River'. The discoverer of the field, Christie Palmerston, at first had the Aborigines here working for him. See C. Palmerston, 'The Diary of a Northern Pioneer', C. Palmerston, 'From Herberton to the Barron Falls', and C. Palmerston 'The Explorer: From Mourilyan Harbour to Herberton', *Queenslander*, 22 September, 29 September, and 6 October 1883. The slightest sign of gold brought a rush of European and Chinese prospectors which might quickly swell to three or four hundred: 'From Herberton to Barron Falls', p. 237.
  - 18 *Queenslander*, 8 December 1877, editorial. See also *M.M.*, 24 November 1877, and *P.M.*, Cairns, to Col. Sec., 19 November 1877 [telegram], Q.S.A. COL/A248, 5357 of 1877.
  - 19 *The Townsville Herald*, 29 December 1877.
  - 20 *C.P.*, 11 April 1888. See also, *P.D.T.*, 30 August, 25 October 1879; Sub-Insp. Stuart, Port Douglas, to Sub-Insp. Nowlan, 1 October 1879, Q.S.A. POL/12B/G2; 'Warden Towner's Report on the Mulgrave Goldfield', *1882 V. & P.*, Vol. II p. 768; *M.M.*, 28 August 1880, 'Blacks on Mulgrave', from *Cairns Advertiser*.
  - 21 *P.D.T.*, 30 September 1882, from *Herberton Advertiser*. See also Petition from businessmen, mineowners, miners and residents generally [265 signatures] of Herberton District to T. McIlwraith, Premier and Col. Sec. of the Colony of Queensland, 3 April 1882, Q.S.A. COL/A335, 2409 of 1882; Dixon, *The Dyirbal Language*, pp. 24, 25, 34. Tindale map, *Aboriginal Tribes of Australia*.
  - 22 Bolton, *A Thousand Miles Away*, pp. 118-20; *C.P.*, 9 July 1885: 'Aborigines 200 strong near road'; 8 October 1887, 'Blacks on the Warpath'; 26 October 1887, 'Police Protection in the Herberton District'.
  - 23 *P.D.T.*, 8 September 1883, 'Telegraphic News', Brisbane, 5 September 1883; *C.P.*, 22 May, 3 July, 10 July 1884; 1 January, 29 January, 14 August, 21 August, 3 December 1885; 11 February 1886.
  - 24 I. Henry, Cardwell, to Col. Sec., 9 September 1885, Q.S.A. COL/A437, 6952 of 1885. See minutes by Griffith and Police Commissioner Seymour. See Bolton, *A Thousand Miles Away*, pp. 144-52 for the decline of the sugar industry from late 1883.
  - 25 *Queenslander*, 13 March 1886, 'Johnstone River'; *P.M.*, Cairns, to Col. Sec., 3 September 1880, Q.S.A. COL/A298, 4813 of 1880.
  - 26 J.W. Stewart, J.P., Daintree, to Col. Sec., 21 April 1885 [telegram]; H. Smith, Clerk, Port Douglas Divisional Board, to Col. Sec., 10 April 1885; Pol. Com. to Col. Sec., 27 April 1885, encl. Q.S.A. COL/A437, 6952 of 1885. See also *C.P.*, 16 April 1885; *H.A.*, 15 June 1885, 'Blacks on Daintree'.
  - 27 For the Lower Herbert, see *Queenslander*, 31 March, 21 April, 5 May, 2 June 1877; 10 August 1878; 8 February, 11 October 1879; 26 November 1887. For the Cairns District, see *Queenslander*, 23 December 1876, 'Some Wrinkles

- About Trinity Bay and the Hodgkinson by Dry Fiddler'; 2 August 1879; 20 January, 26 June 1886; Constable J.H. Norris, Smithfield, to Insp. Isley, Cairns, 23 February 1878, Q.S.A. POL/12B/G1, p. 22; *C.P.*, 11 February 1886.
- 28 Birtles, *Land Use, Settlement and Society* pp. 151-5. See Table 2.
- 29 *P.D.T.*, 1 January 1885, 'The Noble Savage', from the *Wild River Times*; *C.P.*, 7 August 1884, letter to editor from John Atherton, Emerald End.
- 30 Petition of Residents of Herberton District [215 signatures] to Col. Sec., 6 March 1885; Pol. Com. to Col. Sec., 19 March 1885; Tinaroo Progress Association, Herberton, to Col. Sec., 18 April 1885; Insp. J.B. Isley, Port Douglas, to Pol. Com., 5 May 1885, encl. Q.S.A. COL/A428, 4592 of 1885.
- 31 *H.A.*, 21 August 1885; 21 October 1887; 4 January 1889; *C.P.*, 1 February 1888.
- 32 *C.P.*, 1 August 1888, 'Barron Valley Protection'; *H.A.*, 11 April 1890, a letter signed 'Selector'.
- 33 *H.A.*, 10 December 1886 (Telegraphic News, Geraldton, 6 December 1886); 11 February, 22 July, 26 August, 30 September, 21 October 1887.
- 34 *H.A.*, 26 February 1886; 11 February, 17 June 1887.
- 35 *C.P.*, 26 June 1889.
- 36 *H.A.*, 11 April 1890, letter signed 'Selector'. See also *H.A.*, 4 February, 17 June, 8, 15 July, 21 October 1887; *C.P.*, 26 October 1887; R.C. Ringrose, Hon. Sec., Tinaroo Progress Association, Herberton, to B.D. Morehead, Col. Sec., 16 July 1888, encl. Q.S.A. COL/A558, 7966 of 1888.
- 37 *C.P.*, 1 February 1888. See also *H.A.*, 27 January, 3 February 1888.
- 38 *H.A.*, 3 February 1888.
- 39 'Report of the Hodgkinson and Mulgrave Gold Fields', 1883-84 *V. & P.*, p. 1558; 'Report of the Hodgkinson and Mulgrave Gold Fields', 1884 *V. & P.*, pp. 191, 192; *C.P.*, 1 February, 4 August 1888.
- 40 B. Sheridan, P.M., Maryborough, to Col. Sec., 12 August 1880, Q.S.A. COL/A298, 4590 of 1880; Sgt Greene, Herberton, to Sub-Insp. Britton, Port Douglas, 22 October 1883, Q.S.A. COL/A372, 5714 of 1883; Sub-Insp. Carr, Barron River, to Under Col. Sec., 30 June 1884, Q.S.A. COL/A429, 4936 of 1885. Certain rations were given to Aborigines at Thornborough, Kingsborough, the Hodgkinson River, and the Barron River. These Aborigines had apparently previously been let in. Mention is made of feeding children. The examples noted above fitted into the framework of a nineteenth century government's responsibility for its citizens, limited though the concept was, especially in Queensland. P.M., Cardwell, to Under Col. Sec., 16 September 1886, and Broad Brothers, Kirrama, via Cashmere, Herberton, to Col. Sec., 10 July 1886, encl. Q.S.A. COL/A483, 7578 of 1886.
- 41 *C.P.*, 4 August 1888: two petitions, one for Barron Valley and the second for the Evelyn Scrubs selectors. See also R.C. Ringrose, Hon. Sec., Tinaroo Progress Association, Herberton, to B.D. Morehead, Col. Sec., 16 July 1888, and Mears, Clerk of Tinaroo Provisional Board, Herberton, to Col. Sec., 3 July 1888; and Mears, Clerk of Tinaroo Divisional Board, Herberton, to Col. Sec., 15 August 1888 encl. Q.S.A. COL/A558, 7966 of 1888; *H.A.*, 18 January 1889: petition to have Native Police camp at Nigger Creek re-

- established. For the use of guards, see *C.P.*, 12 August 1888; *H.A.*, 11 January 1889. See *C.C.*, 30 October 1888, (Telegraphic News, Brisbane, 30 October), for reference to deputation of northern members to the Colonial Secretary.
- 42 A.H. Zillman, P.M., Herberton, to Col. Sec., 30 June 1892, Q.S.A. COL/A703, 8171 of 1892. The eventual solution to the Aboriginal resistance led to a dramatic expansion of agriculture which Zillman believed would be inhibited if the resistance was renewed. See also *C.P.*, 26 October 1887; 1 February, 1 August 1888; *H.A.*, 4 January 1889.
- 43 Insp. Isley, Port Douglas, to Pol. Com., 26 February 1880, Q.S.A. POL/12B/G2, 19 of 1880. The Port Douglas-Cairns police records are the only ones discovered in this study to reveal Native Police action. His predecessor, Inspector Stuart, had made a similar comment: 'The only officer that will be any use here is a good bushman—a man that can walk all day through the scrubs and over the Ranges with his boys and if necessary camp out a week without his blankets'. See Insp. J. Stuart, Port Douglas, to Pol. Com., 2 January 1880, Q.S.A. POL/12B/G2, 3 of 1880. See also *C.P.*, 3 July 1884, letter to editor, signed 'Mulgrave Settler', complaining Sub-Insp. Carr used well-frequented tracks. He mentioned the need for foot patrols. See also *C.P.* 10 July 1884.
- 44 *Q.P.D.*, XLVII, 1885, p. 825, Col. Sec., debate on Supply. See also Insp. J. Stuart, Port Douglas, to Pol. Com., 25 August 1879, Q.S.A. POL/12B/G2, 222 of 1879; Stuart to Pol. Com., 2 January 1880, Q.S.A. POL/12B/G2, 3 of 1880; Insp. J. Stuart, Port Douglas, to Pol. Com., 12 September 1879, Q.S.A. POL/12B/G2, 239 of 1879; Insp. J. Stuart, Port Douglas, to Pol. Com., 23 August 1879, Q.S.A. POL/12B/G2, 221 of 1879, for Native Police work in the rainforest.
- 45 Insp. J. Stuart, Port Douglas, to Pol. Com., 23 August 1879, Q.S.A. POL/12B/G2, 221 of 1879; Insp. Isley, Port Douglas, to Pol. Com., 5 May 1885, Q.S.A. COL/A428, 4592 of 1885.
- 46 Douglas Divisional Board to Col. Sec., 10 April 1885; Pol. Com. to Col. Sec., 27 April 1885, encl. Q.S.A. COL/A437, 6952 of 1885.
- 47 'Report of the Commissioner of Police for 1878', 1879 *V. & P.*, p. 752; 'Report of the Commissioner of Police for 1884', 1885 *V. & P.*, Vol. I, p. 543.
- 48 Pol. Com. to Col. Sec., 19 May 1885; Pol. Com. to Col. Sec., 24 June 1885, encl. Q.S.A. COL/A428, 4592 of 1885; Pol. Com. to Col. Sec., 27 April 1885, encl. Q.S.A. COL/A437, 6952 of 1885.
- 49 *H.A.*, 27 January 1888; *C.P.*, 1 February 1888; Bolton, *A Thousand Miles Away*, pp. 144-54; 'Report of Royal Commission: Recruiting Polynesian Labourers in New Guinea and adjacent Islands', 1885 *V. & P.*, Vol. II, pp. 813-32; *C.P.*, 30 July 1885, report of a meeting of the Cairns Progress Association: Mr Patience referred to an interview with Griffith in Brisbane when he 'found the Premier altogether adverse to the Native Police Force and anxious to abolish it'. See also *Q.P.D.*, 1885, Vol. XLVII, p. 825. The Colonial Secretary and Premier, Griffith, had said: 'He should be very glad if the Government could see their way to abolish the native police altogether'.
- 50 *Q.P.D.*, 1885, Vol. XLVII, p. 826, Col. Sec.
- 51 *Wild River Times*, 30 December 1884: 'for it must be remembered that the

- old way of dispersing blacks is done away with and no harm will now be done to them'; *C.P.*, 16 April 1885: 'We have been told pretty often of late that there is but one law for the white and the black, both having to undergo the same ordeal when indicted for crime or misdemeanour'; *C.P.*, 7 August 1884, letter from John Atherton, Emerald End; *H.A.*, 14 January 1885, 'To Shoot or Not to Shoot': 'What a fine frenzy of human feeling ran through the Colonial Secretary's speech when he declared that he would have justice avenged on the murderer of the poor niggers at Herberton'. See *H.A.*, 24 January 1885, for trial of Sub-Insp. Nichols and his troopers. J.W. Stewart, J.P., Daintree, to Col. Sec., 21 April 1885 [telegram]; Minute D.T. Seymour [Pol. Com.], 22 April 1885; Pol. Com. to Col. Sec., 27 April 1885, encl. Q.S.A. COL/A437, 6952 of 1885.
- 52 Pol. Com. to Col. Sec., 24 June 1885; Insp. J. Isley, Port Douglas, to Pol. Com., 5, 19 May 1885; Pol. Com. to Col. Sec., 19 March 1885, encl. Q.S.A. COL/A428, 4592 of 1885. See also *C.P.*, 30 July 1885.
- 53 Pol. Com. to Col. Sec., 24 June 1885, loc. cit.
- 54 'Report of the Commissioner of Police for 1886', *1887 V. & P.*, p. 1082; *C.P.*, 3 December 1885, 'New Native Police Camp Established at Mulgrave Reserve'; *Q.P.D.*, Vol. XLVII, 24 September 1885, pp. 825, 826, Col. Sec.
- 55 *C.P.*, 3 December 1885, 'New Native Police Camp Established at Mulgrave Reserve'; *C.P.*, 11 February 1886. He was now Sergeant Whelan.
- 56 Const. J. Higgins, Atherton, to Insp. Lamond, Herberton, 28 July 1891, Q.S.A. POL/12B/N1. See also Higgins to Insp. J. Stuart, Port Douglas, 13 September 1889, Q.S.A. POL/12B/N1, 33 of 1889. Higgins reported Hansen, at the Russell River, needed two more trackers and more ammunition. [Senior Const.] G. Brett, for Insp. Police, Townsville, 30 April 1896, Minute of Pol. Com., W.E. Parry-Okeden, to Under Col. Sec., 12 May 1896, encl. Q.S.A. COL/139, 13634 of 1896; W. Craig, Niagara Vale, Cardwell, to Col. Sec., 4 April 1896, Minute W.E.P.O. [Pol. Com.], 25 April 1896, encl. Q.S.A. COL/139, 13643 of 1896; Const. Higgins, Atherton, to Insp. J. Stuart, Port Douglas, 12 November 1889, 39 of 1889: '... the Const. and Tracker Rooshan dispersed a mob of Blacks that was camped up [Poison] Gully'; Higgins to Stuart, 25 November 1889, 40 of 1889; Higgins to Stuart, 13 December 1889, 212 of 1889; Higgins to Stuart, 20 February 1890, 3 of 1890; Higgins to Stuart, 27 February 1890, 5 of 1890; Higgins to Sub-Insp. Lamond, Herberton, 21 May 1891; Higgins to Lamond, 8 July 1891: all enclosed Q.S.A. POL/12B/N1.
- 57 'Report of the Commissioner of Police for 1886', *1887 V. & P.*, p. 1082.
- 58 Pol. Com. to Col. Sec., 19 March 1885, encl. Q.S.A. COL/A428, 4592 of 1885.
- 59 Pol. Com. to Col. Sec., 19 May 1885, encl. Q.S.A. COL/A428, 4592 of 1885. For settler expectations, see W. Bonan, Chairman, Tinaroo Progress Association, Herberton, to Col. Sec. enclosed Q.S.A. COL/A428, 4592 of 1885; *H.A.*, 21 August 1885; 20 May, 17 June 1887; *C.P.*, 26 October 1887; 1 August 1888, letter from 'Selector'.
- 60 Pol. Com. to Col. Sec., 19 May 1885, loc. cit.
- 61 R.C. Ringrose, Hon. Sec., Tinaroo Progress Association, Herberton, to B.D.



- Morehead, Col. Sec., 16 July 1888, encl. Q.S.A. COL/A558, 7966 of 1888.
- 62 C. Mears, Clerk of Tinaroo Divisional Board, Herberton, to Col. Sec., 3 July 1888; Mears, to Under Col. Sec., 15 August 1888, and Minute J. Finucane, pro Pol. Com., 28 August 1888, encl. Q.S.A. COL/A558, 7966 of 1888; W. Craig, Niagara Vale, Cardwell, to Col. Sec., 4 April 1896, encl. Q.S.A. COL/139, 13634 of 1896. See Minute by Pol. Com., W.E. Parry-Okeden, 25 April 1896: 'Cons. Hansen was selected specially because of his known humanity and special fitness for the work'. It is not clear whether this refers to his first appointment or to his transfer to the Cardwell District after he had established his reputation at Atherton. His actions at Atherton, especially his use of local Aborigines, suggest strongly that he went there with special instructions. See Loos, *Aboriginal-European Relations in North Queensland*, pp. 284-6, for the role of local initiative.
- 63 H.A., 3 February 1888. This issue contains articles on the deputation and Zillman's appointment. See A. Zillman, P.M., Herberton, to Col. Sec., 27 February 1888, Q.S.A. COL/A538, 2063 of 1888. Zillman took up duty on 27 February 1888. Zillman to Under Col. Sec., 18 June 1889, encl. Q.S.A. COL/139, 11961 of 1890. See also Zillman to Under Col. Sec., 28 June 1889, enclosed Q.S.A. COL/139, 11961 of 1890: 'I fear I am troubling you over-much on this subject but must plead the very deep interest I take in it'.
- 64 Const. C. Hansen, Atherton, to Insp. Stuart, Port Douglas, 25 November 1888, Q.S.A. POL/12B/N1, 1 of 1888. See also Hansen to Stuart, 2 January 1889, and Hansen to Stuart, 3 February 1889, Q.S.A. POL/12B/N1. (These letters are not numbered.) See also Dixon, *The Dyirbal Language*, pp. 23, 24, for the degree of communication possible between the various languages in this area. C.P., 29 December 1888; Zillman to Under Col. Sec., 26 February 1889, Q.S.A. COL/139, 1789 of 1889; W.B. Kelly, on behalf of the settlers of the Upper Barron Valley, to Insp. Stewart [*sic*], Port Douglas, 23 February 1889, encl. Q.S.A. COL/139, 11961 of 1890.
- 65 See *Government Gazette*, 21 March 1889, p. 1041, for identity of Mayor; Zillman to Under Col. Sec., 1 March 1889, encl. Q.S.A. COL/139, 11961 of 1890. See minute J.M., 12 March 1889.
- 66 Zillman to Under Col. Sec., 15 March 1889, encl. Q.S.A. COL/139, 11961 of 1890. Minute B.D.M. [Col. Sec.], 22 March 1889.
- 67 F.T. Wimble, M.L.A. Brisbane, to Col. Sec., 20 March 1889; G.S. Davis, Clerk, Tinaroo Divisional Board, Herberton, to Col. Sec., 4 July 1889; Insp. J. Stuart, Port Douglas, to Pol. Com., 19 March 1889, encl. Q.S.A. COL/139, 11961 of 1890. His was conventional colonial wisdom stated, however, with authority:  
to civilize the wild aboriginal the primary step is to overcome his fear of the white man which can only be done through his stomach but once that is accomplished the remainder of his education is mainly a matter of time.
- 68 Zillman to Under Col. Sec., 7 June 1889; Zillman to Under Col. Sec., 18 June 1889, encl. Q.S.A. COL/139, 11961 of 1890. For kinship obligations, see R.M. and C.H. Berndt, *The World of the First Australians*, pp. 105-7.
- 69 *Ibid.*, Zillman to Under Col. Sec., 26 August 1889, encl. Q.S.A. COL/139, 11961 of 1890. See also Birtles, *Land Use, Settlement and Society*, pp. 155-6,

- 183, 187, 198-202, and Loos, Aboriginal-European Relations in North Queensland, pp. 291-2, for discussion of agricultural expansion.
- 70 Zillman to Under Col. Sec., 26 August 1889, loc. cit.
- 71 Zillman to Col. Sec., 28 June 1889; Zillman to Col. Sec., 9 September 1889; Zillman to Under Col. Sec., 27 September 1889; W. Atherton, Herberton, to P.M., Herberton, 24 August 1889, encl. Q.S.A. COL/139, 11961 of 1890.
- 72 G.P.M. Murray, Relieving P.M., Brisbane, to Under Col. Sec., 13 November 1889, encl. Q.S.A. COL/139, 2853 of 1894. See also Sub-Insp. J. Brooke, Barron Water to Insp. Stuart, Port Douglas, 23 April 1889; and F. Robinson, Waroora Station, to Sub-Insp. J. Brooke, Barron Water, 6 June 1889, encl. Q.S.A. COL/139, 11961 of 1890.
- 73 Zillman to Under Col. Sec., 27 September 1889, encl. Q.S.A. COL/139, 11961 of 1890.
- 74 Ibid., Minute B.D.M., 7 October 1889. See also W.H. Ryder, Assistant Under Col. Sec., to G.P.M. Murray, Relieving P.M., Brisbane, encl. Q.S.A. COL/139, 11961 of 1890.
- 75 G.P.M. Murray, Relieving P.M., Brisbane, to Under Col. Sec., 13 November 1889, encl. Q.S.A. COL/139, 2853 of 1894.
- 76 Under Sec., Department of Lands, to Under Col. Sec., 4 February 1890; B/C. 10800 Lands, 6 December 1889; Cairns Divisional Board to Under Col. Sec., 11 January 1890, Woothakata (Thornborough) Divisional Board, to Under Col. Sec., 16 January 1890, Tinaroo (Herberton) Divisional Board to Under Col. Sec., 4 February 1890, encl. Q.S.A. COL/139, 11961 of 1890. See also Zillman to Under Col. Sec., 27 November 1891, encl. Q.S.A. COL/139, 823 of 1895.
- 77 W.B. Kelly, Atherton, to Sub-Insp. Lamond, Herberton, 18 September 1890; Sub-Insp. Lamond, Herberton, to Insp. Murray, Cooktown, 29 September 1890, Const. J.G. Higgins, Atherton, to Sub-Insp. Lamond, Herberton, 10 September 1890; Insp. F. Murray, Cooktown, to Pol. Com., 13 October 1890, Minute: H.T. [Col. Sec. Tozer], 17 November 1890, encl. Q.S.A. COL/139, 11961 of 1890; Zillman to Under Col. Sec., 30 June 1892, Q.S.A. COL/A703, 8171 of 1892.
- 78 Zillman to Under Col. Sec., 30 June 1892, Q.S.A. COL/A703, 8171 of 1892.
- 79 Ibid., Zillman to Under Col. Sec., 20 September 1893; Zillman to Under Col. Sec., 14 December 1891, encl. Q.S.A. COL/139, 823 of 1895; W.B. Kelly, Atherton, to B.D. Morehead, Premier [late May 1890], encl. Q.S.A. COL/139, 11961 of 1890; A.R. MacDonald, P.M., Herberton, to Under Col. Sec., 7 June 1895, encl. Q.S.A. COL/139, 16681 of 1896.
- 80 Murray to Under Col. Sec., 13 November 1889, loc. cit.; A. Longden, J.P., Mt Orient, to Col. Sec., 22 October 1889, Q.S.A. COL/139, 9303 of 1889; C. Masterton, Daintree River, to Chief Sec., 15 October 1891 [telegram]; Macarthur, P.M., Port Douglas, to Under Col. Sec., 6 December 1892; encl. Q.S.A. COL/139, 1581 of 1894; Sub-Insp. J. Lamond, Herberton, to A.H. Zillman, P.M., Herberton, 3 June 1892, and Zillman to Under Col. Sec., 6 June 1892, encl. Q.S.A. COL/139, 16681 of 1896; A.C. Haldane, P.M., Herberton, to Under Home Sec., 5 November 1896, encl. Q.S.A. COL/139, 7080 of 1897; Zillman to Under Col. Sec., 27 March 1893, Q.S.A.

- COL/139, 3674 of 1893.
- 81 E.D. Collins and 23 other residents of the Murray and Tully Rivers to Col. Sec., 20 October 1893; Ernest Brooke and 16 other residents of the Tully and Murray Rivers, to Col. Sec., 28 March 1895; Insp. F. Murray to Pol. Com., 3 June 1895, Minute H.T. [Col. Sec. Tozer], 18 June 1895, encl. Q.S.A. COL/139, 13634 of 1896.
- 82 P.M., Cairns, to Under Col. Sec., 31 August 1895, Minute [Col. Sec. Tozer], 11 September 1895, encl. Q.S.A. COL/139, 10689 of 1895.
- 83 E. Hannam, Myola, to Col. Sec., 3 October 1895, Q.S.A. COL/139, 12189 of 1895. See Minute [Tozer], 19 October 1895; F.W. Myles, P.M., Bowen, to Under Col. Sec., 1 February 1890, Minutes: [Tozer], 12 November 1890 and Pol. Com. [n.d.], and A. Barton, Sec. Kennedy Hospital Board, 11 February 1893, Minute [Tozer], 28 February 1893, encl. Q.S.A. COL/139, 1211 of 1890. Telegram, Insp. Lamond, Thornborough, to Pol. Com., 11 November 1891, departmental minutes, 11 November 1891, and Tozer's minute, 12 November 1891, encl. Q.S.A. COL/139, 823 of 1895.
- 84 Murray to Under Col. Sec., 13 November 1889, loc. cit.; See Loos, *Aboriginal-European Relations in North Queensland*, Chapter 10 for missions and Chapter 11 for the evolution of government policy.
- 85 Zillman to Under Col. Sec., 27 November 1891, encl. Q.S.A. COL/139, 823 of 1895.
- 86 *H.A.*, 22 July, 30 September 1887.
- 87 Zillman to Under Col. Sec., 15 March 1889; Zillman to Under Col. Sec., 18 June 1889; Robinson to Sub-Insp. J. Brooke, 6 June 1889.

## Chapter 5

- 1 Bolton, *A Thousand Miles Away*, p. 76; Loos, *Aboriginal-European Relations in North Queensland*, Chapter 3, pp. 89, 90; Cannon, *Savage Scenes from Australia*, p. 30, mentioned that small vessels collecting bêche-de-mer for the Chinese market called at Somerset, 'manned by Solomon Islanders, Fijians, and "other Kanakas"'. The settlement was established in 1864. H.M. Chester, *Autobiography and Parodies* (typescript copy, M.L., B 1416), p. 13.
- 2 C.D. Aplin, P.M., Somerset, to Col. Sec., 3 March 1875, 'Records of Somerset, 1872-1877' (D.L.); 'Bêche-de-mer and Pearl-Shell Fisheries of Northern Queensland', 1890 *V. & P.*, Vol. III, p. 4. See Table 3 for returns for the industry 1880 to 1889; 'Bêche-de-mer and Pearl-Shell Fisheries of Northern Queensland', 1890 *V. & P.*, Vol. III, pp. 3, 4; W. Saville-Kent, *The Great Barrier Reef of Australia; Its Products and Potentialities* (London, 1893), p. 204.
- 3 Beaglehole, *Cook's Endeavour Journal*, p. 388: Cook observed pearlshell ornaments; 'Notes on Pearlshell Fishery of Queensland', Q.S.A. HAR/48, p. 1; F.L. Jardine, P.M., Somerset, to Col. Sec., 1 November 1870, 'Somerset Letterbook 2 September 1868-30 December 1871' (D.L.). See also 'Extracts from Somerset Letter Book No. 1 of the Police Magistrate, Somerset Settlement, 28 July 1869-1 October 1870' (M.L., B 1415).

- 4 Aplin to Col. Sec., 3 March 1875, 'Records of Somerset, 1872-1877' (D.L.).
- 5 Ibid., H.M. Chester, P.M., Somerset, to Col. Sec., 7 May 1877, 'Records of Somerset 1872-1877' (D.L.).
- 6 Saville-Kent, *The Great Barrier Reef*, pp. 204-9. See Table 4.
- 7 W. Saville-Kent, 'Pearl and Pearl Fisheries of Northern Queensland', 1890 *V. & P.*, Vol. III, pp. 704-5; Captain C. Pennefather, Q.G.S. *Pearl*, Thursday Island, to Col. Sec., 31 October 1882, 'Extracts from Queensland Government Records, Somerset, 1869-1882' (D.L.).
- 8 'Bêche-de-mer and Pearl-shell Fisheries of Northern Queensland', 1890 *V. & P.*, Vol. III, p. 728. Hereafter: 'Saville-Kent's Report', 1890 *V. & P.*
- 9 'Saville-Kent's Report, 1890 *V. & P.*, p. 732.
- 10 'Annual Report of the Government Resident at Thursday Island', 1890 *V. & P.*, Vol. III, p. 172.
- 11 'Saville-Kent's Report', 1890 *V. & P.*, p. 728. See also 'Annual Report of the Govt. Res. at Thursday Island', 1890 *V. & P.*, Vol. III, p. 172. 'Manilla' was the accepted spelling.
- 12 Dr W.E. Roth, Northern Protector of Aborigines, Cooktown, to Pol. Com., 6 May 1898, 6944 of 1898, Q.S.A. COL/142; Insp. J. Stuart, Brisbane, to W.E. Parry-Okeden, Pol. Com., Gayndah, 19 March 1898, Q.S.A. POL/1, p. 29, quoting from a telegram from the Government Resident, John Douglas. See also Roth to Pol. Com., 6 May 1898, for Douglas's attempt to prevent women and children being employed.
- 13 Aplin To Col. Sec., 3 March 1875, 'Report on the Pearl Fisheries of Torres Straits'; F.L. Jardine, P.M., Somerset, to Col. Sec., 1 January 1872, 2 of 1872: *Active* had 47 tons of bêche-de-mer and one ton of pearlshell; Jardine to Col. Sec., 1 May 1873, 106 of 1873, 'Records of Somerset 1872-1877' (D.L.); Saville-Kent, *The Great Barrier Reef*, p. 205; H.M. Chester, P.M., Somerset, to Col. Sec., 7 May 1877, 'Records of Somerset 1872-1877', 57 of 1877 (D.L.).
- 14 Saville-Kent, *The Great Barrier Reef*, pp. 205-6. See also Roth to Pol. Com., 6 May 1898.
- 15 G.E. Dalrymple, C.C.L., Bowen, to Col. Sec., 10 October 1861, Q.S.A. COL/A22, 2787 of 1861, and inquests into the deaths of N. Millar, seaman, and Henry Irving, Q.S.A. JUS/N3, 65 of 1861; J. Jardine, P.M., Rockhampton to Col. Sec., 14 June 1862, Q.S.A. COL/A30, 1618 of 1862: 'another of the many instances of the folly of putting any faith in the Natives of our North coast'; Sheridan, P.M., Cardwell, to Col. Sec., 3 February 1872, Q.S.A. COL/A166, 254 of 1872: two men, Smith and Clements, killed on a fishing expedition at Gould Island about eleven miles from Cardwell; *P.D.T.*, 27 January 1877: three prospectors landed at Cape Sidmouth; *M.M.*, 14 September 1878, and *P.D.T.*, 17 August 1878 and 24 August 1878: the cook, John Morrison, of the *Louisa Maria*. See also file Q.S.A. TRE/A19, 1818 of 1878 for *Louisa Maria*.
- 16 G.J. Griffin, Sub-Collector Customs, Port Hinchinbrook, to Col. Treasurer, 5 February 1879, Q.S.A. TRE/A20, 343 of 1879. See also *P.D.T.*, 4 July 1874, for account of an attack by Aborigines upon two men in a boat anchored off Great Palm Island for the night.

- 17 *The Story of James Morrill*, p. 12. Aplin to Col. Sec., 11 May 1875, 'Records of Somerset 1872-1877', 53 of 1875 (D.L.). See also Cilento and Lack, 'Wild White Men' in Queensland, pp. 25-8, 31-4.
- 18 J. Hall Scott, Bowen, to Col. Sec., 26 October 1865, Q.S.A. COL/A72, 2993 of 1865; *P.D.T.*, 26 October 1867; *M.M.*, 18 September 1878, two of crew of *Eliza*; *P.D.T.*, 14 September 1878, two of crew of *Riser*; *P.D.T.*, 28 March 1872; *Brisbane Courier*, 22 March 1872; 'New Guinea Expedition per Brig "Maria"', 1872 *V. & P.*, of N.S.W., encl. Q.S.A. COL/A172, 1812 of 1872; P.M., Cooktown, to Col. Sec., 8 July 1887, Q.S.A. COL/A508, 5503 of 1887: two shipwrecked sailors attacked by some Aborigines and rescued by others.
- 19 See *P.D.T.*, 28 March 1872. The paper reported the killers of the *Maria* castaways were punished 'for their inhuman treatment of the unfortunates'; F. Byerley, Northern Engineer of Roads, Rockhampton, to Col. Sec., 23 September 1861, encl. Q.S.A. COL/A22, 2787 of 1861; *M.M.*, 31 August 1878, editorial; *P.D.T.*, 14 September 1878.
- 20 C.C., 22 April 1892, 'The Fisheries Act'. This report of a petition of Cairns fishermen to the Chief Secretary indicated how completely accepted this belief was:

1st.—We would point out that payment of wages every three months is quite unworkable when applied to floating stations (i.e. fishing carried on by large vessels, schooners, etc.), which start on a cruise of from 6 to 10 months at a stretch, and extending from the reefs off Keppel Bay in the South to the reefs off Thursday Island in the North . . . loss of time would occur when the seamen are paid, as they would certainly require a few days or weeks to spend their wages, and in the case of aboriginals, if paid anywhere near their homes, they would clear out, in most cases for good.

See also H.M. Chester, P.M., Somerset, to Col. Sec., 19 December 1876, 'Letterbook of the Somerset Settlement, Cape York Peninsula 1 January 1872-December 1877', Q.S.A. Accession Number 13/5.

- 21 Chester to Immigration Agent, Brisbane, 30 November 1869, 'Somerset Letterbook 2 September 1868-30 December 1871', 19 of 1869 (D.L.); F.L. Jardine, P.M., Somerset, to Col. Sec., 1 November 1870, 'Somerset Letterbook 2 September 1868-30 December 1871', 61 of 1870 (D.L.); Jardine to Col. Sec., 19 February 1872, enclosing copy of a letter from J. Moresby, Captain H.M.S. *Basilisk*, to Jardine, 17 February 1872, and copy of a letter from Jardine to Moresby, 'Records of Somerset 1872-1877', 5 of 1872 (D.L.).
- 22 Jardine to Col. Sec., 1 January 1872, 'Records of Somerset 1872-1877', 2 of 1872 (D.L.); Chester to Col. Sec., 2 August 1876, 'Records of Somerset 1872-1877', 78 of 1876 (D.L.). Chester remarked that there were about five hundred 'natives' engaged in the industry, exclusive of Aborigines. See also C.E. Beddome, P.M., Somerset, to Col. Sec., 11 November 1873, 'Somerset Letterbook 1 January 1872-December 1877', Q.S.A. Accession Number 13/5. Jardine reported there were large numbers of the 'natives' of the mainland and adjacent islands employed by pearlshellers as divers. E.L. Brown, pro G.E. Dalrymple, P.M., Somerset, to Col. Sec., 10 August 1874, 'Records of Somerset 1872-1877', 24 of 1874 (D.L.). Dalrymple was too ill to write.

- 23 Chester to Col. Sec., 13 March 1877, 'Records of Somerset, 1872-1877', 29 of 1877 (D.L.).
- 24 'Report of the Commissioner of Police for the Year 1896', 1897 *V. & P.*, Vol. II, p. 35; W.E. Roth, Northern Protector of Aborigines (hereafter: N.P.A.), Cooktown to Under Sec. Home Dept 13 March 1901, Q.S.A. Lands Reserve No. 91-14, Part I, 7027 of 1901.
- 25 C. Pennefather, Q.G.S. *Pearl*, Thursday Island, to Col. Sec., 31 October 1882, 'Extracts from Q'ld Government records Somerset, 1869-1882': These notes have been made available by Father Chester, O.P.' (D.L.). Lt DeHoghton noted in his report on the pearlfisheries of Torres Strait, 'Further Correspondence in re Pearlshell etc. Fisheries', 1880 *V. & P.*, p. 1164: 'No spirits are allowed to the men, as a rule, spirits seemed to be little used at the stations'. His report is generally optimistic. See also C.C., 3 July 1888, 'Piracy' for indication of heavy drinking at the bêche-de-mer stations and the disastrous effect this could have on lives of Aborigines involved in the industry.
- 26 'Reserves for Aborigines, Cardwell District', 1877 *V. & P.*, Vol. II, p. 1245.
- 27 These attempts by Harris to recruit labour are themselves interesting and illuminating. At his first attempt, probably at Fraser Island, the captain had induced two Aboriginal men and three women on board, given them presents of bread, pipes, and tobacco and sent one of the men ashore to fetch other Aborigines. The other man and two women were prevented from leaving but, when no other Aborigines appeared by the following day, the captain was so confident he would obtain labour elsewhere that he allowed them to return to their island. It is possible he thought he would obtain recruits willingly or that he thought the three he had were too few to worry about with such a long time to elapse before he sailed to the guano islands. At the next island they tried, the captain, the owner's brother, and two or three of the crew had gone ashore armed to obtain Aborigines but met none. After other failures, he asked two of the crew to obtain Aborigines while they were ashore at Townsville. They persuaded four Aborigines to come down to the boat that night, but as the captain got drunk and did not return to the boat that night, the Aborigines left. The captain and members of the crew spent a night on Magnetic Island trying to contact Aborigines but failed. Depositions of John Shaw, James Russell, and Daniel Deasy with B. Fahey, Water Police Magistrate, Cooktown, to Water Police Magistrate, Brisbane, 19 May 1877, encl. Q.S.A. TRE/A18, 1306 of 1877: 'The Douglas Tragedy'.
- 28 1877 *V. & P.*, Vol. II, p. 1245.
- 29 B. Fahey, Water P.M., Cooktown, to Water P.M., Brisbane, 19 May 1877, and memo, 28 May 1877. The signature is indecipherable. It may be that of the Water Police Magistrate in Brisbane or the Colonial Treasurer. The memo and file were forwarded to the Premier. Such an enlightened response to Aboriginal resistance was very rare.
- 30 B. Fahey, Sub-Collector of Customs, Cooktown, to Collector of Customs, Brisbane, 2 March 1882, Q.S.A. COL/A363, 1385 of 1882.
- 31 *Ibid.* Extracts from this report were read to both houses of parliament in the debate on the 1884 Native Labourers Protection Act.
- 32 H. St George, P.M., Cooktown, to Col. Sec., 3 March 1882, encl. Q.S.A.

- COL/A333, 1385 of 1882; Fahey to Collector of Customs, 2 March 1882; Insp. H. Fitzgerald, Cooktown, to Pol. Com., 2 March 1882, encl. Q.S.A. COL/A333, 1385 of 1882. See minute, D.T. Seymour to Col. Sec., 14 March 1882.
33. Q.S.A. COL/A333, 1385 of 1882; encl. Minutes [McIlwraith] to Attorney General, 2 March 1882; [indecipherable signature, presumably the Attorney General], 2 March 1882; [A third handwriting]: Imperial Slave Act 5 Geo 4; B. Fahey, Sub-Collector of Customs, Cooktown, to Under Sec. Treasury, 1 August 1884, Q.S.A. TRE/A28, 2534 of 1884. Steve Barry was later left at low tide on a reef by his Aboriginal labourers from the Mulgrave and Daintree River.
34. Deposition of Andrew Anderson, Court House Cooktown, 16 May 1884, and H. Milman, P.M., Cooktown, to Under Col. Sec., 9 June 1884, encl. Q.S.A. COL/A394, 4516 of 1884.
35. Insp. H. Fitzgerald, Cooktown, to Pol. Com., 16 May 1884; Milman to Under Col. Sec., 16 June 1884; Milman to Under Col. Sec., 13 June 1884; Milman to Under Col. Sec., 21 June 1884; J. Hartley, C.P.S., Cooktown, to Under Col. Sec., 24 June 1884; Milman to Under Col. Sec., 25 June 1884; Milman to Under Col. Sec., 26 April 1884; Milman to Under Col. Sec., 21 May 1884, encl. Q.S.A. COL/A394, 4516 of 1884.
36. W.E. Roth, N.P.A., to Pol. Com., 4 February 1898, encl. Q.S.A. COL/139 'Typescript Copies of Reports of W.E. Roth at Cooktown 1898' [hereafter 'Roth's 1898 Reports']; 'Report of the N.P.A. for 1899', *1900 V. & P.*, Vol. 5, pp. 583-5.
37. 'Report of the N.P.A. for 1899', *1900 V. & P.*, Vol. 5, p. 581.
38. C.C., 22 April 1892, 'The Fisheries Act'.
39. 'Report of the Govt. Res. at Thursday Island to the Colonial Secretary for 1892-3', *1894 V. & P.*, Vol. II, p. 912; C.C., 11 April 1890; Chester to Col. Sec., 29 December 1882, Q.S.A. COL/A353, 328 of 1883. The Pearl-shell and Bêche-de-mer Fishery Act of 1881, 45 Vic. No. 2, Clause 11, prohibited the employment of Polynesian and native labourers except under a written agreement.
40. C.C., 1 March 1889. Dillon was acquitted as there was no proof that the wounded Aboriginal had died. It was claimed he had absconded with a boat. See also trial of Edward Moran below: C.C., 22 January, 25 January, 19 April 1889.
41. C.C., 22 January, 25 January 1889. See C.C., 19 April 1889 for Supreme Court trial.
42. C.C., 3 July 1888, 'Piracy', and 6 July 1888, 'Charge of Piracy'.
43. B. Fahey, Water Police, Cooktown, to Col. Sec., 23 June 1882, Q.S.A. COL/A340, 3552 of 1882. See minute T.M.I. [Col. Sec. and Premier McIlwraith], 5 July 1882.
44. 'Annual Report of the N.P.A. for 1900', *1901 V. & P.*, p. 1332; 'Annual Report of the Govt. Res. at Thursday Island', *1890 V. & P.*, Vol. III, p. 172; 'Annual Report of the Govt. Res. at Thursday Island', *1894 V. & P.*, Vol. II, pp. 912, 913. See also 'Reserves for aboriginals, Cardwell District', *1877 V. & P.*, Vol. II, pp. 1245, 1246: 'The then Colonial Secretary directed me to

- prosecute the master for kidnapping, but the Attorney General, Mr. Bramston, said I could only lay an information and proceed against him for assault, and there was so much delay about the matter that at last the whole thing fell through.'
- 45 C.C., 22 January, 25 January 1889. See also Fahey to Under Sec. Treasury, 1 August 1884. The two Aborigines left stranded with Steve Barry were old hands from Townsville. 'Annual Report of Acting Govt. Res. at Thursday Island for 1886', 1887 V. & P., Vol. III, p. 691; P.M., Cooktown, to Col. Sec., 5 April 1882, Q.S.A. COL/A334, 1684 of 1882.
  - 46 Roth to Pol. Com., 28 January 1898, Q.S.A. COL/142, encl. 1919 of 1898 [Pol. Com. Number].
  - 47 'Report of N.P.A. for 1899', 1900 V. & P., Vol. V, p. 584. See also Douglas's 'Report of the Govt. Res. at Thursday Island for 1885', 1886 V. & P., pp. 491, 492.
  - 48 'Annual Report of Acting Govt. Res. at Thursday Island', 1888 V. & P., Vol. III, p. 221. See also 'Report of the Govt. Res. at Thursday Island for 1894-95', 1896 V. & P., p. 506.
  - 49 'Saville-Kent's Report', 1890 V. & P., Vol. III, p. 731; Saville-Kent, *The Great Barrier Reef*, p. 228.
  - 50 'Annual Report of the Govt. Res. at Thursday Island for 1892-3', 1894 V. & P., Vol. II, pp. 912, 913.
  - 51 Jardine to Col. Sec., 19 January 1872, encl. Jardine to Captain Moresby, H.M.S. *Basilisk*, 'Records of Somerset, 1872-1877', 5 of 1872 (D.L.). See Tables 3 and 5 and Appendix B, for deaths resulting from Aboriginal resistance.
  - 52 'Saville-Kent's Report', 1890 V. & P., Vol III, p. 730; 'Statistics: Pearlshell and Bêche-de-mer Fishery, Queensland', Q.S.A. HAR/48. See Tables 3 and 5. See Appendix B, pp. 344-5. See also footnotes 48, 49, and 50 above.
  - 53 See p. 345 and Appendix B, for an analysis of the data, and 'Annual Report of the Govt. Res. at Thursday Island, 1892 V. & P., Vol II, p. 1032.
  - 54 'Annual Report of the Govt. Res. at Thursday Island', 1894 V. & P., Vol. II, pp. 907 912. See Appendix B for details of the deaths.
  - 55 'Annual Report of the Govt. Res. at Thursday Island', 1894 V. & P., p. 907; 'Statistics: Pearlshell and Bêche-de-mer Fishery, Queensland', Q.S.A. HAR/48, 'Folder: Pearlshell Acts and Regulations'. See Table 5.
  - 56 'Report of the Govt. Res. at Thursday Island Upon the Working of "The Native Labourers' Protection Act of 1884"', 1890 V. & P., Vol. II, p. 1567; Lt T. DeHoghton, H.M.S. *Beagle*, Thursday Island, to Commodore J.C. Wilson, H.M.S. *Wolverine*, Sydney, 22 September 1879 [copy], 1880 V. & P., Vol. II, p. 1163; J. Douglas, Govt Res. Thursday Island, to Col. Sec., 16 December 1891, 1894 V. & P., Vol. II, p. 920.
  - 57 'Report of the Govt. Res. at Thursday Island upon the Working of "The Native Labourers' Protection Act of 1884"', 1890 V. & P., Vol. II, pp.1565-8; 'Report of the Govt. Res. at Thursday Island for 1892-3', 1894 V. & P., Vol. II, pp. 911, 912.
  - 58 'Report of the Govt. Res. at Thursday Island for 1894-5', 1896 V. & P., p. 506; see Appendix B, for deaths caused by Aboriginal resistance.



- 59 'Report Together with Minutes of Evidence and Proceedings of the Commission Appointed to Inquire into the General Working of the Laws Regulating the Pearlshell and Bêche-de-mer Fisheries in the Colony', 1897 *V. & P.*, Vol. II, p. 1317. Govt Res. Douglas giving evidence.
- 60 'Reserves for Aboriginals, Cardwell District', 1877 *V. & P.*, Vol. II, pp. 1245, 1246; Q.S.A. TRE/A18, 1306 of 1877, the file on 'The Douglas Tragedy'; Chester to Col. Sec., 21 December 1876, Q.S.A. 'Somerset Letterbook 1872-1877'; 'Report of the Govt. Res. at Thursday Island for 1885', 1886 *V. & P.*, p. 490; 'Report of the Govt. Res. at Thursday Island upon the Working of "The Native Labourer's Protection Act of 1884"', 1890 *V. & P.*, Vol. II, pp. 1565-8.
- 61 'Report of the N.P.A. for 1899', 1900 *V. & P.*, Vol. V, p. 583; E. Brown, Missionary at Mapoon, Thursday Island, to Dr Roth, 3 May 1898, encl. Q.S.A. COL/139, 6944 of 1898.
- 62 'Report of the N.P.A. for 1899', 1900 *V. & P.*, Vol. V, pp. 583, 584; Roth, N.P.A., Mapoon, to Under Sec. Home Dept, 4 October 1899, Q.S.A. Lands Department Records, Lands Res. No. 91/14, 28798 of 1899. See also Roth to Pol. Com., 6 May 1898, Q.S.A. COL/142, 6944 of 1898 [Pol. Com. Registration No.].
- 63 H. Milman, Acting Govt Res., Thursday Island, to Chief Sec., 25 February 1887, encl. Q.S.A. COL/A492, 1884 of 1887; Roth to Under Sec. Home Dept, 4 October 1899, Q.S.A. Lands Dept, Lands Reserve No. 91/14 Part 1, 28798 of 1899; *Periodical Accounts*, September 1892, p. 585 (M.L. MSS, 1893, carton No. 4). See Minute [Home Sec. Foxton], 24 November 1899, and Roth to Under Sec. Dept of Public Lands, 21 April 1903, Q.S.A. Lands Dept Res. 96-91, Part I, 7225 of 1903.
- 64 Roth to Under Sec., Home Dept, 4 October 1899.
- 65 Report [presumably from the Police Magistrate or Shipping Master] to the Col. Treasurer, 12 June 1882. This was read in the Legislative Assembly by S.W. Griffith and recorded in Hansard. This extract is taken from the *Northern Miner*, 5 August 1884, editorial: 'Native Labourers Act'; 'Report of the Govt. Res. at Thursday Island for 1885', 1886 *V. & P.*, p. 490; Roth to Pol. Com., 24 June 1898 [copy], Q.S.A. COL/139, 'Roth's 1898 Reports'.
- 66 Roth to Under Sec., Home Dept, 4 October 1899; 'Report of the N.P.A. for 1899', 1900 *V. & P.*, Vol. V, p. 584; P.M., Cooktown, to Under Col. Sec., 24 June 1884, Q.S.A. COL/A374, 4517 of 1884.
- 67 'Annual Report of the Acting Govt. Res. at Thursday Island', 1887 *V. & P.*, Vol. III, p. 691. See also Aplin to Col. Sec., 3 March 1875, 'Report on the Pearl Fisheries of Torres Straits', 'Records of Somerset 1872-77' (D.L.). Aplin thought the intruders created the impoverished conditions on the mainland. See also 'Annual Report of Govt. Res. at Thursday Island for 1889', 1890 *V. & P.*, Vol. III, p. 172. Douglas believed them half-starved in their 'wild state'.
- 68 Lt T. DeHoghton, H.M.S. *Beagle*, Thursday Island, to Commodore J.C. Wilson, H.M.S. *Wolverine*, Sydney, 22 September 1879, encl. 'Further correspondence re Pearl-Shell, etc. Fisheries', pp. 1163, 1165; 'Report of the Govt. Res. at Thursday Island for 1885', 1886 *V. & P.*, p. 491; Aplin to Col.

- Sec., 3 March 1875, 'Records of Somerset 1872-77' (D.L.).
- 69 Roth to Under Sec., Home Dept, 4 October 1899.
- 70 Roth to Pol. Com., 4 February 1898, Q.S.A. COL/139, 'Roth's 1898 Reports' [copy]; 'Report of the Govt. Res. at Thursday Island for 1894-95', 1896 V. & P., p. 506; Roth to Pol. Com., 6 May 1898, Q.S.A. COL/142, 6944 of 1898 [Pol. Com. Registration].
- 71 'Bêche-de-mer and Pearl-shell Fisheries of Northern Queensland', 1890 V. & P., Vol. III, p. 732; Roth to Under Sec., Home Dept, 4 October 1899; *Moravian Messenger*, 3 February 1894, IV, 82, p. 25 (M.L. MSS 1893 carton No. 4).
- 72 Douglas to Col. Sec., 16 December 1891 [copy], 1894 V. & P., Vol. II, p. 920.
- 73 'Report of the Govt. Res. at Thursday Island upon the Working of "The Native Labourers' Protection Act of 1884"', 1890 V. & P., Vol. II, p. 1567; 'Bêche-de-mer and Pearl Fisheries of Northern Queensland', 1890 V. & P., Vol. III, p. 731-2; 1890 V. & P., Vol. II, p. 1567; report published in an unidentified newspaper on 21 July 1897, *Newspaper Cutting Book* (M.L. MSS 1893, carton No. 4). The cover is entitled: 'Australian Rough Diary 1907'.
- 74 C.C., 19 October 1894. From *Torres Strait Pilot*, 13 October 1894.
- 75 N.Q.R., 11 October 1893. An interview with Rev. J.G. Ward of Mapoon.
- 76 Roth to Under Sec., Home Dept, 4 October 1899.
- 77 'Annual Report of the Govt. Res. at Thursday Island', 1890 V. & P. Vol. III, p. 172; Roth to Pol. Com., 6 May 1898; Douglas to Col. Sec., 16 December 1891; Lt DeHoghton, H.M.S. *Beagle*, Thursday Island, to Commodore J.C. Wilson, H.M.S. *Wolverine*, Sydney, 22 September 1879 [copy], encl. 'Further Correspondence in re Pear-Shell, etc. Fisheries', 1880 V. & P., Vol. II, p. 1164.
- 78 R.M. and C.H. Berndt, *The World of the First Australians*, pp. 85, 164-5. Note Berndt's definition of prostitution. 'It is a matter for debate whether sexual relations outside marriage, accompanied by gifts, can be classified as prostitution. But prostitution can be defined as the selling of sexual favours without the expectation of marriage, and without the setting up of a specific dyadic relationship as between sweethearts or lovers: a transient association in which recompense, or payment is crucial. The contract, implied or explicit, is relatively impersonal: one partner can be substituted for another without altering the nature of the arrangement . . . In contrast in most instances of pre- and extra-marital relations in Aboriginal Australia, the gift, if any, seems to be incidental; however acceptable, in itself, it is regarded as a love token rather than payment'.
- Lt DeHoghton to Wilson, 22 September 1879, loc. cit.; Lt Commander G.E. Richards, H.M.S. *Paluma*, Townsville, to [Rear Admiral H. Fairfax, *Diamond*, Townsville?], 24 September 1887, encl. Q.S.A. COL/A521, 8237 of 1887. Two young Palm Island men called by the Europeans, 'Jimmy' and 'Sammy', apparently decided to use this traffic to their own advantage and suggested to a young woman that she should co-operate and pass the purchase price on to them. The young woman refused and was strangled in the presence of the rest of the Aborigines. An old man protested and was also killed by the two men who then ritually consumed portions of the bodies of their victims.

Richards believed the two men were trying to take control of the whole prostitution business.

- 79 'Report of the N.P.A. for 1899', *1900 V. & P.*, Vol. V, p. 584. See also Roth to Under Sec. Home Dept, 4 October 1899. In a report from Mapoon he noted: 'only last week, *James Nickle* . . . had women on his boat at night: taxed about it, he admitted the circumstance in my presence to Hey, and asked him to overlook it'.
- 80 'Report of the Govt. Res. at Thursday Island for 1892-3', *1894 V. & P.*, Vol. II, p. 913; Douglas to Col. Sec., 16 December 1891.
- 81 Roth to Under Sec., Home Dept, 4 October 1899.
- 82 'Report of the Govt. Res. at Thursday Island for 1892-3', *1894 V. & P.*, Vol. II, p. 914. See *Periodical Accounts*, March 1895 (M.L. MSS 1893, carton No. 4). In a letter dated Mapoon, 1 December 1894, the missionary, J.G. Ward, described the return of four women from the fisheries, one of whom had been on the boats since she was a girl.
- 83 Roth to Under Sec., Home Dept, 4 October 1899; Roth to Pol. Com., 11 March 1898 [copy], Q.S.A. COL/139, 'Roth's 1898 Reports'.
- 84 Roth to Under Sec., Home Dept, 4 October 1899; Roth: 'It is these young men to whom their aged mothers look for support'. See R.M. and C.H. Berndt, *The World of the First Australians*, pp. 104-5, 107-8, 118-19, 178.
- 85 Roth to Under Sec., Home Dept, 4 October 1899. This was estimated on a minimum wage of 10 shillings a month for six months of the year for 100 Aborigines. The average time spent in boats was apparently longer than this and the wages should have been higher, especially as in the late 1890s there was a marked increase in swimming diving for pearlshell. Cutten Brothers, Clump Point, to A.S. Cowley, M.L.A., Ingham, 25 January 1889, encl. Q.S.A. COL/A739, 7458 of 1893, claimed the recruiters eagerly sought the Aborigines on their property because they were quiet and trustworthy.
- 86 Roth to Under Sec., Home Dept, 4 October 1899; O.W. Parnaby, *Britain and the Labor Trade in the Southwest Pacific* (Durham, N.C., 1964), pp. 140-54.
- 87 Roth to Under Sec., Home Dept, 4 October 1899.
- 88 Ibid. A.A. Abbie, *The Original Australians* (Sydney, 1969), p. 95; N. Hey, Mapoon, to Home Sec., 1 July 1898, *1898 V. & P.*, Vol. IV, p. 505; M.H. Ward, Diary 1905, 18 October 1897 (M.L. MSS 1893, carton No. 4); P.M. Moodie, *Aboriginal Health* (Canberra, 1973), pp. 163-8, 178 ff., 237.
- 89 'Report of the N.P.A. for 1899', *1900 V. & P.*, Vol. V, p. 583.
- 90 A. Meston, Southern Protector of Aborigines, Brisbane, to Pol. Com., 11 February 1898, Q.S.A. COL/142, 1919 of 1898 [Pol. Com. Registration]. For the intrusion of the fisheries into other areas see B. Fahey, Sub-Collector Customs, Cooktown, to Under Sec. Treasury, 30 September 1884, Q.S.A. TRE/A28, 3303 of 1884. The boat *Alarm* from Boydong Island was stolen by some or all of a crew of eight Aborigines from Hinchinbrook Island and Cleveland Bay. *N.Q.R.*, 11 October 1893, mentioned that Aborigines for the bêche-de-mer and pearlshell fisheries were recruited on the east coast from as far south as Bowen and on the west coast to as far south as the Archer River. Fahey to Under Sec., Treasury, 1 August 1884, Q.S.A. TRE/A28,

- 2534 of 1884. The *Ruby* had three Aborigines from the Daintree River, two from the Mulgrave River, and two from Townsville: 'old and tried servants'. Roth to Pol. Com., 28 January 1898, Q.S.A. COL/142, 2780 of 1898. Roth mentions eight or ten Johnstone River Aborigines stranded in Cooktown. Chester to Under Col. Sec., 6 June 1892, Q.S.A. COL/A712, 12344 of 1892. Boats were in the habit of calling in at Bloomfield River for recruits without notifying the Customs at Cooktown. See also C.C., 6 June 1890, for an earlier account of use of Bloomfield River Aborigines. 'Reserves for Aborigines, Cardwell District', 1877 V. & P., Vol. II, pp. 1245, 1246, mentions recruiting from Dunk Island, Townsville, and a boat decoying women on board at Palm Island.
- 91 See Loos, *Aboriginal-European Relations in North Queensland*, pp. 643-70, for legislative attempts to control the fisheries between 1879 and 1884.
- 92 R.L. Sharp, 'Tribes and Totemism in North-East Australia', *Oceania*, 9, 1939, pp. 254-75 and 10, 1939, pp. 439-61.
- 93 Saville-Kent, *The Great Barrier Reef*, p. 228.
- 94 'Report of the Govt. Res. at Thursday Island for 1892-3', 1894 V. & P., Vol. II, p. 914. See 'Police Court', the trial of James Underwood for murder of Aboriginal Maori, C.C., 10 June 1892, C.C., 14 June 1892, and C.C., 8 July 1892, for good examples of the wild and exciting life at the fishing stations. Interview with Mr Reg. Palm Island at Palm Island, 20 December 1972. He was referring to the later stages of contact after traditional values had changed greatly.
- 95 Roth to Under Sec., Home Dept, 4 October 1899; 'Report of the Govt. Res. at Thursday Island for 1894-95', 1896 V. & P., p. 502; 'Saville-Kent's Report', 1890 V. & P., Vol. III, p. 731; 'Report of the Govt. Res. at Thursday Island for 1892-3', 1894 V. & P., Vol. II, p. 914: Douglas stated that the Aborigines near Mapoon 'had already been utterly demoralized by the bêche-de-mer men' when the missionaries arrived in 1891. Sharp, 'Steel Axes for Stone Age Australians', pp. 78-90.
- 96 'Saville-Kent's Report', 1890 V. & P., Vol. III, p. 731.
- 97 Milman to Chief Sec., 28 February 1887; and Sgt C. Savage, Police Station, Port Kennedy, Thursday Island, to the Acting Govt Res., Thursday Island, 24 February 1887, encl. Q.S.A. COL/A492, 1884 of 1887.
- 98 C.C., 10 April 1878.
- 99 J. Douglas, Govt Res., Thursday Island, to Col. Sec., 2 September 1890, and Reid, Master, Q.G.S. *Albatross*, Port Kennedy, to Douglas, 26 August 1890, encl. Q.S.A. COL/A629, 9886 of 1890; C.C., 20 May 1890; C.C., 12 March, 7 May 1889, 'The Wild Duck Massacre'.
- 1 A. Morisset, Inspector of Native Police, to Pol. Com., 26 November 1887, encl. Q.S.A. COL/A528, 9775 of 1887. In a petition from Barron River farmers for increased protection, great stress was placed on the stealing of firearms. Morisset pointed out that there was not a single instance where the Aborigines had used firearms but that they realised what firearms did to them. They sometimes kept them in their camp but they were inevitably found in an unusable condition. H.A., 4 January 1889; P.D.T., 10 December 1886, 'Telegraphic News', 6 December 1886.

- 2 *P.D.T.*, 19 March 1887, from *Carpentaria Times*; *P.D.T.*, 17 June 1893; *Queenslander*, 26 March 1887; 10, 17 June 1893; *N.Q.R.*, 21 June 1893; H. Milman, Acting Govt Res., Thursday Island, to Chief Sec., 28 February 1887, encl. Q.S.A. COL/A492, 1884 of 1887.
- 3 Chester to Col. Sec., 30 June 1882, Q.S.A. COL/A342, 4002 of 1882.
- 4 B. Fahey, Sub-Collector of Customs, Cooktown, to Under Sec., Treasury, 9 November 1881, Q.S.A. TRE/A24, 2070 of 1881. This report gives two examples of Aborigines, one group from Cape Grenville and one from Night Island, stealing guns and ammunition. *C.C.*, 4 May 1894. The Aborigines attacked a camp of Batavia River miners killing one and seriously wounding two. They took away rifles, revolvers and cartridges. J. Douglas, P.M., Cooktown, to Under Col. Sec., 16 December 1895, Q.S.A. COL/A801, 15033 of 1895. Aborigines stole firearms and ammunition from Lee's station. This, presumably, is the Lee involved in the sinking of the Aborigines' boat and kidnapping of some of the survivors. Lee was killed by the Aborigines in Princess Charlotte Bay. See *Queenslander*, 25 January 1896, p. 151.

## Chapter 6

### Conclusion

- 1 J. Hall Scott, Strathbogie, to Col. Sec., 10 May 1869, Q.S.A. COL/A125, 2071 of 1869.
- 2 *P.D.T.*, 20 February, 6 March 1869.
- 3 Loos, Frontier Conflict in the Bowen District, Chapter IV, 'Black Meets White', especially pp. 175-84, and Loos, Aboriginal-European Relations in North Queensland, pp. 388-400.
- 4 Eden, *My Wife and I in Queensland*, p. 211.
- 5 Loos, Aboriginal-European Relations in North Queensland, pp. 398-416.
- 6 *P.D.T.*, 27 October 1877.
- 7 *Kirchliche Mitteilungen*, 28 (1896), p. 41.
- 8 Loos, Aboriginal-European Relations in North Queensland, pp. 751-9.
- 9 *C.C.*, 19 February 1889, editorial: 'Hospital'. See also *C.C.*, 30 June 1891, 'Limestone Hospital A.G.M.'
- 10 Dr H. Finlay, Ravenswood, to Col. Sec., 8 July 1884, encl. Q.S.A. COL/A395, 5034 of 1884. Maryborough Hospital also did. See Sec., Maryborough Hospital, to Col. Sec., 4 January 1874, Q.S.A. COL/A191, 68 of 1874.
- 11 *Ibid.*; P.M., Nanango, to A.W. Manning, Col. Sec., 12 September 1865, and Minute, A.W.M., 18 September 1865, Q.S.A. COL/A71, 2412 of 1865; Dr T. Garde, Toowoomba, to Home Sec., 23 November 1898, encl. Q.S.A. COL/140, 127968 of 1898; G.I. Evenden, President, Thornborough District Hospital, to Col. Sec., 9 August 1886, and Minute, Col. Sec., 21 August 1886, encl. Q.S.A. COL/A477, 6377 of 1886.
- 12 *Ibid.*; P.M., Port Douglas, to Col. Sec., 30 September 1890, Q.S.A. COL/A632, 10678 of 1890; Sec., Herberton and Tinaroo District Hospital, to

- A.H. Zillman, P.M., Herberton, 3 March 1893, Q.S.A. COL/A727, 2821 of 1893; R. Hislop, J.P., Ayton, to Police Officer, Ayton, 3 March 1893, Q.S.A. COL/A728, 3059 of 1893; *H.A.*, 28 October 1887, died from injuries inflicted by a William Nichols who was charged with murder; *H.A.*, 4 September 1895; Const. J. MacCarthy, Port Douglas Police Station, to Sub-Insp. Police, Cairns, 17 September 1897, Q.S.A. POL/12D/G2; P. Forbes, Geraldton, to Col. Sec., 1 May 1893, Q.S.A. COL/A733, 5029 of 1893.
- 13 C.C., 15 November 1891, monthly 'Hospital Meeting'; 10 January 1890; 17 April 1891.
  - 14 C.C., 17 April 1891.
  - 15 F.W. Myles, P.M. Bowen, to Under Col. Sec., 1 February 1890, encl. Q.S.A. COL/139, 1211 of 1890; and Asst Under Col. Sec., W.H. Ryder, to P.M., Bowen, 22 January 1890, Q.S.A. COL/G55, 00/288.
  - 16 A.M. Barton, Kennedy Hospital, Bowen, to Col. Sec., 11 February 1893, encl. Q.S.A. COL/139, 1211 of 1890; Minute H.T. [Col. Sec. Tozer], 28 February 1893.
  - 17 G.I. Evenden, Hodgkinson District Hospital, Thornborough, to Col. Sec., 9 August 1886, Q.S.A. COL/A477, 6377 of 1886, Minute [Col. Sec.], 21 August 1886. See W.H. Ryder, Under Col. Sec., to G.I. Evenden, Q.S.A. COL/G36, outletter 2898 of 1886. *My emphasis.*
  - 18 See reports of 'Kennedy District Hospital A.G.M.', *P.D.T.*, 29 January 1876; 25 January 1879; 21 January 1880; 28 January 1881; 29 January 1882; 27 January 1883; 26 January 1884; 30 January 1886; 29 January 1887; 28 January 1888; 19 January 1889; 18 January 1890; 17 January 1891; 21 January 1898; 20 January 1894; 19 January 1895.
  - 19 *P.D.T.*, 10 November 1883, 'Kennedy Hospital'.
  - 20 *P.D.T.*, 15 October 1892, 'Kennedy Hospital Monthly Meeting'.
  - 21 *P.D.T.*, 13 February 1886.
  - 22 *P.D.T.*, 29 January 1887.
  - 23 'Report of N.P.A. for 1899', *1900 V. & P.*, Vol. V, p. 590; 'Report of N.P.A. for 1900', *1901 V. & P.*, p. 1335.
  - 24 *Charters Towers Mining Standard*, 19 August 1896, editorial: 'The Colour Question'.
  - 25 W. Earnshaw, State School, Buderim Mountain, to Under Sec., Dept of Public Instruction, 17 July 1896, Q.S.A. 'Education Various I—Mission Schools', 8939 of 1896. See minute, D.E. [Chief Clerk], 23 July 1896.
  - 26 *Charters Towers Mining Standard*, 19 August 1896, editorial: 'The Colour Question'.
  - 27 *P.D.T.*, 5 January 1895, 'Bowen Municipal Council'. Council business was regularly reported in the newspapers.
  - 28 See C.C., 7 March 1893. A Benevolent Society had been established for seven months and its meetings reported in the newspapers. There is no indication that the members considered Aborigines within the sphere of their benevolence.
  - 29 *H.A.*, 10 July 1885.
  - 30 Chief Sec., New South Wales, to Col. Sec., Queensland, 18 October 1884, Q.S.A. COL/A404, 7433 of 1884.
  - 31 *P.D.T.*, 15 February 1879.

- 32 *P.D.T.*, 23 July 1887. This Aboriginal was regarded as a villain by the locals. The point, however, is that no one would have begrudged even the worst white criminal a formal burial.
- 33 *P.D.T.*, 8 March 1879, for an account of his ministry to the Aborigines in North Queensland.
- 34 *P.D.T.*, 13 December 1879, reporting a pastoral letter supporting 'Hospital Sunday'.
- 35 See R. Pearsall, *The Worm in the Bud: The World of Victorian Sexuality* (Ringwood, Victoria, 1971), Chapter 4, a discussion of 'Courtship, Love, and Marriage'. In a confusion of attitudes towards marriage, its cultural importance was undeniable.
- 36 Pol. Com. to Insp. Graham, Normanton, 18 July 1898, letterbook Q.S.A. COL/141, p. 153.
- 37 *Q.P.D.* of L.A., LXXIII (1895), p. 997, Col. Sec., in committee, debate on Supply.
- 38 *Q.P.D.* of L.A., LXXVI (1896), p. 1099, Home Sec., in committee, debate on Supply. See A. Matthews, Archibald Meston: The Man 'who has had considerable experience with aboriginals' (Second Year Honours Research Essay, James Cook University, 1972) for a careful but far from complimentary assessment. The title, Colonial Secretary, had been changed to Home Secretary.
- 39 A. Meston, 'Queensland: Monograph on the Aboriginal. Past and Present Condition', to Home Sec., J.F.G. Foxton, 14 November 1899, Q.S.A. COL/140, 3566 of 1900. Meston's description of how he came to initiate and formulate the 1897 legislation was presented in this formal dispatch to Foxton and accepted without question.
- 40 A. Meston, *Queensland Aborigines—Proposed System for their Improvement and Preservation* (Brisbane, 1895), pp. 22-31. See also introduction. Meston had believed completely in the doomed race theory as late as 1889.
- 41 *Q.P.D.* of L.A., LXXVI (1896), p. 1099, Home Sec., in committee, debate on Supply; 'Report on the Aborigines of North Queensland', 1896 *V. & P.*, Vol. IV, p. 723.
- 42 'Report on the Aborigines of Queensland', 1896 *V. & P.*, Vol. IV, p. 735; Meston, *Queensland Aborigines*, p. 31.
- 43 'Report on the Aborigines of Queensland', 1896 *V. & P.*, Vol. IV, p. 735.
- 44 *Ibid.*, p. 736.
- 45 *Ibid.*, pp. 725, 727, 730, 735.
- 46 *Ibid.*, pp. 726-35.
- 47 *Ibid.*, p. 735. See 'Report on the North Queensland Aborigines and the Native Police, with Appendices', 1897 *V. & P.*, Vol. II, pp. 29, 36-8.
- 48 See file Insp. Lamond, Cooktown, to Pol. Com., 13 December 1897, Q.S.A. COL/142, 14887 of 1897 and files Lamond to Pol. Com., 3 August 1897; Lamond to Pol. Com., 31 August 1897; Sgt Whiteford, Musgrave Station, to Lamond, 3 September 1897; Lamond to Pol. Com., 30 August 1897; Lamond to Pol. Com., 17 July 1897; Lamond to Pol. Com., 22 July 1897; Lamond to Pol. Com., 8 June 1897; Lamond to Pol. Com., 26 June 1897; Lamond to Pol. Com., 8 November 1897, Q.S.A. COL/140 [typed copies].

- 49 'Report on the North Queensland Aborigines and the Native Police', 1897 *V. & P.*, Vol. II, pp. 29-32, 36-7.
- 50 *Ibid.*, p. 37.
- 51 Rowley, *The Destruction of Aboriginal Society*, p. 179. See also pp. 182, 183.
- 52 'Report on the North Queensland Aborigines and the Native Police', 1897 *V. & P.*, Vol. II, pp. 31-2.
- 53 *Ibid.*, pp. 40-1: 'A Bill for the Protection and Better Government of the Aborigines of Queensland'; A. Meston to Principal Under Sec., Home Sec.'s. Office, 23 August 1897, Q.S.A. COL/140, 10750 of 1897. See also A. Meston to Home Sec., Foxton, 14 November 1899, Q.S.A. COL/140, 3566 of 1900, *Queensland: Monograph on the Aborigines. Past and Present Conditions*, pp. 7-13, 26.
- 54 *Q.P.D.* of L.A., LXXVII (1897), p. 1010, Home Sec., in committee, debate on Supply. See also pp. 1011, 1021.
- 55 *Ibid.*, p. 1019, Keogh, in committee, debate on Supply; p. 1021, Home Sec., in committee, debate on Supply.
- 56 *Q.P.D.* of L.A., LXXVIII (1897), p. 1538, Home Sec., Aboriginal Protection and Restriction of the Sale of Opium Bill, Home Sec., second reading. See whole of second reading in Legislative Assembly, pp. 1538-49, and second reading in Legislative Council, pp. 1887-9.
- 57 'An Act to make Provision for the better Protection and Care of the Aboriginal and Half-caste Inhabitants of the Colony, and to make more effectual Provision for Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Opium', 61 Vic. No. 17, clauses 3, 4. I have not discovered any reference to half-castes of a European mother in this study. I have retained the use of the term 'half-caste', even though many Aborigines find it offensive, because of its importance in this act and in Queensland's twentieth century legislation. The whole body of legislation is, of course, offensively racist.
- 58 The Aboriginal Protection and Restriction of the Sale of Opium Act, 1897, clauses 9, 10. Exceptions were (a) those Aborigines employed under the provisions of this Act or its Regulations, or under any other law in force in Queensland, for example, the 1884 Native Labourers Protection Act (b) those who had been granted permits to be absent from a reserve (c) female Aborigines married to and residing with a non-Aboriginal husband and (d) those Aborigines for whom the Minister believed satisfactory provision had otherwise been made.
- 59 *Ibid.*, clause 31, section 10; clause 33.
- 60 *Q.P.D.* of L.A., LXXVIII (1897), p. 1539, Aboriginal Protection and Restriction of the Sale of Opium Bill, Home Sec., second reading. I doubt if Tozer had done all his homework on the Bill by the second reading.
- 61 *Ibid.*, p. 1629, Home Sec., in committee; Battersby, in committee. The real intent of the clause was clearly spelt out in the Legislative Council by the Secretary for Agriculture, Thynne, who had responsibility for the Bill in that house. See p. 1887, Secretary for Agriculture, second reading.
- 62 *Ibid.*, pp. 1629, 1630, Home Sec., in committee; p. 1626, Home Sec., in committee. A history of these missions in the twentieth century might show that the granting of such temporal power was, in many ways, anything but a



- blessing to the missionaries or to the Aborigines—or so my reading into twentieth century mission records tentatively suggests.
- 63 Ibid., p. 1631, Aboriginal Protection and Restriction of the Sale of Opium Act, Home Sec., in committee. See 61 Vic. No. 17, clauses 12-15.
- 64 *Q.P.D.* of L.A., LXXVIII (1897), p. 1541, Home Sec., second reading; p. 1909, Sec. for Agriculture, in committee, in L.C.
- 65 61 Vic. No. 17, clauses 20-3.
- 66 Ibid., clause 31.
- 67 Parnaby, *Britain and the Labour Trade*, pp. 140-54, 188-93.
- 68 See N.A. Loos, *The Aboriginal Citizen. Some Aspects of Queensland Native Policy 1859-1967* (History Department, James Cook University, unpublished research paper, 1967), *passim*, and A. McIntosh, *Racism: The Queensland Experience. Some Aspects of Queensland Legislation, 1897 to 1971* (History Department, James Cook University, unpublished research paper, 1973), *passim*.
- 69 *Q.P.D.* of L.A., LXXVIII (1897), p. 1538, Home Sec., second reading. See also p. 1887, Sec. for Agriculture introducing second reading in L.C.
- 70 Ibid., second reading in L.A., p. 1542, Browne, Jackson; p. 1543, Petrie; p. 1544, Annear; p. 1545, Smith; p. 1546, Thorn; p. 1547, Hamilton; p. 1549, Sim; L.C., second reading: p. 1888, Lambert.
- 71 Ibid., L.A., pp. 1541, 1542, Home Sec., second reading. See also p. 1545, Smith; p. 1546, Thorn and Finney.
- 72 Ibid., pp. 1545, 1546, Thorn; p. 1546, Finney; p. 1541, Home Sec.; second reading.
- 73 Ibid., p. 1541, Home Sec., second reading. See p. 1632, Home Sec., in committee: 'Those people had to be treated as children'. Tozer eventually decided on up to fourteen days. See also p. 1837, L.C., Sec. for Agriculture, second reading and p. 1544, L.A., Petrie, second reading.
- 74 Ibid., p. 1540, Home Sec.; p. 1543, Petrie; p. 1547, Hamilton; second reading.
- 75 Ibid., p. 1538, Home Sec., second reading. See also L.A., second reading: p. 1544, Petrie; p. 1545, Smith; p. 1546, Finney; p. 1627, Smith; p. 1627, Smith in committee; L.C., second reading: p. 1887, Forrest, second reading. Only Finney thought the Aboriginal population might increase.

# Annotated Bibliography

## I. Archival Sources

### *Queensland State Archives*

In-letters to the Colonial Secretary and associated out-going correspondence 1860-1897. Especially:

Police Magistrate's correspondence.

As the senior government official in each district, complaints about Aborigines or the treatment of them were generally directed to this official who would in turn report to the Colonial Secretary and advise action if he considered it necessary.

Collected correspondence concerned specifically with Aborigines following Access Number 48/205; 'Relating to the Supply of Rations to Aborigines 1888-1902'.

'Correspondence Records and Printed Reports on the Aborigines of Queensland 1896 with Papers Relating 1868-1900' (3 bundles).

'Police Letter Book Concerning the Aboriginal Act'.

Inquests 1860-1897.

These by no means include all of the deaths resulting from attacks by Aborigines.

Review of prisoners under sentence of death.

Six bundles, EXE 1-6, contain legal comment on sentences given to Aborigines.

Ordinary Despatches from the Governor of Queensland to the Secretary of State for the Colonies 1859-1897.

References to the Aborigines are most frequent from Governor Bowen, the first Governor of Queensland. After Governor Cairns there are few if any comments.

Ordinary Despatches from the Secretary of State for Colonies to the Governor of Queensland 1859-1897.

Generally occasional requests for inquiries into complaints made about alleged atrocities.

Confidential Despatches from the Secretary of State, from 1 May 1868 to 29 December 1887.

A few indications of British government's concern for Queensland's native policy and the Native Police.

Correspondence of the northern Commissioners for Crown Lands.

These contained few comments on the Aborigines, possibly because this responsibility had passed to the Native Police by the time North Queensland was colonised. The letterbooks of the Burke District, CCL/14G, were of some use.

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### Court of Petty Sessions Records.

Those of Bowen, Herberton, Mackay, Maytown and Port Douglas survive. They were of surprisingly little use because of the lack of detail associated with most of the trivial offences Aborigines were charged with. The papers concerned with serious offences were apparently forwarded to higher courts and were rarely able to be traced.

Letterbook of the Somerset Settlement, Cape York Peninsula, 1 January 1872-December 1877. Accession Number 13/5.

This and other Somerset letterbooks found at the Mitchell and Dixson Libraries give an invaluable insight into the development of the northern fisheries.

Papers Relating to the Pearlshell and Bêche-de-mer Fisheries HAR/48.

Contains important statistics on the development of these industries.

Correspondence from Water Police Magistrates and Customs Officials in bundles labelled TRE.

Contains some reports of conflict between Aborigines and boat crews.

Education Various, 'Mission Schools'.

Some information relevant to period researched.

More important for later period.

Lands Department Correspondence especially that concerned with the Bloomfield River, Cape Bedford (Hope Valley), Mapoon, Yarrabah, and Mari Yamba Missions in Lands Reserve, and with the Mackay Reserve of the 1870s in Lands Open.

Records of Police Stations at Bowen, Cairns, Cloncurry, Halifax, Port Douglas, Ravenswood.

Contain some insights into relations between ordinary police and Aborigines.

Queensland: Monograph on the Aboriginal. Past and Present Conditions. A. Meston to Home Sec., Foxton, 14 November 1899, COL/140, 3566 of 1900.

By the main architect of the 1897 Act.

### *Police Commissioner's Office, Brisbane*

Quite extensive records of the period studied but of limited use except for 410M, 'Diseases Among Aborigines', and 411M, 'Half-Castes 1882-1946'.

### *United Evangelical Lutheran Church of Australia Archives, Adelaide*

Complete run of *Kirchliche Mitteilungen*, a Lutheran missionary society journal, for period of missions being covered in this book. In German. Relevant parts translated for this research.

Two large files, U.E.L.C.A.A. B808 and B833, dealing with the early years of Hope Valley and Bloomfield River Missions. Mainly in German. Translated for this research.

Miscellaneous papers relating to Hope Valley and Bloomfield River Missions. e.g. accounts of rations distributed, work done, financial statements.

A very valuable resource, especially *Kirchliche Mitteilungen*, which carries extensive reports from the missionaries. The splendid translations by Mrs L. Mathew, Tutor in the Department of Modern Languages, James Cook University of North Queensland, were of invaluable assistance. They are available from the History Department of the above university.

## II. Other Repositories

### *Mitchell Library*

Papers of the Presbyterian Board of Missions, MSS 1893, carton No. 4.

Especially:

*Periodical Accounts Relating to the Missions of the Church of the United Brethren*

*Periodical Accounts* is a journal of the Church of the United Brethren or the Moravians as they were popularly called. Extensive extracts but often lacking some information needed for reference purposes.

Extracts from other missionary journals e.g. *Illustrated Missionary News*, *Moravian Messenger*, *Ministering Women*, *The Messenger*, *Moravian Missionary Reporter*, *Austral Star*, *Moravian Missions*

Various Reports from Mapoon.

Newspaper Cutting Books of Missionary endeavour e.g. those with covers marked: *Album*; *Australian Rough Diary 1907*

M.H. Ward, *Diary 1895*

The diary goes to November 1897.

Unsigned MS. in folder 'Mrs. Ward and Mrs. Hey'.

Miscellaneous papers relating to the Presbyterian missions.

Miscellaneous Manuscripts:

Anon., *Pioneering in the North-West. A Few Rambling Notes of Happenings in the Far North-West of Queensland 40 to 45 Years Ago*. Typescript, n.p., 1920. The writer claimed to be an ex-Native Police Officer. Possibly Sub-Inspector Eglington, who served at one time at Bouliia.

Chester, H.M. 'Autobiography and Parodies'. Typescript copy. Refers to Chester's Somerset experience.

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— Report [to the Under Secretary, Home Dept, Brisbane] on the Aborigines of the Pennefather (Coen) River District and other coastal tribes occupying the country between the Batavia and Embley Rivers. Cooktown, 8 January 1900. Uncat. MS 216.

— [Report to the Commissioner of Police, Brisbane]. An Account of the Kokomini Aborigines, occupying the country drained by the Middle Palmer River.

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Cooktown, June 1889. Uncat. Ms 216.

— Scientific Report (to the Under Secretary, Brisbane) on the natives of the (lower) Tully River: with an appendix. Cooktown, 20 September 1900. Uncat. Ms 216. Towns & Co. Papers. Papers 1829-1940, including personal papers of Robert Towns, Sir Alexander Stuart and W.E. Wilson.

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### *James Cook University of North Queensland*

Cunningham, M.W. 'The Pioneering of the River Burdekin'. Original in the possession of Mr E. Cunningham, Strathmore Station, Collinsville, Queensland. This article contains some factual errors of the early settlement at Bowen but gives a good and, seemingly, faithful impression of pioneering.

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Loos, N.A. *The Aboriginal Citizen. Some Aspects of Queensland Native Policy 1859-1967*. Second year honours research essay, History Department of James Cook University, 1967.

McIntosh, A. *Racism: The Queensland Experience. Some Aspects of Queensland Legislation, 1897 to 1971*. Second year honours research essay, History Department of James Cook University, 1973.

Matthews, A. *Archibald Meston: The Man 'who has had considerable experience with aboriginals'*. Second year honours research essay, History Department of James Cook University, 1972.

### *Other Manuscripts*

Anning, R.H. *Sun on the Right*. Unpublished typed manuscript, narrating the pioneering experiences of the Anning family. Now in possession of Anning Family, Townsville.

Bowen Historical Society, *Collected manuscripts of lectures presented to the society*.

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### III. Official documents

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 1879 Pearl-shell and Bêche-de-mer Fishery Bill which was withdrawn;  
 1881 Pearl-shell and Bêche-de-mer Fishery Bill;  
 1884 Native Labourers Protection Bill;  
 1897 Aborigines Protection and Restriction of the Sale of Opium Act.  
 After 1885, the Aboriginal missions, welfare and Native Police estimates in the debate on 'supply' are valuable for the study of the evolution of government policy.
- Queensland Journals of the Legislative Council.  
 Queensland Government Gazette.

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### IV. Newspapers

#### Abbreviations

JC	James Cook University of North Queensland.
m	microfilm.
Q Parl	Queensland Parliamentary Library.
QSL	Queensland State Library.
VSL	Victorian State Library.

Examined closely for the dates indicated.

*Argus* (Melbourne), September 1891; May 1892. V.S.L.

*Cairns Post*, 1884-1893. V.S.L. *Morning Post* (Cairns) premises.

*Charters Towers Mining Standard*, 1896-7. V.S.L.

*Charters Towers Times*, 1888-91. Q.S.L.

*Cooktown Courier*, 1874-79. Q Parl. 1888-95. V.S.L.

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Dr Noel Loos is Senior Lecturer in Aboriginal Education at the Townsville College of Advanced Education. He is also director of the Aboriginal and Islander Teacher Education Program which has resulted in about 12 per cent of the on-campus enrolment at the College being Aboriginal or Islander.

Dr Loos, a North Queenslander himself, has lived and worked in the area he writes about. His aim in his book is to determine the truth of the history of the white 'invasion' of Queensland, not only to illustrate the broad theme of the history of European-Aboriginal relations but also to assist Queenslanders to understand why today Aborigines are endeavouring to obtain a fairer settlement than that dictated by force of arms at the time of white settlement.



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